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ABSTRACT 
Did the civil war in North Yemen during the 1960s ‘make’ the new Yemeni state? If it did, how 
did it do so, and what was the nature of the state it made? To answer these questions, the 
thesis draws on hitherto untapped Egyptian and German archival material. It develops a 
model of the specific and contingent processes linking practices of civil war to state formation 
outcomes and uses the model to trace the processes whereby war (trans)formed the state.  
The thesis reveals dynamics of state formation that have been hitherto neglected or 
misunderstood during this decisive episode of Yemen’s history. Wartime violence and the 
practices associated with its mobilisation, administration, and financing shifted the political 
settlement of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). The prominence of tribal leaders during the 
1980s and 1990s and the concomitant tribalisation of the military and militarisation of the 
tribes are shown to be outcomes of the civil war. Similarly, the investigation reveals a 
dramatic and largely untold fiscal transformation of the YAR during the 1960s, which meant 
that government income came to rely primarily on external donors. Finally, the war, or rather 
the practices associated with it, altered the very idea of political order in North Yemen 
between 1962 and 1970. Spurred by competition for public support, elite discourses 
converged around the rhetorical commonplaces of modernity, development and the people. 
Although fragmentary and contradictory, these new commonplaces all privileged the central 
state as an actor and addressee of claims.  
In addition to these insights into the specific legacies of the civil war, the thesis uses points of 
disagreement and slippage between the model and the rarely studied case of Yemen to 
problematise and suggest additions to the literatures on civil war, state building, and state 
formation. 
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Transliteration loosely follows the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES), while 
erring towards full transliteration. While adopting the IJMES conventions around common 
words, places, and names outside North Yemen, I have opted for full transliteration of 
personal names and places connected to what became the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), 
following many a frustrating attempt to match people and places from the Arabic literature 
with their transliterated alter-egos. I have also fully transliterated all Arabic sources.   
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PROLOGUE 
The revolution and civil war in North Yemen in the 1960s marked a watershed moment in 
Yemen’s history, yet it remains poorly studied and misunderstood. Before delving into the 
arguments of the thesis proper, it may be useful to introduce the dramatis personae and to 
summarise the plot. 
The war occurred in north Yemen, whose borders with British-controlled south Yemen and 
with north Yemen’s northern neighbour, Saudi Arabia, had been internationally agreed in the 
1930s. At the beginning of 1962, north Yemen was known as the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of 
Yemen and was ruled by Imam Yaḥiyā Ḥamīd al-Dīn. Ḥamīd al-Dīn rule had been facing 
growing opposition from a range of social forces and was finally cut short by a military coup 
in September 1962, remembered in Yemen as the September Revolution. The ensuing civil 
war pitted the republicans, who overthrew the Imam, against the royalists, who supported 
the restoration of the Ḥamīd al-Dīn dynasty.  
The royalists comprised the Ḥamīd al-Dīn family and many former high-ranking officials and 
leading local notables, particularly from families that suffered executions, saw their lands 
confiscated, or lost positions of influence in the first weeks of republican rule. The royalists 
also drew on tribal support, in particular from the Bakīl tribal confederation. Geographically, 
their support was concentrated in the highland north of the country.  
The republicans had broad popular support in the central highlands of Yemen around Taʿiz 
and ʾIbb, in the Tihāma, and among Shāfiʿī merchants. At their head were military officers 
trained abroad, nationalist intellectuals, lowland traders, and tribal opponents to the Imam -- 
an initial alliance between highland and lowland enemies of the Ḥamīd al-Dīn royal family, 
which began to break down in the course of the war.  
Within this unravelling alliance there were, on the one hand, those ‘radical republicans,’ 
within the terminology of republican politics, who sought to re-make or at least significantly 
reform Yemeni society in-line with the ideals of Arab Socialism. They refused status 
distinctions on the basis of sect or north Yemen’s traditional status hierarchy and, at least 
rhetorically, aspired to equal citizenship, land redistribution, and nationalisation. These 
groups were concentrated in the officer corps or organised around the main Arab political 
parties of the day – Nasserist, Baʿathist, and Arab Nationalist. They organised as a clandestine 
network of plotters before the overthrow of the Imam and became institutionalised in the 
committees and hierarchies of the republican state after 1962. They were united by their 
centre of gravity in lower Yemen and their outsider status: many of their leaders hailed from 
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outside the circles of Yemen’s traditional elites. They were the main beneficiaries of Egyptian 
support. 
On the other hand, there were those republicans dubbed ‘moderate’ by their supporters and 
‘dissident’ (munashiqūn) by their opponents. Though the moderate republican leaders had 
hardly been at the pinnacle of the Imamic state, they were culturally and educationally 
products of the Imamate, often hailed from well-known tribal or learned families, and drew 
their support from their religious learning, their patronage networks, and their positions of 
prominence in tribes, towns, or villages. More invested in the status quo, they tended to 
invoke liberal ideas of progress, Yemeni nationalism, and the ideas of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, while hoping to keep more far-reaching social change at bay. They aimed to 
overthrow the Imamate and to replace it with a mode of notable-based representative rule, 
seeking modernisation and improved standards of living largely within the framework of the 
traditional social order. They played an important role at the local level of republican politics 
and organised nationally through a series of tribal peace conferences during which they built 
support for their anti-Imamate and anti-Egyptian position. 
Inside Yemen, tribal dynamics played a central role during the war. Two of northern Yemen’s 
main tribal confederations, Bakīl and Ḥāshid, were a crucial source of military power for both 
of the contending sides. Both were split in terms of their political alignment. However, most 
of the tribes associated with Bakīl backed the royalists throughout most of the war. 
Meanwhile, the paramount shaykh of Ḥāshid supported the overthrow of the Imam and did 
much to push tribes affiliated with the Ḥāshid confederation into the republican camp. On 
the whole, the revolution was more popular among shaykhs, including important Bakīl 
leaders, than amongst tribesmen, yet the tribal politics of alignment during the war were 
complex. Tribes and sub-tribes were split in their allegiance and frequently changed sides. 
Ultimately, the war was to substantially re-draw the political role of tribal leaders and the 
relations between tribal leaders and ordinary members of tribes.  
In terms of the broader politics of the Middle East during the 1960s, the civil war in Yemen 
became the ‘hot’ flashpoint for the regional Cold War between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The 
Egyptian leadership, seeking to export its Nasserist revolution, to gain access to oil rents, and 
to overthrow the region’s remaining monarchies (Saudi Arabia first and foremost), supported 
the republicans. They saw the Imamate in Yemen as the weakest link—the chink in the 
armour of the Arab Peninsula’s monarchies. They believed that if the Imam could be toppled 
in Yemen, the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates, and other monarchs would soon 
fall too. As a result, they supported the republicans. In a classic case of mission creep, the 
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initial symbolic Egyptian deployment of troops eventually turned into a full-blown 
occupation, with some 70,000 soldiers and hundreds of civilian advisors. The Egyptian 
intervention left a lasting mark on emerging Yemeni military and civilian government 
institutions. The USSR also actively supported the Republicans and became, after Egyptian 
withdrawal in 1967, the main supporter of the Republican cause alongside Syria and Algeria, 
who also stepped in after Egyptian withdrawal. 
The Saudi royal family was deeply worried about an Egyptian military presence and an 
Egyptian-supported client state on its southern border and provided substantial funding for 
the royalist war effort, purchased arms for the royalists, and paid for British and French 
mercenaries to train the royalist militaries. As the Saudi system of payments evolved and 
became institutionalised, it laid the foundations for Saudi Arabian sponsorship of Yemeni 
tribal leaders and politicians and institutionalised Saudi Arabia’s deepening involvement in 
the internal politics of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). Alongside Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan, 
Great Britain, France, and Israel lent varying levels of clandestine or official support to the 
royalist cause. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
“Yemen went out of the darkness and into the light” (al-Maqāliḥ, 1987, p.136) 
The revolution of 26 September 1962 and the ensuing civil war in North Yemen between 
royalists and republicans constituted, according to much of the Yemeni historiography, a 
momentous transition from ‘darkness’ to ‘light’ and from ‘backwardness’ to ‘modernity.’ It 
was the revolution that gave birth to the modern Yemeni state and unleashed rapid 
economic development.1  
This historiography appears to support the claims of war-centred accounts of state formation. 
There is a tendency to reduce this literature to Charles Tilly’s (1992, 1985, 1978) explorations 
of state formation in early modern Europe. Yet, writers stressing how the establishment of 
monopolies on the use of force and taxation were intimately bound up with the struggle of 
revolutionary or incumbent rulers against domestic competitors and foreign rivals have 
looked, inter alia, to twentieth century Russia and China (Skocpol, 1979), nineteenth century 
Latin America (Centeno, 2002; Lopez-Alves, 2000), and contemporary Afghanistan (Giustozzi, 
2009). There is also a partially forgotten nineteenth and early twentieth century tradition of 
scholarship, encompassing such figures as Franz Oppenheimer, Georges Sorel, Georg Simmel, 
and Vilfredo Pareto, who analysed and sometimes glorified the way political order and the 
state emerged through war and violence.2 Their common claim is that war making and state 
making are intimately intertwined, though they by no means suggest that the states wars 
make are identical. These writers have focused on both international and domestic wars, 
suggesting that “statemaking and what we now call ‘internal war’ are two sides of the same 
coin” (Ayoob, 1998, p.42).3  
The celebration of the revolution in Yemeni historical writing and the broader arguments of 
war-centred accounts of state formation stand in contrast to a literature from the 1990s and 
2000s on the relationship between violent conflict and state fragility and failure. This 
literature stresses that war, particularly internal war in the contemporary developing world, 
                                                          
 
1 Since “revolution” (thawra) is by far the dominant label given to the events of September 1962 in the 
Arabic-language literature, I, too, use it, without making a classificatory claim.  
2 For a recent discussion see: Malešević, 2010; also: Oppenheimer, 1907; Peter, 1996. 
3 Other war-centric accounts of state formation have argued that civil wars and interstate wars have 
opposite effects e.g.: Herbst, 2004, pp.310–311; Kasfir, 2004.  
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unmakes the state. This perspective has its roots in liberal views of war as (only) dangerous 
and destructive and has been particularly evident in policy centred work, which has claimed 
that civil wars result from and contribute directly to state weakness, fragility, or failure 
(OECD, 2008; USAID, 2005; Rotberg, 2004; World Bank, 2002). Because of a limited 
engagement with the actual historical trajectories of state formation at different times and in 
different parts of the world, these accounts arguably miss the centrality of violence, 
particularly internal violence, for the establishment and reproduction of states. A second, 
partially overlapping literature has stressed that wars now unmake states because of the 
radically different nature of the contemporary world since the end of the Cold War. Because 
of changing norms of sovereignty, changing patterns of international trade, investment and 
exploitation, and changing technologies of violence, wars have become new wars, states have 
become quasi-states, and civil wars now unravel the state (Jackson, 1990; Kaldor, 2013, 1999; 
Leander, 2004). 
The present inquiry begins from this puzzle: do conflicts within the bounds of internationally 
recognised states support the centralising processes associated with state-formation; or do 
they undermine and weaken them? And what of the civil war in Yemen during the 1960s? Did 
war make the new Yemeni state? If so, how did it do so and what was the nature of the state 
it made?  
In answering these questions, the study departs from much of the writing on the impact of 
civil war on the state by subjecting the central terms to an interrogation that has been too 
frequently absent. It applies insights from the literature on political settlements in order to 
trouble unitary conceptions of the state and to unpick the complex of practices, power 
relations, and ideas that produce the state. It also investigates definitions and typologies of 
civil war to ultimately draw attention to the practices that compose internal conflict, rather 
than focusing on the classifications of international law, the coding rules of international 
datasets, the resources underpinning conflict, or belligerents’ and experts’ claims about their 
causes and framings. These analytical moves help to decentre the analysis and reveal the 
multiple linkages between the compound and sometimes fuzzy concepts at the heart of the 
investigation. This allows the thesis to trace the varied, but specific linkages between the 
practices of internal war, shifts in social power, the creation of state institutions, and the 
production of ideas of coherent domination. This allows the argument to move beyond the 
conclusion that there is “no single unambiguous causal relation between states and wars” 
(Schlichte, 2003, p.38) and to illuminate the multiple, contextual, contingent, yet recurrent, 
causal relations between them. Throughout, the argument is based on a view of war and 
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violence as productive. This does not imply that the products of violence are good things, but 
that conflict produces and defines political order.  
The following chapters use process tracing to examine the transformations linked to the 
1960s civil war in Yemen. This reveals the wartime origins of central features of the YAR, 
providing a hitherto missing account of how these defining features of the YAR state took 
shape. The centrality of the civil war for state formation in North Yemen has previously been 
almost wholly overlooked and the formation of the YAR state more broadly has remained 
understudied and misunderstood.  
The process tracing reveals how the civil war in Yemen produced new power relations that 
favoured the belligerents and left them to dominate the peace, allowing military officers and 
the tribal leaders who backed the republic to dominate the political settlement into the 21st 
century. The war also re-fashioned the relationship of formal central and informal local 
institutions. The model of state building Egyptian experts and military planners applied to 
Yemen combined with Cold-War era international rents and the projects of emerging Yemeni 
technocratic elites to rapidly expand central ministries. These ministries and other 
government institutions became focal points for domestic lobbying and international 
cooperation and produced constituencies with vested interests in their continued existence 
and expansion. At the same time, wartime dislocations and the ways in which the war directly 
fed the growing power of local, especially tribal, strongmen, meant that these central 
ministries could not regulate the local institutions they theoretically sat atop of, except by 
providing and withholding funding and through alliances with local power brokers. This mode 
of integration defined the limited power of the central YAR state and has structured how it 
has come apart in the 2010s, when rent flows slowed.  
In addition, the war, or rather Egyptian intervention, directly caused a fiscal reorientation of 
the central state from domestic extraction to international rents, thereby transforming lines 
of accountability and dependence and reorienting the domestic political economy around the 
pursuit of international aid. The war thus made the fiscal basis of the new Yemen Arab 
Republic (YAR) and defined its externally-orientated political economy. Finally, mobilising for 
war and rivalry between royalists and republicans for domestic support and international 
backing produced a convergence of ideas of the state around a set of modernist and 
nationalist rhetorical commonplaces: the war produced a language of politics in which 
sovereignty resides with ‘the people,’ but in which the people were imagined in partially 
tribal terms; unity and economic modernisation became the agreed goal of government, but 
both were initially imagined as prerogatives of the military.  
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Of these important and defining changes, only the growing role of tribal leaders has been 
examined in any detail to date. The thesis thus provides an account of institutional change 
and state formation that is substantively new. It adds a hitherto entirely missing account of 
how the fiscal basis of the YAR state emerged and was shaped by the war; reinterprets how 
new government institutions were formed and articulated with pre-existing institutions; adds 
detail and nuance to existing accounts of the impact of the war on the political settlement; 
and systematises accounts of changes in ideas, relating them clearly to shifts in social power 
and changes in institutions. 
While the main contribution is thus to understanding the civil war in North Yemen in the 
1960s and its legacies, the process tracing also helps to solve the broader puzzle sketched 
above and to identify and explain the causal linkages between civil war and state formation 
more broadly, beyond the doubtlessly true, but ultimately unsatisfying, conclusion that there 
is no single causal relationship or universal covering law connecting the two. Without falling 
into determinism, it reveals the central importance of wartime mobilising and funding 
strategies, and the decisive, if often unintended and counterproductive, role of external 
intervention as the main drivers of change. Ultimately, this approach to studying the civil war 
in Yemen reveals four limitations of much of the literature on civil war. The conclusion 
returns to these points in more detail. 
First, the experience of Yemen during the 1960s highlights the central importance of external 
intervention while revealing that most of its impact operates via unintended effects. 
Interveners decisively define wartime dynamics, yet rarely get their way. Paradoxically, the 
opposite view defines the literature: much writing on civil wars continues to neglect 
intervention, at best treating internationalisation as a variable or looking at ways intervention 
shapes the calculations of domestic actors. Conversely, much of the literature focused 
explicitly on intervention continues to over-estimate the ability of interveners to reshape 
institutions and societies. The case of Yemen suggests the importance of placing intervention 
and the connections between domestic and international politics front and centre in 
scholarship on civil war and underscores the utility of an emerging research agenda on the 
unintended consequences of external state building and intervention. 
Second, the chapters below reveal at every turn the limits of constructing a political economy 
of conflict that abstracts from the specific politics of domestic alliances. It underscores the 
importance of recent calls to bring politics back in to the study of conflict, while questioning 
whether recent moves to do so via ‘ideology’ can be effective. Instead, it makes the case for 
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taking seriously historically and geographically specific political settlements and the thick 
alliances they bring with them: the personal connections of cohort, family, and faction.  
Third, the fiscal transformation of the Yemen Arab Republic during the civil war highlights 
that the growing literature on state formation and established attempts to think about ‘state 
strength’ in fiscal terms must take the ways in which government spending can at least 
partially substitute for direct control far more seriously. With regard to post-conflict state 
building, thinking about taxation and the fiscal underpinnings of the state at all is recent and 
remains underdeveloped. Thinking about taxation in conjunction with spending and taking 
seriously the effects of neopatrimonial strategies of allocation and patronage on state 
formation remains almost wholly absent. Yet the case highlights the central role of such 
strategies and underscores that more work is needed in this area. 
Fourth, the shifting role of Yemen’s tribes and tribal leaders reveals that tribal logics need not 
be, in fact were not, antithetical to ‘the state,’ so much as providing a particular vision of 
state authority. Despite a surge of interest in ‘hybrid’ and ‘local’ forms of governance over 
the past decade, there is an enduring belief in ‘state’ institutions as at least distinct from, if 
not opposite or antithetical to, ‘social’ institutions. The case reveals that not only that this 
assumption should be relaxed but shows that dynamics often postulated as being a matter of 
‘either-or’, may sometimes more fruitfully be thought of in terms of combining and 
intertwining. 
The remainder of this chapter develops the central questions and concepts and explains why 
we should be interested in them both from the perspective of Yemen as well as the thematic 
perspective of literatures concerned with the relationship between violent conflict and state 
formation. Section 1.1 presents the existing work on the civil war in North Yemen. It 
highlights the centrality of the war for the formation of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and 
suggests that past explorations, while forming an essential point of departure, have left 
significant gaps that warrant further consideration. The questions animating the exploration 
of the case – whether war made the new Yemeni state, how did it do so, and what the nature 
of the state it made was – have received only passing attention and, at best, partial and 
contradictory answers.  
Section 1.2 further develops the central puzzle from the perspective of thematic literatures 
exploring the relationship between violence and social order. It argues that much of the 
existing work on the relationship between violent conflict and state formation gets stuck in a 
conceptual dead end when it treats both civil war and the state as single and straightforward 
concepts. Instead, they are composite and complex, and Section 1.3 develops an alternative 
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way to think about these central terms and their potential relationship. Investigating the 
impact of civil war on state formation requires understanding civil war in terms of a recurring 
but variable set of practices. The most important of these practices centre on mobilisation, 
financing, territorial control, and maintaining or creating elite bargains. It is these practices, 
not some abstraction called ‘war,’ that transform, reproduce, or undermine political order. 
Similarly, the state is not usefully conceptualised as a singular thing. The division between 
‘state’ and ‘society,’ the relative power of institutions, the political settlement on which it is 
based, and the rhetorical commonplaces that legitimate political domination are sites of 
ongoing and constitutive conflicts that bring the state itself into being. 
Taking the re-conceptualisation of civil war and the state from Section 1.3 as its point of 
departure, Chapter 2 develops a methodology for probing their relationship. It introduces 
process tracing, presents how it can help resolve the central puzzle by drawing on hitherto 
untapped material from the Egyptian National Archives and the German Foreign Ministry 
Archives, and explains why the royalist-republican civil war in Yemen is a suitable case. The 
bulk of the chapter is devoted to developing the model that guides the remainder of the 
inquiry. Having reframed the central terms of ‘civil war’ and ‘the state’ in Chapter 1 allows 
the model to draw on a variety of rich, grounded research into such issues as the micro-
dynamics of conflict, the development of wartime institutions, and the logics of violence in 
civil war, rather than needing to rely on general accounts of the relationship between civil 
war and state formation. The model draws on these literatures to specify the linkages 
between civil war and state formation. Starting from three recurrent features of civil war, the 
model proposes rival pathways with differing, often opposite outcomes on state formation. 
Its purpose is not to generate predictions. As the model itself serves to highlight, the links 
between wartime practices and state effects are potentially contradictory as well as being 
contextual and contingent. Rather, the model provides the framework for the subsequent 
analysis. It highlights what practices, specifically, we should be looking at and the causal 
connections between them and state formation understood in terms of changes in the 
political settlement, government institutions, and ideas of the state.  
Chapters 4 to 7 form the empirical heart of the thesis, exploring developments during the civil 
war in Yemen through the analytical lens of the model. Chapter 3 lays the groundwork, 
detailing the status quo ante bellum by presenting the political settlement of the Imamate, 
the institutions of the Imamic state, and the foundations of the Imams’ claims to legitimacy. 
Each of the following chapters takes up one aspect of this tripartite division, exploring the 
transformations associated with the civil war through the model. Each probes to what extent 
the model accurately captures not only what changes occurred, but how they did, and 
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suggests alternative explanations where the model – and by extension the literatures it draws 
on – falls short. Chapter 4 explores changes to the political settlement wrought by the war, 
Chapter 5 investigates changes to formal institutions, and Chapter 6 investigates the role of 
the conflict in shifting ideas of the state. These chapters illuminate in far more detail than 
currently available a central episode in Yemen’s modern history, demonstrate the model’s 
utility for revealing processes of state formation that have been hitherto neglected or 
misunderstood, and suggest how a careful consideration of the case of Yemen nuances and 
inflects existing literatures on state formation and civil war.  
1.1 Blanks in the historiography of Yemen 
Our understanding of North Yemen’s modern history and of state formation in the YAR 
remains patchy. There is a longstanding tendency in more general treatments of the state in 
the Middle East to either ignore the experience of Yemen or to view the state in North Yemen 
as altogether absent or non-existent (e.g. Anderson, 1987, p.3), although this tendency has 
been attenuated since Yemeni unification in 1990 (Dresch, 1993a, p.67). Writing in European 
languages specifically focused on the development of state institutions in North Yemen has 
generally bracketed the civil war, social upheaval, and external intervention that marked the 
1960s in Yemen, declaring it a period of disorder and ‘development in reverse.’ Studies of the 
war, by contrast, have largely ignored questions of state formation and longer-term social 
and political change. Both literatures have paid insufficient attention to the way the civil war 
determined the winners and losers who shaped – or did not shape – Yemeni politics through 
the 1980s at least. 
To date, studies of Yemen’s civil war from 1962-1970 have been journalistic and heavy on 
battles, military leaders, and peace negotiations, with some of the main studies written as 
fighting continued (Deffarge and Troeller, 1969; O’Ballance, 1971; Schmidt, 1968; Wenner, 
1967). Since then, much of the writing on the civil war has been concerned with the foreign 
policies of the great powers and regional actors with interests in Yemen. Important recent 
studies include work on the impact of the Yemen war on Egyptian politics and Egypt’s 
regional standing (Ferris, 2012; Ḥajjāj, 2014), the internal politics of British support to the 
royalists (Jones, 2004), and the evolution of great power politics towards the Yemen war 
(Orkaby, 2014). These join an established literature with a similar focus on the Egyptian 
presence in Yemen (ʾAḥmad, 1981; al-Bayḍānī, 1993; Dawisha, 1975; Rahmy, 1983; ʾAḥmad, 
1992), Soviet and US policy towards Yemen (Page, 1985; Al-Madhagi, 1995), and a limited 
literature on Saudi Arabia’s evolving perceptions of and policy towards the conflict (Badeeb, 
1986; Gause, 1990). However, with few exceptions, Yemen is only of coincidental interest to 
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these studies. Instead, they seek to unpick the relationship between different centres of 
power in the setting of Egyptian, Saudi, American, British, or Soviet foreign policy or aim to 
understand the impact of engagement in Yemen on shifting policies towards the region. As a 
result, they often have little to say about developments in Yemen itself. 
In Yemen, the civil war and its role in state formation has received more attention, but the 
centrality of the ‘September Revolution’ to the modern mythology of the Yemen Arab 
Republic and the Republic of Yemen after 1990 has perhaps restricted the space available for 
scholars to critically interrogate the episode and its legacy. Much of the literature produced 
in Yemen has tended towards hagiography, celebrating the ‘revolution’ as a broad-based 
popular movement (al-ʾAshwal, 2001, p.11) and a transformative “social revolution” 
(Zabarah, 1984) that brought Yemen “out of the Middle Ages” (al-ʿĀlam, 1987, p.135; also: al-
Ḥulwa, 1987; al-Maqramī, 1991; in a more careful and circumscribed register: Zabarah, 1982; 
al-Abiadh, 1984).  
By contrast, much of the literature available in European languages has either ignored the 
impact of the war4 or taken a dim view of the civil war’s role in state formation as a period of 
frozen development and retrogression, identifying the 1970s as the true period of 
institutional change. These authors insist that only after the end of the civil war “could the 
first foundations of a modern, effective state be established” (Peterson, 1986, p.xiii) because 
the war “put much state-building and socioeconomic development on hold” (Burrowes, 2009, 
“Yemeni civil war;” also: Burrowes, 1987; Peterson, 1984, 1982).5 Interestingly, the Arabic 
and non-Arabic literatures thus reproduce the debate between the state making and state 
breaking effects of civil war outlined at the beginning of this chapter and investigated in the 
next section. That is, to the extent that this critical moment has been studied at all, it has 
                                                          
 
4 This appears true for the study of the Middle East more broadly, despite Steven Heydemann (2000, 
p.3) noting some years ago that “lack of attention to war in statemaking is puzzling” in literature on the 
region. 
5 This is also the default position of scholars who do not explore the period directly (Rabi, 2015, p.xvi; 
Swagman, 1988a, p.1). An exception are the revisionist claims of Orkaby that the civil war “helped 
further the establishment of a modern political bureaucracy, a national army, and an increase in 
revenue with the expansion of existing taxation and the postal networks (Orkaby, 2014, pp.10–11). 
While the first part of this statement is almost certainly true, the claims about revenue and taxation, as 
we will see in Chapter 5, are less compelling. 
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involved a sort of dialogue of the deaf between scholars writing in Arabic about the civil war 
as a period of rapid modernisation and revolution and a largely English-language literature 
that has argued, or simply assumed, that war and state formation do not mix. An exploration 
of Yemeni state formation during this period thus promises to contribute significantly to our 
understanding of a critical and under-studied episode in Yemen’s history. 
Attempts to take the civil war seriously as a transformative period that shaped institutions 
and the relative influence of different power brokers, without falling directly into hagiography 
and mistaking grand plans and pronouncements for actual change, are rare. In an important 
study that has not yet reached beyond a German-speaking audience, Mohamed El-Azzazi 
(1978, e.g. p.106) highlights that the civil war not only marked a decisive period in the 
political development of Yemen but changed the balance of political power and hence 
influenced the formal development of institutions as well as their functioning. Paul Dresch’s 
(2000) history of modern Yemen crams much that is useful and rings true in its short chapter 
on the civil war and his earlier work explores the legacies of the civil war on the relationship 
between tribes and the central state in some detail (Dresch, 1993b, 1984). The most recent 
work on the civil war makes a similar point, arguing that “the trajectory of contemporary 
Yemen was set during the 1960s, and it is still playing out today” (Johnsen, 2017, p.189). 
Johnsen’s is one of the first English-language monographs on the civil war to seriously engage 
with the complicated elite politics of the war and insist on Yemeni agency. However, its 
central claim that the defining legacy of the civil war was a sort of crisis of identity around the 
question of what it meant to be Zaydī without an Imam, is only partially convincing.6 It is 
perhaps a missed opportunity that a study surveying Yemen’s long 20th century from 1914 to 
2014 finds little to say about the ways in which the civil war may have paved the way for a 
succession of military officers and tribal leaders to dominate YAR politics, how it shaped 
government dependence on external funding, or how it influenced institutional legacies.  
1.2  (Mis)understanding the link between civil war and state-formation  
The discussion above suggests that the literature on Yemen partially reproduces a broader 
puzzle: scholars insisting on the way in which the war ‘froze’ development espouse views akin 
                                                          
 
6 The study’s silence on the period between 1970 and the mid-1980s sits uneasily with other attempts 
to understand Zaydī revivalism in Yemen in the context of Saudi Arabian proselytising, the complex 
politics of the Salafi movement in Yemen, the evolution of the ʾIṣlāḥ party, or the doctrinal debates of 
the 1990s. See e.g.: Bonnefoy, 2011; Brandt, 2017; vom Bruck, 1999.  
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to those found in a literature that identifies civil war with state fragility and failure. Those 
that celebrate the ‘September Revolution’ as a period of significant and enduring 
transformation are not far from those who insist on the close relationship between war 
making and state making.  
One attempt to resolve the apparent paradox between these literatures has been to ‘test’ the 
state making and state breaking effects of civil war. After brief discussions of Tilly’s work, 
often reduced to what Tilly himself once called a “cartoon history” of early modern Europe 
(Tilly, 1992, p.206),7 these authors tend to test the proposition that war makes states by 
running regressions for various groups of countries with war or civil war as the independent 
variable and state strength as the dependent variable. Such tests have been conducted for a 
number of regions and with slightly differing specifications of how state making and 
unmaking might be measured (e.g. Chowdhury and Murshed, 2014; Lu and Thies, 2013; Thies, 
2005; Schwarz, 2012). Overall, they suggest that civil war weakens states measured in terms 
of the ratio of tax to GDP.8 Yet, in addition to a number of potential technical issues,9 there is 
a marked lack of engagement in this literature with the central variables ostensibly of interest 
and often less still with the mechanisms connecting them. This is a concern, since, as we will 
see below, it is likely that ‘civil war’ as well as ‘the state’ are not so much things in themselves 
                                                          
 
7 Tilly was wary of taking the European historical experience as a straightforward model, warning 
against inferring sequences, stages, or probable events. At the same time, he argued for the enduring 
importance of war for defining state structures and the utility of exploring them in comparative 
perspective (Tilly, 1975, p.82, 1992, pp.193–197).  
8 This is by no means an unreasonable choice of single indicator, though it is not clear why a single 
indicator is appropriate, since state strength or capacity – to the extent that this is a useful 
conceptualisation of the state at all (compare 1.3.2 below) – appears to be a multi-dimensional 
measure (Hendrix, 2010).  
9 They have generally not engaged with evidence from studies of civil war onset that coding decisions 
about civil war can have substantial impacts on findings (Sambanis, 2004), with evidence that GDP data 
is highly unreliable (Jerven, 2013), or with arguments that missing data may be systematically absent: 
“For it is in the nature of things that [the quality of] state-performance information is directly 
proportional to the level of development and the strength of the state” (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2009, p.9). 
Moreover, as Bruce Porter (1994, pp.11–17) points out, Europe went from having 500 states in 1500 to 
25 in 1900. Running regressions on the data might show that war makes states fail or disappear – 
which it did; except for the successful ones, whose structures it decisively shaped.  
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as attempts to analytically bracket a set of processes or practices. Similarly, lack of 
engagement with the mechanisms connecting the two leads to propositions that suggest that 
“following the Tillyan approach” means that “we would expect the emergence of an 
institutionally strong state in those states that experienced war-making” and weak states in 
those without war (Schwarz, 2012, p.7). 
War as a necessary and sufficient condition for state strength, is, of course, not the argument 
advanced by Tilly and many of the more thoughtful attempts to explore the relationship 
between civil war and state formation have taken his arguments – and those of others – 
more seriously.10  War making in early modern Europe pace Tilly was state making to the 
extent that consolidating power against internal and external rivals required large standing 
armies, which in turn required bureaucracies for logistics and supply and large amounts of 
capital. Taxation and borrowing from creditors11 required still more sophisticated 
bureaucracies as well as bargains with the holders of capital. The paradoxical outcome was 
that – given the technologies of violence, the nature of inter-state competition, the 
distribution of capital, and other factors that a student of the longue durée like Tilly was well-
aware were historically specific – war within and between states created standing armies, 
sophisticated centralised bureaucracies, and, increasingly, civilian control over the state (Tilly, 
1992, 1985, 1978).12  
Spelled out in these terms, the question becomes whether the proposed mechanisms linking 
war to standing armies, armies to bureaucracies, and bureaucracies to bargaining still hold, or 
whether different domestic conditions and changed international contexts mean that they 
                                                          
 
10 The more war you put in, the more state you get out, is a similar simplification and appears to be the 
position of those who argue that it is the absence of war, not its changed character, that explains state 
weakness in the developing world (Herbst, 2004; Jackson, 1990; in different terms: Migdal, 1988, 
pp.273–274), or, in more nuanced terms, that ‘limited war’ made ‘limited states’ (Centeno, 2002, 1997; 
Lopez-Alves, 2000). 
11 Bargains with bankers and alliances with a rising bourgeoisie that afforded access to increasingly 
sophisticated capital markets was part of the financing story in Tilly’s terms, but these have been 
eclipsed by a focus on taxation. 
12 By contrast, Hui (2005) argues that many of the expedients adopted by rulers to make war in early 
modern Europe were in fact “self-weakening.” On this view, state making wars before mass 
conscription were rare and the European trajectory was far more contingent than generally assumed. 
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are no longer applicable. There is a significant literature from the 2000s, in particular, arguing 
that changed international conditions have undermined and reversed the logic whereby war 
made the state. 
Some have argued that the absence of international wars and external competitors has 
changed the dynamic of war making as state making. International norms of sovereignty 
mean that foreign invasions are unlikely. States have internationally agreed and largely fixed 
borders (Atzili, 2007) and are no longer in danger of suffering ‘state death’ (Fazal, 2004). As a 
result, the large armies required for interstate wars are no-longer needed and their 
centralising knock-on effects no longer hold (Kasfir, 2004; Sørensen, 2001). Instead, civil wars 
favour militias, the outsourcing of coercion to local strongmen, and deliberate strategies of 
fragmentation, which allow rulers to defeat local insurgencies while protecting them from 
concentrating too much power in the military, minimising the chance of a coup (Leander, 
2004; Reno, 1998, 2001).13 
Other authors have instead (or also) stressed changes to the international political economy 
whereby the availability of external funds from states, international financial institutions, and 
corporations undermines the link between war making, expanding bureaucracies, and 
taxation. Lootable resources, loans with attached conditionality, or geopolitical rents do not 
encourage taxation and attendant bargaining, but rather encourage privatisation of formerly 
public institutions to local warlords, predatory elites, or international investors, constituting a 
‘criminalisation’ of the state (Leander, 2004, pp.72–75; Bayart et al., 1997, p.42). Relatedly, 
there is a literature about the way domestic rulers use disorder as a way to extract external 
rents, increase profits, and enhance political control (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; on Yemen 
during the 1990s and 2000s: Phillips, 2011). In the unregulated environment of war, violence 
entrepreneurs capture increasing concentrations of power (Reno, 2001).  
These studies share the assumption that the political economy of war remains intimately 
connected to the political economy of central rule, but that how the two relate depends on 
other factors and supposes that these have changed. They form an essential point of 
departure, for they begin to engage at the level of specific mechanisms with the relationship 
between civil war and the state. Yet, they have also tended to be highly selective in their 
                                                          
 
13 Ian Lustick (1997) makes a related argument about the Middle East, analysing how European great 
powers prevented potential regional hegemons from waging war and expanding their territory. 
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focus, problematic in their conceptualisation of the central terms, and perhaps too ready to 
simply invert the war making as state making narrative.  
These studies have focused their attention almost exclusively on instances of perceived state 
‘failure,’ without investigating cases where civil war did not have the expected effect. The 
states that emerged through internal conflict in Colombia, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
or Algeria in the past three decades – or in Yemen during the 1960s – may not resemble the 
desired civilianised European end-state, yet these states are also not obviously ‘weaker’ than 
at the outset of hostilities. Although some have argued that they are ‘stronger,’14 the next 
sub-section highlights that it may be that thinking in terms of state strength and weakness at 
all – as if these were measures along a single axis, independent of expectations of what states 
should do, and of the broader balance of power within societies – is part of the problem.  
As Jonathan Di John (2010b) has highlighted, authors who are certain that war in the 
contemporary developing world un-makes the state have also been so concerned with the 
negative effects of patrimonial politics that they have been unwilling to acknowledge that 
patrimonialism is the norm in both developmental and failing states (Khan, 2007, 2010). This 
is perhaps emblematic of two further problems: First, a tendency to take the war making as 
state making narrative as the (European) norm and insist that ‘non-Europe’ can best be 
explained by the absence of factors that explain ‘positive’ outcomes in the European context 
(Heydemann, 2000, p.4). And second, a tendency not to take domestic politics seriously 
enough. This literature sees similar external pressures playing out in similar ways irrespective 
of domestic institutions and the political economy. Yet state formation implies that governing 
elites reduce the autonomy and rule-making ability, access to violence, and fiscal and other 
resources of rival domestic actors (Giustozzi, 2011a, 2011b; Schlichte, 2007) and we have 
good reasons to believe that the domestic alliances on which rule is based define in 
important measure the incentives and possibilities facing regimes (Rueschemeyer, 1991; 
North et al., 2009; Putzel and Di John, 2009; Eriksen, 2012). 
Moreover, as the discussion below highlights, there is a great deal of diversity both between 
different instances of what we refer to as ‘civil war,’ as well as between the amalgamation of 
actors, institutions, and beliefs we refer to as ‘the state.’ If this is true, then it is a problem 
that much of this literature has “not focused in a detailed fashion on actual states engaged in 
                                                          
 
14 On Algeria e.g. see: Rich, 1997; Martinez, 2000. On the central but ambivalent role of violence in 
Ethiopian and Eritrean state formation see: Clapham, 2001. 
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specific wars” (Taylor and Botea, 2008, p.33), for there are almost certainly multiple 
competing and contradictory causal pathways linking civil wars to outcomes in terms of state 
formation (see e.g. O’Kane, 2000). 
A few existing studies show how fruitful a specific focus can be. In the Middle Eastern 
context, two stand out: Michael Barnett (1993) highlights the central importance of interstate 
violence and capital accumulation for state formation in Israel and Egypt and finds evidence 
for both ‘state-strengthening’ and ‘state-weakening’ impacts of war. Whether war makes the 
state depends, in this account, on the state building strategy pursued by rulers and, 
especially, relations with domestic economic elites. Similarly, Steven Heydemann and 
contributors (2000) highlight the centrality of war making in defining distinctive institutional 
configurations, state-society relations, and techniques of governance in the Middle East, 
while highlighting that these depended both on external configurations and internal 
bargaining – conflict led to the “emergence of domestic political economies organised around 
the regional and international pursuit of strategic rents” (Heydemann, 2000, p.13). 
1.3 Towards a definition of civil war and the state 
The above discussion suggests that much hinges on how we think about the main concepts of 
interest, civil war and the state, while also suggesting that both are far from straightforward. 
They are both not so much distinct objects with clear boundaries, as compound concepts 
with fuzzy and contested limits. 
1.3.1 Civil war 
Too often, thinking about civil war and particularly about the connections between civil war 
and the state has engaged in little analysis of what civil war is and what may characterise 
phenomena labelled in this way. Yet there are, to quote the title of an influential paper, 
“conceptual and empirical complexities” involved in the definition (Sambanis, 2004). 
That is not to say the term has been poorly defined. The Uppsala Conflict Database, the 
Correlates of War, and other similar attempts to systematically collect information about 
contemporary conflict have detailed codebooks that include specific and widely-used 
definitions. For Uppsala, for instance, “internal conflict” is defined as “a form of state-based 
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armed conflict”15 that occurs between a “government”16 and a “non-governmental party,” 
“with or without external intervention”17 (Themnér, 2017, p.9). The Correlates of War calls a 
similar phenomenon “civil war,” defined as “wars involving the government of the state 
against a non-state entity” (Sarkees, 2010).18 These definitions stress the presence of conflict 
within existing internationally recognised territorial boundaries and the involvement of the 
central government. In this, they accord with a recent exploration of the history of the idea of 
civil war, focused on its evolution in Europe and the United States, that stresses the intrusion 
of armed conflict into a space previously marked by cooperation under a single authority as 
being central to thinking about civil war since the Romans coined the concept of bellum civile 
(Armitage, 2017). 
Yet, while operational definitions are widely accepted, there have been limited attempts to 
explain why and how civil wars constitute a meaningful category of things. This is potentially 
an issue because for long periods other terms, that draw attention to other features, have 
been analytically preferred. Much of the literature on conflict within the territorial confines 
of internationally recognised states throughout the Cold War period, for instance, preferred 
the vocabulary of revolution to that of civil war. Theda Skocpol’s (1979) arguments about the 
link between violent conflict and state formation focused initially on social revolutions,19 as 
did much of the work of Ted Gurr (e.g. 1988). Some recent efforts to explore the relationship 
of civil war and state formation have, as a consequence, stressed the necessity of 
distinguishing between different types of intra-state conflicts and specifically called for taking 
revolution seriously again as a category distinct from civil war (Taylor and Botea, 2008). This 
                                                          
 
15 “A contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed 
force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (Themnér, 2017, p.1). 
16 “The party controlling the capital of the state” (Themnér, 2017, p.2). 
17 This results in two possible values, either “conflict, intrastate” or “conflict, intrastate with foreign 
involvement.” 
18 For the Correlates of War, the government of the state is “those forces that were at the start of the 
war in de facto control of the nation’s institutions.” Civil war is one of three types of intra-state war in 
their coding, the other two being “regional internal war” and “inter-communal war,” both defined by 
the non-involvement of the ‘government of the state’ (Sarkees, 2010, pp.2–3). 
19 Skocpol later (1996) focused on civil war. 
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approach, of disaggregating and distinguishing different types, has also been adopted by 
those arguing that ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars follow different logics (Cederman et al., 
2013; Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Sambanis, 2001), and that secessionist conflicts, rebellions, 
and coups likely include differential dynamics and may be made more likely by different 
factors (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Kalyvas, 2005; Le Billon, 2001, 2012).  
However, not only does such a more ambitious classificatory undertaking quickly, as any 
typology must, highlight difficult liminal cases, but more fundamentally, it runs into the messy 
politics of naming that is often itself at issue in such conflicts. Civil war, as a contest between 
competing groups and political projects, has features of an essentially contested concept – 
the conflict is in part about what it will be called. Where insurgents win, they declare a 
revolution, where something resembling the status quo ante is re-established, the conflict 
becomes glossed as mere ‘troubles’ or ‘rebellion.’ The civil war in Yemen is a case in point: 
the dominant republican historiography insists that it was a revolution, while the royalist 
narrative imagined it as an Egyptian invasion. Had they been victorious, the royalists would 
likely have commemorated the war as a struggle for independence, analogous to the Imam’s 
victories over Ottoman attempts to maintain Yemen as part of the Empire. Others, taking a 
geopolitical perspective, found it politic to frame the conflict as a proxy war between Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia. The civil war label is largely one adopted by Western scholars. 
Such long running contests over the naming of specific conflicts and efforts to make 
conceptual distinctions between different types of conflicts generally classed as civil war 
suggests that there is great diversity both between different instances of what we refer to as 
civil wars and between what happens in different places and to different (types of) people 
within any given such conflict. Because of this, it may be most useful to focus at a more 
grounded level on the processes present in such conflicts and to view civil war as a form of 
violent claim making and collective action sharing features with other forms of contentious 
politics. This has become a common theme of work focusing on the micro-dynamics of 
conflict at least since Kalyvas’ (2006) important contribution (e.g. Justino et al., 2013). In this 
view, civil war is collective contentious action exhibiting high levels of coordination and in 
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which violent coercion is the main way in which power is exercised and contested – that is, 
the ‘salience of violence’ is high (Tilly, 2003).20  
Such an approach to civil war readily acknowledges the wide diversity of causes, 
consequences, forms, and objectives at work in the group of events and processes we call 
civil war. It can also deal with the fact that civil war, as a form of contention, is always about 
challenging the status quo: Insurgents claim to fight to establish or maintain a more just order 
for some fraction of the population (Jung, 2003, p.15). In this sense, it is unlikely that civil war 
has a single effect on the institutions of the state and the dominant coalitions that emerge 
from conflict. The status quo and the alternative being offered matter: What is being 
contested, by whom, against whom, and how. Insurgent aims, degrees of success, wartime 
institutional developments by both incumbents and insurgents, and the peace agreements 
that end conflict shape the political order that emerges.21  
However, such a definition also highlights that civil war is likely to exhibit important 
similarities at the meso-level (Tarrow and Tilly, 2007; Tilly, 2003). This is because as a form of 
highly coordinated collective action in which the salience of violence is high, civil war requires 
the public articulation of a challenge to the status quo and thus (1) reveals the existence of 
rivals to the dominant coalition. In addition, as a form of contention in which violent coercion 
is the main way in which power is exercised and contested, (2) civil war increases the salience 
of violence for contestation and rule maintenance. Finally, because of widespread 
coordinated violence for control of territory, population, and/or resources, (3) civil war re-
draws zones of control, with far-reaching implications for strategies of rule maintenance. 
Overlying these processes, the violence, death, and destruction of war itself is liable to cast a 
long shadow.22 That we can construct such a list of common processes operational during civil 
                                                          
 
20 While there is no obvious boundary between civil war and related phenomena, in important ways, 
political violence is not simply a continuation of non-violent contentious politics by other means 
(Rogers, 2011, p.51). 
21 Such an approach may also instil a sensible scepticism about the various efforts to pin down precise 
and consistent definitions and coding rules for civil war (Cramer, 2006, pp.57-76). 
22 Viewing civil wars in this way also alerts us to dangers of reification and glorification that have 
accompanied war, in the sense that it is only one form – and often a destructive and ineffective one – 
of claim making and collective action. At the same time, viewing civil war as a set of processes within a 
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war highlights that such wars, or rather the practices that compose them, have the potential 
to influence the state in systematic ways.  
1.3.2 The state and state formation 
Attempts to theorise the state in the fields of development and conflict studies have tended 
to focus on crises of the state in parts of the global South; crises that have typically been 
conceptualised in terms of state collapse, fragility, or weakness (Herbst, 2004; Milliken, 2003; 
Patrick, 2006; Rotberg, 2004; Zartman, 1995). Implicitly or explicitly, this literature shares a 
vision of the state as the supplier of rights and public goods and as the arena of peaceful 
democratic and market-based competition. It defines the state in terms of functions and 
determines whether states are strong or weak based on the extent to which they fulfil these 
functions. Where this notion of the state is made explicit, we are offered lists of state 
functions – to supply public goods, provide social welfare, encourage civility, or give citizens 
the right to vote – whether codified as ten such functions (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008) or a 
more compact four (Levi, 2002; Zürcher, 2007). 
Arguably, this literature has courted tautology,23 is characterised by serious confusion 
between the concept of state weakness and its consequences (see e.g. Woodward, 2017, 
pp.11-25), and, more broadly, is orientated towards externally imposed criteria and 
suppresses power, politics, and history. The analysis relies on categories that are “subjective, 
arbitrary and externally imposed,” to borrow from Kriger’s (2003, p.11) assessment of 
peacebuilding criteria; for the functions of the state are derived from a particular historical 
notion of the state, which itself has always been something of an idealisation. Indeed, for 
decades after Weber (1980) formulated his thoughts on the state, even in the most powerful 
states, the legitimate use of force was not only exercised, but successfully claimed, by party 
and private militias, vigilantes, and by private security and detective companies like the 
Pinkertons (O’Hara, 2016).  
When trying to evaluate whether the state is strong or weak from the perspective of state 
functions, practical difficulties, surrounding the choice of indicators, quality of data, and 
                                                                                                                                                                        
 
continuum of political violence and collective action highlights its political nature and cautions against 
the similarly reifying demonization of any violent challenge to the status quo. 
23 For instance, in defining ‘weak states’ as ones that have ‘weak political institutions’ (Vallings and 
Torres, 2005). 
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issues of aggregation, abound (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2009). Major theoretical difficulties 
accompany them. Thinking about the state in terms of functions by its nature requires a 
(normative) theory of what states should do, an account of the boundaries between the state 
and society, and a theory of how the state should be doing the things states are supposed to 
do. None of these are unproblematic, as the ‘third wave’ of state theorising underscored 
(Jessop, 2001; Migdal, 2001; Mitchell, 2006, 2002, 1991).24 Moreover, such thinking about the 
state is blind to the identity of powerful actors and the very different political orders implied 
by different dominant coalitions. 
Rather, to understand how civil war influences the state, we must approach the state through 
the prism of state formation: exploring the often contradictory historical processes by which 
certain types of centralised political order have come into existence. 
There has been a marked convergence in recent work in political economy (Cramer, 2006; 
Cramer and Goodhand, 2002; Putzel and Di John, 2009), institutional economics (Khan, 2007; 
North et al., 2009, 2013) and established sociological writing interested in long-term historical 
trajectories (Mann, 2012, 1993, 1986; Tilly, 1992, 1985, 1978), offering a view of the state 
and state-formation focusing on conflict, power, and violence, rather than state functions. 
Indeed, this literature views such functions almost as by-products. These works all share an 
interest in the historical processes by which actually existing states have been formed and 
stress that the ‘state’ is not a unitary abstract thing, but a concrete set of institutions and 
relationships whose goals and functioning are defined in important measure by the specific 
groups that control it, by its historical antecedents, and by the processes that brought it into 
being. They tend to view the forms and institutions of the state as a product of significant and 
ongoing conflict over social power, located primarily in control of capital, coercion, and 
consent; and they tend to assume a central role for violence and war for contesting, 
establishing, and reproducing the state. 
A promising way to capture these insights lies in the conceptual vocabulary of the political 
settlement (Khan, 2010; Putzel and Di John, 2009) or dominant coalition (North et al., 2009, 
                                                          
 
24 In attenuated form, this is also a problem for attempts to assess state strength via state autonomy 
(Mann, 1984) or coercive and extractive capabilities (Migdal and Schlichte, 2016). All regimes have 
constituencies, autonomy can reflect isolation and even irrelevance, and state and ‘society’ in the form 
of everything from business associations and trade unions, to local notables, tribal structures, and 
secret societies, interpenetrate.  
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2013). This approach stresses that any political order is based on an agreement between 
groups with access to violence, particularly those that could bring down the existing order 
were they to revolt. I call these groups, whose alliance is at the heart of state power, the 
dominant coalition and refer to the implicit or explicit agreement governing the allocation of 
obligations and rights (to violence, property, political influence, and dispute resolution) 
amongst them as the political settlement. This settlement reflects the underlying political 
economy, for the powerful interests that make up the dominant coalition and their 
(imperfect) control of coercion and capital determine whose interests are reflected in laws 
and state practice. Although often stable for long periods, any political settlement is subject 
to recurrent renegotiation, in which external shocks or gradually-accruing changes in 
bargaining power can lead to (sudden) shifts in the settlement. A focus on political 
settlements requires enquiring into the influence of conflict on the dominant coalition in 
control of capital and coercion and the bargains underpinning their alliances. 
Though it has rarely used this terminology, some of the literature on the state in the Middle 
East and the Arabian Peninsula has long adopted a framework akin to a political settlement 
perspective.25 The evident importance of ruling families, tribes, military peer groups, and 
other lines of trust and belonging that do not follow formal institutional divisions, has 
encouraged inquiry into elite networks, lines of patronage, and the unspoken deals sustaining 
rulers. This is evident in studies focused on the political economy of the region’s states 
(Achcar, 2016; Heydemann, 2004; Richards and Waterbury, 1990) on analysing elite bargains 
(Asseburg and Wimmen, 2016; Mufti, 1999; Perthes, 2002b), and on the role of the military 
and militias as political and economic actors (e.g. Grawert and Abul-Magd, 2016; Picard, 
2000, 1988). Though at some remove from a strict political settlement perspective, the 
pioneering accounts of the state and modern state formation in the region likewise placed a 
premium on the production and reproduction of elites and the bargains between them, 
whether taking Tilly (Anderson, 1987), Michael Mann (Gongora, 1997) or Antonio Gramsci 
(Ayubi, 1995) as their point of departure.  
Proponents of the political settlement view have generally advanced it as an alternative to 
the vexed language of the state. Yet, in abandoning the state as a concept, there is a danger 
                                                          
 
25 This is but one of a range of approaches, with another important strand of the literature on political 
authority and the state emphasising the role of cultural practice and particularly Islam. See e.g.: 
Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996. 
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of throwing out the twin babies of institutions and legitimacy with the bathwater of a narrow 
focus on state functions.  
The tendency of the political settlement literature to treat institutions primarily as 
epiphenomena of more or less inclusive coalitions underestimates institutions’ importance. 
Institutions entrench, administer and reproduce the political settlement. On their own, 
political settlements are liable to break down as a result of even minor changes in relative 
position and bargaining power. Institutions and administrative personnel that uphold, police, 
and administer the settlement and develop a vested interest in its maintenance – and thus 
partial autonomy from the elite interests of the dominant coalition – are central to stabilising 
it (Fukuyama, 2018). Institutions also generate new interests and even social groups, thus 
creating path dependencies, altering the political settlement in turn, and constraining the 
range of options open to the dominant coalition (Hall, 1997; Hall and Taylor, 1996). A focus 
on institutions, that is the organisations, rules, formal procedures, functionaries, and 
bureaucrats that embody the state in practice and provide both its organisational form and 
the officials who conceive of themselves as its agents, is therefore essential.  
Without a focus on institutions, making sense of central aspects of political order that have 
animated past efforts to evaluate the impact of war on the state is difficult. The political 
settlement view on its own has little to say about the organisation of power and associated 
tendencies of fragmentation vs. cohesion, centralisation vs. de-centralisation, and 
routinisation and formalisation vs. informalisation. The familiar and appropriate political 
settlement charge that superficially identical institutions function differently in the context of 
different settlements and the insight that institutions are legacies and outcomes of past 
conflicts do not obviate the need to place a central focus on institutions in conjunction with 
an exploration of the political settlement.  
Moreover, there is a danger in an exclusive focus on the political settlement of losing sight of 
the shifting ideas of political order that help define potential configurations of the settlement 
itself. Such ideas of the state operate at two levels. First, from the perspective of dominant 
coalitions, “identifying who is – and is not – a potential ally is rarely an obvious calculation” 
(Staniland, 2015, p.771). Assessments of threats and the possibility of alliances hinge on 
which cleavages and ideas dominant coalitions fear or value. It is a function of ideas and 
ideologies whether the dominant coalition views support for “leftist revolution, 
ethnolinguistic fragmentation, religious radicalism, or majoritarian sectarianism, for instance” 
as a threat or as a vehicle for entrenching its power (Staniland, 2015, p.777). It is impossible 
to make sense of state formation and particularly state formation during episodes of conflict 
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without paying attention to the ideas, symbols and cleavages that dominant coalitions draw 
on and are located within and how these relate to views held more broadly within society 
(Holsti, 1996). Second, and more fundamentally, ideas of the appropriate domains for 
political regulation and the rules defining legitimate authority do not exist outside and prior 
to state formation, but are produced by claims and counter-claims, encroachment and 
resistance (Mitchell, 2006).  
In accordance with these considerations, the following discussion views state formation in 
Yemen in terms of changes to the (1) political settlement, to (2) institutions administering 
coercion, capital and consent, and to (3) ideas of the state. Such a view, as noted above, is 
compatible with important writing on the state in the Middle East and North Africa, though it 
clearly disagrees with other perspectives that have sought neat distinctions between state 
and society as analytical categories (Migdal, 1988)26 or have analysed the region’s rentier 
states based on the assumption that rents accrue to ‘the state’ or ‘the ruler’ as opposed to a 
potentially heterogenous dominant coalition dependent on alliances with other holders of 
social power (Beblawi, 1987, 2016; Schwarz, 2004; but see: Hertog, 2011).   
Against such views, it asserts the primary importance of analysing the state from the 
perspective of the political settlement, while inflecting and complementing political 
settlement views with a focus on institutions and on the ways ideas of the state structure 
expectations and possibilities of rule. It conceives, in other words, of the state as a system of 
domination defined by the balance of power between powerful groups in society, incarnated 
in rules and patterned behaviours, and structured by shifting but durable ideas about the 
parameters of legitimate rule and the relevant cleavages identifying allies and enemies.27 
1.4 Conclusion to Chapter 1 
Large blanks in the historiography of Yemen invite an exploration of the impact of the civil 
war during the 1960s on the development of the YAR state. The case of Yemen also replicates 
and is partially emblematic of a broader puzzle about the impact of civil war on the state. 
Approaching this puzzle requires abandoning straightforward but misleading accounts of the 
                                                          
 
26 Migdal has subsequently (2004, 2001) troubled these distinctions. 
27 C.f. Weber posing the analytical problem in the Protestant Ethic (1930, p.91) as being about 
understanding the “interdependent influences between the material basis, the forms of social and 
political organisation, and the ideas current in the time.”  
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central variables of interest and to think instead about civil war as an amalgamation of 
processes associated with violent contentious politics exhibiting important recurrent features 
at the meso-level: the existence of rivals to the dominant coalition, an increased salience of 
violence for rule contestation and maintenance, and re-drawing and contestation of zones of 
control. Similarly, state formation should be conceptualised as an actually occurring historical 
process, likely to be reversible, contingent and not reducible to a list of state functions 
irrespective of place and time. This, in turn, suggests the need to move beyond a binary 
debate of whether civil war ‘strengthens’ or ‘weakens’ the state and towards an examination 
of the processes of change such conflicts precipitate in the political settlement, in institutions 
administering coercion, capital and consent, and in ideas of the state. Examining the 
characteristics of the political orders created by civil war, albeit framed in slightly different 
terms, has recently been identified as an “extremely important area for future research” as 
“we have only started to open the black box of […] types of institutional change promoted by 
different processes of armed violence” (Justino, 2013, p.301). 
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2 BUILDING A MODEL FOR PROCESS TRACING 
If, as the above discussion suggests, both civil war and state formation are compound 
concepts, there is no a priori reason why all the processes linking civil war to state formation 
should operate in the same direction, or why they should have consistent effects across the 
political settlement, institutions, and ideas of the state. The linkages between the two 
variables of interest are likely to be complex28 and we will see that process tracing is best 
suited to disentangling their multiple and mediated connections.  
After presenting process tracing as a methodology in 2.1, the remainder of the chapter 
develops a model of the process to be traced, building on the definitions developed above. 
Having unpacked the aggregate concepts of ‘civil war’ and ‘the state,’ this model can focus on 
how recurrent features of civil war (the existence of rivals, an increased salience of violence, 
and the redrawing of social and spatial zones of control), can transform the political 
settlement, formal institutions, and ideas of the state. Drawing on grounded research on the 
micro-dynamics of conflict and the development of wartime institutions, each section of the 
chapter develops a set of causal processes along one of these dimensions: 2.2 focuses on 
effects on the political settlement, 2.3 on changes in institutions, and 2.4 on ideas of the state 
current in popular and elite thinking. 
2.1 Process tracing 
It is now widely acknowledged that there are clear trade-offs between intensive and 
extensive research designs and that understanding causality and theory development require 
intensive designs (Sayer, 1992, pp.241–251). In particular, a single case design promises the 
space to make a genuine contribution to the literature on Yemen and is the method of choice 
for exploring complex causal relationships like that postulated between the variables of 
interest (George and Bennett, 2005, p.19). 
The specific case-study method employed is process tracing, defined by its ambition “to 
identify the intervening process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an 
independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable” (George and 
Bennett, 2005, pp.206–207). It represents an attempt to “peer into the box of causality” to 
link “some structural cause and its purported effect” (Gerring, 2007, p.45). As this language 
                                                          
 
28 Complexity is used throughout in the sense of complexity theory, as relating to emergent properties 
of mutual interaction. See: Miller and Page, 2007, p.3. 
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suggests, process tracing as a methodology places causality and a search for causal 
mechanisms at the centre and hence implies a ‘mechanismic’ ontology – the belief that 
statements of causality can go beyond statements of constant conjunction. Inverting David 
Hume, it suggests that we can and should be interested in gravitational force; not merely in 
the constant conjunction of apples and falling (Sayer, 1992).29 
Causal mechanisms are understood as relatively simple, parsimonious pathways that link one 
variable of interest (X) to another (Y) via a series of intervening steps. In a simple formulation, 
X may cause A, which under condition B causes Y. The nature of the causal relationship 
implied at each stage in the process need not involve constant conjunction, nor does it 
require that the cause is a necessary and sufficient condition of the effect. In fact, most 
statements of the sort X causes Y are making claims about contributory causes – they are 
INUS conditions: insufficient but nonredundant parts of an unnecessary but sufficient 
condition (Brady, 2008; Mackie, 1965). In INUS conditions, the further attributes of a given 
context determine what type of outcome the mechanism generates (Beach and Pedersen, 
2013, pp.34, 12). It is therefore important to recognize that “mechanisms alone cannot cause 
outcomes. Rather, causation resides in the interaction between the mechanism and the 
context within which it operates” (Falleti and Lynch, 2009, p.1145). 
To take the issue at hand, the claim that ‘war made the state’ is not a claim that war is a 
necessary condition for the emergence of states with specific features, i.e. it is not a 
statement of the form ‘the formation of all states involves war.’ It is also not a claim that it is 
a sufficient condition – it does not claim that ‘all wars make states (though non-war state 
formation is a possibility).’ Rather, it is a statement that approximates an INUS condition: 
war, given a set of further circumstances, causes forms of institutional development 
associated with the formation of the modern state, although it is not the only thing that does.  
Process tracing is particularly suited to exploring contingent and complex causal relationships 
(George and Bennett, 2005, p.212) and processes that are path dependent or rooted in 
strategic interaction (Hall, 2006, pp.29–30). This makes it the preferred choice for an 
exploration of the relationship between two variables, which, as Section 1.3 highlighted, 
                                                          
 
29 Causal mechanisms, according to one widely cited and influential definition are the “ultimately 
unobservable physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities 
operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other 
entities” (George and Bennett, 2005, p.137). 
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appear to be compound concepts. There is no a priori reason to assume that all the recurrent 
features of civil war influence actors’ incentives in the same direction – there may 
simultaneously be pressures towards centralisation due to the salience of violence for rule 
maintenance and towards fragmentation due to the existence of rivals to the dominant 
coalition, for instance. Similarly, there is no reason to believe that any one of these features 
will have consistent effects across different contexts and across the political settlement, 
formal institutions, and the idea of the state.  
Process tracing is not simply thick description. It requires a theory-driven account of the 
various ways the variables of interest are likely to relate and the associated evidence we 
would expect to find, before undertaking the exploration of the case. That is, it deduces the 
likely relationships between the variables of interest based on the existing literature and then 
examines “whether evidence shows that each part of a hypothesized causal mechanism is 
present in a given case” (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, pp.3, 57).30 As such, the investigation 
proceeds along the following steps (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, pp.14, 34; also: Kay and 
Baker, 2015, p.12): 
1) Conceptualize a causal process linking civil war and state formation based on a wide 
reading of the existing literature, making explicit the context within which it is 
expected to function. Ideally, such a process should include a wide range of different 
and rival potential linkages (George and Bennett, 2005, p.217).  
2) Operationalise the linkages of the proposed process with reference to a case, 
translating theoretical expectations into case-specific descriptions of what observable 
manifestations each step in the process should generate. This operationalisation 
provides the framework for collecting empirical evidence and defines what kind of 
evidence is of interest for the process tracing. 
3) Trace the process to determine whether (and what part) of the hypothesized 
mechanism was present in the case and whether it functioned as predicted. This 
constitutes the ‘test’ of the process and provides additional information to update 
the process, explore alternative explanations, and new within-case inferences, with 
the aim of contributing to a mid-range theory of mechanisms and context conditions 
for the proposed process. 
                                                          
 
30 Beach and Pedersen call this ‘theory testing’ process tracing. Others have conceptualised the same 
method as theory-development (George and Bennett, 2005, p.209).  
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These steps provide the framework for the following exploration. The following sections (2.2-
2.4) complete step one, developing a model of the causal process to be investigated, based 
on a wide reading of the existing literature.  
Step two, operationalising the linkages of the model, preceded data collection and features at 
the beginning of each of the main empirical chapters 4, 5 and 6 as a short description of the 
rival predictions of the model.31 Tracing the model, as per the third step, takes up the bulk of 
these chapters. Chapter 7 then reflects on the successes and failures of the model in 
explaining the case, highlighting the ways in which the case inflects and modifies the model 
and discussing the limitations it reveals in the literatures the model is based on. 
Process tracing is, of course, no panacea. Like most intensive designs, it is better at ensuring 
internal than external validity: while it should be able to tell us a great deal about Yemen, we 
will want to subject any more general causal relationships it suggests to further scrutiny. At 
the same time, the theory-led nature of the inquiry and the way evidence can be compared 
against rival predictions should allow the tracing of individual cases to significantly affect our 
confidence in the existence and operation of the proposed mechanism(s). Process tracing 
also does not make claims to completeness: more than one causal process may be consistent 
with the facts and process tracing may not be able to distinguish whether different processes 
are complementary or one is wholly spurious (George and Bennett, 2005, p.222). 
Mechanisms may or may not be portable between contexts and their scope conditions may 
be difficult to specify – particularly based on a single case. 
2.1.1 Yemen: a typical case?  
Case selection criteria for process tracing suggest that in cases, such as this, where we are in 
the dark regarding potential mechanisms linking the dependent and independent variable, 
we should seek to examine a “typical case to identify a plausible causal mechanism that can 
be tested empirically in subsequent research.” A typical case is one where all the variables of 
interest are present along with relevant scope conditions (Beach and Pedersen, 2013, p.154; 
see also: Gerring, 2007, pp.91–97).  
Of course, what looks like a typical case depends strongly on the theoretical framing of the 
issue. There is no obviously unsuited case for this sort of exploratory process tracing, 
                                                          
 
31 See Annex 1 for a table of process-derived questions and potential sources prepared prior to 
fieldwork, which guided research. 
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provided the basic variables of interest are present; and, as we saw in Section 1.1, there are 
good reasons to investigate the rarely examined case of Yemen in its own right. This is 
especially true since Middle Eastern states have rarely animated discussions of violence and 
state formation more broadly. Existing examinations have largely focused on Sub-Saharan 
Africa and to a lesser extent on Latin America and South, Central, and South-East Asian cases 
(e.g. Centeno, 2002; Khan, 2013; Lopez-Alves, 2000; Stubbs, 1997). Thus, Yemen promises to 
add to the evidence and update the scope conditions for which extant theories may apply by 
contributing to identifying what causal linkages may hold across regions. 
From the perspective of different literatures about the connections between the dependent 
and independent variables, Yemen will seem like a more or less ‘typical’ case. This can be 
made to work to our advantage. If they have described their scope conditions accurately, we 
would expect approaches stressing the importance of colonial gatekeeper states, post-Cold 
War changes to strategic rents, the global economy and illicit flows, or historical 
particularities of Sub-Saharan Africa (see the discussion in 1.2 above) to be inapplicable or at 
least unimportant for the case of Yemen in the 1960s. Since the investigation will find that 
foreign rents convincingly account for the absence of domestic taxation and bargaining with 
domestic holders of capital, this suggests that the mechanisms associated with external 
funding that these literatures propose are robust, but that their scope conditions need 
updating. 
Conversely, Yemen exhibited many of the ‘risk factors’ identified with state weakness and 
fragility like rough terrain (Jimenez-Avora and Ulubasoğlu, 2015), (tribally) segmented 
societies (Giustozzi, 2016), low GDP per capita (Fearon, 2010), and regional inequalities 
(Stewart, 2008). Since, in a setting that from the perspective of this literature is so unlikely to 
experience any measure of durable state formation, we will observe conflict generating such 
dynamics, this suggests that such risk factors, while potentially useful indicators and 
parameters, do not determine developments. The presence of centralising dynamics and 
rapid institutional developments linked to conflict in Yemen suggests that similar dynamics 
are likely to exist in less unlikely contexts as well.  
2.1.2 Sources and caveats  
Process tracing relies on “histories, archival documents, interview transcripts and other 
sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes […] is in fact evident in the 
sequence and values of the intervening variables” (George and Bennett, 2005, p.6). In order 
to explore the ways in which the 1960s civil war in North Yemen influenced the trajectory of 
state formation in the Yemen Arab Republic, the following study draws primarily on 
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contemporary documents, reports, and analysis. It focuses in particular on papers from the 
Egyptian and West German Ministries of Foreign Affairs, since these have hitherto not been 
consulted for their perspective on state formation in Yemen.32  
The Egyptian embassy had a hand in the preparations for the coup that overthrew Imam al-
Badr on 26 September 1962 and within half a year, Egypt had tens of thousands of combat 
troops and hundreds of civilian experts stationed in the Yemen Arab Republic. The Egyptian 
government was heavily implicated in fighting in Yemen and was on the forefront of state 
building efforts. The Egyptian archives provide a privileged perspective on these 
developments. They are also a hitherto untapped source and as recently as 2012, Jesse Ferris 
(2012, p.16) identified “the closure of the relevant Egyptian archives to researchers,” as a 
major obstacle to understanding the civil war in Yemen.  
This research draws on the papers of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs held by the 
Egyptian National Archives, the Dar al-Wathaʾiq al-Qawmiyya (DWQ). The records of the 
Egyptian presidency and military appear to remain off-limits to researchers. It was also clear 
from the papers I consulted that they were only a fraction of the total material that the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs must have produced on Yemen during the 1960s. For instance, I 
was able to consult one folder of routine daily correspondence between the Egyptian 
embassy in Taʿiz and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Cairo, which covered the six-month 
period from September 1967 to February 1968. No analogous folders existed for the 
remainder of the period.  
Despite these limitations, the documents provide a great deal of information on the civilian 
side of Egypt’s presence in Yemen, including details of the numbers and specific roles of 
Egyptian secondees, details of individual projects, discussions of grants and loans, and 
Egyptian economic and trade policy towards the YAR. Although material directly related to 
the Egyptian military mission in Yemen remains off-limits, references and evaluations in the 
documents nonetheless offer important glimpses of the military side of the Egyptian 
presence. In particular, the papers add detail about official Egyptian support for and 
perceptions of the republican military.  
                                                          
 
32 The papers of the German Democratic Republic were also consulted but proved less useful as the 
GDR presence was far smaller and increasingly focused on relations with South Yemen and the PDRY. 
They are cited as PAAA MfAA (Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten). On the GDR’s policy 
towards the Arab World and especially South Yemen see: Müller, 2015. 
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The other main archival source the study draws on is the regular reporting of the Federal 
Republic of Germany’s embassy in Taʿiz and later Ṣanaʿāʾ from the Politisches Archiv des 
Auswärtigen Amts (PAAA) in Berlin. Together with Italy, the Federal Republic was the only 
Western country to have diplomats in Yemen throughout the civil war period, yet none of the 
existing studies of 1960s Yemen has drawn on these papers. Britain and France did not 
recognise the new Republic until after the end of the war and were not allowed to maintain 
diplomatic representation after early 1963. The US embassy was shut down following the 
1967 Arab-Israeli war and diplomatic relations were only re-established in July 1972. 
Although the embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in the YAR was also officially 
closed after the Federal Republic and Israel established diplomatic relations in May 1965, in 
practice this was of little consequence: embassy staff remained in Yemen, continued to meet 
with Yemeni politicians, and sent regular reports to Bonn. Throughout the 1960s, the Federal 
Republic was also an important source of development assistance for the new republican 
state and, in part because it had few tangible interests in Yemen, aside from preventing a 
Yemeni recognition of the German Democratic Republic, the reports its diplomats sent to 
Bonn are rich in observations of the minutiae of daily politics: government initiatives, cabinet 
reshuffles, behind the scenes manoeuvring, and evaluations of the republican military and 
state apparatus. Egyptian and West German archival sources were selectively supplemented 
with material published in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series and 
indirectly via the substantial scholarship that exists on the British (Jones, 2004) and US 
American archives (Ferris, 2012; Johnsen, 2017; Orkaby, 2014). 
Yemeni archives could not be consulted, as a new round of heavily internationalized civil war 
accompanied this study almost from its outset, making travel to Ṣanaʿāʾ impossible. Relevant 
archives in Ṣanaʿāʾ were only intermittently functioning, suffering from aerial bombing, power 
outages, and growing political censorship. However, it appears that what material is available 
for this period has been explored in some detail and could be consulted via previous studies 
or published documents (Chaudhry, 1997; Markaz al-Dirāsāt wa al-buḥūth al-yamanī, 1987).  
To gain insight into the perspectives of those involved first-hand, the study also draws on the 
published memoirs of Yemeni politicians and Egyptian military officers, as well as interviews. 
There has been a slew of recent memoirs, some published posthumously. These include 
those of tribal leaders (al-ʾAḥmar, 2008; ʾAbū Luḥūm, 2002) and leading politicians (al-ʾIryānī, 
2013; Alaini, 2004; Zayd, 2004), as well as the earlier memoirs of military officers (Juzaylān, 
1977; Muṭahar, 1984), and high-ranking Egyptian military commanders or intelligence 
operatives (Ḥajjāj, 2014; ʾAḥmad, 1992; al-Ḥadīdī, 1984). In addition, the markaz al-dirāsāt 
wa al-buḥūth al-Yamanī (Centre of Yemeni Studies and Research) has recorded and published 
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(1987) collections of testimonies. I also conducted a series of interviews. The following 
people kindly agreed to give time for sometimes extensive conversations in London, Cairo, 
and Amman: Prime Minister Muḥsin al-ʿAynī, General Ḥamūd Baydar, Ambassador ʿAlī 
Muḥsin Ḥamīd, Sayyid ʿAbd Allah al-Kibsī, Sayyid ʿAbbās al-Mukhtafī, General Talaʿat 
Musallam, Sayyid ʾAḥmad al-Sayyānī, and Sayyid Qāsim bin ʿAlī al-Wazīr.  
In order to supplement these perspectives, located primarily at the level of elite politics on 
both republican and royalist sides of the civil war, the study draws on ethnographic work 
conducted in the immediate post-war period up to the early 1980s (Caton, 2005; Dresch, 
1993b; Gerholm, 1977; Meissner, 1987; Messick, 1978; Stevenson, 1985; Swagman, 1988a; 
Tutwiler, 1987; Weir, 2007; Mundy, 1995). Despite sometimes quite different interests and 
areas of focus, these were invaluable sources for many of the changes under investigation.  
In addition, the investigation draws on general histories of modern Yemen, journalistic 
contemporary accounts of the war (O’Ballance, 1971; Schmidt, 1968; Deffarge and Troeller, 
1969), as well as scholarly work focusing on the Yemeni military (Nājī, 1988), the political role 
of Yemen’s tribes (al-Ẓāhirī, 1996), the Free Yemeni Movement (Douglas, 1987), local 
development associations (Carapico, 1998), urbanisation during the 1960s (Serjeant and 
Lewcock, 1983; Grandguillaume et al., 1995) and other relevant topics. The small number of 
existing studies focusing on the development of the YAR state have likewise been of central 
importance, even when the study takes issue with some of their arguments about the role of 
the civil war in state formation (Burrowes, 1987; Peterson, 1982; Stookey, 1978; Wenner, 
1967). A recent clutch of PhD theses, some since converted into monographs, focusing on the 
civil war from various perspectives, have also added much to our knowledge – particularly in 
terms of Egyptian operations in Yemen (Ferris, 2012), the wider international context, 
crucially including Soviet perspectives (Orkaby, 2014), as well as continuities of Zaydī thought 
across the divide of the civil war (Johnsen, 2017).  
Two caveats about these sources must be kept in mind. First, the following chapters navigate 
a certain mismatch between the categories and concerns of the thematic literature and the 
interests of the sources. Egyptian diplomatic reporting was heavily inflected by the 
vocabulary of Arab nationalist politics, identifying the main protagonists in Yemen as 
Nasirists, ‘dissident republicans,’ including Baʿathists and Arab Nationalists, the ‘third force,’ 
and royalists. The German papers are marked by a focus on the international implications of 
events in Yemen, assumptions about modernisation, fears of communist infiltration, and 
vague ideas about tribalism. Memoirs tend to focus on personalities, their connections, and 
conflicts. By contrast, the model developed in the next sections draws on conventional social 
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science distinctions between social groups along such lines as class, sect, generation, and 
region. Such categories are at a remove from the way most of the sources made sense of 
events. At important points in the analysis, the argument seeks to bring politics into the story 
and by extension back into the literature on civil wars and the political settlement and at 
these points party labels feature. Yet, overall, the politics it seeks to bring back in are not 
party labels, which often obscure more than they reveal. The micropolitics of networks of 
power and broad, structural views of the relative position of different social groups are the 
preferred mode of analysis.  
The second caveat relates to the reliability of statistical data gleaned from these sources. 
Throughout, the discussion draws on official YAR government data and expert estimates. This 
data is problematic and contemporary sources sometimes claim that there were “no 
economic or social statistics,“ in the YAR during the 1960s (IBRD, 1970, p.i), indeed, that 
North Yemen was marked by a “complete absence of all information” relating to economic 
matters (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12337, 11 Apr. 1968). Few systems were in place to accurately 
track, record, and aggregate government income and expenditure. In the first decade in 
which some statistics exist – from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s – fundamental measures 
remain unavailable or deeply suspect. As a result, the figures presented in the following 
chapters must be treated as rough approximations and even the careful conclusions based on 
the available data may be misleading.  
2.2 Effects on the political settlement  
Process tracing requires a model of the process to be traced. The following sections 
conceptualize the causal processes linking civil war and state formation based on a wide 
reading of the existing literature. Presenting in relatively simple, abstracted form the complex 
linkages between civil war and state formation, they reveal the different ways in which civil 
war may fundamentally re-shape the state.  
This model’s utility does not lie in ‘predicting’ what will happen, but in highlighting what sorts 
of things may and how they do so, thus telling us where to look. Assembling evidence for 
process tracing is sometimes described as searching for the proverbial needle in the haystack. 
In keeping with this metaphor, the model tells us what kind of a needle we are looking for 
and in what part of the haystack we are likely to find it. Developing the model also provides 
an opportunity to spell out the implications of much current research on civil wars for the 
questions of interest. As such, it provides the framework not only for exploring the case of 
Yemen, but for identifying where the case departs from, challenges, or prompts a 
reconsideration of the thematic state of the art. 
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Unintended consequences abound and the same choices in different contexts do not 
necessarily lead to the same or even similar outcomes, as rival potential pathways make 
clear. For those seeking (probabilistic) prediction, it will be frustrating when the model 
highlights that a wartime response to a specific challenge may lead to one outcome or its 
opposite. As a framework for analysis, the same statement is invaluable, because it tells us 
that this particular response needs investigating: It will likely hold part of the answer to how 
this particular war transformed the specific state in question.  
This first section discusses the potential linkages between civil war and changes in the 
political settlement.  
Revealing the existence of rivals to the dominant coalition, civil war both creates and reflects 
an elite crisis. On the one hand, civil wars tend to arise under conditions of renegotiation or 
crisis of the political settlement (Giustozzi, 2011b; Skocpol, 1979); on the other, war and civil 
war generally open up “new arenas of conflict, bargaining and accommodation” between 
elites in and of themselves (Heydemann, 2000, p.17). As a result, internal armed conflict 
often translates into conflict between and defection of elements of the dominant coalition, as 
it calls into question existing alliances and places a premium on the bases of political trust 
(Staniland, 2015). This opens the door to rapid shifts in power and in the composition of the 
dominant coalition itself. Moreover, since war provides opportunities for primitive 
accumulation (Cramer, 2006) and extreme returns on investment are possible for those 
willing to take the risks of operating during war or to serve the needs of violence specialists 
(Cramer and Goodhand, 2002), civil war tends to create stark winners and losers among 
economic actors, thereby again re-drawing the membership of the dominant coalition. These 
dynamics are summarised in the first row of Table 1. We will see this dynamic playing out in 
the civil war in Yemen, where the war broke the power of the hereditary administrative elite, 
the sāda and where a handful of violence entrepreneurs, some of them major tribal figures, 
but many more of them small and relatively unimportant shaykhs at the outset of hostilities, 
became tremendously powerful members of the dominant coalition by its end. 
The second set of pathways in Table 1 relate to the control of coercion. They begin from the 
observation that civil war increases the salience of violence for rule maintenance, creating 
strong incentives for its use (Giustozzi, 2011b). At the same time, civil war redraws zones of 
control, reducing dominant coalitions’ and challengers’ ability to use selective violence 
(Kalyvas, 2006). As a result, it increases their need for coercion, while simultaneously 
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reducing their ability to use it effectively, creating strong pressures to gain access to new 
sources of organised violence – whether by mobilising existing local violence specialists,33 by 
creating new security organisations, or by seeking external allies. In the simplifying terms of 
the model, each has a different effect on the political settlement, since access to violence 
determines the distribution of the benefits and opportunities war offers (Raeymaekers, 
2013).34 However, these choices need not be mutually exclusive, and there may be elements 
of all three – and consequently an activation of contradictory causal pathways – in any given 
situation.  
If members of the dominant coalition or those seeking to challenge them predominantly 
build alliances with existing local violence specialists, this is likely to decentralise power over 
coercion. It usually involves giving up large amounts of central oversight and transferring 
rights to revenue extraction and control over resources from the centre to local violence 
specialists to buy loyalty (Giustozzi, 2011b, p.63). Such additional rights and resources make 
local violence specialists more independent and strengthen them within the dominant 
coalition. Moreover, as Joel Migdal (2001, p.68) has argued, powerful local intermediaries 
tend to undermine conditions for centralising control of coercion in the longer term, thus 
potentially weakening officers in command of the central military within the evolving political 
settlement. Indeed, while ‘taming’ violence may make sense viewed from the capital, 
violence and brinkmanship are often tools for local violence specialists to increase their 
leverage (Giustozzi, 2009, p.13). This causal story appears to be borne-out in the case of 
Yemen, where both republican and royalist wartime mobilisation relied to a significant extent 
                                                          
 
33 The term “violence specialists,” introduced by Charles Tilly (2003), has been fruitfully adopted (e.g. 
Collins, 2009) to capture the range of actors for whom using physical violence is one of their central 
roles: from members of police and military forces, over mercenaries and underworld bruisers, to 
guerrilla fighters. Labelling these groups violence specialists does not imply that they are intrinsically 
violent, but highlights that using and performing violence are accepted parts of their social roles, 
generally connected to training (specialisation) in violence. See Section 4.2. for a discussion of the 
applicability of this framework to tribal fighters in the civil war in Yemen. 
34 Different conditions of warfare influence choices over mobilising. According to Gongora, (1997), the 
need to access advanced weapons for interstate conflict has underwritten rulers’ preference for large-
scale external support in the Middle East since the 1950s. In this sense, civil war, which is often 
characterised by less technology-intensive warfare, may be one of the few forms of contemporary 
warfare in which belligerents might predominantly rely on domestic resources and technologies.  
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on Yemen’s highland tribes, transferring large amounts of resources to them in the process. 
These resources, in turn, allowed tribal leaders to dominate the peace.  
By contrast, successful attempts to create new security organisations are likely to strengthen 
the officers at their head within the dominant coalition, providing them with additional 
resources, autonomy, and opportunities for patronage, as appears to have been the case in 
Peru during the 1980s (Mauceri, 1997). This view captures something important about 
military mobilisation in Yemen during the civil war, although the distinction between the two 
strategies – of empowering local violence specialists versus creating new organisations – may 
not be clear-cut and the range and variation between armed groups falling somewhere 
between national militaries and local village, tribal, or landlord levies is significant (Jentzsch 
et al., 2015). Certainly in Yemen, as we will see, distinctions between tribal militias and the 
royalist and republican armies were blurred. In trying to disentangle the two, the exploration 
enquires into the networks of political trust that predominate in purportedly ‘new’ 
organisations and into the elite alliances that the political settlement view foregrounds. Yet, 
despite this blurring and the fact that, for a range of reasons discussed in the following 
chapters, military mobilisation was by far subordinate to mobilising tribal fighters, several 
short and abortive efforts at mass mobilisation nonetheless left lasting legacies and created 
an alternative centre of power among a part of the officer corps that contested the emerging 
dominance of tribal leaders, local notables, and high-ranking officers. 
The third way to access new sources of organised coercion lies in securing large-scale external 
military support or direct intervention. Such external intervention decisively shapes the 
parameters and incentives within which domestic actors pursue strategies and tends to 
supply coercive capacities well in excess of those available by other means. However, this 
does not mean interveners tend to get their way, or that domestic factors become irrelevant 
during foreign intervention. External intervention may be associated with increased power 
and influence for both local power brokers and officers atop the central military. On the one 
hand, it has, in the 20th and 21st centuries, tended to involve sophisticated technologies of 
violence – such as aircraft or armoured vehicles – that gave an advantage to the military and 
the officers at its highest levels. On the other, interveners have tended to seek alliances with 
local violence specialists as suppliers of local knowledge. Not only, but perhaps especially, in 
an age of nationalism, legitimacy and local information have been among the most elusive 
resources for external interveners.  
In addition, intervention has tended to add the resources necessary for sustaining a broad 
range of potential dominant coalitions not necessarily supported by the domestic political 
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economy. As a result, the political settlement in these contexts may be highly unstable when 
intervention changes or ends (Giustozzi, 2011b, p.227; Putzel and Di John, 2012, pp.33–38) 
and domestic political economies tend to become organised around the pursuit of 
international strategic rents to sustain externally-orientated dominant coalitions 
(Heydemann, 2000, p.13). Interventions may also disadvantage the domestic holders of 
capital in particular, as it provides domestic violence specialists with sophisticated weapons 
and funds without having to strike bargains with the holders of capital. As we will see, the 
Egyptian military intervention in Yemen helped create a political settlement dependent on 
external rents and increased the power of tribal leaders and military officers. The commercial 
elites that most enthusiastically supported Egyptian intervention, gained little from it.  
Finally, the reconfiguration of zones of control means that under conditions of civil war, 
dominant coalitions lose access to domestic revenue, even as the cost of rule-maintenance 
increases.35 The economic core of the state may be in question: the capacity to mobilise, 
allocate, and spend public resources (Boyce and O’Donnell, 2007a, p.1). From the perspective 
of the political settlement, four potential reactions are particularly relevant. As in the case of 
mobilisation strategies, incumbents and insurgents can and do pursue multiple financing 
strategies at a time (Mampilly, 2011, p.14), meaning more than one of these pathways may 
be active at once. 
The first concerns gaining large-scale external financing. Particularly for incumbents in post-
colonial settings, who inherited institutions designed to face the imperial metropole, export 
resources, and collect revenues from cross-border trade (Bayart, 1996; Bayart et al., 1997; 
Cooper, 2002; Young, 1994), this has often been a favoured strategy.36 Post-independence 
incumbents and many of the insurgencies they faced derived much of their income from 
natural resource extraction and international strategic alliances (Mampilly, 2011, pp.69–72; 
Moore, 2004). Like access to large-scale external coercion, external funding changes the 
                                                          
 
35 How important loss of territory is for revenues depends on the political economy and the resources 
in question. Loss of territorial control may be of marginal importance in some cases, such as offshore 
oil or other ‘non-lootable’ ‘point resources’ (Snyder and Bhavani, 2005) and any loss of revenue may be 
offset by strategic rent related to the conflict itself. 
36 As a result, it has often been insurgents, not incumbents, who attempt to create systems of taxation 
offering benefits for the taxed – though we should avoid equating all forms of (rebel) governance with 
state formation (Arjona et al., 2015). 
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parameters for forming a dominant coalition. Where financing does not rely on taxation and 
the bargains with domestic holders of capital it implies, the potential composition of the 
dominant coalition is more variable and coalitions that are unsustainably narrow in domestic 
terms and must rely on continued access to external resources can emerge. Within this 
variability, external financing appears especially likely to undermine the role of domestic 
capital in the political settlement, while strengthening the position of domestic actors in 
control of coercion. As foreign funding becomes central to deploying coercion and thus the 
survival of the dominant coalition, this weakens the bargaining power of domestic holders of 
capital and therefore cancels out incentives for (other) members of the dominant coalition to 
respond to their demands (Leander, 2004, pp.72–76).37 Constituencies that gain bargaining 
power are those that provide access to violence, as well as external donors. However, which 
coalitions do emerge depends in important measure on the agendas of external interveners 
and on different domestic actors’ ability to successfully use such funding for their own ends.  
Contrary to authors who have seen such external financing and especially access to global 
financial flows as a recent phenomenon or a feature of ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 1999; Leander, 
2004), this dynamic has a longer pedigree. For example, Miguel Centeno (2002) argues that 
the availability of international financing for Latin American governments in the 19th century 
diminished their need to extract revenue from their citizens to finance wars, leading to the 
formation of externally-orientated states. We will also see that in Yemen during the 1960s, 
foreign funding played an important role and helped to keep commercial elites out of power. 
There are other ways in which both incumbents and challengers might react to a loss of 
revenue, even as the costs of control increase, most notably the fiscal innovations that have 
often accompanied the high capital requirements of war: printing money, expanding 
(government) borrowing, and domestic resource mobilisation through taxation. Table 1 
                                                          
 
37 The distinction between groups whose power depends on capital and those whose power depends 
on coercion is analytically useful in thinking about different interests within the dominant coalition, 
since commercial and martial interests are often at odds and organised in different ways. It is also a 
simplification, in that power is fungible: capital can buy coercion and access to coercion can create 
lucrative markets in protection or enforce monopolies. 
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suggests that strategies of money-creation, because of the inflationary pressures they cause, 
will tend to weaken the holders of capital within the dominant coalition. By contrast, 
increasing domestic debt and borrowing likely empowers them, since, all other things being 
equal, they gain influence as creditors. Both of these tendencies should not be over-stated.38 
Likewise, mobilising additional resources through taxation will tend to strengthen the holders 
of capital within the dominant coalition and often encourages a broadening of the coalition. 
Since taxation, to be successful, is reliant on at least the passive acquiescence of those paying 
taxes (Levi, 1988), expanding taxation requires bargaining and often the extension of rights or 
                                                          
 
38 Holders of capital can make enormous profits under conditions of (hyper)inflation (see e.g. Picard, 
2000 on Lebanon), while leaders in control of coercion have often rid themselves of debts through the 
use of force, pointing to the limits of control exercised through the purse alone. As Machiavelli pointed 
out: “while gold by itself will not gain you good soldiers, good soldiers may readily get you gold” 
(Machiavelli, 2004, Ch. 10). 
Table 1: Effect of civil war on the political settlement 
Starting point         → Intervening process               → Effects on the political settlement 
Civil war reveals the 
existence of 
alternatives to the 
incumbent 
Reflects and provokes crisis in the 
dominant coalition 
Rapid shifts in the dominant coalition 
and renegotiation of the political 
settlement 
Civil war increases the 
salience of violence for 
rule maintenance 
Contenders mobilise local 
violence specialists 
Increases the independence of local 
violence specialists and strengthens 
them within the dominant coalition 
Contenders organise new 
violence specialists, creating 
more sophisticated security 
institutions 
Strengthens the leaders of security 
forces within the dominant coalition 
Contenders gain outside coercive 
capabilities 
Enables the formation of domestically 
unviable dominant coalitions; may 
weaken domestic capital within the 
dominant coalition 
Civil War redraws 
zones of control, 
decreasing income 
derived from territorial 
control and increasing 
costs of rule 
maintenance 
Contenders gain external 
financing 
Enables the formation of a domestically 
unviable dominant coalition; may 
weaken domestic capital within the 
dominant coalition and strengthen local 
and/or central actors in control of 
coercion 
Contenders expand taxation or 
borrow money domestically 
Strengthens domestic capital in the 
dominant coalition 
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other benefits to broader constituencies – an idea that can be found in a succession of 
influential thinking about state formation from Joseph Schumpeter (1991) over Michael 
Mann (1984), to Charles Tilly (1992).  
2.3 Effects on institutions  
The second set of connections links civil war to outcomes in terms of institutions, that is 
changes in organisations, rules, formal procedures, functionaries, and bureaucrats. These 
linkages are summarised in Table 2 below. They begin from the same recurrent features of 
civil war. 
Revealing the existence of alternatives to the incumbent, civil war reflects and provokes a 
crisis in the dominant coalition. This is likely, at least in the short term, to fragment political 
authority and central institutions as the rump coalition loses the resources – including 
violence specialists – provided by the defecting elements, weakening central control over 
violence. Where control is tenuous, loyalty is too (Kalyvas, 2006), thus increasing the margin 
of manoeuvre of local power brokers.  
In addition, the increased salience of violence for regime maintenance and contestation 
increases incumbents’ and challengers’ need for violence. In response, they can empower 
local violence specialists, create new organisations for violence, or secure external military 
support. These choices are familiar from the discussion above. 
In terms of institutional change, the literature suggests that empowering local violence 
specialists tends to multiply competing local institutions and weakens central institutions for 
control of violence. It has been associated with a disintegration of the military as a centralised 
institution in a variety of contexts, including Sierra Leone (Arnold, 2008), South Sudan (De 
Waal, 1994), and Tajikistan (Nourzhanov, 2005). In his discussion of warlordism in 
Afghanistan, Antonio Giustozzi (2009) likewise highlights that attempts to recruit local 
violence specialists for counterinsurgency fragmented central control over violence. Such 
dynamics may be unintentional, or incumbents may deliberately empower local violence 
specialists to avoid military concentrations of power (Leander, 2004; Reno, 1998). A 
substantial literature also suggests that the fragmentation resulting from empowering local 
violence specialists increases the incidence of violence because in ‘markets’ of violence, the 
actors that provide ‘security’ are, paradoxically, in a position to increase demand for their 
services by creating insecurity (De Waal, 2015b; Elwert, 1997; Mehler, 2004). However, 
Yemen calls into question elements of this story, as we will see below. Tribal militias 
developed alongside and in alliance with the central military and local autonomy and indirect 
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rule were compatible at different times with both high levels of stability and significant 
instability, recalling dynamics analysed in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(Naseemullah, 2014). 
Incumbent elites and insurgents may also organise new coercive organisations. A substantial 
literature suggests that this should generate more centralised control over coercion and 
create more sophisticated security organisations. The centralising impetus of new coercive 
organisations stems from the direct relationships they create between actors at the centre 
and various locales not mediated through local gatekeepers, generating support for the 
central government and extending the reach of its patronage networks (Lowi, 2005, p.235; 
Martinez, 2000, pp.194–195; Wood, 2008, p.545).39 In a related dynamic, the pressures of 
civil war to increase selective violence can in some cases put a check on recruitment and 
organising strategies in the armed forces that exclusively prioritise political loyalty, creating 
incentives for institutionalisation and professionalization and thus fostering more 
sophisticated security organisations (Finer, 1976, 1975; Giustozzi, 2011b, pp.43–74).40 These 
centralising dynamics help explain why proponents of modernisation theory saw militaries as 
meritocratic, modernising, and nationalist, opposed to particularism and with a hierarchical 
organisation able to effectively mobilise resources (Halpern, 1965; Richards and Waterbury, 
1990, p.357; Ball, 1988).  
If this view now appears overly rosy, it is in part due to the caveats about mixed strategies 
discussed in Section 2.2 and the difficulties raised when, as in Yemen, new military units are 
organised along the very particularistic lines of (tribal) belonging they were believed to 
efface. More generally, different groups in the military may ally with different civilian groups 
and these alliances can shift over time. Corporate interests do not necessarily trump personal 
connections or interests associated with other markers of belonging (Ball, 1988, p.23).  
                                                          
 
39 Most military spending tends to be on salaries for personnel (Ball, 1988, pp.29-30). 
40 How soldiers and rebel fighters are recruited may be important in its own right (Weinstein, 2007, 
2005), though disentangling logics and distinguishing types is far from straightforward and the identity 
of members (who participates in armed groups), organisational structures and logics (how they 
participate) and individuals’ motivation and socialisation within the armed group (why they 
participate) determine the longer-term effects of military recruitment and militia formation 
(Guichaoua, 2013, 2012; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2008, 2003; Mampilly, 2011, p.14).  
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Even where they strengthen militaries, strategies that create new violence organisations may 
have ambivalent and potentially contradictory impacts on formal institutions not primarily 
about the administration of violence. They may weaken other formal institutions by crowding 
out investment and capacity or strengthen them by providing an organisational model and 
experience with large, centrally controlled hierarchical organisations.  
On the one hand, stronger central institutions dealing in violence may weaken institutions 
not primarily concerned with administering coercion. This pathway emphasises the potential 
for military expenditure to crowd out other forms of state spending, capture investment in 
unproductive ways, and impede concentrations of expertise and human capital in other 
institutions (Ball, 1988, pp.173-4). In situations characterised by limited organisational 
capacity and perceived internal and external threats, a unified, professional military has often 
dominated other institutions and appropriated rents and investments to their detriment 
(Giustozzi, 2011a, p.10; Grawert, 2016). In addition, stronger coercive central institutions can 
hollow-out civilian forms of administration as areas come under outright military rule, the 
civilian administration is subordinated to the war effort, and military institutions substitute 
for civilian ones, through military administration, martial law, and military-led construction 
efforts. To the extent that this pathway is operational, the formation of more sophisticated 
military organisations should lead to a weakening of non-coercive institutions. In Yemen we 
will see elements of this dynamic playing out, as military influence in local government and of 
officers as governors contributed to the absence and irrelevance of central institutions at the 
local level after the civil war.  
On the other hand, more sophisticated security organisations can have the opposite effect, 
providing an organisational model and a conduit for other forms of bureaucratic and 
hierarchical organisation. As Weber argued with reference to the European experience, the 
rule-bound behaviour and organisational discipline of the military may be transferable to the 
civilian bureaucracy (Weber, 1980, pp.681–686). Hierarchical, centralised, and disciplined 
security organisations have formed the organisational kernel of hierarchical, centralised, and 
often repressive administrative institutions (Straus and Waldorf, 2011; Cronin, 2014, p.17). In 
addition, mobilising, keeping track of, equipping, paying and otherwise managing new 
militaries can create demand for similarly centralised bodies to organise everything from the 
growing of food (Collingham, 2013), over the recruitment of soldiers, to overseeing industrial 
production (Wilson, 2006), thus driving selective bureaucratic penetration and expansion. In 
a related logic, Richard Stubbs describes a process whereby, during the ‘Malayan Emergency,’ 
the colonial government’s attempts to control territories “cleared” of insurgents and to avoid 
their return led it to significantly expand the civil service at the local level and send 
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government agents into areas where they had not hitherto been present (Stubbs, 1997, 
pp.65–66).  
If incumbent elites or challengers turn to external military intervention, the effect on 
institutions is similarly ambivalent. Outside military aid can directly train and equip the 
military, strengthen it as an institution, and supply additional capital resources and training 
(Ball, 1988, p.238). However, external intervention can also appear to guarantee the security 
of the incumbent regime, removing incentives to develop or invest in centralised security 
services and making ‘fragmentation strategies’ more attractive (Giustozzi, 2011a).  
Table 2: Effect of civil war on institutions 
Starting point         → Intervening process               → Effects on institutions 
Civil war reveals the 
existence of 
alternatives to the 
incumbent 
Reflects and provokes a crisis in 
the dominant coalition 
Multiplies competing local institutions 
and weakens central control of violence 
Civil war increases the 
salience of violence for 
rule maintenance 
Contenders empower local 
violence specialists 
Multiplies competing local institutions 
and weakens central control of violence 
Contenders organise new 
violence specialists, creating 
more sophisticated security 
institutions 
Strengthens central control of violence 
Weakens non-coercive formal 
institutions by crowding-out investment 
and capacity 
Strengthens non-coercive formal 
institutions through linkages and  
demonstration effects 
Contenders gain outside coercive 
capabilities 
Security guarantees allow neglect or 
purposive fragmentation of central 
institutions in control of violence 
Outside training and equipment 
strengthen the security forces and 
central control of violence 
Civil War redraws 
zones of control, 
decreasing income and 
increasing costs of rule 
maintenance 
Contenders gain external 
financing 
Donors define institutional forms and 
priorities; accountability flows to donor 
Contenders decentralise taxation 
Weakens non-coercive formal 
institutions through crowding-out 
Contenders expand taxation or 
borrow money domestically 
Strengthens non-coercive formal 
institutions through demonstration and 
emulation 
   
The third common feature of civil wars in this framework, redrawing and contestation of 
zones of control, often reduces both central control and the ability locally to sustain complex 
institutions that provide public goods (Arjona, 2014). Combined with the increased costs of 
maintaining effective control implied by a coordinated, violent challenge to the status quo, 
this creates strong incentives for incumbents to seek additional sources of funding or to more 
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aggressively exploit existing ones. Again, analogous to Section 2.2, incumbents and insurgents 
face difficult choices between different strategies. The literature suggests that the most 
important options from the perspective of institutional change are likely to be decentralising 
taxation to local power holders, expanding taxation to mobilise domestic resources, and 
gaining large-scale external financing. As before, these are not mutually exclusive options. 
Decentralising taxation often accompanies strategies to decentralise control over violence. If 
insurgents or members of the dominant coalition seek predominantly to decentralise taxation 
to existing local violence specialists, this is liable to weaken central institutions and non-
coercive institutions in particular. Contemporary warlord politics and historical variations of 
feudal models approximate such a system (Marten, 2007).  
Conversely, the literature suggests that seeking to centralise control over revenue 
strengthens non-coercive formal institutions and generates (selective) bureaucratic strength. 
Some research suggests that the state formation impact of internal conflict operates 
primarily via taxation and other measures to centralise control over revenues (Rodríguez-
Franco, 2016).41 On the whole, these are measures that require centralisation, rule-bound 
behaviour, and, because they are reliant on at least the passive acquiescence of important 
portions of the population, require bargaining and imply direct linkages between state 
officials and the broader population (Levi, 1988, 2002). The acute crisis of civil war may also 
be one of the few opportunities in which dominant coalitions, fearing insurgent victory, 
acquiesce to higher taxes (Stubbs, 1997, pp.60–62, 2004). However, the specific impact of 
taxation strategies will depend on the detail of their implementation. Whether tax is 
collected from all parts of the territory, whether there are other actors with the right or 
ability to tax, and whether taxation requires bargains with large numbers of economic actors 
or is purely rent-based is likely to temper the straightforward equation of taxation and 
bureaucratic strength and penetration (Di John, 2010a). Taxation, precisely because of the 
bargaining and institution-building it implies, may often be a final resort. In Yemen, even 
fiscal crisis did no more than prompt a flurry of new tax laws that remained unimplemented. 
To the extent that the new government generated income, it rested on control of trade, 
strategies of patronage, and the selective co-option of holders of capital.  
                                                          
 
41 Measures like marketing boards and compulsory savings schemes have historically been equally or 
more important (Di John, 2010a). 
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Finally, external funding has meant that donor preferences, via conditionality, affect 
institutions and procedures, often in unintended ways. External funding generates links of 
accountability to donors, allowing donor preferences to shape institutional structures, 
procedures, and priorities, often creating externally-orientated institutions in the donors’ 
image, generating economic distortions, or producing institutions that cannot be sustained by 
the domestic political economy (Ghani et al., 2007, p.182). External funding can also crowd 
out domestic institutions, bypass them, or erode the legitimacy that comes from delivery of 
services (Boyce and O’Donnell, 2007a p. 10-11). Certainly, the republican-royalist war in 
Yemen witnessed the wholesale reorientation of the YAR government apparatus to pursuing 
international rents and Egyptian spending largely bypassed the republican state in support of 
Egypt’s own ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns. However, the stronger claims in some of the 
literature, of de-institutionalisation as a systematic response to external financial flows 
(Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Reno, 2001, 1998) may generally not hold-up (Di John, 2010b, 
pp.20–22). In Yemen, though there were instances of crowding out and bypassing, there was 
also much externally-led institution building, suggesting, perhaps, the importance of donor 
agendas, the project being pursued, and the domestic political settlement, which defined 
how such financing was utilised and adapted. 
2.4 Effects on ideas of the state  
Civil wars and associated violence and upheaval are periods of intense and discontinuous 
change in conceptions of the state and popular ideas about what constitutes legitimate 
authority. Claim-making escalates and contenders articulate competing visions of ‘what we 
are fighting for.’ Table 3 summarises the ways in which the literature suggests this is likely to 
occur, presenting several potential pathways linking civil war to notions of legitimate 
authority and expectations of rule.42 
Since mobilisation during conflict is not only about recruiting fighters, but about generating 
much broader civilian support (Wood, 2016, p.458), contenders seeking to mobilise allies and 
followers tend to polarise and politicise the population and reshape public discourse and 
                                                          
 
42 As Lisa Wedeen (1999) reminds us, ideas need not be universally or even widely believed to be 
powerful in structuring elite decisions and popular expectations. 
55 
 
action along the macro-cleavages of the conflict (Tarrow and Tilly, 2007).43 Such politicisation 
can call into question the prevalent political common sense and make accepted elements of 
the status quo a point of contention between rivals. As a result, it provides an opening for 
shifts in the parameters of legitimacy.  
One way to analyse such shifts is to focus on rhetorical commonplaces, concepts like 
‘civilization,’ modernity’ or ‘the people,’ with vague and symbolically charged meanings that 
along with their collocates define the terms in legitimation contests. A rhetorical 
commonplace is a specific word or phrase appealed to by contending political forces. The 
vocabulary of rhetorical commonplaces draws attention to language not primarily as system 
of meaning, a formation of power, or a totalising system, but as a site of contention. Analysis 
of rhetorical commonplaces then is not analysis of discourse, of referents and difference, but 
of public rhetorical contests of the meaning of central terms used to claim legitimacy within a 
discourse — that is the public utterances and positionings of actors within a discourse in 
contests over terms whose importance is uncontested, while their meaning is. The idea of 
rhetorical commonplaces is also distinct from ideology in its focus: rather than drawing 
attention to the way a political organisation or philosophical movement bundles a set of 
specific understandings of such commonplaces and their relationships, it draws attention to 
public contests over the meaning of these central terms. It focuses not on where ideas come 
from, but on how they are used publicly. Specifically, Jackson (2006) introduces the term 
‘rhetorical commonplace’ to analyse how the trope of ‘western civilisation’ entered the post-
war German political lexicon. It became a central consensual reference point for a broad 
range of West German political forces, even while they sought to invest this commonplace 
with rival specific meanings. We can identify rhetorical commonplaces by identifying the 
most commonly used terms in contests over legitimacy. Such contests involve intersubjective, 
observable articulations of rhetorical commonplaces and claims about their meaning and 
relationship to one another. A given commonplace both shapes possibilities of public 
justification and is a site for contests over legitimacy (Jackson, 2006). It is primarily through 
the analysis of rhetorical commonplaces that the following investigation traces changes in 
                                                          
 
43 The idea that armed conflict can be associated with dramatic ideational change is also familiar from 
Castroist and Guevarist approaches to insurgency that view armed struggle as a means for rapid 
popular politicisation (Debray, 1969). 
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ideas of the state.44 Rapid changes in macro cleavages and acute contests over rhetorical 
commonplaces can also provide a legitimating framework, often tied to material support 
from incumbents and challengers, for groups and individuals seeking to alter or undermine 
existing forms of local authority and control. Micro-level studies of civil war have discussed 
this dynamic in terms of the co-production of cleavages at the local level, where the macro-
cleavages the conflict is ‘about,’ afford the framework for local actors to pursue their own 
interests, re-casting local allegiances and challenging traditional authorities (Kalyvas, 2003; 
Wood, 2008). The fact that the competencies required for success in violent settings are 
rarely those that are socially accepted and dominant during peace (Guichaoua, 2013, p.71, 
2011; Reno, 2001), strengthens this dynamic. Thus, war shifts the relative power of different 
local actors and affords opportunities to challenge existing local power brokers, re-
configuring power at the local level. This tends to undermine the legitimacy of the political 
order more broadly because it reveals it to be contingent and open to challenge, and re-
opens negotiations over the allocation of rights over control of capital and coercion (Cramer, 
2006). At the same time, political polarisation and more violent politics can produce a rally to 
the established order, not least by making the state more visible and its categories matter 
more immediately to everyday life as the dominant coalition cracks down on opposition and 
dissent (Heydemann, 2000, p.18). Indeed, political polarisation is likely to both produce and 
reinforce state centric identities and reduce the legitimacy of the political order, as rival 
groups mobilise followers to violently attack or defend the status quo.  
Civil war also increases the salience of violence for rule maintenance, so that the dominant 
coalition has an increased need for violence. Incumbents and challengers can meet this need 
by outsourcing violence to existing local violence specialists, mobilising new constituencies 
for violence, or gaining external military support. These choices are familiar from the previous 
sections. 
                                                          
 
44 The analysis of such commonplaces allows a serious consideration of how political actors use ideas in 
public contests over legitimacy, the main dimension of interest, while making fewer demands on 
sources, genealogical digging, and the longue durée than more Foucauldian-inspired analyses of 
discourse. This was an important consideration given the paucity of data and recorded texts of 
speeches, radio, and print media, especially on the royalist side, as well the greater weight placed on 
the political economy dimensions of analysis in the thesis. 
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From the vantage point of literatures on ideas of the state, providing resources and social 
sanction to local strongmen, tribal militias, or the levies of local landlords, reinforces 
established social organisations operating according to rules and logics that are different 
from and in many cases in rivalry with, those of the central state, generating political 
fragmentation and undermining the idea of the state as a coherent system of domination 
(Migdal, 2001). Indeed, if processes of state formation have in common the attempt to bring 
separate communities under the control of a central power and to redirect resources and 
loyalties previously embedded in local networks towards the political centre (Tilly, 1975), 
then by definition, outsourcing coercion in this way constitutes a reversal of such processes. 
Yet, while this view captures important dynamics in Yemen, we will see that, ultimately, a 
simple opposition between local and central, state and society is not helpful. Although this 
view has been largely absent in the civil war literature, we will see that literatures on tribes 
and (neo)patrimonialism in the Middle East that have highlighted the different modalities of 
co-option, cooperation, and incorporation of local and traditional institutions in state building 
processes (Charrad, 2011; Dresch, 1990; Kostiner, 1990), provide a more convincing reading 
of the case than one that views central and local projects and ideas as being fundamentally at 
odds with one another. 
Alternatively, dominant coalitions as well as insurgents can create new organisations dealing 
in violence. This will tend to reinforce state-centric identities because collective violence 
requires potent mechanisms of justification and widely-shared narratives about what is being 
fought for (Malešević, 2010). Military mobilisation has tended to “stress citizenship, collective 
identity, aggressive nationalism and mass mobilisation” (Heydemann, 2000, p.14; see also: 
Weber, 1977). It is likely that the identities thus created or reinforced will be heavily 
militarised, since the state and its violence specialists often become coterminous in elite 
representations and popular imaginings during wartime. The military tends to become the 
guardian of national values and the avatar of modernisation (Heydemann, 2000, p.19). The 
case suggests that such militarisation of ideas of the state can occur vicariously through 
external intervention. 
Gaining foreign military intervention is often associated with a loss of legitimacy for the 
dominant coalition, whose members become vulnerable to charges of being foreign agents, 
collaborators, or compradors (Cronin, 2014, p.10). Despite efforts to win ‘hearts and minds’ 
and investment in state building, citizens have primarily understood foreign military 
deployments – and the aid that accompanies them – as attempts by foreign powers to 
dominate their homeland, as important parts of the population did in Yemen and as appears 
to have been the case in Vietnam (Elkind, 2016). 
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The increased salience of violence for rule maintenance is also likely to lead to the 
incorporation of violence itself into conceptions of the state in the sense that violence 
becomes inscribed into social networks, interactions, and institutions and is legitimised, 
legalised, and routinized (Justino et al., 2013, p.7; Justino, 2012). By raising the stakes of 
political disagreement and because violence itself has the ability to create and reinforce 
divisions, this is also likely to be closely bound-up with political polarisation (Appadurai, 
1998). It is easy to over-state or essentialise the brutalising effect of conflict, but if violence 
shapes political identities across generations (Balcells, 2012) and moulds the very imagination 
of what power is (Tripp, 2013, p.21), it is liable to shape the idea of the state in important 
ways, although the effect appears ambivalent: the proliferation of physical violence and its 
inscription in everyday life can underwrite a rally to ‘normalcy’ and legitimate (any) order by 
Table 3: Effects of civil war on ideas of the state 
Starting point         → Intervening process              → Effects on ideas of state 
Civil war reveals the 
existence of 
alternatives to the 
incumbent 
Reflects and provokes a crisis in 
the dominant coalition, leading 
to political polarisation 
Creates an opening for shifts in the 
parameters of legitimacy 
Produces and reinforces state-centric 
identities 
Inscribes violence into ‘politics as usual’ 
Civil war increases the 
salience of violence for 
rule maintenance 
Contenders empower local 
violence specialists 
Reinforces non-state local logics and 
reduces legitimacy of the political order 
Contenders organise new 
violence specialists 
New, direct relations between central 
and local actors reinforce state-centric 
identities 
Larger coercive institutions militarise 
ideas of the state 
Contenders gain outside 
coercive capabilities, making 
them vulnerable to charges of 
foreign occupation and control 
Reduces legitimacy of the dominant 
coalition 
Civil War redraws zones 
of control, decreasing 
income derived from 
territorial control and 
increasing costs of rule 
maintenance 
Contenders print money, 
potentially triggering inflation 
and economic crisis 
Reduces legitimacy of the dominant 
coalition 
Incumbents decentralise 
taxation 
Increased predation reinforces state-
centric identities 
Reinforces non-state local logics and 
reduces legitimacy of the political order 
Contenders expand central 
taxation  
Increased taxes make the state present 
and visible, reinforcing state-centric 
identities 
Increased taxes are a grievance, 
reducing the legitimacy of the political 
order 
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comparison to the traumatic violence of war, or it can undermine legitimacy by reducing faith 
in the benefits of domination by the dominant coalition, as the state’s ability to afford even 
the most basic protection to its citizens is called into question.  
Finally, wartime dynamics surrounding control of capital likewise affect ideas of the state. 
This pathway begins from the observation that civil war involves the redrawing of zones of 
control, so that dominant coalitions lose access to domestic revenue. Combined with the fact 
that the increased salience of violence for rule maintenance will tend to increase the cost of 
maintaining effective control, this creates strong incentives to seek additional sources of 
funding or to more aggressively exploit existing ones. 
In this context, dominant coalitions can choose to outsource taxation – often in combination 
with outsourcing violence – providing de facto or de jure permission to local violence 
specialists to loot or extract resources in other ways. There is a tendency in the literature to 
equate such ‘warlord’ control with increased predation (Reno, 1998, 2002a; Leander, 2004). 
This is liable to be something of an oversimplification as there is mounting evidence that 
modes of extraction and governance depend on incumbents’ and challengers’ time horizons, 
as well as specific ideologies, levels of community organisation, and the connections between 
violence specialists and local communities (Arjona, 2014, 2011; Mampilly, 2007; see also: 
Jackson, 2003). Alternatively, contenders may seek to expand the tax bureaucracy and 
centrally-controlled extraction to increase revenues. Both outsourcing and expanding 
taxation likely have ambivalent effects. Increased predation by local violence specialists can 
retroactively justify central control, or conversely highlight the incoherence of existing 
institutions and the indifference of the dominant coalition to the everyday travails of the 
population. Similarly, increasing taxation can make the state more present, powerful and 
meaningful in popular imagining, if only by signalling that such a thing as ‘the state’ exists 
(Weigel, 2018) or, conversely, serve only to escalate grievances against the exactions of the 
dominant coalition.   
Other options involve gaining external funding or relying on other forms of rent that are less 
dependent on territorial control, printing money, or increasing domestic borrowing. The 
literature has little to say about these. Some research suggests that strategies of money 
creation that have a strong inflationary effect are associated with low growth and economic 
crisis if inflation surpasses context-specific thresholds (Bruno and Easterly, 1998; Eggoh and 
Khan, 2014). As such, it may create discontent with rulers, although not necessarily with the 
broader political settlement. 
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2.5 Conclusion to Chapter 2 
In place of the question whether civil war in general weakens or strengthens the state, which 
Chapter 1 rejected as simplistic, the model reveals the range of political orders created by 
and through war. In terms of the political settlement, it encompasses outcomes that include 
significant narrowing or broadening of the dominant coalition and decisive changes in the 
relative ascendancy of actors in control of coercion and capital within it. Institutional 
outcomes range from stronger and more centralised coercive and non-coercive institutions to 
fragmenting political power and the establishment of more localised coalitions and 
institutions. From the perspective of ideas of the state, it highlights the possibility of both 
continuity and fundamental transformation.  
The model reveals that war is neither ‘development in reverse,’ nor, as Heraclitus would have 
had it, the father of all things – a view continuing through 19th and 20th century thought to 
bring us advocates of ‘giving war a chance’ today (Herbst, 2004; Luttwak, 1999). Instead, it 
reveals civil war as a complex social process, which can be analysed in terms of recurring 
features. At the level of these recurring features, the model also demonstrates the utility of a 
variety of existing writing that has sought to derive mid-level contingent theory from the 
grounded, in-depth analysis of specific conflicts. This writing proved productive for 
developing a model of how civil war impacts the state, even though this is a question that has 
not, generally, been at the centre of this literature’s concerns.  
The model tells us what sort of transformations civil war may cause and draws attention to 
different alliances among contending groups, mobilisation for violence, and war financing. As 
rival potential pathways make clear, the same choices in different contexts do not necessarily 
lead to the same or even similar outcomes and context and contingency loom large. 
Moreover, the three layers of the model are likely to interact: some dynamics may be self-
reinforcing (for instance, accumulation of power by local power brokers is likely to hasten 
formal decentralisation and institutional fragmentation and vice-versa), while others may be 
self-weakening (for instance, if foreign intervention empowers military officers in the 
dominant coalition, but tends to weaken the military they command). It is a model that wants 
application to specific states engaged in specific wars, in fact, it shows why analysis only 
makes sense at that level. 
The model derived from these literatures sets the scene for process tracing and the 
subsequent discussion by telling us where to look and what sort of dynamics, within the 
almost unlimited richness of social reality, we should be interested in. At the same time, as 
the discussion has looked ahead to the application of the model to Yemen, it has highlighted 
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developments that do not seem to fit the causal relationships the dominant literature 
suggests. In this way, the model provides a means to identify where the case departs from, 
challenges, or prompts us to reconsider and critique the thematic literature, allowing us, 
through process tracing, to use the case study to reflect back systematically on the state of 
the art in civil war research.  
In applying the model, the following chapters seek to do justice to nearly eight years of 
conflict in North Yemen, full of changes, reversals and contradictions. Groups and individuals 
rapidly gained positions of power and just as quickly lost them again. To some extent, the 
discussion charts this ebb and flow of an ongoing power struggle, highlighting the different 
elements of the process active at different times, and the contingency of the final outcome. 
At the same time, the chapters give special prominence to the end points of these struggles – 
the final outcomes of wartime transformation are the explananda of interest. 
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3 STARTING POINTS: ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION 
Evaluating changes to the political settlement, institutions and ideas of the state wrought by 
the civil war requires an account of the ‘state starting points’ prior to the war as well as a 
discussion of the trajectories of state formation up to the 1960s. If civil war made a specific 
state, assessing the changes caused by war requires an account of the political order that 
preceded it, to allow the analysis to separate elements of stability and continuity from 
changes linked to the conflict. 
Continuing the preparatory work of Chapter 2, this chapter lays the empirical foundations for 
process tracing by examining the Imamate state before the civil war along the dimensions of 
the political settlement, institutions, and ideas of the state. In doing so, it seeks to adjudicate 
between older accounts, both within Yemen and without, stressing the static, backwards, and 
traditionalist nature of Yemeni society, the administration, and the underlying political 
settlement during the first half of the twentieth century,45 with more recent scholarship that 
has brought out the significant turmoil and changes of this time. There is much to commend 
the recent revisionist insistence that Imam Yaḥiyā Ḥamīd al-Dīn (r1918-1948)46 “transformed 
the Imamate, an otherwise marginal Shiʿi spiritual and temporal institution, into a powerful 
state that challenged British rule in the South and made claims to lead the entire Islamic 
world” (Willis, 2012, p.12). This scholarship stresses the dramatic changes under way in 
administering Yemen under the Ḥamīd al-Dīn Imams (Messick, 1993; Willis, 2004; and with 
qualifications: Bin Daghar, 2005). Yet, it may at times have over-compensated, veering too far 
down the revisionist path. Dramatic changes in dominant coalitions and their social 
underpinnings, in institutions, and ideas of the state were the rule, not the exception, in the 
Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa and the rest of Yemen’s near abroad during the first half 
of the 20th century. Within this context, the changes in Yemen were among the most cautious 
until the 1962 revolution. 
Section 3.1 explores the political settlement under Imam Yaḥiyā and his son Imam ʾAḥmad 
(r1948-1962). It discusses the role of Yemen’s powerful Hashemite families, the sāda, the 
                                                          
 
45 This persists, e.g. in: Jones, 2004, p.21. 
46 Arguably, Ḥamīd al-Dīn rule began in 1890 when the Zaydī ʿulamaʾ selected Muḥammad bin Yaḥiyā 
Ḥamīd al-Dīn, Imam Yaḥiyā’s father, as Imam. Yaḥiyā issued his daʿwa, his call to be recognised as 
Imam, in 1904. The Ottomans withdrew from Yemen in 1918, handing control to Imam Yaḥiyā.  
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religiously learned secondary elite, the quḍāa, and the important role of tribes and tribal 
leaders in the dominant coalition. It traces fault lines and divisions within the political 
settlement and highlights how growing centralisation of power within the Ḥamīd al-Dīn family 
called the political settlement into question as formerly powerful groups came to resent their 
increasing marginalisation. It closes with a discussion of merchants and military officers, 
whose political influence remained limited even as their control over capital and coercion 
expanded.  
Section 3.2 moves to a discussion of formal institutions, covering taxation and fiscal 
institutions (3.2.1), the military and security institutions (3.2.2), and the organisation of 
central and local administration (3.2.3). After Ottoman withdrawal, the Imams first adopted 
many recent Ottoman administrative and military innovations and then expanded upon 
them, extending their rule to areas that had rarely come under the influence of previous 
Imams.47 North Yemen’s political institutions during this time were marked by an extensive, 
effective, and widely resented bureaucracy for collecting and administering taxes; a growing 
central military that increasingly limited tribal influence in politics; and growing 
administrative centralisation in a context of minimal delegation of authority, limited 
institutionalisation, and low levels of functional differentiation. 
Section 3.3 discusses ideas of the state, describing the religious and anti-colonial rhetorical 
commonplaces that structured expectations of just rule during the Imamate. During the 
1940s and 50s, ideas about Imamic rule from Zaydī jurisprudence were increasingly 
supplemented and displaced by other concerns, which the Imams struggled to accommodate. 
First, emigration to Aden and experiences studying abroad catalysed elite demands for 
political reform couched in nationalist terms. Then, during the 1950s, Arab nationalism, 
socialism, and development became the predominant rhetorical commonplaces. Increasingly, 
existing ideas of just political order and legitimate rule were in question. 
Section 3.4 closes the chapter with a brief exploration of Crown Prince al-Badr’s regency in 
1959. An important moment of crisis, it is an episode that reveals the eroding foundations of 
the Imamate political settlement and changing parameters of legitimacy on the eve of the 
revolution, at a time when formal central institutions reached an unprecedented level of 
                                                          
 
47 Arguably, the early 20th century Imamic state and its innovations were themselves the product of the 
war against the Ottomans and Ottoman counterinsurgency. See: Wilhite, 2003. 
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influence. As such, it sets the stage for the analysis of wartime changes in the succeeding 
chapters.  
3.1 The political settlement on the eve of the revolution  
Imam Yaḥiyā and his son ʾAḥmad pursued an aggressive policy of centralisation and directly 
challenged alternative power centres, so that on-going conflict and change characterised the 
political settlement throughout the first half of the 20th century. The Imamic settlement, 
consolidated in the 1930s, was dominated by an alliance of spiritual and temporal authority 
between families of notables who claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad, known in 
Yemen as the sāda (singular sayyid), and the highland tribes, most notably the heads of the 
Ḥāshid and Bakīl tribal confederations.  
This settlement was under significant strain by the 1950s: Sayyid families with rival claims to 
the Imamate assassinated Imam Yaḥiyā in 1948.48 Military officers largely excluded from the 
settlement played a key role in fighting between factions of the Ḥamīd al-Dīn family in 1955 
and threatened mutiny in 1959. In addition, a series of tribal revolts, involving elements of 
the powerful tribal confederations of Ḥāshid, Bakīl, and Khawlān, called the alliance between 
the Ḥamīd al-Dīn and the highland tribes into question during the tumultuous years leading 
up to the 1962 revolution.  
3.1.1 The sayyid and qāḍī families  
Unlike much of the rest of the Arab world, where colonialism, domestic modernisation drives, 
and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire weakened traditional elites, northern Yemen 
exhibited remarkable elite continuity until the middle of the twentieth century (vom Bruck, 
2005, p.7).49 This continuity found its clearest reflection in the enduring role of a number of 
‘great houses’ or families (buyut kubar), who claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad 
and formed a quasi-hereditary administrative elite. This religious establishment largely 
belonged to the Zaydī school of Islam, a branch of Shiʿi Islam. It taught, judged, and ruled and 
was defined by descent, endogamous marriage, and a tradition of scholarship and public 
                                                          
 
48 On sayyid dominance of the coup, see: Douglas, 1987, pp.131–132. 
49 Sometimes this stability, purportedly combined with endogamy and residential segregation, has 
been likened to caste structures (Chelhod et al., 1985, pp.15–16). 
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service (vom Bruck, 2005, pp.4, 44, 131).50 The sayyid families were flanked by a religiously 
learned secondary elite, the quḍāa (singular qāḍī), who held positions as government judges 
and functionaries, or as officials in mosques and the ʾawqāf. They did not claim descent from 
the Prophet Muhammad and included both Shāfiʿīs and Zaydīs. 
Not all sāda were wealthy or part of the dominant coalition, nor were all wealthy landowners 
or high officials sāda. The male members of sayyid families might be teachers in religious 
schools, minor functionaries, and some were destitute. Some, like the Ghamdān family, even 
became involved in trading, long a low-status occupation in Zaydī thought (Stookey, 1978, 
p.180; vom Bruck, 2005, p.44). Conversely, a number of qāḍī families had comparable wealth 
and political influence to the great sayyid houses, including, for instance, the al-ʿAmrī, and al-
Siyāghī families (Stookey, 1978, p.180). Yet, quintessentially, the sāda were identified with 
large landholdings and high office and only sāda could aspire to become Imam.51 
Governorships, ministerial positions, and other leading government posts were generally held 
by sāda and sāda appear to have been exempt from government taxation (PAAA, B36 45, 24 
Apr. 1963).  
Moreover, in occupying administrative positions at the local level, the sāda were closely 
identified with state power and Ḥamīd al-Dīn rule as the everyday agents of the state, reading 
out political news and announcing government decrees and proclamations (Swagman, 1988a, 
p.79). In the North, this accorded with tribal conventions of rule and the sāda had a long-
standing role as mosque preachers, judges, mediators, and as administrators of religious 
endowments and markets, even during the periods of extensive tribal self-administration 
when central control lapsed throughout much of the 19th century (al-Saidi, 1981; Meissner, 
1987; Messick, 1993). In lower Yemen, their role was far less established prior to the rise of 
the Ḥamīd al-Dīn Imams. Here, the Imams partially replaced Shāfiʿī shaykhs and ʿulamaʾ, 
religious scholars, with Zaydī officials, many of them sāda (Douglas, 1987, p.13). Thus, 
particularly in lower Yemen, sāda became identified with Imamic government and rival local 
                                                          
 
50 Sayyid families are spread across Yemen, generally living among other groups. However, in the tribal 
north, a significant fraction of sāda lived in specific towns and settlements known as hijrāt (sing. hijra), 
where they were the majority of the population (Chelhod et al., 1985, p.28). 
51 In the North, sayyid landed wealth was comparable to that of tribesmen (Mundy, 1995, p.47). In the 
Tihāma, large landholdings by sayyid, and to a lesser extent qāḍī and shaykhly, families was the norm. 
See 3.1.4. 
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elites encouraged opposition to the sāda. By the late 1950s, anti-sāda sentiment formed an 
important part of the discourse of opposition to the Imam (see Section 3.3) and “the 
monopoly of power by the Seyeds [sic. …] was much resented” in the lead up to the 1962 
revolution (UKNA, PREM 11/3877, 6 Oct. 1962). Indeed, some sāda believed that Imam 
ʾAḥmad deliberately fostered hostility to them as a group to rally the sāda to the Imamate 
(vom Bruck, 2005, p.56). 
3.1.2 The Ḥamīd al-Dīn 
If this was the case, it was at best a partially successful strategy. For at the centre of sayyid 
power in the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, but at the same time increasingly at 
loggerheads with the ambitions of other sayyid families, was the house of Ḥamīd al-Dīn, one 
of the sayyid families with a historical claim to the Imamate. The Ḥamīd al-Dīn rulers brought 
an unprecedented level of centralisation to North Yemen. At least since the 1970s, students 
of Yemen have highlighted Imam Yaḥiyā’s “notable feat” of constructing a unified state after 
Ottoman withdrawal in 1918 through “more or less constant campaigns of conquest” during 
the 1920s (Stookey, 1978, p.167).  
Growing centralisation of power under the Ḥamīd al-Dīn contrasted with the chronic inability 
of the Ottoman government in Yemen to collect taxes and maintain a modicum of security 
(Willis, 2012, p.110). As such, the observation of British travellers in the late 1930s that, “if 
any ruler can say I am the state, it is the ruler of Yemen” (Scott and Britton, 1942, p.171), 
reflected recent changes in governance, rather than a constant of Yemeni history. Growing 
centralisation was accompanied by a gradual narrowing of the dominant coalition, as notable 
Shāfiʿī families, tribal leaders, and rival sayyid families were increasingly side lined (Stookey, 
1978, p.167). Yet, plenty of governance remained decentralised. Central authority focused on 
security and taxation and even here, tax farming and shaykhs’ command over ‘their’ tribal 
levies highlights how embedded forms of indirect rule remained (see 3.2). 
The Ḥamīd al-Dīn Imams pursued an increasingly dynastic vision of kingship at some variance 
with traditional Zaydī doctrine. In combination with the growing centralisation of power 
within the family, this upset and alienated powerful men of the other great houses like the 
Sharaf al-Dīn and al-Wazīr families, who found their offices transferred to relatives of the 
Ḥamīd al-Dīn (vom Bruck, 2005, p.49; Douglas, 1987, p.14). By the mid-1940s, the most 
lucrative provinces, in terms of their tax incomes, were governed by Ḥamīd al-Dīn princes, 
including Crown Prince ʾAḥmad in Taʿiz, Prince Ḥassan in ʾIbb, and Prince ʿAbd Allah in al-
Ḥudayda (Stookey, 1978, p.194). Less powerful sayyid families likewise saw their influence 
under threat due to centralising administrative reforms, such as growing treasury control 
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over the management of religious endowments (ʾawqāf), which had previously been 
administered by local sayyid families. Such measures generated growing resentment among 
other sāda, who considered themselves socially equal to the Ḥamīd al-Dīn but were 
increasingly politically subordinated (vom Bruck, 2005, p.51). Moreover, riches increasingly 
flowed to the family in ways that violated Zaydī prohibitions on using public office for 
personal gain. Imam ʾAḥmad created a monopoly on pharmaceutical products and received a 
large cut of several large commercial ventures (Stookey, 1978, p.195). For example, the Imam 
received over 50% of profits of the Yemen Trading Company, which enjoyed a near monopoly 
on imports of sugar, flour, rice, and tobacco. Prince Ḥassan, the Imam’s advisors, and several 
other princes also received significant shares. Only 12% of profits went to the merchant 
families who actually ran the business (Dresch, 2000, p.71). Narrowing access to power and 
the rents deriving from it, increasingly called the settlement overall into question.52 
3.1.3 Tribal leaders 
Yemen’s tribes have been decisive political actors and an important source of organised 
violence for successive rulers. Mostly, but not exclusively, defined by (myths of) shared 
ancestry (Weir, 2007, p.2), the vast majority of Yemen’s tribes are sedentary and hence 
territorially defined. Tribesmen in the first half of the 20th century were almost exclusively 
farmers, primarily owner-cultivators (Dresch, 1984, p.158).  
Scholars of Yemen’s tribes have disagreed on the extent to which tribes form meaningful 
collective actors and whether tribe and state formed alternative or complementary systems 
of political order.53 Yet they have been united by an insistence that ‘tribe’ is a meaningful 
social category and one that, certainly in North Yemen, had little to do with the knowledge 
production of imperial governance.54 Tribe (qabīla) and tribalism (qabīliyya) remain central 
                                                          
 
52 These internal rivalries among the sāda confound simpler versions of political settlement approaches 
that suggest settlements are defined by broad markers of ascriptive identity. 
53 Mundy (1995, p.203) suggests tribal power was historically a separate sphere of power and Carapico 
(1998, p.64) suggests it “presented itself as an alternative to the state,” while Dresch (1990) has 
stressed how tribal conceptions of rule viewed the tribe as embedded in the Imamic state and Lackner 
(2017, p.194) has recently suggested that tribe and state have complementary roles and “work best 
together in alliance.” 
54 Attempts to write about Yemen while rejecting the category have been far between (Blumi, 2011, 
2003; Wedeen, 2008) and arguably unconvincing. 
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categories for writing about history and politics by Yemeni and non-Yemeni scholars and 
continue to play an important role in how Yemenis who identify as members of a tribe 
describe their own identity (Brandt, 2017, pp.15–18; Weir, 2007, pp.1–4). 
Different evaluations of the role of tribes in part reflect regional variation and change over 
time. Tribes in Upper Yemen form larger units with more sophisticated mechanisms of 
federation and coordination than in the central highlands south of Ṣanaʿāʾ and in lower 
Yemen. Tribal organisation is also shaped by Yemen’s diverse ecology and topography (Weir, 
2007, pp.2–3). In Upper Yemen, most tribes belong to two large confederations, Ḥāshid and 
Bakīl, both headed by a paramount shaykh (shaykh al-mashāyikh) with significant influence in 
Yemeni politics throughout much of the 20th century. Other tribes and confederations exist 
alongside them, like the Khawlān bin ʿĀmir (Dresch, 1984, p.154). These tribes have 
sophisticated organisational structures, an administrative and juridical apparatus, written 
laws, durable alliances, a culture of mediation and dialogue, and historically evolved links 
with state power (Weir, 2007, p.4; see also: Brandt, 2017, p.17). By contrast, in lower Yemen, 
‘tribal’ organisation in the middle of the twentieth century was largely village-based (Stookey, 
1978, pp.183–184), leading some to suggest tribes were wholly absent in these areas (Dresch, 
1990, p.254).  
Even at the head of the most coherent tribes, tribal leaders “se rapprochent d’avantage de 
présidents de comités que de chefs d’état” (Serjeant, 1967, p.286) and collective action 
required bargaining and deal-making. The position of the paramount shaykh was contested 
(Brandt, 2014, pp.100–104) and tribes, sub-tribes, and families maintained bargaining power 
vis-à-vis tribal leaders, through defaults on tribal subscriptions, threatening defection, and 
even the use of force (Weir, 2007, p.277).55 Imam’s Yaḥiyā’s skilful exploitation of such 
divisions between and within tribes was key to his ability to manage tribal rebellions and 
impose chosen officials and central rules on tribes (Weir, 2007, pp.264–265; al-Saidi, 1981, 
pp.148–149). Similarly, during the civil war, many shaykhly families supported the republic, 
while large parts of the tribes they headed supported the Imam (Dresch, 1993b, p.248).  
In the first decades of the Ḥamīd al-Dīn Imamate, the tribes, individually and collectively, 
formed the backbone of the Imam’s armed strength (Peterson, 1982, p.51). This began to 
                                                          
 
55 Despite a mythology of constancy, individuals, sub-tribes and occasionally larger units can change 
affiliation (Peterson, 1982, p.50; Gingrich and Heiss, 1986, p.17; Dresch, 1984). On tribal structure in 
general see: Dresch, 1993b, pp.24–25; Meissner, 1987.  
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change when Imam Yaḥiyā developed a regular standing army, the jaysh al-niẓāmī, and a 
trained tribal reserve, the jaysh al-difāʿī. To a lesser extent, however, the Imams continued to 
rely on the armed strength of the highland tribes. The niẓāmī and difāʿī armies continued to 
be supplemented by the jaysh al-barānī – tribal fighters under command of their shaykhs. 
Barānī troops attached themselves to officials and tax collectors and the forcible billeting of 
barānī troops, known as tanfīdh, was a major source of resentment against the Ḥamīd al-Dīn 
Imams, especially in the Tihāma and lower Yemen (Douglas, 1987, pp.13, 66; Ḥajjāj, 2014, 
p.60; Nājī, 1988, p.124; Weir, 2007, p.47). Ad-hoc levies of tribal fighters played an important 
role in defeating the 1948 coup against Imam Yaḥiyā (Johnsen, 2017, pp.56–63) and in 
containing a mutiny within the regular army in 1959, explored further in Section 3.4 below. 
While still armed, organised and politically relevant, as the 1960s dawned in Yemen, tribes 
were less central to Yemeni politics than in previous decades. Tribal leaders played virtually 
no role in formal politics, the regular army and divide and rule strategies had defeated tribal 
rebellions, and the Imam cut off tribal leaders from Ottoman-era stipends – they now 
received money only in exchange for giving up tribal hostages (see 3.2.3 below). Although, as 
Imam Yaḥiyā developed the “strongest and most centralised state Yemen had hitherto 
known,” he created state structures largely congruous with the tribal order in Upper Yemen, 
in aggregate centralisation slowly stripped away tribal autonomy. Making use of local 
interests and divisions, the tribal system proved prone to subversion where it experienced a 
sustained challenge and the Imam was able to manage tribal discontent by promising lesser 
shaykhs advancement against the incumbent leaders (Dresch, 2000, pp.71, 84; Bin Daghar, 
2005, pp.96-97). Increasingly, tribal leaders were negotiating local power with centrally-
appointed governors, commanders, and other officials.  
In the absence of more granular general histories, studies of specific areas illustrate this 
dynamic. For instance, in her study of Jabal Rāziḥ, Shelagh Weir describes how the land of the 
Khawlān bin ʿĀmir tribes became the governorate of Ṣaʿda and the al-Nāẓir sub tribe became 
the administrative unit of Jabal Rāziḥ. Tribally-chosen shaykhs, notables, and tribesmen 
staffed the lower levels of administration and tribal leaders kept responsibility for handling 
most transgressions in their domain and those by members of their tribe according to tribal 
law (Weir, 2007, pp.269–270, 275). Yet, at the same time, over the course of the 1930s, the 
Imam began appointing the governor and judges, installed treasury officials in the provincial 
capital, and commissioned a census of the Khawlān bin ʿĀmir tribes. The al-Nāẓir tribe began 
to allow government police into their territory and government judges handled a growing 
number of disputes instead of tribal mediators (Weir, 2007, pp.269–270, 275–276). The Imam 
collected tax in Jabal Rāziḥ, a portion of the taxes went to the Imam’s court, and the Imam 
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received the proceeds from auctioning off rights to collect import duties from trade with 
neighbouring Saudi Arabia. The share of locally collected taxes the Imam paid to tribal leaders 
was less than half of what they had received when Jabal Rāziḥ was ruled by al-ʾIdrīsī (Weir, 
2007, pp.278, 279).  
3.1.4 Peripheries of the Settlement: Sectarian divisions, Military Men, and Merchants 
On the margins of the settlement were merchants from the Shāfiʿī lowlands, who were 
gaining in influence as the Yemeni economy became more cash-based and more integrated 
into the global economy; and military officers, who sat atop a military that gradually gained in 
power vis-à-vis the tribes. These groups require at least brief mention, not least because they 
were to play an important role in the overthrow of the Imam in 1962 and the ensuing civil 
war.  
The role of these groups is intimately bound up with the sectarian dimension of the Imamate 
political settlement, an issue that remains politically sensitive, particularly in light of the 
sectarianisation of the current war (Philbrick-Yadav, 2017). One important and enduring line 
of division in Yemen was that between Zaydīs, a strain of Shiʿi Islam with significant doctrinal 
overlap with the Sunna, and followers of the Shāfiʿī school of Sunni Islam.  
The doctrinal difference between the two schools is relatively minor and it was (and still is) 
common for believers of one or the other school to pray in the other’s mosques. Moreover, 
the ideal of Muslim unity formed a common reference point for Shāfiʿīs and Zaydīs and hence 
protesting the irrelevance of this distinction was central to Yemeni politics of the time. 
Indeed, the creation of sectarian tension was a common slur directed against political 
enemies. Prominent Shāfiʿī quḍāa in the Free Yemeni Movement like ʾAḥmad Muḥammad 
Nuʿmān claimed the Imam was sowing such tension, just as the Imam himself accused ṣawt 
al-ʿarab and particularly the broadcasts of ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-Bayḍānī of encouraging 
sectarian discord. 
Irrespective of the niceties of doctrinal debate, political and economic factors lent the 
distinction between Zaydīs and Shāfiʿīs important weight in practice. It structured Yemeni 
politics under the Imams and was central to the way both outsiders and Yemenis made sense 
of the politics of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom and the Yemen Arab Republic (Douglas, 1987, 
p.8). Ottoman governing knowledge had depended on the Shāfiʿī-Zaydī distinction (Wedeen, 
2008, p.32) and the Imam maintained separate Zaydī and Shāfiʿī legal systems and judges. 
Under the Ḥamīd al-Dīn, Shāfiʿī shaykhs and ʿulamaʾ were increasingly displaced by Zaydī 
governors and lower-level officials (Douglas, 1987, p.13). 
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The Shāfiʿī-Zaydī split also coincided, in general terms, with regional differences in social 
organisation. The highlands, where the ideal, if not always the reality, of social organisation 
was that of autonomous tribes as social, military, and economic units composed of formally 
equal small-holding farmers, were largely Zaydī. Landholdings there rarely exceeded several 
hectares. By contrast, the Tihāma, which was majority Shāfiʿī, displayed far more unequal 
land-holdings. In the spate irrigated Wādī Mawr region, for instance, two landowners each 
owned more than 150 ha of prime irrigated farmland and more than 1,300 ha of rain irrigated 
land (Escher, 1976, p.85). In the Tihāma overall, tenant farming and landless labourers were a 
significant part of the agricultural economy (Nugent, 2003, pp.263–266). The parts of Yemen 
with the highest rainfall around Taʿiz and ʾIbb, had more equal landholding patterns and were 
also majority Shāfiʿī. However, tribal organisation in these areas, to the extent it mattered, 
was far more small scale and village orientated than in the highlands (El-Azzazi, 1978, p.36; 
see also: Chaudhry, 1997, p.106; Kopp, 1981, pp.130–134).  
Regional differences in custom and accent closely mapped onto the sectarian distinction and 
some have argued it was “akin to ethnic difference” (Dresch, 2000, p.47). This seems too 
strong given that, though an important marker of identity, it was also one that was relatively 
fluid.56 Nonetheless, the distinction between Shāfiʿī and Zaydī was a structuring horizontal 
inequality in the Imamic political settlement (Stewart, 2008). Shāfiʿī areas in the spate-
irrigated Tihāma valleys and the famously green terraces of ʾIbb and Taʿiz were “expected to 
provide the bulk of tax income” of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom (Chaudhry 1997, 103) and 
Shāfiʿīs were under-represented in civil and military positions of power (Stookey, 1978, 
p.173). High taxation was a significant factor in migration from lower Yemen and, alongside 
the use of corvée labour and the practice of billeting troops, fed discontent in the Shāfiʿī 
lowlands (See 3.2.1 and: Chaudhry, 1997, pp.103, 109; Peterson, 1982, p.77).  
Merchants 
In the Yemeni status order, traders were subordinate to the sāda, quḍāa, and tribes (Lackner, 
2017, pp.195–196) and in Zaydī doctrine in particular, trade was considered a profession 
                                                          
 
56 For instance, Zaydī families that settled in ʾIbb as governors and administrators adopted local 
pronunciation and Shāfiʿī practice and became locally understood as Shāfiʿī within a generation 
(Messick, 1978, pp.60–61, 361–362). 
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without honour.57 As a result – and because the coastal towns were largely Shāfiʿī – 
historically most traders were Shāfiʿī. Yet, as the profits available from trade outpaced those 
available through land-ownership, this picture began to shift slightly over the first half of the 
20th century. In the course of the 1930s and 1940s, Imam Yaḥiyā created a series of trading 
monopolies and monopsonies, in the process creating a northern commercial class 
(Chaudhry, 1997, p.111). This encompassed the Ṣanaʿāʾ-based commercial houses of al-ʿAmrī, 
al-Thawr, al-Withārī, and al-Zubayrī from among Zaydī qāḍī families, al-ʿAdhbān, a leading 
tribal family and al-Ghamdān, a sayyid family. However, the most important trading families 
were based in Aden, were disproportionally Shāfiʿī, and largely hailed from lower Yemen. The 
Thābit family and Hāʾil Saʿīd ʾAnʿam, for instance, both operated from Aden and originally 
hailed from lower Yemen, building large trading empires without significant patronage. By 
contrast, the al-Jabālī family, originally from the Tihāma, proved the most adept at building 
relations with the Imam, and ʾAḥmad al-Jabālī came to dominate the external trade of the 
Mutawakkilite Kingdom, building a cotton ginning factory and an oil press in al-Ḥudayda – 
investments other traders feared to make (El Attar, 1964, pp.202–204). 
Thus, although some Ṣanaʿāʾ based trading families existed, the bulk of traders hailed from 
lower Yemen and Taʿiz in particular and until the early 1980s, they played a dominant role in 
North Yemen’s commerce (vom Bruck, 1998, pp.279–282). Traders formed the bulk of the 
Shāfiʿī urban elite and controlled most commerce above the retail level. With the exception 
of al-Jabālī, they were without strong ties to the Imam’s court, resentful of Imamic taxation, 
and lacked security for their investments. Many of the main trading families either made their 
fortunes in Aden or moved there as the Imams tightened control of trade in the decades 
before the revolution. Yet, they remained deeply invested in the goings-on in the North and 
remained the main source of foreign currency for the government. For this reason, most of 
the new government-licensed trading organisations and monopolies created in the 1940s and 
50s included merchants as minority partners (Stookey, 1978, pp.182, 201–202).  
Lowland merchants played an important role in informal banking, remittances, and transport, 
thanks to their cross-border ties (Chaudhry, 1997, p.114) and their capital and connections 
provided important resources to the Free Yemeni Movement and its nascent newspapers and 
magazines opposing the Imam (Chaudhry, 1997, p.123; Stookey, 1978, p.197). At least one 
Aden-based Shāfiʿī trader, known as Saʿīd ʾIblīs, used his trading networks and warehouses to 
                                                          
 
57 This changed during the war. See: Tutwiler, 1987, p.407.  
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purchase, stockpile, and smuggle arms and ammunition to overthrow the Imam (Douglas, 
1987, pp.224–228). Overall, there were about one million North Yemenis living outside the 
Mutawakkilite Kingdom at the beginning of the 1960s, equivalent to 20-25% of the 
population, largely in Aden and Saudi Arabia (Stookey, 1978, pp.195–196). 
Military Officers 
Military officers played an important role at the periphery of the political settlement – and 
were to forcefully impose themselves in the course of the 1960s. The growth of the military 
under Imams Yaḥiyā and ʾAḥmad is explored in Section 3.2.2, yet one important aspect not 
readily legible in terms of the military as an institution is its composition and relationship to 
other power centres – the focus of this section.  
The Imam created the regular standing army (al-jaysh al-niẓāmī) in the 1920s to modernise 
the armed forces and balance the coercive power of the tribes. Following defeat in the 1934 
war with Saudi Arabia, in which better trained and equipped Saudi regulars routed the 
Yemeni forces, the Imam oversaw additional innovations. Greater emphasis on drill and some 
changes to pay scales increased the distinctions between soldiers and officers (Nājī, 1988, 
p.121). In 1935, the Imam sent the first cohort of officers abroad for military training in Iraq 
and established a military intelligence branch.58 In a break from established practice, the 
officers sent to Iraq were almost exclusively non-sayyid and without connection to major 
tribal families (Douglas, 1987, pp.25–29; Burrowes, 2005), since the Imams considered 
officers without tribal ties more politically reliable in case of a tribal challenge. Similarly, 
although it recruited from both Zaydīs and Shāfiʿīs, the niẓāmī army had few Shāfiʿī officers 
and none at the highest ranks, as their devotion to the Imamate was suspect. Many of the 
officers sent abroad for training were orphans, aiding the creation of an officer corps with a 
measure of collective identity (Nājī, 1988, p.111; Stookey, 1978, p.211).  
This officer corps, of no more than 400 trained officers in the niẓāmī army at the time of the 
1962 coup, sat atop a military that was gradually gaining an edge – in terms of equipment, 
                                                          
 
58 Officer training abroad continued under the Imams in Iraq between 1936-1948, in Egypt between 
1948-1962, and the USSR between 1957-1962 (Ḥajjāj, 2014, p.56). Among those sent to Iraq were al-
Sallāl, who led the 1962 revolution and ʾAḥmad Yaḥiyā al-Thulāyā, the leader of the failed 1955 coup. 
On military educational missions in general see: Bin Daghar, 2005, pp.107-109 and Juzaylān, 1977, 
pp.30-31, 33-38. 
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training and doctrine – over tribal units, but that had relatively low social status and no clear 
ties to other power centres within the Imamate settlement. This was part of Imam ʾAḥmad’s 
careful balancing of rival power centres: Ḥāshid and Bakīl had proven decisive in 1948 to 
reverse the coup against Imam Yaḥiyā and Ḥāshid had seen off the threat of a military mutiny 
in 1959, but the regular military had put down a succession of tribal revolts in the final years 
before the revolution.  
3.2 Imamate government institutions 
This Imamic political settlement was incarnated in and administered by an array of 
government institutions. They have generally been cast as backwards and ineffective, 
including in more recent scholarship (Jones, 2004, p.19), reproducing revolution-era 
propaganda that claimed an absence of administration prior to the overthrow of the Imam.59 
Other, particularly more recent, scholarship has insisted on the Imamate’s administrative 
innovations and the way it adapted and expanded on Ottoman models that themselves 
represented attempts to modernise the Empire (Kuehn, 2011; Willis, 2012; Farah, 2002). 
Beyond expanding taxation, re-casting administrative divisions, and setting-out procedural 
codes during the 1920s and 30s (Peterson, 1982, pp.51–52), these reforms included military 
innovations and the extension of the telegraph network to allow direct communication 
between the Imam and local officials in all governorates (Willis, 2012, pp.107–108, 125–126). 
Together, these new practices centralised decision making and expanded the Imams’ rule 
outside of the highland towns to areas that had only intermittently come under the influence 
of previous Imams (Peterson, 1982, p.59). These revisionist accounts accord with 
ethnographic studies of the immediate post-war years, covering different areas of the 
country, that tend to stress effective administration under the Imam, high levels of central 
control, and the importance of the circulation of zakat taxes for the local political economy 
(e.g. Messick, 1978; Weir, 2007). 
North Yemen’s political institutions during the first half of the twentieth century were 
defined by an extensive, effective, and widely resented bureaucracy for collecting and 
                                                          
 
59 This view also defined official reports of the immediate post-war era. For instance, the IBRD notes 
that “the system of public finances inherited from the Imam was essentially medieval in character and 
totally unsuited to the needs of an economy attempting to modernize,” calling it “at best archaic” 
(IBRD, 1970, p.27). 
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administering taxes; a growing central military that increasingly limited tribal influence in 
politics; and growing administrative centralisation in a context of minimal delegation of 
authority and limited institutionalisation and functional differentiation. These features are 
further explored with a focus on taxation and fiscal institutions (3.2.1), the military and 
security institutions (3.2.2), and the organisation of central and local administration (3.2.3) in 
the years leading up to September 1962.  
3.2.1 Fiscal institutions under the Imam  
By most accounts, Imamic taxation functioned with significant central control and oversight, 
often involving the Imam personally. The Imams kept careful tallies of income and Imam 
ʾAḥmad allegedly personally telegraphed al-Ḥudayda, the most important port, every day to 
find out how much customs duty had been collected (Burrowes, 2009, “revenue and taxes”). 
Most of the perhaps 2,000 officials employed in the central administration in the late 1950s 
were directly involved in taxation and “the extractive agencies of the Imam were highly 
developed” (Chaudhry, 1997, p.106; see also: Dresch, 2000, p.124). The treasury had an 
extensive local presence in most towns and central assessors sought to ensure the Imam 
received all he was due. At the same time, administration at the centre rested with the Imam 
alone and the German embassy noted, for instance, that the finance ministry before the 
revolution was a “farce” that existed in name only. District-level directors of finance insisted 
on direct relationships with the Imam and refused to communicate with the ‘ministry’ (PAAA, 
B12 1060, Annual Report 1961). No matter was too small to warrant a decision by the Imam 
and no payment too trifling to require personal sign-off (Burrowes, 1987, p.18; see also: 
Carapico, 1998, p.29).  
In a book adapted from his PhD thesis, a later YAR finance minister estimated the 
government budget for 1961, before the overthrow of the Imam (El Attar, 1964, pp.213–214). 
His figures, summarised in Table 4 below, give a glimpse into the fiscal basis of the Imamate 
state. They sketch the picture of a government that relied for the overwhelming majority of 
its income on direct taxation, had minimal access to domestic credit, and was being offered 
external funding for development projects beyond its fiscal means. It spent about 30% of its 
recurrent budget on the security services and the remainder on civilian administration and 
payments to tribes. Total domestic government income in 1961 came to 25 million Maria 
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Theresa Thaler (MT),60 largely from direct taxes. Recurrent expenditure was equal to income 
from domestic sources, with approximately 8 million MT going to ‘military and security’ 
expenses and 17 million MT to ‘civilian expenses.’ Without offering further details, El Attar 
estimated that ‘payments to sāda’ – which appears to be a tendentious rendering of 
payments to local administrators – and subsidies to the tribes made up the most important 
costs under the civilian budget line.  
Table 4: Estimated Yemeni government income and expenditure in 1961 
(MT millions) 
Income 38.2 
From domestic sources 25 
of which taxes 21 
of which customs duty 4 
From foreign aid and loans 13.261 
Expenditure 38.2 
Recurrent expenditure 25 
of which military expenses 3.8 
of which other security 
expenses 
4.1 
of which ‘civilian expenses’ 17.1 
Investment 13.2 
Table adapted from El Attar, 1964, pp.213-216 
Direct Taxation 
Taxation and specifically zakat was the biggest source of revenue for the Imamate state. 
Taking their cue from the complaints of the Free Yemenis and other opponents to the Imam, 
scholars have generally stressed the high levels of taxation under the Imamate, especially in 
the lowlands and the Tihāma (Dresch, 2000, p.47; Stookey, 1978, p.201).62 These ubiquitous 
                                                          
 
60 The German and Italian embassies estimated government income to be 20 million MT in 1961 (PAAA 
B12 1060, Annual Report 1961). The Maria Theresa Thaler, a silver coin first minted in Austria in the 
18th century, was a popular trading currency in the Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa, and the 
Indian Ocean and the dominant currency in Yemen until the paper Riyal was introduced in 1964. Prior 
to 1964, the terms Yemeni Riyal and Maria Theresa Thaler denote the same currency. It was also 
sometimes known as the riyāl fransī (French Riyal). 
61 El Attar (1964, pp.215–217) estimates foreign aid was $15 million in 1957, $16 million in 1958 and 
$15 million in 1960, respectively; a five-year annual average of $9.2 million (13.2 million MT) for the 
1957-1961 period.  
62 Occasional claims that Zaydīs were not taxed appear false. Taxation of Zaydī tribes was the norm 
(e.g. Weir, 2007, pp.277–278), though sāda appear to have been exempt (compare 3.1.1 above). 
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complaints about taxes may be as much a reflection of the novelty of successful taxation 
under the Imam and its perceived illegitimacy, as of a particularly high tax burden – if we 
distinguish between the taxes accruing to the Imam or his agents and the overall burden of 
expenses farmers and particularly sharecroppers in different parts of Yemen faced.  
Taxation theoretically was everywhere the same and followed the canonical regulations on 
zakat, amounting to 10% of the yield on rain-fed agriculture and 5% on irrigated land 
(El Attar, 1964, pp.209–210). Unlike the Ottomans, who struggled to collect zakat outside of 
towns and had reverted to local shaykhs assessing and collecting contributions of their own 
tribes – rendering taxation uneven, quasi-voluntary, and largely ineffective – the Imams were 
more successful in taxing the countryside (Messick, 1978, p.170). Most of the Imam’s civil 
servants were engaged in one form or another in collecting taxes and, according to the IBRD, 
“under the old regime the administration of zakat taxation, although not uniform, was more 
effective” than after the revolution (IBRD, 1970, Annex II, p.3).  
Nonetheless, farmers in different areas faced significantly different expense burdens. In 
practice, taxes could be far higher than stipulated, as the Imams relied on tax farming for 
certain types of taxes, resulting in “arbitrary taxation levels” set by the tax farmers 
themselves (Peterson, 1982, p.54; El Attar, 1964, p.211).63 Moreover, while official 
representatives of the Imam assessed and collected taxes in the lowlands (Messick, 1978, 
pp.221–223), in the highlands, taxation was collected by a locally appointed representative 
(ʾamīn). Because he was locally appointed, the ʾamīn had incentives to limit exactions, held in 
check by pay by commission, while centrally-appointed directors of finance in lower Yemen 
did not (IBRD, 1970, Annex II p.3). Payments to landowners could also vary significantly and 
could be cripplingly high in the lowlands, with sharecroppers responsible for all seeds, labour, 
and other inputs and routinely paying half of the crop to the landowner and/or the owner of 
the water in certain types of irrigated agriculture (Escher, 1976, pp.91–92; Dequin, 1976, 
p.47; Kopp, 1981, pp.142–149). In the tribal highlands, land ownership was much more 
egalitarian and multiple mechanisms limited the ability of outsiders to acquire land and of 
tribesmen with large landholdings to exploit their theoretically equal fellow tribesmen. As a 
result, smallholdings predominated (Kopp, 1981, pp.136–137; Dostal, 1974, p.8). 
                                                          
 
63 Halliday claims that taxation routinely amounted to 25% of total yield (Halliday, 1974, p.88). 
78 
 
Combined with taxes, bribes to assessors, fees to tax farmers, and the upkeep of billeted 
troops, expenses for sharecroppers in the Tihāma and lower Yemen were high enough to 
deter production. In ʾIbb, many farmers avoided planting winter crops because they were, in 
practice, more heavily taxed. Livestock ownership and coffee and hide production, two of 
Yemen’s few exports, all declined in the late 1950s and early 1960s because a combination of 
droughts and taxes made them unprofitable (Stookey, 1978, p.195).64 High taxation – or 
rather high payments to landowners combined with taxation – also played an important role 
in migration from lower Yemen to Aden (Douglas, 1987, pp.13–14).65 
Fiscal innovations: customs duty and foreign aid 
Beyond zakat and other canonical Islamic taxes, the Imams developed ways to raise 
additional revenue from trade through customs duties and foreign loans. After taxes, 
customs duties were the second most important source of income, levied at border crossings 
with British South Arabia and Saudi Arabia and at the Mutawakkilite Kingdom’s Red Sea ports 
of al-Mukhā and al-Ḥudayda. The most important source of customs duties by far was al-
Ḥudayda port, which, after a Soviet-financed expansion in 1960, handled the majority of the 
country’s foreign trade (Peterson, 1982, p.54). Customs duty was levied on imports and 
export taxes were levied on all Yemeni exports of significance (El Attar, 1964, p.212).66 As 
discussed in 3.1.2 above, the Imam also became increasingly involved in trade directly. 
Foreign aid and loans also began to factor in government calculations from the mid-1950s 
onwards, when Imam ʾAḥmad accepted the first large-scale projects proposed by the USSR, 
the United States, and China, to expand al-Ḥudayda port and connect the main cities of 
Ṣanaʿāʾ, Taʿiz, and al-Ḥudayda by road. Foreign spending on large infrastructure projects 
accounted for more than a third of government income over the 5 years leading up to the 
revolution and it is important to acknowledge the extent to which the Imamate relied for 
                                                          
 
64 Cotton production, however, increased significantly under Imam ʾAḥmad (El Attar, 1964, pp.177–
179). 
65 The political economy of the Imamate calls into question the recently popularised idea that states 
cannot climb hills (Scott, 2009). The political and fiscal problems of the Imamate revolved around 
highland control of lowland agriculture. 
66 The Mutawakkilite Kingdom ran a persistent trade deficit. It was ca. $8 million in 1961 (El Attar, 
1964, pp.177–178, 194–201; see also: Ḥajjāj, 2014, p.50). 
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investment on outside aid. However, it is also easy to overstate the Imamate’s dependence 
on such loans and grants. Foreign funding provided one-off investments in infrastructure. 
Government current expenditure did not depend on external aid. Moreover, although 
El Attar points out that Yemen would have faced a large balance of payments deficit without 
foreign aid as early as 1959 (El Attar, 1964, p.217), since the vast majority of inputs for road 
building and harbour expansion were imported, the deficit may not have been structural, but 
a result of foreign loans and grants.  
3.2.2 Military and security institutions under the Imam 
When Ottoman troops withdrew from Yemen in 1918, they left the Imam “almost without 
military or police organisation” (Wenner, 1967, p.55). Realising the need for a military force 
against rebelling tribes, for collecting taxes, and to keep in check external enemies, including 
an expanding Saudi Kingdom to the north and the British to the south, Imam Yaḥiyā 
succeeded in retaining approximately 300 Ottoman officers and soldiers for a new Yemeni 
military modelled on the Ottoman Jandarma. For the next three decades, military orders and 
drill were in Turkish as Imam Yaḥiyā embarked on an ambitious campaign of conquest. 
Successful campaigns against Muḥammad al-ʾIdrīsī, who ruled over large parts of the Tihāma 
and ʿAsīr after Ottoman withdrawal (Bang, 1996), and less successful battles against the Al 
Saʿud and the British ended in a series of treaties and agreements throughout the 1930s that 
defined the international borders of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen to the North and 
South (Nājī, 1988, pp.107, 110, 122; Ḥajjāj, 2014, p.51; see also: Fattah, 2010).  
The Jandarma-based force mustered for these battles was called the ‘organised’ or 
‘systematic’ army (jaysh al-niẓāmī). It was initially composed of the rump Ottoman forces and 
approximately 2,000 recruits drawn from the tribal fighters who had supported Imam Yaḥiyā 
against the Ottomans, former soldiers in the Ottoman military, and new recruits, particularly 
from the small tribes around Ṣanaʿāʾ (Ḥajjāj, 2014, p.54). As the niẓāmī forces grew, 
recruitment became based on the conscription of set quotas from different areas or tribes.67 
Soldiers served in mixed units: soldiers from different tribes served side by side, commanded 
by officers trained in a newly-created war college. Soldiers served, at least nominally, for life, 
and received weapons, uniforms and ammunition from the Imam. Shaykhs or local notables 
acted as guarantors for recruits. Pay, at 5 MT a month and 4 loaves of bread a day during the 
                                                          
 
67 Conscription was enforced if insufficient numbers ‘volunteered.’ This occurred especially in the 
Shāfiʿī lowlands and the tribal areas of the far North and North-East (Wenner, 1967, p.57). 
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1930s, was low, but competitive with farming (Nājī, 1988, pp.109–110; Messick, 1978, 
p.209).68  
The creation of this standing army was a significant innovation. Contemporary European 
accounts stressing the niẓāmī army’s makeshift appearance, with its barefoot soldiers in 
mismatched uniforms, threaten to miss what a radical departure a standing army was – 
particularly one conducting drills, using armoured vehicles and artillery, and engaging in 
weekly military displays overseen by the Imam (Willis, 2012, pp.123–124). The creation of the 
niẓāmī army and its use against tribal uprisings in the late 1950s and early 1960s marked a 
high point in the importance of the regular military and a low point for tribal influence in 
Yemeni politics (Wenner, 1967, p.59). Moreover, the creation of the niẓāmī army had 
extensive linkages to other areas of the economy and society, since equipping and training a 
‘modern’ army required contact with the outside world for training and materiel. In the 1930s 
and 40s, the bulk of Yemen’s imports were destined for the military (Ḥajjāj, 2014, p.58; Bin 
Daghar, 2005, pp.109-110). The new army’s needs also prompted the construction of the first 
factories in Yemen. From the 1930s until the 1960s, Yemen’s only industrial facilities of note 
were two factories producing ammunition, casings, and machined parts for the Yemeni 
military and a textile mill producing cloth largely for the uniforms of the armed forces 
(Stookey, 1978, p.183; Peterson, 1982, p.70; Willis, 2012, pp.122–123). 
By the end of the 1930s, the niẓāmī army reportedly reached a size of 15,000-20,000 
soldiers,69 composed mostly of infantry stationed in Ṣanaʿāʾ, Taʿiz, al-Ḥudayda and Ḥajja. 
Beyond these troop concentrations in major towns, in every governorate, the governor had a 
small company of niẓāmī troops (El-Azzazi, 1978, p.115; Jones, 2004, pp.20–21). Additional 
                                                          
 
68 According to Fattah (2010, p.27), poverty drove many to join the army because it secured daily food 
rations. According to other sources, an enlisted man earned 6 YR per month in the infantry and 7 YR 
per month in the artillery corps alongside 3 loaves of bread in the early 1950s (Bin Daghar, 2015, 
p.113). 
69 As Imamate era administration was highly personalised and records were poor, there is significant 
uncertainty about the size and structure of the military. Estimates for the niẓāmī army range from 
12,000 (Peterson, 1982, p.53) over 20,000 (Nājī, 1988, p.111) to 30,000 soldiers (ʾAḥmad, 1981, p.194; 
Juzaylān, 1995, p.60). Bin Daghar (2005, p.114) provides the most detailed breakdown of the niẓāmī 
army in the late 1950s, implying a size of 19,200 soldiers. There is similar uncertainty about the size of 
the jaysh al-difāʿī and the jaysh al-barānī discussed below.  
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special guards for the Imam, princes, and governors numbered another 5,000 soldiers and 
included two elite battalions commanded by close deputies of the Imam that enjoyed access 
to better weapons (Ḥajjāj, 2014, p.60; ʾAḥmad, 1981, p.194; Nājī, 1988, pp.107–129; 255).70 
During the 1940s and 50s, the niẓāmī army put down tribal revolts, managed border crossings 
and customs duty, protected and delivered mail, manned telegraph relay stations, 
maintained infrastructure, and supported local officials in tax collection (Willis, 2012, pp.122–
123; Peterson, 1982, p.53; Nājī, 1988, p.126). In this, it was largely successful. Travellers in 
the 1950s marvelled at the security they enjoyed in the Mutawakkilite Kingdom when 
compared to neighbouring, British administered, South Arabia or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(Ingrams, 1963, p.32) – although at the same time, abuses by security forces and especially 
the forcible quartering of soldiers known as tanfīdh were a rallying point for the Imam’s 
opponents (Willis, 2012, p.110).  
Besides the niẓāmī army, the Imam created a new force in the 1930s, the army of defence 
(jaysh al-difāʿī) of about 15,000 troops. A reserve force tasked with many of the same 
functions as the niẓāmī army, the jaysh al-difāʿī has been described as an attempt at 
balancing against the possibility of a coup (Fattah, 2010, p.27). It also, according to one of the 
foremost scholars of Yemen’s military, served to keep the tribes occupied and in the Imam’s 
pay, as well as serving as a trained reserve to dissuade foreign attackers. At 4 MT a month, 
soldiers in the jaysh al-difāʿī received less pay than their niẓāmī counterparts and since pay 
was channelled through tribal leaders, who could pay a fee to the Imam to receive an 
officers’ commission, their salaries were less still in practice (Nājī, 1988, pp.112–113). 
According to several accounts, the difāʿī army drafted one quarter of able-bodied men in each 
governorate at a time for 6 months, with the cycle restarting every two years (Ḥajjāj, 2014, 
p.59; Nājī, 1988, p.112; Wenner, 1967, pp.56–57).71  
Imam Yaḥiyā also created a third military force, the jaysh al-barānī, composed of tribal 
fighters recruited from northern tribes and organised in tribal units. Under the command of 
their shaykh, soldiers were recruited by quota from each family or sub-tribe. The, reportedly, 
                                                          
 
70 Cited figures range from 3,000 soldiers in several special guard units, the largest of which was the 
fawj al-badr (Nājī, 1988, p.124) to 10,000 in the fawj al-badr alone (ʾAḥmad, 1981, p.194; Ḥajjāj, 2014, 
p.59).  
71 Although it has generally been reported as fact, it may be more appropriate to read this account of 
recruitment as a declaration of aspiration. 
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50,000 soldiers in the jaysh al-barānī provided their own supplies and weapons and received 
wages of 3.75 MT a month, of which they had to pay 1MT to the shaykh (Nājī, 1988, pp.114–
115; Fattah, 2010, p.28). Like the other formations, barānī troops at various times played an 
important role in putting down rebellions against the Imam and were notorious for their role 
in collecting taxes, as discussed in 3.1.3. 
As the duplication of similar functions across these different forces highlights, balancing and 
fragmentation loomed large as strategies for maintaining political control over the military 
under the Imams. Loyalty followed different logics in different forces: The Imam selected 
niẓāmī officers of low birth outside of existing networks of power and sent them abroad for 
training, or directly recruited foreign officers from Turkey, Syria, and elsewhere (Nājī, 1988, 
p.120; Burrowes, 2005). By contrast, the barānī military reproduced tribal hierarchies and 
relied for political control on balancing networks of tribal allies. When one system failed, the 
other provided an alternative. The 1948 assassination of Imam Yaḥiyā and an attempted 
military coup against Imam ʾAḥmad in 1955 both had the backing of leading niẓāmī officers. 
Both were successfully reversed with tribal fighters rallied by ʾAḥmad when he was Crown 
Prince in 1948 and by Crown Prince al-Badr in 1955 (Nājī, 1988, p.194). In the short term, the 
relative importance of the niẓāmī and barānī forces thus waxed and waned in inverse-
proportion, but in the longer term, the Imams developed a growing reliance on niẓāmī 
troops.  
On the eve of the Imam’s overthrow, the military had about 400 officers with formal military 
training. Being a soldier was not a high-status occupation and previous Imams’ growing 
reliance on outsiders and cadets from low-status families as officers meant that the officer 
corps, which had previously been dominated by sāda, lost status. Much of the army was 
spread across the country in small units engaged in tax-collection and policing, but important 
concentration of troops existed in Yemen’s main cities. Military salaries remained low 
compared to most other occupations and although distinctions, including in salary, between 
officers and enlisted men had increased in the 1930s, they remained relatively muted. 
According to Sulṭān Nājī (1988, p.121), the most widely-cited source, officer salaries ranged 
from 12 to 80 MT and officers who studied abroad started on a salary of 20 MT a month.72  
                                                          
 
72 El Attar (1964, pp.118–119) claims ʿaskarī regulars received 8-10 MT per month on the eve of the 
revolution, while officers received 100-120 MT. Bin Daghar (2005, p.113) suggests the figures were 6-7 
YR and 60-70 YR, respectively. 
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3.2.3 Central and Local government under the Imam 
Beyond the administration of taxation and the armed forces, there was little of a central state 
to speak of under the Imams. The treasury and the security forces ensured control of capital 
and coercion. Most other governance occurred at the local level and central ‘ministries’ 
created under Imam ʾAḥmad consisted of little more than a minister and one or two 
assistants. 
Outside the Imam and the royal family, formal power rested with governors and officials at 
the district level. Governors (sing. ʾamīr) were drawn primarily from leading sayyid families 
and, increasingly over the 1940s and 50s, from the ranks of the ruling Ḥamīd al-Dīn. The 
Imam appointed them to head the top-level administrative units, the ʾalwiya (sing. liwāʾ) of 
the Mutawakkilite Kingdom: Ṣanaʿāʾ, Ṣaʿda, al-Ḥudayda, Ḥajja, ʾIbb, and Taʿiz.73 Although 
charging the Imam with corruption was a common revolutionary trope and local officials did 
collect much of their income by charging for services, in ʾIbb under the Imamic government, 
“gross misappropriation of government funds and exactions upon private individuals appear 
to have been rare” (Messick, 1978, pp.213–214).74  
Below the liwāʾ, at the district (qaḍāʾ) level, the civil service consisted of sāda, quḍāa, tribal 
leaders, and local notables who collected zakat and local market taxes, heard and adjudicated 
disputes, and were involved in the management of the ʾawqāf or the delivery of associated 
services, such as preaching, charity, and schooling. Most formal justice was dispensed at the 
qaḍāʾ level and the centrally-appointed district judges increasingly challenged tribal leaders  
role as mediators (Dresch, 1984, p.164). The qaḍāʾ was also the level at which taxes in kind 
were collected and the lowest level at which officials had formal command over police or 
military units. Although the heads of the qaḍāʾ theoretically reported to the ʾamīr of their 
liwāʾ, most maintained direct relationships with the Imam (El Attar, 1964, pp.79–80; 
Peterson, 1982, p.55).  
Reversing far-reaching autonomy at the qaḍāʾ and especially nāḥiya and ʿuzla levels below it 
under the Ottomans, the royal court made direct appointments even to petty positions 
during the Imamate (Messick, 1978, pp.61, 206). This was even true, albeit unevenly, in the 
                                                          
 
73 The number and division of governorates changed several times between 1918 and 1962. See: 
Matsumoto, 2003. 
74 For a dissenting view, see: El Attar, 1964, p.81. 
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tribal North where the Imamate increasingly succeeded in asserting its right to select tribal 
leaders and engaged in a long-term push to establish shariʿa as the sole legal framework 
against tribal customary law (ʿurf) (Wenner, 1967, pp.65, 67–70). As central taxation 
expanded, local positions became more and more desirable sinecures, with the result that 
the Imam’s power of appointment gained increasing leverage over local decisions (Wenner, 
1967, p.66). Nonetheless, municipal, tribal, neighbourhood, associational, and philanthropic 
networks wielded power and material resources rivalling those of the central state and 
initiatives rooted in tribal and/or religious mechanisms supplied most schooling, water 
supplies, and other services (Carapico, 1998, p.63). 
The hostage system (niẓām al-rahāʾin) has generally been credited with playing a key part in 
this gradual assertion of central control over tribal areas. By 1955, the Imam’s court hosted 
some 2,000 tribal hostages (Seager, 1955, p.218; c.f. Douglas, 1987, p.14). Hostages from 
leading tribal families served as leverage against tribal leaders, but the system also had 
allocative and educational functions: it tied the tribes to the Imam’s court through stipends to 
the hostages’ families and by providing education to future tribal leaders. Hostage stipends 
were generous and became an increasingly important source of income for tribal leaders 
during the 1940s and 1950s to the point where tribal conflicts sometimes centred on leading 
families’ discontent that others’ children were taken as hostages rather than their own (Weir, 
2007, pp.273–275; Peterson, 1982, p.77).  
3.3 Ideas of the state and Imamate era legitimacy  
Underlying the political settlement and structuring expectations of institutions, were the 
ideas of the Imamate state and associated rhetorical commonplaces. Domestically, Imams 
historically appealed to established religious doctrine to justify their rule, while adopting an 
anti-colonial posture internationally focused on the commonplace of independence. Yet, over 
the decades leading up to the 1962 revolution, the new rhetorical commonplaces of 
‘modernity,’ and ‘the people’ became central to political rhetoric in the Mutawakkilite 
Kingdom of Yemen, as a series of coups and political upheavals rocked Yemen and the Arab 
world. 
3.3.1 Domestic legitimacy 
When it was abolished in 1962, the Imamate had existed in Yemen, with occasional 
interruptions, for more than a millennium. Though hardly static, the dominant rhetorical 
commonplaces throughout this time were religious, drawing on the Zaydī doctrine of Imamic 
rule, shot through in practice with tribal custom, and in dialogue and competition with Sunni 
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jurisprudence. Rule was justified to other Zaydīs by conforming to established conditions for 
the Imamate, applying shariʿa law, and by virtue of the personal relationship between the 
Imam and his subjects.  
An Imam was expected to be a scholar, an administrator and a fighter – master of both pen 
and sword. The formal conditions for becoming Imam centred on being a male descendant of 
the Prophet Muhammad ’sound in body and mind.’ In addition, an Imam needed to have a 
righteous and pious character and be a religious scholar capable of ʾijtihād, independent 
religious interpretation (Messick, 1993, p.38). This is because, according to sayyid supporters 
of the Imamate, it was “through the virtue of the Imam” that “this country of ours is a land of 
right, justice, faith, honesty, and loyalty” (Stookey, 1978, p.169); that is, the quality of 
governance depended on the personal virtue of the Imam. In theory, anyone meeting the 
conditions could claim to be Imam and throughout long stretches of northern Yemeni history, 
there was more than one claimant (vom Bruck, 2010; Madelung, 2012).75 
The territorial expansion of Imam Yaḥiyā’s state after 1918 was framed in terms of an 
expansion of the ‘domain of obedience’ to shariʿa, a space of order and justice, as against the 
(tribal and other) areas outside of the Imam’s control, imagined as spaces of corruption, 
dissension (fitna) and chaos (fawḍā) (Willis, 2012, p.118). Conformity to shariʿa is, of course, 
as longstanding a criterion for just rule in Muslim societies, as it is the site of intense 
contestation over what constitutes ‘true’ shariʿa. Thus, Yaḥiyā framed his revolt against the 
Ottoman Sultan in terms of Ottoman deviation from shariʿa, while the Ottomans responded 
with the same charge against the Imam. In the first half of the twentieth century “shariʿa 
constructs provided the principal language of statecraft” (Messick, 1993, pp.4, 50–51).  
While professing support for shariʿa, both Shāfiʿī and Zaydi areas contested the Imam’s 
legitimacy. Historically, an important and recurrent Shāfiʿī trope was the idea that the Zaydī 
Imams were external tyrants and their tribal supporters ignorant and ruthless barbarians 
(Messick, 1993, p.41). Certainly, Shāfiʿī areas contended with higher taxation and, under the 
Ḥamīd al-Dīn were frequently ruled, administered, and judged by Zaydī northerners 
appointed by the Imam. Shāfiʿīs did not recognise the Imam’s claim to head the religious 
                                                          
 
75 Rival claims were encouraged by the fact that, unlike other Shiʿi madhāhib, Zaydī traditions do not 
ascribe quasi-divine attributes such as infallibility or special access to divine guidance to the Imam. On 
the Zaydī conception of the Imamate see: Crone, 2004, pp.104–105; on its evolution see: Haykel, 2003, 
pp.210–212. 
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community in the same way as Zaydīs did, even though the Imams’ temporal authority was, 
by most metrics, more extensive in lower Yemen (Stookey, 1978, p.183). As a result, Imamic 
legitimacy was more clearly in question in lower Yemen (Carapico, 1998, p.77). Nonetheless, 
the Imam’s claims to legitimacy by virtue of just rule were intelligible in Shāfiʿī terms and, 
drawing on Muḥammad al-Shawkānī, an eighteenth and nineteenth century Zaydī jurist who 
brought many Sunni tenets into Zaydī thought, as well as pan-Islamist arguments, the Imam 
consistently denied the relevance of differences between Shāfiʿīs and Zaydis (Willis, 2012, 
pp.141–142; Haykel, 2003). 
In highland areas with strong traditions of tribal self-government, the Imams’ powers were 
more spiritual than temporal, even as the Ḥamīd al-Dīn succeeded in far-reaching 
centralisation towards the middle of the 20th century. Although in official rhetoric tribes were 
the recalcitrant matter the Imams formed to establish the ‘domain of obedience,’ tribal 
customary law was just as routinely decried as un-Islamic by state judges and officials, as it 
was accommodated in practice. So long as the tribes in question accepted the Imam’s 
sovereignty – that is, submitted to other features of Imamic rule like the hostage system, tax 
collection, and accepted the presence of central officials – tribal ʿurf could be accommodated 
(Willis, 2012, pp.146–147; Dresch, 1990, pp.164–165, 271). Indeed it defined practice in such 
fundamental matters as irrigation and inheritance (Mundy, 1989, 1979) and shaped the 
Imam’s arbitration of tribal disputes (Dresch, 1989). 
While the idea of legitimate and extensive domination remained an Imamic monopoly in 
Yemen well into the 20th century, since no shaykh could claim to rule over people who were 
not members of his tribe (Dresch, 1990, p.268), the parameters of legitimacy in the Zaydī 
north were heavily coloured by tribal customs and codes of honour (Adra, 1982, pp.142–144; 
Serjeant, 1982, esp. p.36). Although ‘un-Islamic’ local customs were gradually marginalised 
during the 1940s and 50s (Dresch, 2000, p.65), other ‘tribal’ codes and expectations 
continued to matter tremendously: It was Imam ʾAḥmad’s violation of the rules of tribal 
honour and mediation that provided the impetus for growing numbers of tribal leaders to 
turn against him in the late 1950s, as we will see in Section 3.4, just as it was the Egyptians’ 
refusal to observe tribal claims of sovereignty and conventions on warfare that turned large 
numbers of tribal fighters against them and the Republic. 
In addition, the Imamate was founded, at least in theory, on a personal relationship between 
the Imam and his subjects. As Messick notes, “direct accessibility, based on a public presence 
that enabled personal encounters and personal solutions to problems, was a fundamental 
value of the old administrative style” (Messick, 1993, p.168). The oath of loyalty to the person 
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of the Imam was complemented by a mythology – and far-reaching practice – of direct 
availability. Foreign visitors to Yaḥiyā or ʾAḥmad’s courts inevitably commented on the 
centrality of written petitions to the Imams and marvelled at the speed and efficiency with 
which the Imam and other officials dealt with petitioners who appeared in person (Wenner, 
1967, p.61; see also: Messick, 1993, pp.169, 172; El Attar, 1964, p.71).  
3.3.2 International legitimacy 
In addition to religious claims to legitimacy, the British presence in South Arabia, the 
Mutawakkilite Kingdom’s emergence out of Ottoman occupation, and rivalry between 
European imperial powers for control of the Horn of Africa and the Bāb al-Mandab, lent an 
international dimension to the parameters of legitimacy during the Imamate: the way the 
Imams and Yemeni elites more broadly imagined Yemen’s place within an international order.  
Much writing about Yemen’s role in the globalising international politics of the inter-war 
period stresses Imam Yaḥiyā’s policy of isolation, to the point where it can seem that 
international issues and foreign states’ and rulers’ attitudes and recognition mattered little 
(Burrowes, 2005, p.81, 1987, p.16). Yet, Imam Yaḥiyā closely followed international events 
and had his secretaries present him with daily summaries of a range of newspapers, signed 
treaties with Yemen’s neighbours, and sought diplomatic recognition (Willis, 2012, p.152; 
Messick, 1993). Under Yaḥiyā, Yemen joined the Arab League less than two months after its 
creation in 1945 and the newly-formed United Nations two years after it was established in 
1947 (Wenner, 1967, pp.164–171). In 1948, when ʿAbd Allah al-Wazīr and his co-conspirators 
assassinated Imam Yaḥiyā to create a ‘constitutional Imamate,’ both contenders for the 
position of Imam, Crown Prince ʾAḥmad and Sayyid ʿAbd Allah al-Wazīr, felt the need to 
appeal to an international audience to defend their right to rule. Shortly after announcing his 
daʿwa, al-Wazīr sent a high-ranking delegation to Riyadh to petition King ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Al-
Saʿud, to recognize him as Imam. ʾAḥmad sent a similar delegation. Both also appealed to the 
Arab League (Johnsen, 2017, pp.52–53). International recognition clearly mattered for both 
sides and diplomacy, alliances, and the politics of recognition shaped the way Yemen’s 
political elite evaluated the justice and legality of claims to rule.  
The legitimacy derived from international interactions was centred on nationalist and anti-
colonialist registers. Imam Yaḥiyā’s father, Muḥammad al-Manṣūr Ḥamīd al-Dīn, as well as 
Yaḥiyā himself rose to prominence by leading an armed struggle against the Ottomans. Both 
Yaḥiyā and ʾAḥmad opposed British rule over Aden and southern Arabia and vocally 
expressed this opposition to both internal and external audiences. A real fear over British 
encroachment from Aden underpinned this posture. Imam ʾAḥmad was an enthusiastic 
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supporter of the 1956 Jeddah Pact between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, and joined with 
the Egyptian-Syrian United Arab Republic (UAR) to form the United Arab States in 1958 in 
part over fears of the British. These measures also had a symbolic dimension: standing up for 
Arab and Yemeni independence in the face of the waning colonial power in a context where 
first pan-Islamism and then pan-Arabism had developed a potent critique of European 
colonialism.76 
A number of, possibly apocryphal, stories that circulated in Yemen about the Imam’s distrust 
of foreigners, usually related in a positive register, highlight this tendency. For instance, Imam 
Yaḥiyā is said to have refused an offer of $2 million for oil exploration rights in Yemen, 
arguing that it would cost far more to get rid of foreign interests at a later date (Burrowes, 
1987, p.16).77 Even sharp critics of isolation and the Imamate did not question the values of 
independence and anti-colonialism that underpinned it rhetorically. El Attar, a leading 
republican official after the revolution, for example, describes Yaḥiyā as being motivated by a 
genuine and laudable desire for independence and religious purity (El Attar, 1964, pp.72–
73).78  
3.3.3 New commonplaces: modernity, Arab nationalism, and ‘the people’ 
Haltingly at first, from the 1930s onwards, the religious and anti-colonial commonplaces that 
had defined the Imams’ claims to just rule were supplemented and displaced by other 
concerns, which the Imamate struggled to accommodate. Large-scale emigration to Aden, 
emigrants’ experiences in its active labour movement, and increasing numbers of Yemeni 
students studying abroad in Cairo were catalysts for the emergence of a nascent nationalist 
discourse and initial reform demands during the 1930s and 40s. During the 1950s, as Jamal 
ʿAbd al-Nasir rose to regional prominence and the concerns of Arab nationalism, socialism, 
and development came to define the regional political field, the discourse in Yemen shifted 
further.  
                                                          
 
76 The union with Egypt and Syria was also an attempt to defuse Egyptian propaganda against the 
Imam and remain non-aligned in the ‘Arab Cold War’ (James, 2006; Kerr, 1967). 
77 The Imam’s instincts were right: oil exploration was a CIA front (Orkaby, 2014, p.76). 
78 Interestingly, El Attar (1964, p.73) disagrees with most analysis, which has suggested isolationism 
was a strategy for rule maintenance. He argues it was not. The Imam could more readily have 
maintained power through development, international security guarantees, personal enrichment, and 
the opportunities for patronage this would have provided. 
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These changes in rhetorical commonplaces also become visible in changing patterns of 
opposition and especially the attempts to overthrow the Imam of 1948, 1955, and 1962: 
whereas the first two sought to change ruling personnel because the Imams had abandoned 
received values, the conspirators of 1962 demanded a reorganisation of Yemeni society in an 
entirely new terminology (Stookey, 1978, p.213). If, at the time of al-Wazīr’s 1948 coup, there 
was no “general language in which a popular uprising could be encouraged” (Dresch, 2000, 
p.57), by the late-1950s such a vocabulary had taken shape. A new political order became 
thinkable under the watchword of ’modernity’ (Peterson, 1982, p.83); contributing to a 
growing crisis of legitimacy that called into question not only rule by the Ḥamīd al-Dīn family 
but the Imamate itself.  
As Yemen’s international isolation eased during the 1940s and especially during the reign of 
Imam ʾAḥmad, growing numbers of Yemenis went to study abroad or to work in the booming 
port of Aden. Many of them might relate stories similar to the experience recorded by 
Muḥsin al-ʿAynī in his memoirs: Aden’s blazing electric lights, automobiles, and bustling port 
stood in dramatic contrast to the northern capital Ṣanaʿāʾ, with its unlit streets, locked city 
gates, and much smaller population. Travellers were left with an abiding and shocked sense 
of Yemen’s ‘backwardness’ “as something totally unbelievable” (Alaini, 2004, pp.33, 22). The 
idea that the Imams were holding Yemen back and blocking access to economic development 
became a formidable charge against the Imams and formed a central plank of the critique 
developed by the Free Yemeni Movement (ḥarakat al-yamaniyyin al-aḥrār).79 
Educational emigrants, whether they completed officer training in Iraq or Egypt, studied in 
Cairo or Beirut, or pursued higher degrees in Europe, the Soviet Union, or the United States, 
all got to know political systems different to the Imamate first hand, were influenced by the 
aspirations of their foreign peers, and often chafed at the limited opportunities available to 
them upon their return – indeed, many were imprisoned in the aftermath of the 1948 coup 
(Carapico, 1998, p.99; Peterson, 1982, p.85). By 1961 there were 300-400 Yemenis in 
Egyptian secondary schools, more than 100 at Cairo University, 70-80 pursuing higher 
degrees in Western Europe or the United States, about 300 training in the Communist Bloc, 
and 500 or more studying in Aden (Rahmy, 1983, p.81 note 3). Almost all returned to Yemen 
after their studies and came to identify as members of a special group, which largely 
transcended existing religious, regional, and status distinctions (Burrowes, 2005, pp.87–90; 
                                                          
 
79 On the Free Yemeni Movement see: Douglas, 1987, 1984. 
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Rosser, 1998).80 Moreover, foreign influences and reference points also began encroaching 
on domestic Yemeni education. Like elsewhere in the Arab world, Egyptian teachers made up 
the bulk of teachers at the new ʾAḥmadiyya high school in Taʿiz and the small handful of other 
schools pursuing a ‘modern’ curriculum (Tsourapas, 2016). Many of the teachers who were 
not foreigners, were Yemenis educated abroad. Disaffected graduates shunted into teaching 
jobs had the opportunity to reproduce the very subversive foreign values the Imam feared 
(Stookey, 1978, p.208).  
In addition to educational migrants, tens of thousands of Yemenis, largely from lower Yemen, 
flocked to Aden in search of livelihoods. Like educational migrants, they confronted the sharp 
contrast between the bustling global port city and the towns and villages they hailed from. 
They were exposed to debates about Arab nationalism, non-alignment, and other issues of 
the day. Many were politicised in Aden’s flourishing union movement (Carapico, 1998, pp.87–
99; Douglas, 1987). In addition to regional and religious reasons for disaffection in lower 
Yemen, briefly explored in terms of Shāfiʿī attitudes towards the Imamate in 3.1.4 above, 
greater mobility and exposure to ideas that challenged the established order contributed to 
growing opposition to the Imam in lower Yemen. When ṣawt al-ʿarab, the Egyptian radio 
station, stepped up incitement against the Imam after the break-up of the United Arab States 
at the end of 1961, it was in lower Yemen that calls for revolt seemed to resonate most. The 
Māwiyya district of Taʿiz revolted against Imamic taxation in May 1962. In June, Shāfiʿī 
labourers working on a US-funded road went on strike. In August, student demonstrations in 
Taʿiz, inspired by protests in Ṣanaʿāʾ, involved tens or hundreds of students, who, carrying 
posters of ʿAbd al-Nasir, smashed the windows of government buildings, and tore up pictures 
of the Imam (Stookey, 1978, p.206; Douglas, 1987, p.237).81 
The idea that Yemen was backward and needed economic development had traction beyond 
educational and economic migrants and their students and families in Yemen. These ideas 
were picked up too, to a limited extent, by Imam ʾAḥmad, who briefly flirted with the young 
reformers of the Free Yemeni Movement in the early 1940s (Douglas, 1987, pp.61–62). Imam 
ʾAḥmad also renewed a friendship pact with the USSR in 1955, which promised development 
                                                          
 
80 In the late 1940s, educational migrants were predominantly Zaydī, but by the mid 1950s two-thirds 
were Shāfiʿī (Burrowes, 2005, p.84).  
81 Douglas (1987, p.237 note 90) comments that though contemporary reports refer to ‘hundreds,’ 
“there weren’t ‘hundreds’ of students in Imamic Yemen.” 
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of al-Ḥudayda port, the provision of industrial plant and equipment, and technical and 
economic assistance in exchange for Yemeni agricultural goods (Boals, 1970, p.103). He also 
signed agreements with China, the Soviet Union, and the United States to build roads 
connecting the main cities. And if ʾAḥmad’s modernisation attempts can seem defensive and 
reluctant, Crown Prince al-Badr was certainly a believer in the blessings of development. An 
admirer of ʿAbd al-Nasir and the Soviet Union, Prince al-Badr used his regency in 1959 and his 
week as Imam in 1962 to push-through a host of reforms. In his speech at the opening of the 
new al-Ḥudayda port, he celebrated the fulfillment of Yemenis’ “dream of development” and, 
perhaps in part for the benefit of its Soviet sponsors, heralded the port as a step towards a 
new and more socialist Yemeni society (Orkaby, 2014, pp.64–65). This accords with 
observations by the American Chargé d'Affaires in the Yemen at the time, Harlan Clark, who 
noted that between the mid-1940s and late 1950s there was a marked change in the official 
rhetoric of the Imams, with far less emphasis on religious formulas and far more on economic 
development (Stookey, 1978, p.206). 
Beyond ideas of economic development, appeals to ‘the people’ marked a new, proto-
nationalist register. In the 1948 coup, the new constitution, the Sacred National Charter, had 
appealed to “the people,” while simultaneously drawing on traditional Zaydī formulas, 
forming “a striking link between two concepts of how a state might be organised” (Dresch, 
1993b, p.238). It stressed obedience to learned authority and God’s laws on the one hand, 
while invoking rule in the name of the people and the importance of consultation, on the 
other. Coup conspirators wanted and expected mass support, while remaining deeply 
suspicious of mass politics (Carvajal, 2011, p.7; but see: Johnsen, 2017, pp.42, 50).  
Throughout the 1950s, the idea of a singular ‘Yemeni people’ ranked against other like units, 
grew steadily in popularity (Dresch, 2000, p.69, 1993b, p.274). In non-sayyid Zaydī writing, 
the tribes, imagined as the locus of authentic Yemeni identity, came to play a more important 
role. Muḥsin al-ʿAynī, for instance, used the Qurʾanic story of the Queen of Sheba to appeal 
for republican government, pointing out that the Queen would not decide a matter without 
consultation of all (tribal) chiefs. Elsewhere, he argued that rulers derive their authority from 
the consent of “the tribes and other parts of the nation” (al-ʿAynī, 1957, pp.60, 143). In 
Muḥammad al-Zubayrī‘s novel, Maʾasāt Wāq al-Wāq (The Tragedy of Wāq al-Wāq), as in his 
92 
 
poetry,82 the Imams come in for scathing critique and tribes represent the Yemeni people (al-
Zubayrī, 2015; Dresch, 1993b, pp.240–242; Wagner, 2017, p.487). On a similar note, Martha 
Mundy recounts a story remembered in Wādī Ẓahr, according to which the Imam summoned 
the shaykh and asked him, disdainfully: “who made you shaykh,” seeking to contrast his own 
legitimacy through learning and descent with that bestowed on the shaykh by a rough crowd 
of villagers. The shaykh answers: “those who made you Imam,” countering with a notion of 
legitimacy rooted in the people (Mundy, 1995, p.28). Yet, it is, again, a tribal notion of the 
people, reminding the Imam that his rule depends on tribal oaths of allegiance and the role of 
tribal fighters in enforcing his claims against rivals.  
By contrast, Shāfiʿī writing at the time was influenced by the reference points of Arab 
nationalism, particularly in its Nasirist guise, although the Shāfiʿī critics of the Imam were by 
no means all Nasirists.83 Arab nationalism, on the face of it, was but a small step away from 
the anti-colonialism, Arabism, and pan-Islamism that formed an element of the Imams’ claims 
to legitimacy. But in practice, the nationalist re-imagining of the ‘the people’ and the elective 
affinity of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 60s with revolutionary socialism, its attacks on 
‘Arab reaction,’ and identification with ‘modernity’ (Halliday, 2013, pp.441–443), meant that 
it was a powerful language of opposition, all the more powerful thanks to its resonance with 
ideas the Imams themselves appealed to (Boals, 1970, p.141). By the 1962 revolution, a truck 
driver could explain to the French journalists Marie-Claude Deffarge and Gordian Troeller 
that the revolution meant he no longer had to pay road tolls: The shaykhs or governors 
(Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, p.22): 
prélevaient d’abord un impôt sur les paysans pour la construction de la route. Ensuite, 
ils réquisitionnaient ces paysans pour construire la route. Et nous, nous devions encore 
payer pour passer dessus. Et ils faisaient payer un impôt d’entretien. Maintenant, cést 
fini, les routes appartiennent au peuple [emphasis added]. 
                                                          
 
82 For a translation and annotation of one of al-Zubayrī’s most famous critiques of the Imam see: 
Serjeant, 1979. 
83 Many of them were initially attracted to the ideas of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Islamic modernism of Jamāl al-Dīn al-ʾAfghānī and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Kawākibī (Al-Ahnaf, 1999; 
Burrowes, 2005, pp.88–89; Douglas, 1987, p.33; Kurzman, 2002). 
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The class-based opposition between shaykhs and peasants and the idea that assets should be 
owned collectively mark this articulation of the rhetorical commonplace ‘the people’ out as 
one defined by Arab nationalism.  
Coups against King Faruq in Egypt in 1952, King Faysal II of Iraq, a Hashemite like the Imam, in 
1958, and Muḥammad VIII of Tunisia, also in 1958, were changing ideas about what 
government looked like and how change could be achieved. Whereas the Free Yemeni 
Movement had started off with petitions for better education, health care, and roads, by the 
1940s this had morphed into calls for constitutional limits to Imamic powers, and by the late 
1950s into a platform advocating the creation of a republic (Douglas, 1987, p.xv). Inside the 
Movement, Egyptian financial support and the provision of a powerful platform on ṣawt al-
ʿarab radio helped the progressive, Arab nationalist faction gain influence and become 
dominant in the early 1960s (Douglas, 1987, p.205). By early 1961, the break-up of the short-
lived union between Egypt, Syria, and Yemen and souring relations between Imam ʾAḥmad 
and ʿAbd al-Nasir, marked the “beginning of ‘open season’ on the Imam in the Egyptian 
press” (Ferris, 2012, p.34; Johnsen, 2017, pp.79–81) and the Egyptian intelligence services 
made it clear in contact with young officers in Ṣanaʿāʾ that they expected a revolution to 
happen soon (Alaini, 2004, pp.29, 50–51). By this time, the overthrow of the Imamate, which 
had “previously been unimaginable,” seemed “almost expected” both within Yemen and 
without (Johnsen, 2017, p.103).84  
3.4 In lieu of a conclusion: the al-Badr regency and aftermath 1959-60 
The shifts in the political settlement and changing parameters of legitimacy became 
especially visible in 1959, when Imam ʾAḥmad left Yemen for medical treatment, leaving 
power in the hands of Crown Prince al-Badr. Al-Badr seized the opportunity to prove himself 
as a moderniser – with disastrous results.  
Though the details remain murky (Dresch, 1993b, p.240), it appears that al-Badr pursued a 
number of reforms during his months of regency in April to August 1959. He expanded 
Egyptian training of the armed forces, created health, commercial, and agricultural schools 
with Egyptian staff (Juzaylān, 1977, p.57), and set up a proto-consultative body for 
supervision of administrative affairs. He also announced a 25% pay increase for soldiers and 
                                                          
 
84 This was, for instance, the view of the Kennedy administration (Orkaby, 2014, p.298; Perra, 2017, 
Ch 5). 
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officers and replaced the head of the niẓāmī army ʿAlī bin ʾIbrāhīm, with ʿAbd al-Qādir ʾAbū 
Ṭālib, a younger, more progressive figure (Nājī, 1988, p.202). However, the treasury could not 
deliver on the promised salaries, resulting in military unrest in Taʿiz, al-Ḥudayda, al-Luḥaya, 
and Dhamār. Al-Badr feared an all-out mutiny and requested help from the Egyptian military 
mission to disarm Yemeni soldiers and arrest officers he believed were plotting against him 
(Johnsen, 2017, pp.92–93). Ultimately, al-Badr called on the Ḥāshid tribal confederation for 
help – and was forced to pay them handsomely for their support, further exacerbating his 
financial difficulties (Douglas, 1987, pp.222–223, Juzaylān, 1977, p.58). When Imam ʾAḥmad, 
informed of the mounting crisis, returned precipitously from his treatment abroad, he sought 
to re-claim the money al-Badr had paid to Ḥāshid, dispatching troops and prompting the 
paramount shaykh of Ḥāshid to call for a tribal revolt. Ultimately, ʾAḥmad executed both the 
paramount shaykh, Ḥusayn al-ʾAḥmar, and his eldest son, Ḥamīd, by most accounts under the 
pretext of peace talks. Their executions earned the Imam the enduring enmity of the al-
ʾAḥmar family, of Ḥāshid, of the Khawlān tribes who had heeded calls for revolt, and of the 
tribes in al-Jawf, who had promised Ḥusayn al-ʾAḥmar safe passage (al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, p.61).  
Modernisers were aggrieved by the aborted reforms, military officers balked at the loss of 
their promised raise and foreign training, tribal leaders were shocked by the Imam’s flouting 
of tribal norms, and traditionalists were concerned by what they saw as al-Badr’s rash 
reforms.85 The episode placed additional strain on the fraying alliance between the Ḥamīd al-
Dīn family, their allies among leading sāda and quḍāa, and shaykhly tribal families (Wenner, 
1967, pp.123–128; Johnsen, 2017, pp.95–96). 
The episode is also deeply revealing about changing ideas of the state and the difficulties 
involved in squaring the circle of competing expectations. On the one hand, it highlights the 
way significant portions of the Yemeni elite, and al-Badr himself, had bought into the promise 
of modernity. His reforms closely followed the demands of the Free Yemeni Movement and 
echoed the practice of modernising regimes across the global South in pursuit of ‘modernity’ 
and ‘development.’ He brought in foreign experts, opened new schools, replaced key officials 
with committed modernisers and sought to strengthen the niẓāmī army. He also put in place 
a proto legislature in line with ideas of consultation and accountability to ‘the people.’ Yet, 
                                                          
 
85 Reacting to this episode, David Holden, a correspondent for the Guardian, described al-Badr as 
“naïve” in judging both people and policies. He was “sincerely anxious to reform his country without 
much idea of how to set about it or what passions reform might release” (Holden, 1966, p.89). 
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the episode also highlights the enduring centrality of religious legitimacy and tribal notions of 
honour. ʾAḥmad’s ‘modern’ disregard for proper conduct in war alienated the Ḥāshid 
confederation, with important effects for the civil war. Likewise, al-Badr’s embrace of 
‘modern’ reforms alienated more traditional ʿulamaʾ and also likely contributed to the 
lukewarm support for al-Badr even among tribes opposed to the republic in the first weeks of 
the war. 
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4 THE CIVIL WAR AND THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT 
The civil war in Yemen transformed the political settlement. The son of a blacksmith became 
head of state, military officers without shaykhly or sayyid pedigree became revolutionary 
heroes, tribal leaders became ministers and governors, and sayyid dominance crumbled. 
Using the model developed in Section 2.2 as an analytical lens reveals fundamental 
transformations in the political role of tribal leaders and officers directly linked to wartime 
mobilisation and external intervention. It also explains the sāda’s loss of influence and why 
merchants remained at the margins of the settlement – all developments that have received 
insufficient attention. The examination also provides empirical grounds to confirm some 
aspects of the model and to nuance and modify others: the case underscores the utility of 
focusing on different patterns of wartime mobilisation, highlights the importance of the 
unintended effects of external intervention, and reveals the need to pay close attention to 
the politics of faction and alliance formation in political settlement analysis. 
The starting point for the chapter is the Imamate-era political settlement described in Section 
3.1 in terms of a fraying alliance of spiritual and temporal authority between influential 
sayyid and qāḍī families and the highland tribes. From this starting point, the pathways of the 
model structure the investigation. Section 4.1 explores how the war reflected a crisis in the 
dominant coalition and led to rapid shifts in its composition. In particular, it traces how the 
sāda lost their commanding position in the state administration and their status atop the 
social pyramid. It also considers the role of Egyptian intervention in narrowing the dominant 
coalition. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 explore how different mobilising strategies shaped the political 
settlement. 4.2 focuses on the mobilisation of existing local violence specialists. It explores 
how Egyptian financial support, Saudi Arabian funds, and the developing web of relationships 
between Saudi officials and many of Yemen’s tribal leaders provided additional resources to 
these leaders as they bargained with other power brokers in Yemen. 4.3 considers attempts 
to create a new military and the ways in which external intervention and the growing power 
of the tribes inflected this process. Finally, the shifting role of traders and merchants in the 
settlement is the subject of Section 4.4, which reveals how the bonanza of spending on 
consumer goods associated with the civil war, the withering of government taxation, and the 
influx of Egyptian and Saudi stipends, salaries, bribes, and inducements, both enabled a 
process of rapid accumulation for the holders of domestic capital and entrenched their 
political marginalisation.  
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4.1 The crisis of the settlement: the fall of the sāda and external intervention 
Chapter 2 posited that civil war, by revealing the existence of rivals to the dominant coalition, 
both results from and leads to further elite conflict, bargaining, and defection, generating 
rapid shifts in the political settlement. Certainly, as Chapter 3 suggested, the Imamate-era 
political settlement was in a state of acute crisis at the beginning of the 1960s, marked by 
significant intra-elite conflict and repeated instances of defection, not least the al-Wazīr coup 
in 1948, military mutinies in 1955 and 1959, and tribal revolts in 1959-61. Centralisation of 
power and the dynastic ambitions of the Ḥamīd al-Dīn had alienated other powerful sayyid 
families. Lesser sāda saw their autonomy and influence threatened at the local level by 
central encroachment onto control over zakat, the ʾawqāf, and education. The Ḥamīd al-Dīn 
alliance with the highland tribes was likewise in crisis. In the aftermath of Crown Prince al-
Badr’s regency, there were tribal uprisings in Ḥāshid and influential families within Bakīl came 
out against the Imam. On the margins of the settlement, Shāfiʿī traders and newly-
professionalised military officers chafed at their lack of influence and played increasingly 
important roles in opposition politics from the mid-1950s onwards. 
It was in the context of this significant elite conflict that the Free Officers and their allies 
overthrew the Imam and the civil war began. In fact, when the coup occurred in late 1962, 
there were also significant divisions within the Ḥamīd al-Dīn family itself. As Imam ʾAḥmad’s 
health deteriorated in the late 1950s, the prospect of imminent succession paralysed the 
court. Imam ʾAḥmad and Crown Prince al-Badr disagreed on many issues and ʾAḥmad’s court 
in Taʿiz and al-Badr’s in Ṣanaʿāʾ increasingly worked at cross-purposes. Moreover, the family 
was divided over al-Badr’s suitability as Imam, with some favouring Imam ʾAḥmad’s brother, 
Prince Ḥassan bin Yaḥiyā (Stookey, 1978, p.205). This is not to suggest that the end of Ḥamīd 
al-Dīn rule was inevitable, let alone that the changes to the settlement that occurred through 
the civil war could be derived from these initial conditions. Yet, as the model suggests, the 
outbreak of the civil war coincided with and reflected a moment of acute fragility and crisis of 
the political settlement.  
4.1.1 The fall of the sāda 
Besides reflecting a moment of crisis in the political settlement, the model suggests that civil 
wars themselves exacerbate elite tensions, resulting in rapid shifts in the composition of the 
dominant coalition. This is something of an overarching point that recurs, leitmotif-like, 
throughout the chapter. Yet the most rapid and enduring such shift in Yemen was the fall of 
the sayyid families from the apex of the social pyramid. The following explores why and how 
the sāda experienced a “clear loss” of influence over the course of the 1960s (Peterson, 1982, 
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pp.127–128). Hitherto dominant families like the Ḥamīd al-Dīn, al-Wazīr, or al-Kibsī, ceased 
playing a defining role in Yemeni politics and at all levels sāda were displaced from positions 
of influence. Though some of this loss of influence was reversed in the later war years and 
during the royalist-republican reconciliation, sāda were ultimately relegated to secondary 
and tertiary positions and the ideology of sayyid rule did not survive the war. As the model 
developed in Chapter 2 suggests, rivalries within the dominant coalition account for a large 
part of this loss of influence. Competitors for local or national influence displaced sāda to 
pursue their individual advancement, making use of a rhetoric of revolution with significant 
currency in contemporary pan-Arab debates and backed by Egyptian military support. 
Supporters of the revolution singled out sāda at all levels during the first weeks after the 
overthrow of the Imam. Egyptian broadcasts and radio Ṣanaʿāʾ rejected sayyid influence and 
identified their political and social standing with the Imamate’s alleged crimes. At the 
national level, the Free Officers executed most of the sāda who held ministerial posts or 
governorships, killing about 50,86 three of them members of the royal family. This occurred 
even though, by some accounts, 17 of the original Free Officers that launched the coup 
against the Imam were Hashemites, albeit ones that opposed traditional status distinctions 
(Interview with Qāsim al-Wazīr, 2017). By contrast to the violence against sāda, only two of 
the quḍāa in Imam ʾAḥmad’s cabinet were executed (vom Bruck, 2005, pp.57–58). Members 
of influential sayyid families were imprisoned or kept under close surveillance, and sāda like 
ʾIbrāhīm and Qāsim al-Wazīr, who had been leading reformists and critics of the Ḥamīd al-Dīn 
before the revolution, lost influence and were ultimately forced into exile. Despite their 
historical role in opposition and their role in the coup, with only one exception, no sāda were 
included at the top of the new regime (Stookey, 1978, p.232).  
At a more local level, likewise, “the majority of the elite of the Imamate who suffered 
atrocities in the revolution were sāda” (Haykel, 1997, p.280) and the Free Officers imagined 
the sāda, in their role as local notables and gatekeepers for news and knowledge in the 
countryside, as the embodiment of the old regime and the drivers of a potential counter-
                                                          
 
86 According to Brown (1963, p.352), about 30 prominent sāda were publicly executed and many more 
were killed. The German embassy mentions 23 executions and provides a partial list: PAAA, B12 1059, 
5 Oct. 1962; 1 Oct. 1962. Royalist accounts insist there were 105 executions, citing unattributed 
documents available here: https://www.facebook.com/Yemen-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-September-26-1962-344256595666669/. 
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revolution.87 In the crude class analysis that defined much revolutionary rhetoric during this 
period, the sāda were reactionary feudal lords.88 
Gabriele vom Bruck’s collection of sayyid life histories provides a catalogue of the 
remembered persecutions of this time. Several of her interlocutors remember being told as 
children growing up in the 1960s that the purpose of the revolution was to “finish the sāda” 
and in at least some areas, the honorific sayyid became a curse, casually used to scold 
servants (vom Bruck, 2005, pp.58–61). Others reported ridicule, chants, and stone-throwing 
children, who considered anyone wearing the distinctive headgear of the sāda, the ʿimāma, 
fair game. Departures from endogamous sayyid marriage likewise reveal shifts in the social 
hierarchy, as men who took up prominent posts in the revolutionary government asked for 
Hashemite brides. Sayyid women were sometimes forced into such marriages in the hope of 
gaining freedom for relatives, preventing their execution, or to gain protection (vom Bruck, 
2005, pp.146–147, 153–154).  
Besides the executions in Ṣanaʿāʾ, sāda in several locations were killed for being ‘historical 
oppressors’ and recast as non-indigenous outsiders during the first weeks of the revolution 
(see 6.1.2). Some of these executions were the result of local initiatives; others were directly 
overseen by the new republican government and Egyptian troops. For instance, shortly after 
the overthrow of the Imam, Egyptian expeditionary forces in Ḥabūr, a village in ʿAmrān, 
rounded up the mayor, a sayyid, and shot him (Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, pp.182, 193). On 
the other hand, the new government shied away from land reform, beyond confiscating the 
lands of the Ḥamīd al-Dīn and those sāda executed as enemies of the revolution (El-Azzazi, 
1978, pp.23, 26). There was no wholesale expropriation of the sāda and in those villages in 
lower Yemen where peasant councils formed and sought to arrest landlords or resist 
payments, the new government stepped in to protect landed property (Dresch, 2000, 
pp.122–123). Evidence from individual locations in Upper Yemen, like Martha Mundy’s study 
of Wādī Ẓahr in Hamdān (1995, p.47) shows that after the revolution mean land holdings of 
                                                          
 
87 Concern over sayyid loyalty was not without foundation. When royalist forces under Prince 
Muḥammad bin Ḥusayn approached Ṣanaʿāʾ in 1967, the Prince regularly received prominent visitors 
from the city who came to pay their respects and pledge loyalty (Interview with ʿAbd Allah al-Kibsī, 
2016). 
88 The equation is crude because large landholdings were rare and sayyid status was primarily defined 
by learning and descent. See 3.1.1. 
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sayyid families were comparable to those of tribesmen – as they likely had been before 1962 
– and remained larger than those of other groups.  
In terms of administrative changes, sāda were displaced from positions of power, though 
they continued to play an important role in lower level administration. All governors formally 
lost their positions, while administrative changes at lower levels were more selective and 
depended on the initiative of local rivals and thus varied from village to village. In some towns 
of the south and villages of the West, traditional patterns of deference prevailed. In others, 
local rivals ensured sāda lost their jobs and faced social sanction (see 6.1.2). More 
systematically, sayyid loss of influence was attenuated in royalist areas and some of the 
contested tribal highlands. In 1970, these areas were integrated into the new republic with 
minimal change to their governing arrangements, leaving sāda in charge (Dresch, 2000, 
p.124).89 After 1970 large numbers of sāda also returned to areas from which they had fled 
and houses and lands were returned to their previous owners, who reassumed positions of 
prominence. Nonetheless, the war shook the traditional status order and displaced sāda from 
the top of the social pyramid. 
In Jabal Rayma, for instance, Swagman notes that whereas the sāda had previously been 
governors, directors of finance, or the head judges, after the civil war they could be found 
only at lower rungs of the civil service: the local assistant judge, the assistant district director, 
and the secretary to the district director were all sāda. In their place, tribal leaders held far 
more extensive formal power, with the brother of a paramount shaykh becoming the local 
director of security, for example. Many sāda, disproportionally literate and well-educated, 
thus found places in the middle reaches of the newly expanded government bureaucracy 
(Stookey, 1978, p.233; vom Bruck, 2005, p.170) but were barred from the top reaches of 
government (Burrowes, 1987, p.29).90  
Insisting, as the model does, on the general language of flux and change, amounts to a 
recognition that winners and losers in civil war are contingent. The stakes are high; changes 
are chaotic and defined by fundamental uncertainty, rather than risk susceptible to 
                                                          
 
89 For instance, Sayyid al-Marwanī remained director of ʾArḥab district throughout the civil war 
(Interviews with ʾAḥmad al-Sayyānī and ʿAbbās al-Mukhtafī, 2016). 
90 Some have gone so far as to suggest that though the sāda lost political influence, their social position 
was untouched (Chelhod et al., 1985, pp.16, 27). This appears to be too neat a distinction. 
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(probability) modelling. Had Egyptian support focused on other personalities, ended earlier or 
continued later, had Saudi support for the royalists been greater, had the alienation of key 
tribes from the Ḥamīd al-Dīn been less pronounced, had things been slightly different, in 
other words, different outcomes would have ensued. 
Yet, while outcomes are contingent, there are generalisable logics at play. There are likely to 
be general benefits to new rulers in removing the top echelons of the existing administration 
and particularly any with political loyalty to the deposed ruler. Similarly, promoting officials 
and social groups relegated to the ‘second tier’ of political position and social status under 
the old order can strengthen a constituency for the coup by generating selective benefits and 
creating new networks of patronage. Moreover, such changes appear path dependent. 
Moves to unseat established elites are liable to develop a strong logic of their own as they 
come to define the framing of the overall conflict. Had an outside power supported 
disgruntled sāda seeking a constitutional Imamate, as the conspirators of 1948 had, rather 
than military officers pursuing an Egyptian-style revolution, there would have been little 
scope for coalitions of quḍāa, peasants, and occasionally tribal leaders, to come together to 
break sayyid power. For the composition of the Yemeni political settlement and its changes 
over the course of the civil war, the fact that the war began with a military coup that 
appealed to ideas of social revolution, defined the sort of changes that were possible. How 
local coalitions used ideas of social revolution and the propaganda and concerns of the 
Egyptian interveners, is explored further in Section 6.1.2 below.   
4.1.2 The Egyptians and the crisis of the settlement 
The impact of Egyptian intervention on the political settlement is an overarching concern of 
this chapter. The resources it provided fundamentally shaped the trajectories of mobilisation 
examined in sections 4.2 and 4.3 below and played an important role in circumscribing the 
role of Yemen’s lowland traders in the emerging political settlement, explored in Section 4.4. 
The discussion here centres on its overall size and character as well as one issue not well 
captured in these later discussions: the preference leading Egyptian politicians showed for 
specific people and policies. These idiosyncratic preferences contributed to the enduring 
crisis of the political settlement throughout the war and to a narrowing of the dominant 
coalition; particularly in a context where, as we saw in 3.3, independence from foreign 
interference was a widely-shared ideal of legitimate rule.  
The model suggests that while external intervention per se does not create unsustainable 
dominant coalitions, it can supply resources independent of the domestic political economy, 
allowing dominant coalitions to form that are dependent on continuing external support for 
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their survival. Indeed, it may incentivise narrow and unsustainable coalitions if interveners 
prefer dependent local leaders over whom they have leverage. This causal story is borne-out 
in the YAR. The Egyptian intervention supplied significant resources for a series of narrowly 
based governments under their control. Yet, these governments remained unstable and the 
Egyptian command was repeatedly forced to make deals with other groups and to accept 
ministerial appointments and whole governments it judged hostile in order to avoid outright 
insurrection and a loss of control, despite its overwhelming military and financial leverage. 
The Egyptians rarely got their way, suggesting much of the literature continues to 
underestimate the limits of external intervention and the extent to which its possibilities are 
shaped by the domestic balance of power. 
Within little more than a week of the overthrow of the Imam, there were 3,000 Egyptian 
soldiers in Yemen; after three months, there were 15,000; after six months, 30,000. The 
Egyptian military presence continued to grow to reach 70,000 soldiers, supported by an 
extensive intelligence apparatus by the summer of 1965. Though numbers decreased briefly 
in early 1966, they likely hovered around 50,000 for most of the remaining period until 
Egyptian withdrawal in winter 1967 (DWQ, 0078-044111, 29 Aug. 1968).91 The total cost of 
the Yemen deployment remains unclear, yet the limited figures available suggest that, even 
excluding Soviet contributions, it probably exceeded $500 million over the five years between 
October 1962 and December 1967 (Ferris, 2012, p.195-196).  
The Egyptian President, Jamāl ʿAbd al-Nasir, the President of the National Council, Anwar al-
Sadat, and the Chief of Staff, ʿAbd al-Hakim ʿAmir hand-picked the first YAR government and 
appointed ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-Bayḍānī’s as Vice President. Al-Bayḍānī, who had grown up in 
Egypt to Egyptian-Yemeni parents without having set foot in Yemen, was close enough to 
ʾAnwar al-Sadat to still be denying rumours he was his brother in law 40 years later (Manṣūr, 
2001).92 Sadat had ‘rescued’ al-Bayḍānī from exile in Sudan and ensured he received airtime 
on ṣawt al-ʿarab, column inches in rūz al-yūsuf magazine, and was elevated to lead the Cairo-
based Yemeni opposition before the revolution (Douglas, 1987, p.235-237). Thanks to 
Egyptian support, al-Bayḍānī was on the first plane to Ṣanaʿāʾ after the revolution and held an 
impressive array of portfolios in the first YAR government, including as Vice President and 
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (ʾAḥmad, 1992, pp.331, 335; Dresch, 1993b, p.244).  
                                                          
 
91 See also: O’Ballance, 1971, p.66; Jones, 2004, p.65; Nājī, 1988, pp. 192–193, 221–223, 226, 232, 235. 
92 These may have originated in part from: Halliday, 1974, p.104. 
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Al-Bayḍānī proved to be a highly divisive figure. Having grown up abroad, he lacked both a 
power base in Yemen and a fine-grained understanding of its politics. His virulently anti-Zaydī 
politics and sectarian vision of Yemen’s revolution flew in the face of early attempts to 
mobilise tribal support for the new government and risked provoking general opposition in 
the highlands and among traditional power-brokers in the lowlands. Within the government’s 
inner circle, key policy decisions, particularly his acquiescence to transferring Yemen’s 
currency reserves to Cairo, likewise proved divisive. After approximately six months, during 
which he wielded substantial power, the remaining members of the revolutionary 
government stripped al-Bayḍānī of his offices while he was away on a visit to Cairo in 
February 1963 and later, in August 1963, revoked his Yemeni citizenship. Faced with such 
hostility, the Egyptian command refrained from imposing his return (O’Ballance, 1971, 
pp.116–117). 
A similar, though more nuanced story can be told about the Egyptian command’s insistence 
on maintaining President al-Sallāl in office and avoiding the appointment of ministers 
deemed Baʿathist, communist, reactionary, aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, or 
otherwise not to its liking. Egyptian experts protected the office of the Presidency from 
attempts by the former Free Yemeni leadership to create a more parliamentary system, over 
which the Egyptians feared losing control (PAAA, B36 115, 2 May 1964). Egyptian troops 
likewise physically protected President al-Sallāl, guarding the Presidential Palace from 
October 1962 (PAAA, B12 1060, 29 Oct. 1962). They remained an important part of the 
President’s security retinue until the Egyptian retreat and the presidential guard, which 
became central to al-Sallāl’s ability to weather discontent in the army, could grow to some 
3,000 elite soldiers largely thanks to Egyptian support (Nājī, 1988, pp.222–243). So invested 
was President al-Sallāl at the end of his tenure in the Egyptian presence, he did everything he 
could after the 1967 Jeddah accords set the parameters for Egyptian withdrawal, to sabotage 
its implementation (DWQ, 0078-044109, 3 Oct. 1967; 4 Oct. 1967).93  
Yet, despite their strong presence in Yemen, reaching 70,000 combat troops and hundreds of 
civilian advisers, the Egyptians proved repeatedly unable to maintain their chosen narrow 
coalition and durably exclude other power brokers. This becomes clear, for instance, around 
                                                          
 
93 Al-Sallāl and other pro-Egyptian republicans may also have sought deliberately to sabotage the 
Ḥaraḍ conference against the wishes of their Egyptian patrons (Zabarah, 1982, p.99; but see: Ferris, 
2012, p.268).  
104 
 
the ʿAmrān conference in September 1963. Organised as a Yemeni peace conference by 
Maḥmūd al-Zubayrī, a prominent poet and member of the Free Yemeni Movement, it 
attracted participation from a wide range of shaykhs and ʿulamaʾ (see 6.2.1). The Egyptian 
command strongly opposed the conference and initially sought to arrest al-Zubayrī. Yet, after 
the conference demanded Egyptian withdrawal in its final resolution, the Egyptians 
abandoned their attempts to arrest al-Zubayrī. Ultimately, the Egyptian command recognised 
many of the conference demands and agreed to make Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-ʾIryānī, a 
political ally of al-Zubayrī, Vice President and Prime Minister (PAAA, B36 45, 9 Oct. 1963), 
even as it backed efforts to organise rival, pro-Egyptian conferences elsewhere (PAAA B36 45, 
2 Dec. 1963). Similarly, after al-Zubayrī’s assassination in April 1965, for which some blamed 
the Egyptians, the Egyptian command, fearing a general tribal revolt, recalled the increasingly 
unpopular President al-Sallāl for ‘consultations’ to Cairo and agreed to a government under 
ʾAḥmad Nuʿmān that demanded phased Egyptian withdrawal and sought to chart a more 
independent course (Schmidt, 1968, p.228). 
Although unable to prevent the Nuʿmān government from coming to power, Egypt’s 
extensive presence in Yemen did mean that its advisors and commanders were able to 
sabotage its every move and those of its successors. ʿAbd al-Nasir blocked Prime Minister 
Ḥassan al-ʿAmrī’s attempts in late 1965 to negotiate with the Soviet Union to directly receive 
weapons shipments without Egyptian mediation (al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, p.119). In the summer of 
1965, after the Nuʿmān government demanded a phased Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen, 
Egypt cut off aid and ʿAbd al-Nasir intervened to halt a Kuwaiti loan that would have made up 
for the shortfall (Alaini, 2004, p.113). In the summer of 1966, an Egyptian plane flew al-Sallāl 
back to Ṣanaʿāʾ and Egyptian troops imposed his return when Yemeni units sought to stop 
him at the airport (Nājī, 1988, p.234). In disarray, a large delegation of leading government 
officials travelled to Cairo to protest, but they were placed under house arrest when they 
arrived.94 Mass arrests within the officer corps, explored in more detail in Section 4.3, 
followed. Briefed on these developments by a UAR official, an East German report celebrated 
the “cleansing of the apparatus of state from reactionary elements” (PAAA, MfAA C740-73, 
May 1967). Yet, this state faced increasingly open unrest in the cities and deepening 
                                                          
 
94 According to one recent account, Nasser treated his erstwhile allies poorly during their de-facto 
imprisonment in Cairo. Officials were kept incommunicado, some were tortured, and some family 
homes were demolished (al-ʾẠhmar, 2008, p.120). See also ʾAḥmad Nuʿmān’s description of his own 
ordeal (Zayd, 2004, pp.115-121). 
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opposition from nominally republican-aligned tribes. At the beginning of November 1967, 
even before the last Egyptian troops left Yemen, a broad-based republican coalition deposed 
al-Sallāl. Despite its overwhelming military presence, Egypt had been forced to bargain and 
negotiate with nationalist politicians and saw its influence evaporate the moment the last 
Egyptian soldier left Yemen. 
4.2 Empowering local violence specialists: the renaissance of tribes 
When the Free Officers proclaimed the overthrow of the Imam, the paramount shaykh of 
Ḥāshid, ʿAbd Allah al-ʾAḥmar, was a prisoner of the Imam in Taʿiz (al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, p.79). His 
imprisonment reflects the low ebb of tribal influence on the eve of the revolution. Imam 
Yaḥiyā and Imam ʾAḥmad had gradually brought the predominance of armed power to the 
centre. The Imam had successfully put down tribal uprisings in 1959, 1960, and 1961 and the 
leaders of these uprisings were in prison or exile. Tribal leaders remained politically relevant 
and tribal revolts were a recurrent threat to Imamic rule, yet tribal leaders held no formal 
office, were cut off from Ottoman-era stipends, and were negotiating local power with 
centrally-appointed governors, commanders, and other officials. Tribal levies’ aging rifles 
were increasingly outmatched by the automatic weapons, armoured vehicles, and artillery of 
the niẓāmī army.  
Yet, during the civil war, tribes quickly became central to the calculations of all sides. Given 
Yemen’s mountainous terrain and low rates of urbanisation, tribal support was essential to 
keeping supply and communication lines open and for access to water, supplies, and local 
knowledge. Moreover, the tribes maintained an important role in Yemen’s oligopoly of 
violence and larger tribes could mobilise several hundred or even several thousand fighters. 
Although the niẓāmī army had repeatedly defeated tribal uprisings, when it fractured in the 
immediate aftermath of the coup (see 4.3 below), the tribes found themselves ascendant. 
This was particularly true, since, by the 1960s, rallying the tribes was the standard script for 
an Imam facing a coup or uprising. As a result, not only did the Imam immediately seek to 
rally tribal support, but impeding the Imam’s efforts to rally the tribes became a central 
concern of the Free Officers. Though liable to over-play the importance of the Ḥāshid tribal 
fighters he was commanding, it is probably no exaggeration when ʿAbd Allah al-ʾAḥmar states 
that a large majority of troops involved in the first civil war battles for Shahāra, Ṣaʿda, and 
Ḥajja were tribal fighters (al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, p.86-87).  
A word on the identification of tribes with the ‘local violence specialists’ of the model: There 
is a long and problematic tendency in writing about Yemen in Arabic and in European 
languages to portray tribes as “backwards, ignorant […] uncivilized and violent” (Corstange, 
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2009, p.14; see also: Lackner, 2016, p.1). Analysing them in terms of their function during the 
war as local violence specialists may raise associations with such literature, but the purpose is 
expressly not to equate tribes with backward, chaotic, violence. Rather the starting point, as 
3.1.3 highlighted, is that tribes in northern Yemen provided a broad range of local governance 
and as such are institutions designed to tame, manage, and regularise violence. Their ability 
to do so, however, was and is based on a local predominance of violence: on the myth and 
reality of tribal control over territory and responsibility for the security of all of the people 
within that territory – sometimes independent from, sometimes shared with, and sometimes 
subordinate to, the central military (Brandt, 2017, p.71; Lackner, 2017, p.196). Bearing arms 
and responding to tribal summons is but one part of what it means to be a tribesman, but it is 
an element of tribal identity and collective violence is part of the tribes’ expected role. It is in 
this sense (only) that tribes were local violence specialists and it is from this feature of tribal 
organisation in Yemen that their prominence during the civil war largely derived.  
How were these tribal fighters mobilised and to what effect? The model developed in 
Chapter 2 suggests that building alliances with existing local violence specialists is likely to 
decentralise power over coercion, since it usually involves giving up large amounts of central 
oversight and implies the transfer of rights and resources to local violence specialists. The 
model also suggested that, since violence and brinkmanship can serve local violence 
specialists as tools to increase their leverage vis-à-vis the centre, mobilising strategies that 
rely on them render attempts to build coalitions for centralising violence more difficult in the 
longer term.  
Yemen bears out these dynamics and this section highlights the key role of mobilising 
strategies for the resurgence of tribal influence, closely probing this element of the model. 
4.2.1 traces the strategies employed by royalists, republicans, and their regional backers to 
secure tribal support and highlights that the most important mobilising strategy consisted of 
direct payments to tribal leaders, made possible by the resources external interveners 
provided. 4.2.2 explores the impact of these strategies on tribal leaders’ place in the evolving 
political settlement during and after the civil war. Next to the decentralising outcomes the 
model suggests, which the investigation amply bears out, this sub-section highlights how rival 
politicians at the centre courted tribes as a distinct political constituency to balance the 
Yemeni left and how tribal leaders made use of central resources in internal power struggles, 
adding a missing element to the model’s story. 
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4.2.1 Mobilising the tribes 
Most discussions of the war gloss over issues of tribal allegiances and mobilisation, explaining 
only that most of Ḥāshid backed the republic and most of Bakīl supported the royalists, 
although they tend to stress that tribes focused on their own interests and that many tribal 
leaders successfully played both sides (e.g. Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, p.242; O’Ballance, 
1971, p.112). However, allegiances were not only shifting and unstable, but also fragmented 
and nested and while royalists and republicans competed for the support of tribal leaders, 
tribal leaders competed for ascendancy in tribal politics. Consequently, when describing the 
tribes supporting the Republic, ʿAbd Allah Al-ʾAḥmar provides the name of only a small 
number of tribes (notably Dhū Muḥammad, Siḥār, Āl al-Shāʾif, al-Thawāba, Āl Juzaylān, Āl 
ʾAbū ʾAsbaʿ, al-Fāḍil and ʾIbn ʿAwfān) without qualification, listing other supporters as 
consisting of ‘parts of’ Nihm under Sinān ʾAbū Luḥūm, ‘parts of’ al-Bayḍāʾ under ʾAḥmad Nāṣir 
al-Dhahab and ‘most of’ the Ḥāshid tribal confederation. The remainder of his list of 
supporters consists largely of prominent families (buyut) and individual shaykhs, rather than 
larger units (al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, pp.91–93, 95). Despite the tendency to see tribes as more or 
less unitary actors, which remains stubbornly persistent in contemporary scholarship, 
royalists and republicans could and did appeal to heads of houses and sub-tribes when 
negotiations with tribal leaders failed and royalist shaykhs headed republican tribes and vice 
versa (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 21 Sep. 1965).  
Attempts to mobilise tribal support took place against the backdrop of this complex and 
fragmented map of allegiances, with important effects for logics of mobilisation and their 
political outcomes. In such a context, rights to local autonomy and even national office did 
little to help tribal leaders against local competitors, so that direct payments and the transfer 
of weapons became central for mobilising tribal support. Foreign interveners seeking local 
allies, with short time horizons and unconcerned by the growing predominance of tribes, 
provided vast resources to tribal leaders. Individual shaykhs used these outside resources to 
advance their position within the tribe and to gain a place in the political settlement.95  
Ultimately, far-reaching decentralisation was less a means to win tribal support and more the 
                                                          
 
95 These dynamics are reminiscent of how the rivalry between Imam Yahiya and Muḥammad al-ʾIdrīsī 
fifty years earlier briefly empowered local elites able to play them off against one another (Blumi, 
2003, p.66).  
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outcome of shifts in the balance of power between tribal leaders, the military, and 
administrative elites. 
Exchanging rights for fighters? 
The new government almost immediately announced it was abolishing the tribal hostage 
system and that taxation would henceforth be local and voluntary (Peterson, 1982, pp.138–
139). The first measure was aimed squarely at the tribes, while the second was a broader play 
for support. Both decisions had significant knock-on effects, since the hostage system and 
associated stipends, which taxation paid for, had been the Imams’ main instrument for 
controlling the tribes. In October 1963, the German embassy noted that without hostages 
and money, the republican government had few choices but to offer tribal leaders further 
participation in government to secure support (PAAA, B36 45, 18 Oct. 1963; see also Peterson 
1982, 105). 
Apparently following this strategy, the government included more than 130 shaykhs, who 
had been guarantors for tax collection in their areas under the Imam, in the High Council for 
National Defence in October 1962, granting each the salary of a government minister. 
Similarly, nearly half of the April 1963 Presidency Council was composed of tribal shaykhs 
(al-Ẓāhirī, 1996, p.139). The government also created a High Council for Tribal Affairs in 
December 1962 (SWB ME/W194/A/5) and a Committee for Tribal Affairs in November 1963 
under ʿAbd al-Salām Ṣabra, Shaykh ʿAlī bin Nājī al-Ruwayshān, ʿAbd Allah al-Jayfī, and Sayyid 
Ḥusayn Sharaf al-Kibsī. The committee formed an important part of the new republican 
government, tasked with political education and mobilising tribes (PAAA, B36 45, 23 Nov. 
1963). Al-Ẓāhirī, who stresses an initial honeymoon period in which the new government 
sought to integrate tribal leaders in republican politics, sets much store by these and other 
early decisions, such as the creation of governorate level tribal councils (majālis shuyūkh) in 
April 1963 (al-Ẓāhirī, 1996, pp.139–140). Yet we know about these measures primarily 
because they were decreed and it is unclear to what extent they were implemented.  
Direct payments and repression 
Alongside and eclipsing such transfers of rights and political opportunities, mobilisation 
depended on direct payments to tribal leaders as the predominant strategy. On the royalist 
side, between 1962 and the first months of 1965, the Ḥamīd al-Dīn Princes distributed at 
least 80,000 rifles to tribal fighters and spent between £100,000-200,000 per month on 
payments to tribal leaders (Jones, 2004, p.101). Daily rates for tribesmen fighting for the 
Imam shortly after the coup were 3 Saudi Riyals per soldier per day, or about double the 
wages of a regular soldier in the niẓāmī army before the coup (PAAA, B36 46, 19 May 1963; 
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Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, p.115). With no domestic source of income to finance these 
payments, the Ḥamīd al-Dīn relied almost exclusively on Saudi Arabian weapons and 
financing. Saudi support totalled £25 million (ca. 56 million MT) in the first two and a half 
years of the war – more than double the entire annual government budget of the 
Mutawakkilite Kingdom before 1962 (Jones, 2004, p.194; see also: Aboul-Enein, 2004).96 Most 
of this money made its way directly to the tribes in payments and stipends. Much of the 
remainder made its way to them indirectly in the form of weapons purchased via British or 
French intermediaries and distributed to the tribes.  
In addition to this support via the Ḥamīd al-Dīn family, Saudi Arabia also established direct 
relationships with tribal leaders. Prince Sulṭān, the Minister of Defence and Aviation, directed 
Saudi policy and his relative Muḥammad al-Sudayrī, the governor of the Saudi border 
province of Jāzān, began making direct payments to tribal leaders in the border regions in 
1964 (Jones, 2004, p.48; Stookey, 1978, p.260), a role taken over by the shadowy “Special 
Committee” in the final war years, which also administered the supply of lucrative trading 
licenses to Yemen’s tribal leaders (Gause, 1990, pp.71, 73; Weir, 2007, p.283).97 
Direct payments were also central to republican and Egyptian efforts to generate and 
maintain tribal support. Yet, at first, the new republican government only provided limited 
arms to tribal fighters. Direct payments did not play an important role in the first months 
after the revolution. Shaykh al-ʾAḥmar asserts in his memoirs, for instance, that Ḥāshid 
fighters fought “without salaries” from the government “using their personal weapons” 
during the first months of the war and financed the campaign through contributions by 
villagers in the areas of operation (al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, p.93). Indeed, the Egyptian command 
was initially hostile to the tribes. Part of the rationale for intervention in Yemen was freeing 
the country from ‘backwards’ tribalism, a point explored in 6.1.2 below.  
                                                          
 
96 Besides the Saudi Arabian royal family, which supported the Imam from the outset (Jones, 2004, 
p.46; Interview with ʿAbd Allah al-Kibsī, 2016; but see: Badeeb, 1986, pp.51–53), Jordan was an initial 
staunch supporter of the royalist cause, as were Iran and the UK. France and Israel also supplied and 
air-dropped weapons (Jones, 2004; Orkaby, 2015, pp.128–133; Smiley, 1975). 
97 According to information relayed to the UK government, these payments reflected the Saudi goal of 
ruling Yemen through the tribal shuyūkh without the Hamid al-Din (UKNA, DEFE 13/570 77705, 19 Jul. 
1964). 
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Within several months of the initial Egyptian deployment, however, de facto military practice 
was at odds with the declared political aim of removing tribal influence, as the Egyptian 
command began to view payments to tribes as a central element of its counterinsurgency 
campaign. Paradoxically, from 1963 onwards, the Egyptians played an important role in 
expanding the armed power of the tribes at the expense of the central military. From the 
Egyptian perspective, what was in short supply was not firepower or effective fighters – the 
Egyptian military could provide these – rather, it was local information and a friendly or 
neutral operating environment for Egyptian troops. To this end, gaining the support of 
strategically-placed tribes was more important than growing a central military that could at 
best duplicate and replace what Egyptian forces were already doing. While they did invest in 
the creation of a central military, far more Egyptian support flowed to tribes; and tribal 
militias operated alongside Egyptian troops in joint operations more actively than the new 
Yemeni military. 
Such joint operations were only possible because, like Saudi Arabia, Egypt established its own 
direct relationships with tribal leaders. It created a Tribal Affairs Office in late 1962 and by 
early 1963 instituted its own tribal subsidies of up to £20,000 per month, establishing direct 
relations between the Egyptian command and tribal leaders.98 At the same time, republican 
military commanders also began granting shaykhs sympathetic to the republic funds as 
recruiters and commanders of the auxiliary Popular Forces (al-jaysh al-shaʿabī). These 
payments, of up to 30 YR per person per mission, approximated those of the royalists. In fact, 
tribal leaders offering loyalty to the Republic explicitly demanded payment equivalent to the 
royalist rates (PAAA, B36 46, 19 May 1963).99  
The Egyptians further increased the financial resources devoted to these efforts after 1964, 
when the Egyptian command adopted a new model of operations in which Egyptian troops 
provided air and artillery support to ground offensives by Yemeni tribes (ʾAḥmad, 1992, 
                                                          
 
98 These payments were introduced after Egyptian expeditionary forces suffered heavy losses in initial 
fighting, including at least one instance in which a supposedly allied tribe turned on the Egyptian 
commandos operating alongside them (Ferris, 2012, pp.186–188; al-Ḥadīdī, 1984, pp.70–72). 
99 However, seeing them purely in terms of a ‘political marketplace’ (De Waal, 2015a) underestimates 
non-monetary motivations. The market may have set the price of allegiance, but non-market factors 
determined which allegiances were possible. 
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pp.315–316).100 Eventually, payments to individual shaykhs reached the ‘fantastic’ level of up 
to 200,000 YR, according to the Egyptian ambassador to Yemen (DWQ 0078-044109, 8 Oct. 
1967; 0078-044111, 29 Aug. 1968).101 Financial inducements accompanied major Egyptian 
offensives (Jones, 2004, p.156) and German records refer frequently to Egyptian payments to 
buy tribal support, including a payment to President al-Sallāl of 1 million YR to purchase tribal 
support during the intra-republican splits of summer 1965, a stepping up of tribal subsidies in 
the triangle between al-Ḥudayda, Ṣanaʿāʾ, and Taʿiz to minimise the risk of unrest during the 
implementation of their “long breath” strategy in 1966, and additional one-off payments to 
cover Egyptian withdrawal in late 1967 (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 25 Jun. 1965, 11 Nov. 
1965, 13 Nov. 1966, 21 Mar. 1967).102 Once introduced, tribal stipends proved very difficult to 
drop and after the Egyptian retreat in 1967, the republican government was soon spending 
1.6 million YR in direct monthly payments to the tribes (El-Azzazi, 1978, p.47).103  
Where the carrot proved unsuccessful, the Egyptian military sought to influence tribal leaders 
through repression. Throughout the war, the royalists lacked effective anti-air weapons and 
the Egyptians – and later the republicans – made extensive use of their air superiority. Taking 
a page from the imperial playbook of the British, the Egyptian command bombed and strafed 
villages to punish tribes who joined the royalists. From contemporary sources, it is clear that 
aerial bombardment and shelling were the stock response to attacks on Egyptian troops (e.g. 
PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 22 Feb 1966, clippings of NZZ from 22 Feb. 1966; B36 45, 8 Jun. 
                                                          
 
100 Studies disagree whether the Egyptians and their republican allies only gradually granted “grudging 
acceptance” to “tribal reality” (Ferris, 2012, pp.182–183) or whether they sought at first to woo the 
tribes and then turned gradually against them (al-Ẓāhirī, 1996). This disagreement may derive from 
distinct levels of analysis: While the political leadership sought to side-line tribal shuyūkh in the mid-
60s, operational practice meant growing resources for tribal leaders. 
101 According to Nājī (1988, p.244) overall Egyptian payments reached £ 60 million. See also: Ferris, 
2012, p.197; Jones, 2004, p.155. 
102 Over the course of the war, Egyptian payments became more targeted and selective as the Egyptian 
forces developed “political offices” embedded with individual tribes, charged with incremental 
dispensation of aid in return for specific services. See: ʾAḥmad, 1992, pp.530–532; Ferris, 2012, pp.182, 
188–189; Dresch, 1995, p.43. 
103 See also 5.1.3 below. 
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1963).104 Egyptian bombing was sufficiently regular and intense that whole villages were 
abandoned. Egyptian tactics included the use of chemical weapons (Smiley, 1975, p.181; 
Dresch, 2000, p.106), destroying wells, bombing and burning crops, and strafing herds of 
livestock (Schmidt, 1968, p.120; O’Ballance, 1971, pp.91, 117). Such indiscriminate violence, 
in line with evidence from other conflicts (Kalyvas, 2006), was rarely successful in dissuading 
violence against Egyptian and republican troops. Retaliatory air strikes reliably drove whole 
villages, and sometimes the tribes they belonged to, to join the royalist cause (PAAA, B36 45, 
10 Nov. 1963; see also: Schmidt, 1968, p.175; Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, p.122). 
The Sisyphean task of tribal mobilisation 
Nājī al-Ghādir’s wartime and post-war trajectory summarises and illustrates many of the 
points discussed so far: al-Ghādir was, in 1962, shaykh of the al-ʿArūsh (sub)-tribe of Khawlān 
al-Ṭiyāl, a member of the Bakīl confederation. He initially wavered between supporting the 
revolution and fidelity to the Imamate, but the opportunities presented by royalist payments 
and the excesses of Egyptian intervention pushed him into the royalist camp. The war, its 
resources, and the divisions in tribal politics it engendered allowed al-Ghādir to become, first, 
shaykh of Khawlān and then to challenge the paramount shaykh of Bakīl, ʾAmīn ʾAbū Rās, who 
had sided with the republic, to become the rival ‘royalist’ paramount shaykh of the 
confederation (Brandt, forthcoming, pp.7–9). He went from being a minor shaykh 
commanding 120 men to having thousands of fighters under his command (Halliday, 1974, 
pp.117–118, 128–129). 
Al-Ghādir also crystallises the crucial flaws of direct payments as a mobilisation strategy: they 
were expensive and worked only in the short term. Tribal leaders were able throughout the 
war to play off both sides. According to an Egyptian officer (Khalīl, 1990, p.63), for example, 
during his first meeting with al-Ghādir, he gave the shaykh 5,000 MT. Halliday reports that al-
Ghādir received 800,000 MT from the republican General al-ʿAmrī, while making promises to 
both sides (Halliday, 1974, p.117). Ultimately, al-Ghādir joined the republic only after the 
siege of Ṣanaʿāʾ, when its victory seemed certain.  
Tribal autonomy and direct payments ensured that gathering tribal support was a Sisyphean 
task of perpetual mobilisation. Every raid or assault needed an ad-hoc alliance and the 
assembled coalition would fall apart after – and sometimes before – its objectives were 
                                                          
 
104 See also: Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, p.234; Ferris, 2012, p.189; O’Ballance, 1971, p.180. 
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reached. One of the Septembrist officers, who served as a republican commander during the 
civil war, described the relationship between the military and the tribes in the following 
terms (Interview with Ḥamūd Baydar, 2016):  
During the war, we relied on the tribes a great deal. We gave them weapons and 
equipment in exchange for cooperation on specific missions. […] We would meet with 
tribal leaders we knew were sympathetic to the revolution and ask them for fighters. 
They would send a specific number under the command of a mid-level shaykh. In 
exchange, we would give them weapons and equipment. The tribesmen would fulfil 
the mission and then return to their home [balad]. If we wanted to conduct another 
joint operation, we would go back and negotiate with the shaykh. 
Egyptian military documents and British mercenaries’ assessments capture the same 
dynamics rather less graciously (Smiley, 1975, p.176; Orkaby, 2014, pp.141–142). Even tribal 
leaders like Shaykh al-ʾAḥmar describe instances where they waited for weeks for fighters to 
arrive, and that despite payment in money, weapons, or supplies, they not always showed up 
(al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, pp.135, 159, 162).105 
4.2.2 Outcomes 
The model suggested a causal story according to which central elites, in order to build 
alliances with existing local violence specialists, must reallocate rights over violence and 
revenue. Additional rights and a growing role in keeping the dominant coalition in power may 
empower local power brokers within the dominant coalition, lead to greater local autonomy, 
and erode coalitions for central control and oversight. The outcomes in Yemen and the 
mechanisms by which they were reached closely fit this model. It explains well why tribal 
leaders gained significant local autonomy and influence in central decision making during the 
al-Sallāl government, a period few existing studies acknowledge as witnessing an expansion 
of their role. It can also account neatly for why the influence of tribal leaders expanded 
sharply after Egyptian withdrawal, when tribal support became central to the survival of the 
republican regime.  
Next to this general story, two points stand out that the model has little to say about, though 
it pointed us in the right direction to notice these developments. As power fragmented at 
higher levels, tribal leaders centralised and consolidated their role inside the tribe. They 
                                                          
 
105 This fits with the established evidence on the tendency of side-payments to create loose 
associations that fall apart under pressure (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2008, p.6; see also: Cramer, 2002; 
Weinstein, 2007). 
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gained power vis-à-vis other members of the tribe and the war changed how tribes 
functioned and the relations within them. Moreover, there remains the question under what 
circumstances contending elites seek to mobilise local violence specialists and which tribal 
leaders, specifically, benefited from the opportunities war offered. After describing how the 
transfer of rights and resources elevated tribal leaders in the political settlement and 
touching on dynamics of centralisation within tribes, this sub-section therefore explores the 
politics of tribal influence, arguing that the war opened an opportunity for a system of 
notable politics that played to the strengths of the second tier of traditional elites swept into 
power by the revolution.  
Government insiders and new local powers 
Writing on the political history of Yemen has long stressed that tribal leaders gained 
important positions in government and access to attendant rents after the civil war. Yet, most 
neglect the dramatic rise of tribal leaders during and because of the civil war, attributing their 
rise to President ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-ʾIryānī’s (r1968-1974) attempts to side-line leftist rivals 
and his policies during reconciliation with the royalists (Stookey, 1978, pp.32, 255–260; 
1974b, p.410; Burrowes, 2009, “al-ʾIryānī and al-Ḥamdī regimes and transition period”).106 
Such an account is not without merits and, as we will see, elements of this political story help 
make sense of developments in Yemen. However, tribal leaders’ growing influence was less 
new in the late 1960s and early 1970s than it has appeared to observers. It accompanied 
republican politics almost from the outset and began under President al-Sallāl, although it 
was held in check by the Egyptian presence, which for a time appeared able to secure Nasirist 
political dominance, even as tribal leaders gained increasing resources and important 
government portfolios.  
The discussion above already highlighted how republican governments from 1962 onwards 
offered formal office to mobilise tribal supporters; establishing, for instance, a Committee for 
Tribal Affairs and appointing leading shaykhs to lucrative ministerial-level advisory posts. As 
these measures continued during the war, they became less attempts to woo tribal leaders 
and more capitulations to their growing power. When the government gave responsibility for 
distributing a large gift of wheat from the United States to a committee composed of Shaykh 
Sinān ʾAbū Luḥūm, Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAlī al-ʾAswadī, and the prominent Shāfiʿī notable 
                                                          
 
106 Two exceptions to this tendency are: al-Ẓāhirī, 1996, p.140 and Halliday, 1974, p.115. 
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Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAlī ʿUthmān, it was probably dispensing patronage (PAAA B36 45, 23 
Nov. 1963). Yet, later making Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-ʾAḥmar governor of Ḥajja likely simply 
reflected his de facto importance. It would have been difficult for anyone else to claim to be 
governing Ḥajja. In late 1966, when President al-Sallāl purged his government, he 
nonetheless appointed ʿAbd Allah al ʾAḥmar, ʾAmīn ʾAbū Rās, Ṣāliḥ bin Nājī al-Ruwayshān, 
Muṭiʿ Damāj and ʾAḥmad ʿAbd Rabbuh al-ʿAwāḍī as advisors on tribal affairs with the rank and 
salary of ministers (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 20 Sep. 1966). In doing so, he was recognising 
the influence of political enemies who during the intra-republican stand-off of that summer 
had largely supported his opponents.  
The institutionalisation of tribal power accelerated under President al-ʾIryānī. After Egyptian 
withdrawal, shaykhs made up more than two-fifths of the new governmental council 
(Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, p.268). By 1969, the power of tribal leaders was 
institutionalised in the YAR legislature, the Majlis al-Shūra (Consultative Council) (al-Ẓāhirī, 
1996, p.129). Tellingly, the Majlis al-Shūra grew out of a body called the Majlis al-Shuyūkh 
(Council of Shaykhs), formed immediately after the siege of Ṣanaʿāʾ, and was headed by 
Shaykh al-ʾAḥmar (al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, pp.186–187). Tribal leaders also became entrenched in 
the military, police, and civil service, especially large ministries, providing them with 
significant scope for patronage (Burrowes, 1987, pp.50–51; see also 4.3.2 below). By the end 
of the civil war, “the lowest shaykhs and officers considered themselves more powerful than 
the Prime Minister or any other Minister” (Alaini, 2004, p.204). As a result of the flood of 
guns and money to tribal leaders, many previously impecunious and weak shaykhs found 
themselves “quite affluent” and in command of large and well-armed tribal armies 
(Burrowes, 1987, p.23).  
While politically inexperienced and initially deferring in matters of high politics to others 
more comfortable on the national and international stage (Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, 
p.245), tribal leaders adroitly pursued their sectional interests and ensured direct payments 
to tribes remained, at about 20% of government expenditure, one of the main items on the 
YAR budget (Nyrop, 1977, p.197). When other government actors attempted to end 
payments, this repeatedly precipitated crises of government and threats of tribal insurrection 
forced successive prime ministers to back down (Alaini, 2004, p.208; El-Azzazi, 1978, p.175). 
Post-war bargaining saw a further extension of tribal influence. By the end of the al-ʾIryānī 
Presidency in 1974, tribal leaders held six of ten provincial governorships, including Mujāhid 
ʾAbū Shawārib as governor of Ḥajja, ʾAḥmad ʿAbd Rabbuh al-ʿAwāḍī as governor of Taʿiz, and 
Sinān ʾAbū Luḥūm as governor of al-Ḥudayda (Burrowes, 1987, p.50). 
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In addition to gaining access to high-level positions within the state apparatus, tribal leaders 
also gained far-reaching rights to rule in their local areas. Side payments, the more 
circumscribed strategy of giving increased control over local taxation and justice to tribal 
leaders, and disruption of Imamate era governance mechanisms during the civil war, resulted 
in far-reaching decentralisation. Effective political functioning became the near-exclusive 
domain of the village or tribe and the new balance of power fell to local shaykhs. In areas 
controlled by the royalists, the war hardly changed local administrative arrangements, but it 
severed links to the Imam’s court. Central appointments, oversight, and taxation virtually 
ceased. According to a royalist commander:  
Wherever the royalists held sway, the courts, governors and other institutions of state 
continued to function as they had under Imam ʾAḥmad and the important people 
remained the same. But there were few new appointments. When the Princes or 
others passed through these villages, the officials would renew their allegiance, but 
they focused on their own region and their own men, whereas the focus of the Imam 
and the Princes was on military activity and there was no capacity for anything else’ 
(Interview with ʿAbbās al-Mukhtafī, 2016).107 
Republican areas converged on the same practice, although legally the central government 
had extensive powers over the localities (see 5.2). German embassy reporting insisted that 
real authority was in the hands of local shaykhs and the heads of tribal confederations and 
discusses, for instance, the case of the former governor of Taʿiz, who, as President al-Sallāl 
was seeking his arrest in 1966, was able to hold court unmolested less than 50km from Taʿiz, 
deep in nominally republican territory. Similarly, tribes in Bayḍāʾ forced the republican 
government to withdraw troops from their area, days after they were deployed. A list of such 
examples could be extended almost indefinitely (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 20 Jul. 1966, 16 
Dec. 1966). 
Formal decentralisation eventually followed the de facto leaching away of central influence. 
In 1967, President al-Sallāl guaranteed autonomy to tribes (O’Ballance, 1971, p.180) in an 
attempt to shore up tribal support by belatedly acknowledging an altered balance of power. 
President al-ʾIryānī further enshrined tribal self-administration in law and the wartime, 
decentralised, system of political bargaining and brokerage became the regular and accepted 
pattern of post-war governance (Burrowes, 1987, p.49). Tribal control of appointments in 
                                                          
 
107 David Smiley (1975, pp.148–149), possibly seeking to rally public opinion, claimed more coherence 
for the royalist administration.  
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their areas became accepted practice, and tribal ‘taxation’ of travellers passing through their 
territories increased in the late 1960s. Studies of the 1970s consistently stress the absence of 
central influence on the selection of government officials up to and including the position of 
governor in many areas. These had all been positions dominated by centrally-appointed and 
usually non-tribal officials before the war (El-Azzazi, 1978, p.175; Swagman, 1988b).  
The post-war state also retreated from claiming a monopoly over the legitimate use of force 
in tribal areas. In mid-July 1970, Prime Minister al-ʿAmrī faced an uprising by Bakīl when he 
sought to station a new military commander in the territory of the formerly royalist Banū 
Ḥushaysh, against objections by their shaykh. By mid-1971, the government restricted the 
presence of security forces to urban centres, leaving law enforcement elsewhere officially in 
the hands of tribal leaders and in 1973 delegated formal authority for public order to tribes 
and formally promised not to send armed forces into tribal areas without the agreement of 
the shaykh (Stookey, 1978, pp.258–259; Nyrop, 1977, p.237). At the same time, ever-
increasing proportions of locally collected taxes went to local projects and the local 
development associations that began to emerge during the war and grew rapidly in the 1970s 
(see 5.2.3). Local self-administration became enshrined in law during the late 1960s and early 
1970s as a de jure capitulation to the fact that paying and arming the tribes had elevated 
them to decisive veto-players. Much of the tribal autonomy of the 1970s was a result of the 
war. 
Centralisation within tribes  
A lower-level process of centralisation accompanied this decentralisation at the national 
level, as tribal leaders consolidated their role inside the tribe. Despite the fragmented tribal 
politics of allegiance, and the way outside resources initially provided resources for local 
challenges to established shaykhs, payments to tribal leaders, their growing political role, and 
the devastation of the war in the longer term centralised power within tribes and elevated 
the tribal leaders able to leverage the resources the war offered in intra-tribal politics. In this 
way, the war changed not just the standing of tribes in the state, but also directly affected 
the tribal system. 
Sinān ʾAbū Luḥūm, for instance, was the shaykh of a sub-tribe of Nihm when the civil war 
broke out. A clear commitment to the Republic, adroit political manoeuvring, the ability of 
other members of bayt ʾAbū Luḥūm to gain command of several regular military units, and 
links with leading politicians, such as Muḥsin al-ʿAynī, allowed Sinān ʾAbū Luḥūm to first 
become governor of al-Ḥudayda and ultimately, thanks to his power as governor of the YAR’s 
most important port and his connections in the military, to become paramount shaykh of 
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Bakīl after the war (ʾAbū Luḥūm, 2002). He is emblematic of the way the war allowed actors 
who were initially subordinate in tribal hierarchies to challenge established tribal leaders and 
then to consolidate and centralise their power to unprecedented levels thanks to new 
opportunities for patronage and the devastation of war. For even as war benefited tribal 
leaders, it undermined the livelihoods of ordinary tribesmen and their families. Fighting 
disrupted agriculture and Egyptian bombing raids destroyed crops and wells and drove 
people out of their villages (O’Ballance, 1971, pp.157–158). Many of the frontline areas 
suffered food shortages and by the summer of 1965, famine was becoming a real possibility 
east of Khawlān (Jones, 2004, pp.156, 196). Poor rains exacerbated the disruptions of war, as 
Yemen experienced a series of droughts between 1965 and 1967. Even in areas that largely 
escaped fighting, such as Manākha, Egyptian requisitions of livestock decimated local stocks 
and villagers remembered the “twin calamities” of the 1960s as the “presence of the 
Egyptians and the absence of rains” (Gerholm, 1977, p.57). 
As the war destroyed their independent incomes, patronage and payment for fighting 
dispensed through the shaykh became central to the livelihoods of most tribesmen. The food 
and money royalists and republicans gave freely to tribal leaders to buy loyalty were, 
perhaps, more successful in buying tribesmen’s loyalty to the shaykh, than the tribes’ loyalty 
to either side.108 In the fluid politics of the immediate post war period, growing centralisation 
within tribes further reinforced the power of tribal shaykhs, especially those who learned to 
“pyramid their power and influence:” new access to resources at the centre provided the 
shaykhs with the means to expand and reinforce patronage networks within their tribes, 
while their growing influence within their tribes strengthened their influence at the centre 
(Burrowes, 1987, p.32).109 Yet for all their power, there was, Martha Mundy notes, “a pall 
over the legitimacy” of the shaykhs who became prominent at the national level: their wealth 
was too new and too egregious and the system of patronage and favours that made them 
important intermediaries for tribesmen was in its infancy (Mundy, 1995, p.55). 
                                                          
 
108 However, tribesmen could and did make claims on leaders when they felt they were not given their 
due and observers in the 1970s remarked on the democratic and egalitarian features of tribal 
organization (Dostal, 1974). 
109 After the mid-1970s, large-scale emigration to Saudi Arabia attenuated this dynamic and 
reconstituted independent incomes for tribesmen. However, the patterns of the late war years 
returned with the oil price shocks in the 1980s and the expulsion of Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia 
in 1990.  
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Tribes as a political constituency 
Secure standing within the tribe also provided a strong electoral and political base for tribal 
leaders and the specific politics of the situation add analytical leverage, confirming an 
argument developed out of a different case (Colombia) that perhaps the “effort to build a 
political economy of war without politics is finding its limits” (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2008, p.3). This 
is not to advocate falling back into the categories of contemporary political and journalistic 
analysis and hence to seek to situate and explain the politics of tribal influence primarily in 
terms of an ideological struggle between Nasirists, Baʿathists, Communists, Maoists, Arab 
Nationalists, “moderates,” and “technocrats.” Instead, it requires enquiring into the specific 
alliances and affinities between groups. Ideology mattered, if only in terms of who stood to 
benefit under what label.  
In this sense, tribal influence opened an opportunity to create a system of notable politics 
that played to the strengths of the second tier of traditional elites, swept into power by the 
revolution: the quḍāa, notable families of lower Yemen, large landowners of the Tihāma, and 
tribal leaders of the highlands. This was not quite a case of the bourgeoisie siding with the 
tribes against the revolution (Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, p.268), but certainly an alliance of 
urban and rural traditional elites seeking to create a mode of politics that rewarded their 
cultural capital and networks against the threat of broader social change and political 
displacement. This alliance included many military officers. As Dresch (1993b, p.362) reminds 
us, army officers and shaykhs were often from the same families (see also 4.3.2).  
Of course, not all tribal leaders pursued similar aims or sought an alliance with the republican 
ʿulamaʾ. But those that benefited most from the war and achieved lasting political power did. 
Shaykhs like Sinān ʾAbū Luḥūm, ʿAbd Allah al-ʾAḥmar, ʾAmīn ʾAbū Rās or ʾAḥmad ʿAlī al-Maṭarī 
were of a similar age and outlook and more or less shared the politics of quḍāa like President 
al-ʾIryānī and ʾAḥmad Nuʿmān.110 They had all been republican from the outset and saw 
themselves as progressive modernisers but were sceptical of the Egyptian presence and 
President al-Sallāl and opposed calls for radical change and mass mobilisation. Those that had 
adhered to the ‘third force’ led by the al-Wazīr family, pursuing similar aims in a different 
alliance, also did well. 
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1974. 
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Two of the most prominent ‘royalist’ shaykhs, Qāsim Munāṣir of Khawlān bin ʿĀmir and Nājī 
al-Ghādir of Khawlān al-Ṭiyāl, though they benefited handsomely from the war itself, did far 
less well in the post-war period and were soon making overtures to the south for support 
against Ṣanaʿāʾ (Brandt, forthcoming; Dresch, 1993b, pp.261–262, 274). Men from tribal 
families who sought to build alliances with radical military officers or were attracted by the 
Movement of Arab Nationalists likewise lost out. Ultimately, as Fred Halliday argued looking 
back at the civil war in the early 1970s, the most powerful elements in the emerging YAR 
dominant coalition had reason to prevent the development of any non-tribal and non-
confessional organisations. It was politics conducted in terms of tribes and religion that they 
knew and were good at (Halliday, 1974, p.132; see also: Burrowes, 1987, p.33; Dresch, 1990, 
p.276).111  
From the September 1963 ʿAmrān conference, over smaller conferences in al-Rawḍa, 
Dhayfān, and Manākha, to the large conference at Khamr in May 1965, traditional ʿulamaʾ 
and tribal leaders demanded Egyptian withdrawal, a tribal military, more collegiate 
leadership, and a president with more traditional credentials (PAAA, B36 45, 23 Nov. 1963).112 
These demands were at odds with the more urban and mass-based visions of social 
transformation pursued by the Egyptian command, important parts of the Yemeni officer 
corps, and elements of the internationally-educated technocrats recruited into the new YAR 
government bodies. Beyond conference demands, tribal fighters were central to defeating an 
attempted military coup led by the resurgent Arab Nationalist Movement and other left-wing 
forces in 1968 (Burrowes, 1987, pp.31–32) and in 1970 thousands of Bakīl and Ḥāshid fighters 
threatened to march on Ṣanaʿāʾ, unless leftists ministers were removed from government 
(PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12333, 3 Jun. 1970). External actors read the situation in the same 
terms. According to most interpretations, Saudi Arabia’s decision to continue direct stipends 
to select shaykhs after the end of the war sought to strengthen conservative elements in the 
government and to avoid an alliance between the ‘moderate republicans’ and the left 
(Stookey, 1978, p.260).  
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Section 4.4. 
112 For a detailed documentation of the Khamr Conference outcomes see: al-Wazīr, n.d.b. 
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4.3 Mobilising new violence specialists: The embattled rise of officer-politicians  
Next to the mobilisation of tribal leaders, the civil war in Yemen prompted mass conscription 
and significant investment in the military. Yet, military growth was slow and uneven. 
Republican efforts to organise new constituencies for violence quickly stalled and rival 
factions dissolved new organisations, purged their leadership, and new units found 
themselves in pitched battles with one another. Except for rapid mobilisation at two specific 
junctures, reliance on external interveners and local violence specialists trumped attempts at 
creating new violence organisations during the war.  
A first sub-section examines this mobilisation. We will see that the regular military expanded 
slowly, mass militias were rapidly disbanded, and the royalist armies remained small and 
weakly institutionalised. We would therefore expect few of the outcomes the model 
associates with creating new organisations for violence to play an important role. Yet, as 
4.3.2 highlights, mobilisation occurred at a sufficient scale to draw military officers into the 
dominant coalition. However, the mismatch between expectations and outcomes, as well as 
the presence of deep divisions within the officer corps, calls into question the model’s implicit 
assumption of homogeneity. While military officers generally benefitted from the war, 
officers with tribal ties did particularly well and, once again, the issue of politics in terms of 
alliances within and between elites looms large. In an extended confrontation, an alliance 
between tribal and military leaders on the one hand faced off against other elements of the 
officer corps, party militias, and the southern independence movement. Ultimately, and to no 
small degree because of the growing power of certain tribal leaders explored in Section 4.2 
above, their alliance won out, contributing to a growing intertwining of tribal and military 
power in the last years of the civil war.  
4.3.1 New institutions for violence  
The republican military 
Growing the military was an early concern of the new republican regime, but its attempts 
went into abeyance as Egyptian military involvement deepened, since Egyptian support 
appeared to secure the survival of the Republic irrespective of its military strength. As a 
result, the growth of the military was slow and uneven throughout the 1960s and leading 
Egyptian-backed politicians were more concerned with political loyalty in the armed forces 
and avoiding rival concentrations of power, than they were with creating an effective fighting 
force. As the model suggests, large-scale external military support provided the resources for 
a narrow, externally-dependent coalition; with the paradoxical result that significant 
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resources flowed to the officer corps and the war boosted their social standing and political 
aspirations, while the military as a whole experienced a much more ambivalent trajectory 
and few new constituencies were mobilised. The military remained small, and military service 
became a specialised niche for low status Zaydīs and tribesmen to access positions otherwise 
closed to them. 
Contradictory and almost certainly inaccurate figures for the size of the military make it 
difficult to evaluate its development, particularly as it shaded into tribal units and 
paramilitaries with different degrees of formalisation. Moreover, there is no clear baseline, 
since the Imam’s military split between republicans and royalists after the 1962 coup.113 The 
elite Fawj al-Badr largely joined the royalists, while the Fawj Ḥassan, Fawj ʿAbbās and the 
tribal reserves of the jaysh al-barānī and the jaysh al-difāʿī largely dissolved (ʾAḥmad, 1992, 
pp.298–299; Nājī, 1988, pp.221, 248–255). Small units of the niẓāmī army stationed far from 
Ṣanaʿāʾ also largely joined the royalists or simply disbanded, while many stationed in or near 
larger cities rallied to the republic. All units experienced mass desertion and splits between 
officers.114 These splits and dissolutions mean it is difficult to gauge the effective size of the 
republican military in the weeks after the overthrow of the Imam in September and October 
1962. Estimates range between four and seven thousand soldiers, with real figures likely to 
be at the lower end.  
One of the first measures of the new government after the overthrow of the Imam was a 
large increase in soldiers’ salaries, at least doubling basic pay, as well as other improvements 
in enlisted men’s standard of living (Schmidt, 1968, p.80). A further early measure, which like 
many of the grandiloquent decrees of the first months of the revolution was observed highly 
unevenly in practice, was the introduction of mandatory military service in January 1963. At 
the very least, the law suggests a desire to increase recruitment, even if the “casual method 
of compulsorily enrolling men into the Yemeni army as they were needed went on as before” 
(O’Ballance, 1971, p.107; see also: Nyrop, 1977, p.231). The impact of these measures is 
unclear, though it appears the republican military grew to about 7,000 soldiers by the 
                                                          
 
113 This account, like most others of the early YAR military, is heavily dependent on Sulṭān Nājī’s (1988) 
study. According to former YAR officials and military commanders I spoke to, it is the most accurate.  
114 On the role of location and territorial control for defining political alignment generally see: Kalyvas, 
2006. 
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beginning of 1965 and to approximately 10,000 by late 1967, when the Egyptian military 
withdrew from Yemen (Nājī, 1988, pp.237, 241).115  
Ostensibly, the Egyptian command also invested heavily in building the Yemeni military. 
Egyptian archival sources suggest it provided some YR 100 million in direct support to Yemeni 
military procurement and wages between 1962 and 1967 (DWQ, 0078-044109, no date [Oct. 
1967]). Based on likely estimates for the YAR budget, this accounts for about half of all 
Yemeni government expenditure over this period (IBRD, 1970, p.31) and for well over 90% of 
the defence budget.116 In addition, Soviet weapons and funds were supplied via Egypt and up 
to 75 Soviet military experts worked directly with YAR troops (Orkaby, 2014, p.108). 
These measures were not without effect, although fears of losing political control to an army 
too powerful or independent to manage effectively continuously limited Egyptian training 
efforts and investment. Initially deployed only in guard duties, the Yemeni military 
increasingly participated in combat and received Egyptian air support and weapons (Nājī, 
1988, p.249). According to the German embassy in Taʿiz, republican troops were involved in 
fighting from summer 1964 onwards (PAAA, B130 2205A, 8 Jul. 1964; see also ʾAḥmad, 1992, 
p.301). Moreover, it noted: 
The republican military is making noticeable gains in its composition as well as its 
training and numbers. The units that have now returned from training in Egypt are elite 
troops and, in combination with some of the units trained in Yemen, promise to form 
the backbone of the army (PAAA, B130 2205A, 8 Jul. 1964). 
In subsequent and previous years, German reporting made much the same point. As far as 
the German embassy could tell, between 1963 and 1966 the training and equipment of 
Yemeni troops had improved every year, year on year (PAAA, PAAA B36 45, 9 Oct. 1963; AV 
Neues Amt 1719, 1 Oct. 1965; 8 Oct. 1966). 
However, these years also witnessed continuous efforts to limit the capabilities and 
independence of the Yemeni military. By some accounts, the Egyptians had “little interest in 
training the ragtag republicans” and saw the Yemeni army as “little more than a political 
                                                          
 
115 But compare different figures elsewhere in Nājī’s own account (1988, p.227). Other claims range 
from an unlikely 3,000 soldiers (Knights, 2013, p.269) to 100,000 (Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, pp.249, 
60). See also: Jones, 2004, pp.20–21; O’Ballance, 1971, pp.171, 198–199.  
116 The annual budget available to the chief of staff in 1965 was approximately YR 6 million (Interview 
with Ḥamūd Baydar, 2016). 
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screen for the activities of the Egyptian military” (McGregor, 2006, p.260). This likely 
underestimates Egyptian training activities but captures the politics of the situation. When 
ʾAḥmad Nuʿmān’s appointment as Prime Minister in April 1965 raised the spectre of greater 
republican independence, for instance, the Egyptian command refused to disburse funds that 
had been earmarked for the expansion of the Yemeni army and turned down a joint Soviet–
East German offer to train and supply the Yemeni military and increase its strength to 18,000 
(Nājī, 1988, pp.232–233; Porter, 1986, p.77).117 Officers sent for training abroad were given 
desk jobs on their return (Halliday, 1974, p.115) and newly-trained Yemeni forces more 
generally were kept far from the front lines and the Egyptians did not allow (Soviet-trained) 
Yemeni pilots to fly combat missions. Many Yemenis blamed Egyptian decisions for the YAR’s 
military weakness and believed them responsible for the military’s enduring problem with 
desertions (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, clipping of the NZZ from 15 Feb. 1966).118  
To the extent that they operated with Yemenis at all, the Egyptian military relied more on 
tribal fighters than the regular military. The Egyptian command rarely consulted with Yemeni 
commanders about planned operations (Juzaylān, 1977, p.153) and Egyptian staff officers in 
charge of Yemeni units limited the amounts and types of weapons they distributed to their 
troops (PAAA, B36 45, 18 Oct. 1963; see also: O’Ballance, 1971; Burrowes, 1987, 2010, 
pp.334–336). After the Khamr conference of 1965 and during the Egyptian withdrawal in 
1967, Egyptian forces also took away heavy weapons from Yemeni troops and retreated from 
positions without notifying their republican allies, so that Yemeni units awoke to find that 
Egyptian garrisons had disappeared and previously defended positions were now vulnerable 
(PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 29 Sep. 1967; 17 Jun. 1967; Alaini, 2004, pp.109–11).  
Despite some growth and significant investment, the military throughout the war was in a sad 
state. “Equipment was poor, pay was in arrears, and men routinely sold their weapons” 
(Dresch 2000, 96). As the Egyptians prepared to leave Yemen, the Egyptian ambassador ʿAbd 
al-Raḥman ʾAḥmad Ṣalāḥ, noted morosely that “after 5 years […] we did not succeed in 
making the Yemenis able to defend themselves” (DWQ, 0078-044109, 08 Oct. 1962).  
                                                          
 
117 al-ʾIryānī refers to a Soviet offer to train and equip a 15,000 strong Yemeni army blocked by Nasser 
(al-ʾIryānī, 2013, pp.128-136). 
118 The Egyptians noted the same problem, but had a different diagnosis, blaming difficult living 
conditions and sectarian divisions for the fact that many units were only at half strength (ʾAḥmad, 
1992, p.300).  
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Paradoxically, while the military thus remained relatively weak, officers did well out of the 
war. The new republican government, under Egyptian instruction, rapidly introduced a new 
system of ranks and training that differentiated much more sharply than previously between 
enlisted men and officers and between different functions. Attempts by a military-led regime 
in Egypt to remake the Yemeni military in its image, meant wage differentials between 
officers and enlisted men increased (Nājī, 1988, pp.254, 112–120) and officers found much 
greater attention lavished on their training. Three months after the overthrow of the Imam, 
the first Yemeni military academy was founded and for at least a decade remained the 
“largest and most exclusive building in Ṣanaʿāʾ” (El-Azzazi 1978, 115). Five cohorts completed 
the one-year training by the time of Egyptian withdrawal in 1967 and hundreds more trained 
in Egypt’s own military academies (El-Azzazi, 1978, p.115; Interview with Talaʿat Musallam, 
2017). In addition to an emphasis on technical skills, this was a political education, with a 
strong emphasis on officers’ role as the vanguard of Arab nationalism and modernisation. 
Officers gained new prestige, skills, status, and political aspirations. (O’Ballance, 1971, pp.86, 
199; Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, p.60; Douglas, 1987, pp.222–223, 233; El Attar, 1964, 
pp.81–82).  
Underscoring the growing political importance of the officer corps and the relative 
irrelevance of the military’s fighting strength, President al-Sallāl, with Egyptian support, 
spearheaded major purges of the officer corps, particularly after a tense stand-off with the 
government of Ḥassan al-ʿAmrī over the summer of 1966. The dismissal of more than 40 
officers on 6 October 1966 marked the opening gambit in a month of mass arrests, dismissals, 
and executions (PAAA, B36 244, 16 Oct. 1966). In the last week of October 1966 alone, al-
Sallāl’s supporters and the Egyptian command made more than 2,000 arrests and suspended 
as many as 200 officers, including the chief of staff, the military commanders of Taʿiz, ʾIbb, 
Ṣaʿda, and al-Bayḍāʾ, and the commanders of the paratroopers, the armoured corps, the 
artillery, and parts of the infantry (Schmidt, 1968, pp.283–284; Nājī, 1988, pp.234–235; PAAA, 
AV Neues Amt 1719, 16 Oct. 1966). The Egyptian command also fretted over Baʿathists and 
NLF sympathisers in the officer corps, worried about royalist infiltration and the presence of 
officer-shaykhs hostile to the Egyptian presence (DWQ 0078-044109, 08 Oct.1968; Nājī, 1988, 
p.224; Ferris, 2012, p.175), and generally kept a close watch on the officer corps (DWQ, 0078-
044111, 29 Aug. 1968). Egyptian advisors also agitated for Yemeni officers to oppose political 
decisions the Egyptian government disagreed with, with a former Prime Minister alleging that 
Egyptian advisers were inciting a coup after the Khamr conference, for instance (Alaini, 2004, 
p.114).  
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The divisions in the officer corps revealed by and exacerbated by these purges meant that 
after Egyptian withdrawal, agreement in theory that the military needed strengthening was 
not easily translated into practice. Pitched battles between different units and between tribal 
fighters and the regular military over resources and especially weapons highlight that the 
question of which commanders would benefit from more troops and new weapons was 
sufficiently contentious that the military itself came to block moves for military expansion. 
Splits between ‘radicals’ and ‘moderates’ rent the armed forces, as officers feared troop 
increases and better equipment would benefit internal rivals (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12333, 17 
Jul. 1970). “The army remained extremely fragmented and virtually at war with itself, less a 
unified and hierarchical instrument of the state than a collection of nearly autonomous and 
mutually suspicious units each with primary loyalty to some tribal grouping, locality or 
powerful personality” (Burrowes, 1987, p.51). 
Mass militias: The National Guard and the Popular Resistance Forces 
Next to the slow and conflicted growth of the regular military, the civil war was marked by 
two periods of rapid, almost panicked mass mobilisation in response to existential threats to 
the new YAR. The very different process of mobilisation during these two brief instances in 
1962-1963 and 1967-1968, when external support was not available on a comparable scale, 
underscores the decisive role of external, specifically Egyptian, intervention in shaping the 
slow growth of the military and the political role of the officer corps.  
The model suggests that pressures of civil war and the need to increase selective violence can 
in some cases put a check on recruitment and organising strategies in the armed forces that 
exclusively prioritise political loyalty, creating incentives that favour institutionalisation and 
professionalization. Indeed, when external troops were not available, the need for organised 
violence trumped concerns over its political control, resulting in the recruitment of mass 
militias and a muting of army purges and factional fighting. As suggested in the model, this 
dynamic can be operational in civil war and the experience of Yemen suggests how 
powerfully transformative even short instances of this dynamic can be, as the mass militias 
and new military units built in three-month bursts of forward panic, twice cast long shadows. 
Only through years of purges, selective dissolutions, confrontations, and institutional 
tinkering were these bodies neutralised.  
The first round of such mobilisation saw the creation of a National Guard, disproportionally 
recruited from Shāfiʿī areas. With the regular army melting away and the Egyptian 
deployment in its early stages, the new government made a plea for volunteers for a National 
Guard (al-ḥāris al-waṭanī), designed to take on the functions of the jaysh al-barānī and jaysh 
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al-difāʿī, which had been the hardest-hit by desertions. Unlike the regular military and the 
tribal forces it replaced, the National Guard recruited predominantly from lower Yemen and 
from among exiles and immigrants to Aden, thousands of whom rushed from south to north 
to join (Lackner, 1984, p.37). They “vaguely came under military command and took on a 
loose military form” (O’Ballance, 1971, p.76).119  
The National Guard served in guard duties, as a border patrol, and played an important role 
in early fighting against royalist tribal levies. According to one of the only available published 
accounts that explicitly discusses the National Guard, it was armed largely with rifles and 
mortars, although some units also had access to artillery and armoured cars. National Guard 
units were stationed, amongst others, in Ṣanaʿāʾ and Taʿiz, the towns of Ḥarīb and Māʾrib, and 
in the territory of the Banū Ḥushaysh and Banū Ḥārith (Nājī, 1988, p.258). Much of the details 
of the formation and size of the National Guard, as well as its dissolution in 1964 or 1965 
remain in the dark, as do the details of its role and leadership. In the telling of royalist and 
third-way supporters, it was a highly politicised force, remembered in Northern Yemen for 
stealing and looting and crackdowns on suspected royalists (Interview with Qāsim al-Wazīr, 
2017; Interviews with ʿAbbās al-Mukhtafī and ʾAḥmad al-Sayyānī, 2016). 
Despite its initial widespread use, there is a common trope that the fighting strength of the 
National Guard was highly circumscribed. National Guard troops were sent to the front with 
minimal training, and, at least according to several of my interviewees, they there faced 
vastly superior tribal enemies. However, the story goes, royalist tribal fighters had mercy on 
the hapless National Guard members, confiscating their weapons and sending them back to 
their units unharmed (Interview with Qāsim al-Wazīr, 2017, Interviews with ʾAḥmad al-
Sayyānī and ʿAbbās al-Mukhtafī, 2016). Similarly, the German embassy noted: “The Republic 
has not had much success in creating a modern army. In particular, the fighting ability of the 
army is low, largely because recruitment has, for political reasons, focused on the southern 
part of the country” (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 26 Apr. 1965).120 
                                                          
 
119 They also gained employment and the National Guard may have been an attempt to create a mass 
constituency for the revolution by providing immediate benefits to young men from the lowlands 
(Interview with ʿAlī Muḥsin Ḥamīd, 2015; O’Ballance, 1971, p.76). 
120 The nomenclature of the militaries is confused and inconsistent. Since the regular military was more 
Zaydī dominated and recruited from the highlands, it is likely that the embassy meant the National 
Guard. 
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The second instance of mass Shāfiʿī mobilisation occurred in late 1967 and early 1968 when 
Egyptian withdrawal appeared to put the future of the Republic in question, particularly 
around the 70 day siege of Ṣanaʿāʾ, when royalists seemed on the cusp of winning the civil 
war. During this period, the republican leadership ceased political purges of the army, relied 
on (ideologically) suspect commanders, mobilised thousands of volunteers, and formed 
popular militias in Ṣanaʿāʾ, Taʿiz, and al-Ḥudayda. These measures were critical for defending 
the capital but set the scene for new divisions in the officer corps, as an alliance of rising 
military and militia officers sought political change once the siege had been weathered.  
During the siege, General Ḥassan al-ʿAmrī led a ‘war government’ and played a significant role 
in organising the population of Ṣanaʿāʾ into a militia, creating a Popular Resistance Force (PRF) 
of approximately 10,000 from among Ṣanaʿāʾ ’s 56,000 inhabitants, issued with Soviet-
supplied weapons (Halliday, 1974, pp.121–122; O’Ballance, 1971, pp.192–193).121 The PRF 
was considered a force of the radical left politically, and Deffarge and Troeller report that PRF 
fighters in Ṣanaʿāʾ represented a new group of urban poor, whose ties to village or tribe had 
weakened due to migration (Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, p.263). The Movement of Arab 
Nationalists (MAN - ḥarakat al-qawmiyyin al-ʿarab) became the dominant force within the 
Ṣanaʿāʾ PRF politically, especially as veterans of the southern independence struggle 
reinforced it during the siege. At least 600 members of the southern National Liberation Front 
(NLF), which was affiliated with the all-Yemen MAN, were airlifted into the besieged city and 
on 22 January 1968 the South Yemen Army and the NLF also attacked royalist positions and 
supply lines in Bayḥān, at the border between North and South (O’Ballance, 1971, p.195).122 
The NLF and the MAN also took the lead in organising PRFs in al-Ḥudayda, Taʿiz and other 
towns and gained popularity among the commando and paratrooper brigades of the regular 
army (Burrowes 1987, 29-30). By the end of the siege, the MAN led a significant political 
movement opposed to compromise with the royalists, demanding a stronger regular army, 
the expansion and regularisation of the PRFs, and greater representation of Shāfiʿīs in the 
military. The MAN may also have been involved in peasant organising around Taʿiz, ʾIbb, and 
Radāʿ, where sharecroppers arrested several landlords (Halliday, 1974, pp.121–122). After 
                                                          
 
121 Ṣanaʿāʾ population figures from: Troin, 1995. 
122 On the relationship between NLF and MAN see: Brehony, 2017, pp. 15-18 and Lackner, 1984, p.55. 
According to Dresch (1993, p.274 note 25), southern fighters in the PRF were predominantly former 
FLOSY fighters who had fled from the south when the NLF consolidated power. 
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the end of the siege, al-ʿAmrī, al-ʾIryānī and other centrists in the government became 
increasingly concerned about the loyalty of the PRFs and the influence of the MAN and NLF.  
The royalist military 
Like the initiatives that gave rise to the National Guard and Popular Resistance Forces, there 
is one more effort at organising violence specialists that has been largely written-out of the 
story of the civil war in Yemen: the creation of royalist armies.  
Initially the royalist armies resembled large bodyguards for their commanders, each several 
hundred strong, with shifting composition as fighters drifted in and out of service. Military 
action by the royalists therefore required building coalitions of tribesmen for each operation. 
In the course of the war, however, the armies around the Princes became both larger and 
more organised (O’Ballance, 1971, pp.110, 141). Increasingly, there was a distinction 
between royalist soldiers and royalist tribesmen: soldiers received regular monthly pay of 15 
MT from the Imam through their local commander, were equipped with elements of a 
uniform, received training, including in the use of the royalists’ limited stock of heavy 
weapons, left their home village to serve, and, at least in the most organised of the royalist 
armies, had to commit for a full year of service (Jones, 2004, p.197). By contrast, tribesmen 
were much more territorially rooted, generally remained in their village and were called up 
only for specific operations, especially when their village was threatened (Smiley, 1975, 
p.147). Mercenaries played an important role in training this emerging royalist military. 
French mercenaries conducted most of the training of royalist regulars and British 
mercenaries aided communication, coordination, and the use of artillery and mines (Hart-
Davis, 2011). 
Although it is unlikely that the royalist armies reached the 50,000 regulars claimed by some 
sources (e.g. Smiley, 1975, p.181), the royalists were able to mobilise several thousand 
‘regulars’ in the battle of Ṣanaʿāʾ, in addition to a much larger contingent of tribesmen 
(O’Ballance 1971, 191). Thus, by 1968, the royalist military constituted a significant armed 
force directly under Princes’ command and reduced the royalists’ reliance on coalitions of 
tribal leaders to conduct operations. Yet, this military infrastructure rapidly fell apart after 
the siege of Ṣanaʿāʾ failed, when Saudi Arabian aid ceased. The armies dwindled rapidly as the 
prospect of victory faded and the salaries from the Imam dried up (O’Ballance 1971, 200). 
Integration of royalist fighters into the republican military was not a demand during 
reconciliation and although leading royalists became governors and district level officials, 
potentially offering former fighters opportunities to receive stipends, these were not 
organised along the lines of the royalist regulars.  
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4.3.2 Outcomes 
Given the generally slow and fitful growth of the regular military, the much more marked 
consolidation of an officer corps, and the aborted instances of mass mobilisation, how did the 
role of officers in the political settlement develop? The model suggests that military 
expansion extends access to government rents to new groups, but it clearly did so unevenly. 
Officers, granted privileges and pay raises, were partially drawn into the dominant coalition. 
Yet, those officers purged from the military or in charge of National Guard or PRF units clearly 
benefited far less.  
Who, specifically, was mobilised in new organisations mattered a great deal, calling into 
question the implicit assumption of a homogenous officer corps – or the homogenising 
impact of being a member of the officer corps – of the model and the literature it draws on. 
Instead, divisions within the officer corps and alliances between some officers and other 
centres of power loomed large, pointing towards the importance of political alliances in 
shaping the impact of this sort of mobilisation on state formation. 
Officers’ rise and inclusion in the settlement 
The German embassy concluded in 1965 that it was “officers and tribal leaders” who held real 
power in the Yemen Arab Republic (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 26 Apr. 1965) and later that 
every Yemeni government needs the support of the army (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12333, 26 Jul 
1971). Such an assessment of officers’ standing and military support under the Imamate is 
almost unthinkable. The officer corps gained significant political influence and even became a 
central pillar of the dominant coalition during the civil war.  
At the outset of the war there were some 400 officers in the regular military. Some of these 
officers were among the immediate beneficiaries of the Imam’s overthrow, as they gained 
political office and collected significant riches from the homes and palaces of the Imam, the 
Ḥamīd al-Dīn, and other leading sayyid families in the first weeks of the revolution (Interview 
with ʿAlī Muḥsin Ḥamīd, 2015). As we saw above, officers also benefited from increased 
salaries, Egyptian training, and new unit and rank structures that differentiated more clearly 
between officers and enlisted men. 
Officers also benefited from the general increase in military budgets during the civil war and 
after 1970. Government statistics are spotty at best during the 1960s, but for the years for 
which information is available between 1966 and 1970, the military budget increased as a 
share of total expenditure from 44% in fiscal year 1966/67 to 49% in 1969/70. Although the 
military budget line included “substantial but undetermined payments to tribes” (IBRD, 1970, 
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p.32),123 the military was still by some margin the largest recipient of government funds. After 
briefly falling after the reconciliation that ended the war, spending on the military rapidly 
rebounded to 45% of the total government budget in 1973/74 and 50% in 1974/75 (El-Azzazi, 
1978, p.181). Moreover, during the war military salaries were prioritised throughout a series 
of fiscal crises, generating growing divisions between military officers, who were paid 
regularly, and civilian bureaucrats, who were not (Nājī, 1988, pp.221–222).  
Officers were being drawn into the political settlement as beneficiaries of the new status quo 
and had almost complete discretion to dispense these large sums as they saw fit, since the 
armed forces enjoyed an “almost autonomous status” within the state apparatus (Alaini, 
2004, p.203). While limited budgeting and accountability mechanisms were in place for 
civilian ministries, the ministry of defence received block grants for which it owed no 
reckoning. Civilian control of the military was tenuous under President al-ʾIryānī and 
disappeared under President Ḥamdī, himself a military officer. In fact, the rise of military 
officers as Presidents of the new republic, from al-Sallāl, over al-Ḥamdī, ʾAḥmad bin Ḥusayn 
al-Ghashmī, ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿAbd Allah al-ʿArashī, and ʿAlī ʿAbd Allah Ṣāliḥ itself underscores the 
rising military role – as does the fact that officers were well-represented in cabinet roles 
throughout the war. Military officers also gained political representation at lower levels of 
the state as wartime changes to local administration paved the way for the promotion of 
officers to positions of civilian responsibility and the privileging of military skills in wartime 
strengthened their hand vis-à-vis civilian politicians (Interview with Muḥsin al-ʿAynī, 2016; El-
Azzazi, 1978, p.148). In addition, officers were able to leverage their position near the apex of 
formal power to tap extra-legal sources of income: the civil war period witnessed the 
beginning of officers’ role in smuggling and cemented their ability to demand bribes 
(Swagman, 1988a, p.48). 
Alliances and the long shadow of mass mobilisation 
Commanders of the mass militias, who were first integrated into and then purged from the 
regular army, had a markedly different experience of the war than did military officers who 
allied with tribal leaders and found themselves increasingly at the pinnacle of state power. 
This suggests that officers’ integration into the political settlement was more partial, uneven, 
                                                          
 
123 Payments to tribes accounted for around 20% of total expenditure in later figures (Nyrop, 1977, 
p.197) 
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and political than the model readily captures. Deep internal divisions, framed at the time in 
terms of leftist and ‘moderate’ interests, and which overlapped to a significant extent with 
divisions between upper and lower Yemen and between Shāfiʿīs and Zaydīs, structured the 
integration of military officers into the political settlement in ways not foreseen by the 
model. It is, perhaps, not so much targeted violence that is in short supply in internal 
conflicts, as the model – based on insights from the existing literature – would have it, but 
violence reliably deployable by specific powerful actors. 
It was thus of central importance who the new actors were that were being brought into the 
settlement: their family links, villages of origin, tribal connections, and personal politics. As a 
result of the continued salience of such divisions, alliances within the officer corps and 
between officers and other violence specialists loomed large in determining which officers 
gained entry into the dominant coalition – and what that coalition itself looked like. Given the 
large increase in the power of tribal leaders traced in Section 4.2, it was, unsurprisingly, 
officers able to build alliances with tribal leaders who eventually won out as tribal and 
military power intertwined. In addition, tribal leaders who had fought for the republic 
received honorary military commissions during President al-ʾIryānī’s tenure (Burrowes, 1987, 
p.84). Many of the most powerful officers at the end of the war came from tribal families and 
some headed military units composed of members of their tribe, sometimes stationed within 
the territory of their tribe as well.  
Based on individual trajectories related in interviews, it appears that many of the officers who 
served in the National Guard became officers in the regular military after further training 
(Interview with ʿAlī Muḥsin Ḥamīd, 2015). The mass recruitment of Shāfiʿīs into the National 
Guard changed the composition of the officer corps, as Shāfiʿī officers moved through the 
ranks and came to control important units, in particular, the elite paratroopers and special 
forces (al-ṣāʿiqa) in which clientelist recruitment was weak and political dismissals rare (Alaini, 
2004, pp.141–142).124 Yet, Shāfiʿī officers came up against a glass-ceiling in an officer corps 
dominated by Zaydīs, and Shāfiʿī officers were disproportionally represented among those 
                                                          
 
124 Shāfiʿī officers in these units were also important actors in plans for the coup against absent 
President al-Sallāl in November 1967. Planned at the house of Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-ʾAḥmar, the coup 
went ahead once planners were assured of the support of the paratrooper and special forces units and 
elements of the presidential guards – a rare moment of alliance between leftist and tribally-aligned 
officers (al-ʾẠhmar, 2008, pp.145–147). 
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purged, killed, or exiled in the course of the intra-republican power struggle after the siege of 
Ṣanaʿāʾ. Branded as ‘radicals,’ who sought ties to the new socialist regime in Aden, they 
challenged plans for reconciliation with the royalists and the growing ascendancy of the 
‘moderate’ tribal-military alliance. Contestation of power within the officer corps led to 
pitched battles in al-Ḥudayda in March 1968 and in Ṣanaʿāʾ in August 1968. 
Fighting in Ḥudayda erupted over a Soviet weapons shipment. Described by those hostile to 
the left as a “narrowly foiled NLF plot” to seize Soviet weapons at al-Ḥudayda (O’Ballance, 
1971, p.198), it appears to have been a plan the Soviets were in on. While the Soviets sought 
to deliver weapons to the al-Ḥudayda Popular Resistance Forces, regular military forces under 
the orders of the governor of al-Ḥudayda, Shaykh Sinān ʾAbū Luḥūm, and a Ḥāshid tribal 
militia under the command of Mujāhid ʾAbū Shawārib, wrested control of the shipment from 
the al-Ḥudayda PRF. Ḥāshid tribal forces ultimately made-off with the heavy weapons, 
including anti-tank rockets, apparently with the blessing of the Prime Minister, Ḥassan al-
ʿAmrī (al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, p.164). Fighting in al-Ḥudayda was followed by a purge of the army 
and Popular Resistance Forces, in which many officers suspected of sympathies with the NLF 
and other left-wing movements were arrested. Virtually all of those arrested were Shāfiʿīs 
(Burrowes, 1987, p.30; O’Ballance, 1971, p.198; Stookey, 1978, p.253).  
During the summer, tensions simmered as the MAN formed a new (illegal) political party and 
groups close to the southern NLF expanded their activities around Taʿiz. At the same time, 
conservative politicians and tribal leaders met to draw up lists of leftists to remove from the 
military command in July and deployed additional tribal fighters to Ṣanaʿāʾ from al-ʿUṣaymāt, 
Baraṭ, Sufyān, ʿAmrān, ʿAyāl Surayḥ, as well as Hamdān and Banū Ḥārith (al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, 
p.161).  
The conflict again came to a head in August 1968. After several commanders with leftist 
sympathies in the army publicly questioned the policies of Prime Minister Ḥassan al-ʿAmrī, 
al-ʿAmrī launched a new round of purges, arresting opponents including the popular Chief of 
Staff (ʾarkān al-jaysh), ʿAbd al-Raqīb ʿAbd al-Wahāb Nuʿmān, who was also the commanding 
officer of the ṣāʿiqa special forces. In response, the special forces mutinied, joined by 
paratroopers, the artillery, and parts of the infantry and supported at the highest levels of the 
military command by Major General Ḥamūd al-Jayfī. Fighting raged for more than two days in 
Ṣanaʿāʾ, but was interrupted mid-way to face-off an attempted royalist advance. Nonetheless, 
it eclipsed in intensity most of the battles during the civil war and, according to contemporary 
accounts, almost 2,000 people were killed over the two days of fighting and many buildings 
were heavily damaged or completely destroyed, including a mosque that buried 72 people 
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when it collapsed under artillery fire. Shells also hit the houses of Shaykh Sinān ʾAbū Luḥūm, 
Shaykh al-ʾAḥmar and other tribal leaders. The mutiny was ultimately defeated when tribal 
fighters from Nihm, Banū Maṭar, and the core Ḥāshid territories joined the battle.125 
The ‘August events,’ as they are known, were followed by a new wave of arrests and 
dismissals in the armed forces, a banning of trade unions, and a crackdown on political 
parties. Yet, because the losing officers were almost all Shāfiʿī and the al-ʿAmrī government 
worried about fuelling opposition to the republican regime in lower Yemen, ultimately all 
officers directly involved in the fighting, 24 in total, were exiled to Algeria. Other leftists fled 
to Aden and the government dissolved the Popular Resistance Forces (Burrowes, 1987, 
pp.30–31; Peterson, 1982, pp.102–103, 130; al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, p.176).126  
The political alliance between tribal leaders, the ʿulamaʾ of the Free Yemeni movement, and 
military officers drawn from similar backgrounds thus secured their ascendancy as the war 
came to a close. The above discussion highlights, on the one hand, the long shadow of mass-
mobilisation. The two instances of rapid and mass-based military mobilisation at the 
beginning of the civil war and in late 1967 and early 1968 left a powerful and long-lasting 
institutional legacy that threatened to break the near-monopoly of Zaydī and especially tribal 
fighters in the armed forces and took nearly a year of pitched military and political battles to 
begin undoing. Similar divisions continued to structure the officer corps into the 1970s. At the 
same time, the deep divisions within the officer corps highlight the central importance of 
political loyalty for leaders seeking to mobilise new violence specialists, calling into question 
the idea of a homogenous officer corps or a strongly homogenising impact of becoming an 
officer. Instead, tribal connections and loyalties defined, in important measure, divisions in 
the military and the officer corps.  
This did not amount to a tribal takeover of the armed forces, as has sometimes been 
suggested (e.g. Burrowes, 1987, p.51). Close observers of Yemen’s tribes have argued that to 
see tribal leaders as being in control of the military is to get things mostly backwards: tribal 
                                                          
 
125 For accounts sympathetic to the moderates see: Stookey, 1978, p.253; Alaini, 2004, p.150; al-
ʾAḥmar, 2008, p.174. For accounts closer to the radical perspective see: Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, 
p.267 and Muṭahar, 1984, pp.201-205. 
126 ʿAbd al-Raqīb ʿAbd al-Wahāb returned to Ṣanaʿāʾ in January 1969 demanding the release of 
imprisoned members of his former unit and of labour leaders remaining in prison. He was killed in 
armed clashes, prompting several days of further violence (Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, pp.269–270). 
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figures who rose to prominence during the civil war like Sinān ʾAbū Luḥūm, ʾAḥmad al-
Ghashmī, or whole tribes who did well out of the war like Hamdān and Sanḥān, derived their 
growing importance in tribal affairs from their preponderance within the military, rather than 
vice versa (Dresch, 2000, p.149).127 Military positions could boost individuals’ standing in their 
tribe and many high-ranking officers, even where they had a tribal background, were not 
from leading families within their tribes.  
In this way, the civil war not only changed the role of tribes in the dominant coalition but 
militarised the tribes and ensured the military remained tribalized, recasting the foundations 
of coercive power. In light of the growing resources at the disposal of tribal shaykhs as the 
war wore on, alliances with tribal leaders and their militias became indispensable for officers. 
Yet, tribal leaders without strong linkages into the military sought to keep it small, opposing, 
for instance, plans to increase the size of the republican military to 12,000 in line with the 
demands of the Khamr conference, which they had helped to pass (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 
1719, 10 Jul. 1965). Not all tribal leaders sought alliances with officers, nor did all officers 
seek to work with tribal leaders – as we saw, both the tribes and the officer corps were riven 
by divisions. But officers with tribal connections became indispensable for the functioning of 
the military and tribal leaders with military connections gained an advantage in tribal politics. 
Both benefited handsomely from this arrangement and became central to the dominant 
coalition of the YAR.128  
4.4 Just no good at violence? The rise and fall of traders  
Prominent traders were among the thousands who returned to North Yemen from Aden and 
diaspora communities further afield after 26 September 1962. Other joined them when the 
People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was established in 1967, fearing socialist 
reforms.129 Arriving in the North with significant physical and cultural capital, and sometimes 
with ties to the Free Officers or such pivotal republican politicians as al-Zubayrī, Nuʿmān, and 
al-ʾIryānī through the Free Yemeni Movement, they appeared poised to play a decisive role in 
                                                          
 
127 See also: Burrowes, 2009, “Abu Luhum, Sinan.” 
128 This reflects a broader intertwining of old and new sources of social power, explored further in 5.2. 
129 They were joined between 1970 and 1972 by further Yemeni diaspora groups fleeing political unrest 
and xenophobia in Djibouti and Addis Ababa (Chaudhry, 1997, p.128). 
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YAR politics. Yet, though they rose rapidly in prominence initially and were well-represented 
in the first several revolutionary cabinets, traders’ influence waned as the war wore on.  
A first sub-section, 4.4.1 traces the initial rise to prominence and subsequent loss of influence 
of commercial elites from lower Yemen in the YAR. 4.4.2 explores these developments 
through the lens of the model, whose emphasis on external intervention points us in the right 
direction. The Egyptian presence can convincingly account for much of the decline in 
merchants’ influence. However, the model leaves unexplored the way commercial elites may 
be well placed to disproportionally benefit from the economic opportunities provided by 
large-scale foreign intervention, even as it may tend to reduce their political influence, as well 
as the way in which interveners’ specific economic and political agendas shaped the effects of 
intervention on commercial elites. 
4.4.1 The rise and fall of traders 
Traders began the war on the margins of the political settlement. Concerns over the security 
of their investments, heavy restrictions on trade, and royal monopolies limited opportunities 
for commerce under the Imam. As a result, a large majority of Yemen’s commercial elite, 
largely Shāfiʿīs hailing from lower Yemen, became what Kiren Aziz Chaudhry has called an 
‘absentee bourgeoisie.’ They moved their business beyond the Imam’s writ to Aden and 
other hubs of the Indian Ocean trade, from where they played an important role in fomenting 
opposition to the Imam (see 3.1.4). Many of them returned after the September revolution in 
1962 and more followed after the NLF takeover of Aden in 1967. Initially, during the first half 
of the 1960s, they played a central role in republican politics. 
The first republican government included two merchants from Taʿiz, ʿAbd al-Ghanī Muṭahar 
and ʿAlī Muḥammad Saʿūd and a third, ʿAbd al-Qawī Ḥāmīm, became a member of the 
nominal executive, the Revolutionary Council (Stookey, 1978, p.227). This government also 
abolished trading monopolies and, in an initial burst of enthusiasm, the first months of the 
war witnessed a large influx of migrants and capital from Aden, to the extent that the new 
YAR government began, on 16 October 1962, to appeal to Yemenis in Aden originally hailing 
from the North not to return home (O’Ballance, 1971, p.72). This initial influx included many 
of the wealthiest trading families, like Hāʾil Saʿīd, al-Thābit, and al-Shaybānī, who all opened 
offices in al-Ḥudayda and sometimes Taʿiz and Ṣanaʿāʾ, and invested in industry, storage and 
transportation (Chaudhry, 1997, pp.127–129). Called upon to contribute to military 
mobilisation for the new republic, traders recruited and paid for the supply of several of the 
newly mobilised National Guard units (al-Shamīrī, n.d.).  
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Repatriated capital and the growing Egyptian deployment sparked an economic boom in 
lower Yemen. According to contemporary journalists (Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, p.269), the 
war: 
a ouvert le Yémen au monde extérieur, développé les ports et les voies de communication, 
chassé l’Imam qui avait monopolisé le commerce, et déversé des sommes fabuleuses sur ce 
pays, totalement privé de biens de consommation extérieurs.  
Trade through Ḥudayda port picked up sharply after 1962. Besides increased demand for 
armaments and supplies for the war effort, tens of thousands of Egyptian soldiers, with their 
campaign bonuses, and tribesmen brought into the cash economy through wartime stipends, 
increased demand for consumer goods. In addition, most building supplies were imported, as 
Ṣanaʿāʾ, Taʿiz, and al-Ḥudayda experienced an aid and investment-fuelled building boom 
(Dresch, 2000, p.94). Returnees pushed older Ṣanaʿāʾ i wholesalers out of business and a 
Shāfiʿī commercial class centred on Taʿiz took shape in the first months of the war (Dresch, 
2000, p.123).  
Returnees, or rather the capital they brought with them, also gained a dominant position in 
Yemen’s nascent banking sector, with many active as money changers and in processing 
remittances. Moreover, the large trading families dominated the private capital invested in 
the newly formed Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development (YBRD). The YBRD had a 
mixed capital and ownership structure, with 49% of investment from private investors. Long 
the only bank in Yemen, it combined some central bank functions with investment in business 
and infrastructure. While relatively few returning businessmen, with the notable exception of 
Hāʾil Saʿīd ʾAnʿam and the Thābit brothers, invested in manufacturing or industry, by the end 
of the civil war there were nonetheless 351 ‘industrial’ firms with 5 or more employees, 
together employing 6,706 workers (Chaudhry, 1997, p.129).  
Despite this expansion in influence in the first months of the war, Shāfiʿīs in general and 
trading interests in particular were gradually side-lined in formal politics. While in the first 
cabinets of the YAR, the overall balance of Shāfiʿīs and Zaydīs was about even, by late 1963 
Shāfiʿīs held a minority of one-third of the posts in the cabinet, many of them less sensitive or 
peripheral (Stookey, 1978, p.234). By late 1963, several authors identified “rising Shāfiʿī 
discontent” in the face of a return to Zaydī dominance in government, growing financial 
resources devoted to paying for tribal support, and perceived neglect of Shāfiʿī areas and 
interests (O’Ballance, 1971, p.115). The political influence of lowland traders waned further 
due to the dissolution of the National Guard in the mid-60s, the splits within the military 
during the ‘August events’ discussed above, and the cementing of Northern and Zaydī 
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preponderance in formal government, brought about by the inclusion of leading royalists 
during reconciliation.  
4.4.2 Explaining the fall: violence and external rents 
The mechanisms the model associated with external intervention account for the gradual 
side-lining of commercial elites over the course of the war. After an initial period in which the 
new revolutionary government actively courted returnees and their investments, domestic 
capital became irrelevant for the civil war because Egyptian support obviated the need for 
domestic investment and taxation. Unlike officers, with whom the Egyptian command built 
alliances and on whom it lavished resources despite a sometimes difficult relationship, 
Egyptian planning actively sought to undermine traders. However, even as it actively 
undermined their political influence, Egyptian intervention offered economic opportunities 
from which commercial elites benefited disproportionally. Paradoxically, Egyptian troops 
stationed in Yemen were an important market and leading traders made fortunes catering to 
their needs.  
Deep and persistent budget deficits covered by foreign funds characterised the political 
economy of the republican state from its inception (compare Chapter 5). Egypt channelled 
significant revenue to Yemen from the beginning of its intervention. In addition to the direct 
support to Yemeni military procurement and wages discussed above, the Egyptian 
government invested in development projects and spent perhaps $500 million on wages, 
supplies, and equipment for the up to 70,000 Egyptian soldiers stationed in Yemen. The 
Soviet Union, which provided military equipment as well as infrastructure development also 
provided substantial aid, as did the People’s Republic of China, the United States, and, to a 
lesser extent, smaller members of the rival Cold War blocks and the non-aligned states 
(O’Ballance, 1971, p.176; Badeeb, 1986, p.63).130 After the war, Saudi Arabia took on the role 
of the YAR’s main external patron. In this context, the generation of government revenues 
became primarily about tapping into external flows of rent. Taxing companies or trade, and 
hence making bargains with domestic capital, played almost no role.131  
                                                          
 
130 East and West Germany, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia also provided significant development 
projects and Kuwait invested heavily in school and hospital building. Algeria and Syria supported the 
Republican military after Egyptian withdrawal (Stookey, 1978, p.248). 
131 Nationalisation in South Yemen and the collapse of trade through Aden Port after 1967 also hurt 
traders. 
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At the same time, as Egyptian policy-makers came to grips with the idea that the intervention 
in Yemen was going to last some time, they sought to use the captive Yemeni market to shore 
up import-substitution attempts back home and minimise the economic fallout of the 
increasingly expensive intervention in Yemen. This meant pushing private Yemeni businesses 
out of sectors of interest to Egyptian state enterprises and coordinating carefully, since 
“Yemen is a new market that needs care in entering” (DWQ, 0078-044113, 7 Aug. 1965). 
In 1964 and 1965, several large joint companies were created, each with 49% Egyptian 
(government) capital and 51% Yemeni capital.132 By early 1965, these companies were the 
main players in steel, cement, pharmaceuticals, petroleum products, cotton processing, and 
cigarettes (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 26 Apr. 1965). The pharmaceutical company 
distributed Egyptian-made medicine in Yemen, the petroleum company exported and re-
exported petroleum products from Egypt to Yemen, and a company for ‘cigarettes and 
matches’ imported Egyptian-made tobacco products (DWQ 0078-044109, 18 Oct 1967). They 
enjoyed monopolies or near-monopolies in lucrative parts of the consumer market and the 
joint salt company, founded to exploit deposits at al-Ṣalīf, was long the only commercially 
viable Yemeni firm producing for export (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12337, n.d. [Jan. 1970]).  
These companies were, for the most part, highly profitable, with Egyptian records revealing a 
profit margin of 40% for the pharmaceutical company, for instance. They were also firmly 
under Egyptian control, despite the Egyptian government nominally being the minority 
shareholder. The founding document for the joint petroleum company, for instance, specified 
that the director general, the technical director and the main technical experts were to be 
Egyptian (DWQ 0078-044110, no date [Memorandum by Ḥasan Bulbul on joint companies in 
Yemen]). These joint companies were also, as a rare glimpse into the order books of the 
Egyptian ‘Arab Company for External Trade’ highlights, major customers for Egyptian cement 
and steel as well as industrial equipment either produced in, or purchased from, Egypt (DWQ 
0078-044109, 18 Oct. 1967). Hence, they were in important measure responsible for Egyptian 
exports to Yemen growing thirty-fold between 1963 and 1967 to a total value of E£ 3 million 
                                                          
 
132 These joint Yemeni-Egyptian companies were the Yemen Foreign Trade Company, Yemen 
Petroleum Company, Yemen National Tobacco and Matches Company, Yemen Pharmaceutical 
Company and the Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development (DWQ, 0078-044110, 18 Sep. 
1969; no date [Memorandum by Ḥasan Bulbul on joint companies in Yemen]; and 0078-044111, 29 
Sep. 1968; see also: Burrowes, 1987, p.25; PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 26 Apr. 1965. 
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per year (DWQ, 0078-044109, 8 Oct. 1967).133 The joint companies deepened YAR 
dependence on goods, credit, and support flowing from the UAR (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 
26 Apr. 1965). 
This economic policy had the effect of marginalising the lowland traders. According to 
German analysis, it was not the war that caused low investment by Yemeni businesses in 
manufacturing, agriculture, and commercial infrastructure, since it was not directly affecting 
life in the commercial centres of al-Ḥudayda, Taʿiz, Mukhā, or ʾIbb. Instead, Egyptian-inspired 
state socialism and particularly the public companies that were being strengthened at the 
expense of domestic capital accounted for Yemeni businesses’ reluctance to invest (PAAA, AV 
Neues 1719, 26 Apr. 1965). Egyptian development aid was likewise channelled through 
Egyptian contractors – for instance, to asphalt Ṣanaʿāʾ’s streets, the Egyptian command 
brought in the Nile Company and Egyptian workers (PAAA, B36 45, 9 Oct. 1963). 
Although Yemeni traders were thus pushed out of important parts of the domestic market 
and the Egyptian command ensured that Yemeni enterprises were built to rely on Egyptian 
products, the Egyptian intervention also opened up new and lucrative opportunities. Egyptian 
soldiers received a campaign bonus at least equal to their base salary, paid in Yemeni Riyal. 
The fact that the Riyal was maintained at an artificially low exchange rate to the Egyptian 
Pound to help offset Egyptian costs, created strong incentives for soldiers to spend the 
campaign bonus in situ. This was all the more true as the Egyptian government provided 
soldiers with tax-free allowances to import luxury and consumer goods at a time of acute 
shortages in Egypt. This “created a system tantamount to state-sanctioned smuggling, 
complete with special port facilities for the handling of duty-free goods brought home aboard 
military transports at government expense” (Ferris, 2012, p.203). The markets of al-Ḥudayda, 
Taʿiz and Ṣanaʿāʾ came to be flooded with consumer goods that were heavily rationed or 
unavailable in Egypt, including transistor radios, televisions, wrist watches, cameras, 
refrigerators, washing machines, gas stoves, thermos bottles, pumps, and generators. Few of 
                                                          
 
133 Egyptian exports to the YAR increased from next to nothing in 1963 to $ 3.8 million in 1966 and to 
$8 million in 1967. This made the UAR the largest trading partner for the YAR in both years for which 
data is available (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1970). However, the Egyptian embassy estimated that 
Egyptian profits from trade with Yemen had reached only approximately £ 150,000 per year by mid-
1967 and dismissed its value as, “equivalent to the expenses of a couple of days [of military 
operations]” (DWQ, 0078-044109, 8 Oct. 1967). 
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these items had a large Yemeni market (Burrowes, 1987, p.24; Ferris, 2012, p.173). For 
instance, the German embassy notes that television sets were widely on sale in Ṣanaʿāʾ and 
Taʿiz, even though there was no television broadcasting in the YAR. They were evidently 
intended for Egyptian buyers (PAAA B36 244, 14 Feb. 1966; compare also PAAA, 1719, 21 
Sep. 1965). The YAR became a luxury good entrepôt for Egyptian troops and a centre of black-
market import-export, to the great economic benefit of Yemeni traders with the capital and 
networks to sell to this vastly expanded market (El-Azzazi, 1978, p.29). 
Although external intervention was instrumental to pushing traders out of positions of formal 
influence, it also generated significant additional income for commercial elites and many 
trading families sat atop unprecedented fortunes as the war came to a close. Had external 
involvement ended there, this would likely have put them in a powerful bargaining position 
after the war. Yet, because Saudi Arabia and the rival Cold War power blocs continued to 
provide vast external rents into the 1980s, traders’ position outside of the dominant coalition 
became further entrenched in the post-war years.  
4.5 Conclusion to Chapter 4 
The events of September 1962 were both a reflection of a political settlement in crisis and a 
direct challenge to the traditional dominance of the sāda. The overthrow of the Imam and 
the civil war, in turn, gave rise to further far-reaching changes in the political settlement, as 
mobilisation for the war and extensive external intervention provided new resources to tribal 
leaders and military officers, while ensuring commercial elites remained at the margins of the 
settlement.  
Using the model as an analytical lens reveals dynamics and processes that have been 
neglected in the study of the civil war and its aftermath. Although the growing power of 
tribes during the war is well-established (Burrowes, 1987, p.23; Dresch, 1984, p.169; El-
Azzazi, 1978, p.113; Halliday, 1974, pp.114–115; Peterson, 1982, p.49), the sheer scale of the 
flow of resources to tribal leaders, the fundamental transformative effects of the war on the 
political settlement, and the long-term impacts arising from this have rarely been fully 
acknowledged; nor has the central role of external intervention in making this tremendous 
transfer of wealth possible. Moreover, much of the more recent literature, in particular, has 
tended to take tribes as given features of the Yemeni political landscape, treated their 
prominence during the 1980s and 1990s as unremarkable, and naturalised the limited reach 
of central institutions and their reliance on tribal allies (e.g. Phillips, 2008; Seitz, 2014).  
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The chapter revealed the wartime origins of these features. The war increased the 
prominence and importance of tribal leaders in YAR politics and reshaped intra-tribal 
relations. It changed the tribal system, precisely because it brought tribal leaders into the 
dominant coalition, prompting a centralisation of power within tribes and enabling the rise of 
specific tribal leaders, sometimes from relative obscurity, who excelled at the specific politics 
of mobilisation, fighting, and patronage made possible by the war and the resources it 
brought. The chapter also showed how thinking about military alongside tribal mobilisation 
helps explain the intertwining of military and tribal power that defined YAR politics long after 
the war. Finally, the chapter also revealed the way in which Egyptian intervention shaped the 
paradoxical position of lowland traders in the evolving political settlement, creating the 
conditions for rapid capital accumulation while entrenching their political marginalisation. 
Through the lens of the model, and drawing in important measure on hitherto untapped 
sources, the chapter revealed how central features of the YAR political settlement, ones often 
viewed as characteristic of Yemeni specificity, took shape during the civil war. 
Overall, the chapter thus found strong support for selected pathways of the model. At the 
same time, the examination also provided empirical grounds to modify and nuance the model 
and thereby call into question some widespread assumptions about the relationship of civil 
war and the political settlement. 
First, it underscored the central importance of external intervention while highlighting that 
most of its impact operated via unintended effects. In the civil war, Saudi Arabia and 
especially Egypt drove reliance on local violence specialists and transferred very large 
amounts of weapons and resources to tribal leaders. Contrary to the dominant literature on 
warlordism and the politics of fragmentation (e.g. Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Reno, 2002), it 
was external interveners, not ‘rulers,’ driving these dynamics. Yet, despite its overwhelming 
military and financial leverage, the Egyptian command was repeatedly forced to make deals 
with domestic actors and accept ministerial appointments and whole governments it judged 
hostile in order to avoid outright insurrection. Viewed in terms of the purported role of 
external intervention for defining government insiders and outsiders in the model, this 
suggests that literatures on intervention and state building may continue to underestimate 
the limits of external intervention and the extent to which its possibilities are shaped by the 
domestic balance of power.  
Second, the discussion highlights the limits of constructing a political economy of conflict that 
abstracts from the specific politics of domestic alliances. During the civil war, political rivals 
sought to empower groups and individuals that would support them – tribal leaders were a 
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political constituency for central elites rooted in notable politics. Specific alliances within and 
between elites also loom large in the context of military mobilisation and divisions within the 
officer corps. In an extended confrontation, an alliance between tribal and military leaders 
faced off against elements of the officer corps, party militias, and the southern independence 
movement. Ultimately, the tribal-military alliance won out. This specific alliance and their 
associated values and world-views further contributed to the growing intertwining of tribal 
and military power in the last years of the civil war. The chapter thus highlights the need to 
bring politics in the sense of networks and alliances into the model and by extension back 
into the literature on civil wars and the political settlement.   
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5 THE CIVIL WAR AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS 
“State building? What state building? We were struggling merely to save, not build, the state 
in those days”134 
Writing about North Yemen tends to locate the emergence of the YAR’s institutions and 
practices of local and central governance in the 1970s. It was not until then, many have 
argued, that the state was made: The few institutions created during the war existed in name 
only and conflict froze state formation (e.g. Burrowes, 1991, 1987). This view has roots going 
back to the immediate post-war period, when, in 1970, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) concluded in its first fact-finding mission to Yemen, 
that the revolution sought to create “a central government administration and civil service 
system […] from virtually nothing” (IBRD, 1970, Annex I p.1).135  
Certainly, new institutions did not function as advertised, and many of the IBRD’s 
assessments ring true, as when it concludes that the YAR (IBRD, 1970, Annex I p.1): 
has grafted a centralised system of national government onto a traditional decentralised system 
of local administration […] has created the façade of a professional civil service without the 
qualified staff, the salaries or the training facilities to make it function well, and […] has built 
institutions from models which often had little relevance to Yemeni reality.  
However, more than empty forms were created during the civil war and the institutions that 
emerged did not do so ‘from virtually nothing,’ but grew from, replaced, and interacted with 
the Imamate-era institutions discussed in 3.3. As we will see, the civil war caused 
fundamental changes in the organisation of government institutions and their underlying 
functions and logics. These changes transformed the fiscal basis of the state (5.1), and 
partially reshaped central and local military and civilian institutions (5.2). 
The model developed in Chapter 2 offers analytical leverage to understand the how and why 
of rapid institutional change in north Yemen during this time. It suggests that civil war 
precipitates a crisis in the dominant coalition, likely to multiply competing local institutions 
                                                          
 
134 Ḥusayn al-Ḥubayshī, Legal Advisor to the President, in conversation with Robert Burrowes in Ṣanaʿāʾ 
in 1978 (Burrowes, 1987, p.34). 
135 The idea that post-war reconstruction begins from ‘virtually nothing,’ a blank slate, is a common 
trope (e.g. Cramer, 2006, p.256).  
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and fragment central control over violence. Such tendencies are strengthened where 
mobilising strategies focus on existing local violence specialists. Closely following this causal 
story, the chapter reveals how ceding control over coercion to the tribes was connected to 
decentralising control over taxation, which in turn implied far-reaching decentralisation of 
appointments, oversight, and decision-making. The model’s multiple pathways and 
contradictory outcomes, moreover, help make sense of the way in which the fragmenting of 
the dominant coalition and external funding created pressures for dismantling existing 
institutions at the local level, at the same time as it provided the resources and blueprints for 
creating large central ministries in the capital and other large cities. The civil war gave rise to 
a dozen new ministries, a larger, better paid and better-equipped military, and prompted 
rapid increases in government expenditure and the government’s role in the economy, even 
as the central government lost control over local governance, appointments, and taxation. 
Distinct and rival pathways active simultaneously generated otherwise unintelligible 
combinations of centralising and decentralising dynamics and an intertwining of institutional 
forms. In-line with the conceptualisation of formal institutions as reflecting and being 
dependent on the political settlement, the relative and evolving bargaining position inside 
and outside government of groups seeking to transform and re-make government 
institutions, seeking to guard and maintain institutional legacies of the Imamate, or to keep 
central institutions at bay and carve out new spaces of autonomy, helped determine the 
institutional changes wrought by the war. Throughout this discussion, the caveats from 
Section 2.1 need to be kept in mind: quoted figures are often only informed guesses and 
economic and social statistics were in short supply, indeed the very emergence of statistics in 
the middle of the 1960s tells an interesting story about the changing nature of central 
institutions, as we will see.  
5.1 The fiscal basis of the state: taxation and allocation 
Following the dictum that “the history of state revenue production is the history of the 
evolution of the state” (Levi, 1988, p.1), an initial exploration of taxation and expenditure 
provides the framework for the subsequent discussion of specific institutions. Contrary to the 
assertions of a number of authors, who, usually in passing, have claimed that taxation 
expanded under the republic (e.g. Orkaby, 2014, pp.10–11), the opposite is true: all serious 
attempts to explore the fiscal trajectory of the YAR have concluded that direct taxation under 
the republic was only a fraction of what was collected under the Imamate, while at the same 
time expenditure increased dramatically, funded by foreign and domestic loans. 
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Table 5 presents estimates of YAR government income between 1962 and 1970. Although 
these estimates are inaccurate and published figures sometimes vary significantly (Nyrop, 
1977, p.186), the table provides an important guide to the fiscal changes of the civil war. It 
highlights that the republican government’s sources of income differed markedly from those 
of the Imamate: direct taxation declined, borrowing grew, and indirect taxes increased.  
Between 1961 and the 1969/70 fiscal year, receipts from direct taxation declined even in 
nominal terms.136 Controlling for inflation, income from direct taxes in 1970 was less than 
20% of the pre-war take.137 Despite droughts and declining agricultural production, this 
decline reflects, above all, changes to the way in which taxes were administered, introduced 
                                                          
 
136 The YAR fiscal year ran from 1 July to 30 June. The following does not discuss income and spending 
relative to GDP, since no YAR GDP figures are available until the mid-1970s. However, based on 
contemporary guesses (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12337, n.d. [Jan. 1970]; Gause, 1990, p.25), central 
government income was probably somewhere between 5-10% of GDP.  
137 Taking exchange rates to the US Dollar as a proxy for purchasing power and using estimates of de-
facto exchange rates from a number of archival sources, provides the following deflator figures: 
Year 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Purchasing power 1 1.25 - 0.8 0.66 0.51 0.4 0.29 0.24 0.19 
Annual inflation - -20% - - 21% 29% 28% 39% 20% 25% 
Some data points are more robust than others. There is agreement that the YR-USD exchange rate was 
somewhere near parity until ca. 1964. By 1966 most sources refer to a de-facto exchange rate of about 
2 YR per USD. 1970 is the next point with broad agreement of exchange rates of around 5 YR per USD. 
See: PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12337, no date [Jan. 1970]; 14 Feb. 1966; DWQ, 0078-044111, no date [Sep. 
1968]; 9 Aug. 1967; Nyrop, 1977, p.199; IBRD, 1970, inside cover. For official exchange rates see: 
Treasury Department, n.d. 
Table 5: YAR government income by source 1961-1970 in nominal YR (millions) 
 1961 1962-65 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 
direct taxes 21  7.6 8.2 13.4 15.8 
indirect taxes 4  15.5 18.1 27.1 32.9 
other sources   3.1 3.0 5.5 10.8 
foreign loans   18.0 0 0 44.0 
domestic borrowing  0  3.2 
[10.8] 
21.6 
[35.1] 
63.6 
[66.7] 
57.0 
Source: 1961 figures: El Attar 1964 213-214; 1964-1970 figures: IBRD, 1970, pp.28, 31 and Annex II. 
Figures in [parentheses] are actual deficit figures IBRD 1970, 30. Empty cells represent missing values. 
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almost immediately after the overthrow of the Imam.138 By contrast, nominal income from 
indirect taxes increased 8-fold over the period, equivalent to a doubling in inflation adjusted 
terms. On a small scale, the YAR also tapped new, ‘other’ revenues, such as profits from joint 
Egyptian-Yemeni companies and proceeds from the land confiscated from the Ḥamīd al-Dīn 
and leading sāda. More significantly, foreign loans and deficit financing came to play a far 
more important role in the budget. Although Imam ʾAḥmad had begun to borrow to finance 
infrastructure investment, foreign loans to finance running expenditure had not been part of 
the Imamate budget. By contrast, the Egyptian archives suggest that UAR aid provided nearly 
40% of total running expenses and was the largest single source of income for the YAR 
government between 1962-67 (DWQ, 0078-044109, no date [Oct. 1967]; IBRD 1970, 27). 
After Egyptian withdrawal, the YAR operated with a yawning deficit that grew to more than 
half its outlays before Saudi Arabian budget support began to fill the gap during the 1969/70 
budget year. 
Figure 1: Sources of YAR income in inflation-adjusted YR (millions, base-year 1961)* 
 
* Sources for 1961: El Attar 1964, pp.213-214; for 1966-1970: IBRD, 1970, pp.28, 30-31, Annex II. 
Figure 1 summarises changes in government income during the civil war: from a state heavily 
reliant on direct taxation and particularly agricultural taxation, the YAR became, first, a 
gatekeeper state reliant on customs duty and foreign aid, then a state almost wholly reliant 
                                                          
 
138 Drought affected cereal production from 1965 to 1967 (e.g. Boals, 1970, pp.254–255). As a result of 
drought, the war, and import liberalisation, cereal production dropped from an average of 1.1 million 
tons per year in 1960-65 to 900,000 tons in 1969 (IBRD, 1970, p.37).  
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on borrowing from foreign creditors, domestic capital, and its own central bank.139 After 
reconciliation in 1970 ended the civil war and opened the door to Saudi support, this became 
the new fiscal status quo. 
On the expenditure side, Table 6 chronicles large increases in nominal government spending 
counteracted by high inflation. In inflation-adjusted terms, expenditure grew unevenly, 
though much remains uncertain, since there is no government budget information between 
1962 and 1964. Given well-documented increases in military and civilian salaries, payments 
to tribal leaders, and new investment, it is likely that 1962/1963 and 1963/1964 figures 
would show a real-term increase in government expenditure from Imamate levels, which 
were then likely eroded by inflation, particularly after the introduction of the paper Riyal in 
1964. Yet, the figures during the Egyptian intervention are also unreliable, as significant 
expenditure went through Egyptian systems and is only partially included in these figures. 
The first halfway-reliable data point comes with the budget for 1967/68. After UAR funding 
fell away in late 1967, government expenditure reached the lowest level that decade. In the 
next two years, despite high inflation, real term expenditure nearly doubled. 
Combining the above information yields four periods defined by different sources of funding 
and patterns of expenditure. The YAR government pursued, in relatively distinct succession, 
each of the revenue-raising strategies the model associates with distinct outcomes, providing 
an opportunity to assess its claims by exploring the distinct dynamics of each. An initial period 
between 1962 and 1963, during which the YAR increased spending and reduced taxation, 
burning through the limited reserves of the Imamate and initial Egyptian support, forms the 
focus of 5.1.1. Between 1963 and 1967, the Egyptian role in Yemen increased steadily and 
Egyptian loans and customs duty became the most important sources of government income, 
while expenditure likely languished (5.1.2). Egyptian withdrawal at the end of 1967 prompted 
a deep fiscal crisis, leading to a scramble for new domestic sources of funding. Paradoxically, 
government expenditure steadily increased during this time (5.1.3). Finally, reconciliation in 
early 1970 and the renewed access to foreign funding this afforded meant that ‘gatekeeper 
state’ habits and institutions from the period of Egyptian support became entrenched and 
defined the fiscal basis of the YAR (5.1.4). 
                                                          
 
139 This is true even using the conservative official estimates from the government budget. Actual 
funding from the central bank was consistently, sometimes dramatically, higher (IBRD, 1970, p.30).  
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Table 6: nominal and inflation adjusted YAR government expenditure 1961 and 1965-1970 
 1961 1962-64 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 
nominal YR 25  (32.9) 47.4 50.96 109.54 160.49 
constant 1961 YR 25  21.8 24.3 20.4 31.6 38.5 
All figures in millions of Yemeni Riyals. Sources: 1961 figures: El Attar, 1964, pp.213-214; 1964-1970 
figures: IBRD, 1970, pp.28, 31 and Annex II. Figures marked with (parentheses) from: Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 1970, p15. Empty cells are missing values. 
Overall, the model accounts well for fiscal dynamics. In particular, it highlights that 
decentralising control over coercion coincided with a decentralisation of revenue collection 
and that external aid, despite nominally being dedicated to state building, was a driving force 
in the un-making of the fiscal basis of a viable state. At the same time, the discussion adds 
detail and nuance to the model: First, it highlights how strategies of allocation must be 
examined in conjunction with extraction and can generate their own forms of bureaucratic 
penetration. Although taxation slowed, spending increased and bargaining over expenditure 
created relationships between central institutions and local leaders. Second, it highlights that 
abandoning Imamate-era taxation was a largely one way path: after an initial period in which 
the new government pointedly left the tax administration to fall apart; it failed to put it back 
together. It had lost the requisite expertise and the absence of taxation had become part of 
the emerging republican political settlement.  
5.1.1 1962-1963: the anti-Imamate 
During the first months after the overthrow of the Imam, between September 1962 and mid-
1963, the new republican government granted higher salaries to soldiers and civil servants in 
an attempt to secure loyalty, declared taxation to be voluntary,140 and burned through the 
limited reserves the Ḥamīd al-Dīn Imams had collected.141 By early 1963, it faced a financial 
crisis. No longer able to pay civil service salaries, it requested direct cash payments from 
potential donors (PAAA, B36 46, 21 Jan. 1963).  
                                                          
 
140 According to Johnsen (2017, p.106), it was al-Badr who announced voluntary taxation immediately 
before the revolution. 
141 According to O’Ballance (1971, p.77), the Free Officers found 8 million MT in the Imam’s treasury. 
Ḥamūd Baydar, one of the Free Officers, stated it was 40 million YR (Interview with Ḥamūd Baydar, 
2016). 
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Information on salary increases is anecdotal, but a number of sources suggest that one of the 
new government’s first measures was increasing salaries in the security forces. According to 
the French journalists Marie-Claude Deffarge and Gordian Troeller, police officers in lower 
Yemen who had been paid 20 MT a month before the overthrow of the Imam, saw their 
salaries increase to more than 60 MT by late 1962 and a young military officer who had 
earned 25 MT per month then made 50 MT. On another occasion they report that President 
al-Sallāl raised military salaries to two and a half times their previous levels in mid-October 
1962, when it became public knowledge that Imam al-Badr had survived the coup (Deffarge 
and Troeller, 1969, pp.28, 42, 94). Their account leaves the details of salary increases hazy – 
but they are unlikely to have been uniform or universally implemented in any case.  
In 1962, the YAR government also declared taxation, which had been notoriously high under 
the Imam (see 3.2.1 above), to be voluntary. In doing so, the new government consciously set 
out to pursue the ‘negation’ of the Imamate’s fiscal policy and hence later trumpeted the 
reduction of its income from property and agricultural taxes as a ‘success’ of the revolution 
(PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12337, 9 Apr. 1967). By rendering taxation voluntary, the new 
government addressed the main grievances of merchants and peasants (Stookey, 1978, 
pp.201–205) and met a central demand of the Free Yemeni movement, which had framed 
excessive and unjust taxation as part of the Ḥamīd al-Dīn’s “conspiracy” against Yemen (al-
ʿAynī, 1957). Whereas under the Imam, zakat on agricultural output had been assessed and 
collected by Treasury officials or local representatives responsible to them, during the first 
weeks of October 1962, the YAR government turned tax collection over to officials at the local 
level (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12337, 14 Mar. 1969). According to Deffarge and Troeller, the 
effect was rapidly noticeable in lower Yemen: people who had lived in fear of exactions by 
the police and the Imam’s armed men found the forcible billeting of troops, a common and 
hated method of enforcing tax claims, disappeared. They became ‘free’ (Deffarge and 
Troeller, 1969, p.29). 
Yet while voluntary taxation reduced grievances towards the political centre, it also rapidly 
eroded government income. As the IBRD notes, overcautiously, “there is reason to believe 
that returns from zakat dropped sharply after 1962” (IBRD, 1970, Annex II p.3). Indeed, it 
appears that tax income collapsed and the new system was “wide open to abuse” (Gerholm, 
1977, p.77). There were almost no penalties for evasion and by the end of the civil war as 
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little as 5% of agricultural tax, the mainstay of Imamate era government income, was actually 
being collected (El-Azzazi, 1978, p.31; Chaudhry, 1997, p.200).142  
In his pioneering study of ʾIbb, conducted shortly after the end of the civil war, Brinkley 
Messick documented how changes to taxation visibly and immediately changed the role and 
perception of local government: Until 1962, (local) government operated with a surplus, 
visible in full government grain stores, and this surplus was available for a range of public 
assistance. Since the revolution, local administration became unable to cover its own 
expenses, much less operate with a surplus (Messick, 1978, pp.217–218). Government deficit 
spending and a growing shift to a cash economy would have been visible locally in empty 
grain stores, filled only occasionally with imported wheat from the ports. 
As tax income decreased, the tax bureaucracy languished. Although in overall terms public-
sector employment increased rapidly during this first period,143 the Treasury in general and its 
taxation branches in particular, stagnated. Messick mentions how, over the course of the 
1960s, the māliya (Treasury) in ʾIbb was stripped of personnel and influence and lost its 
previous centrality in the administration and networks of power in the town. Whereas it used 
to dominate local government, kept the accounts for all other offices, and paid all public 
functionaries, it became just one office among many by the end of the 1960s (Messick, 1978, 
pp.185, 220–221). 
This development was not limited to ʾIbb: few new civil servants joined the māliya and the 
IBRD noted at the end of the civil war that the Treasury suffered from lack of funds, training, 
and attention and had particularly few graduates. The Treasury, including its new department 
for ‘modern taxes’ was “clearly unequal to the administrative task of effective [tax] 
enforcement” (IBRD, 1970, Annex II p.9). The anti-sāda measures adopted in the initial 
months of the revolution (see 4.1.1) likely accelerated the hollowing out of the tax 
bureaucracy. Leading officials in the māliya were sāda and particularly in lower Yemen, their 
marginalisation amounted to an active removal of expertise in taxation from the YAR 
bureaucracy. To the extent that the Treasury recruited new officials, they were channelled 
                                                          
 
142 However, in some areas, the fact that zakāa was collected in kind, an expectation that tax payments 
would be similar year on year, and the local circulation of taxes, helped stem the decline (Messick, 
1978, p.204). 
143 See 5.2.2 on the development of the civil service. 
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into new sections for ‘modern’ taxes and customs duty (IBRD, 1970, Annex II p.1). By the end 
of the war, “the Treasury ministry had surprisingly little to do even with the day-to-day 
financial operations of the government; indeed, it was virtually closed down for months with 
no apparent ill effects during a political dispute in 1969” (Burrowes, 1987, p.41). 
In areas under control of the royalists, a similar dynamic was at play. Tax revenues were 
collected and distributed locally and the royalist war effort was funded from Saudi aid and 
occasionally by local commanders’ personal fortunes, not taxation (Interviews with ʿAbbās al-
Mukhtafī and ʾAḥmad al-Sayyānī, 2016). Royalist governance did not involve central control, 
let alone taxation (Peterson, 1982, p.89).144 
All of this suggests it was not merely, or even primarily, a matter of the conflict getting in the 
way of taxation, a lack of qualified personnel, or rapid changes in government that impeded 
fiscal reorganisation, as works in the decades after the war tend to claim (e.g. Nyrop, 1977, 
p.196). Falling income and increased expenditure were initially the direct result of new 
government policies intended to buy political support: The new government dropped taxes 
targeted at farmers and landowners and simultaneously embarked on deficit spending, 
concentrating benefits in the security sector, where wages increased most. Unlike the 
emphasis in the model on exchanging rights to local taxation for mobilisation, the central 
government abandoned taxation before it made serious attempts to mobilise tribes. Giving 
up taxation appears to have been a strategy to buy support, but it centred on forestalling 
mobilisation against the coup, rather than seeking directly to rally support. Elite decisions to 
abandon taxation were not directly caused by the war, but the conflict did shift the balance 
of power to make re-introducing taxes very difficult. The loss of central control over coercion 
contributed to further administrative and fiscal decentralisation down the line. 
5.1.2 1963-1967: The Egyptian republic: the making of a rentier state  
Between 1963 and 1967, Egyptian support stabilised YAR expenditure at the new, higher 
level, although inflation likely eroded spending in real terms. As the UAR increased its troop 
deployment to Yemen, it also sent civilian experts and increasing amounts of financial aid to 
shore-up the revolution. Egyptian budget support ultimately supplied half of the YAR’s total 
expenditure over the 1962-1967 period and the Egyptian archives discuss a variety of 
additional loans, import credits and other forms of financial aid. These include the previously 
                                                          
 
144 Schmidt (1968, p.275) disagrees. 
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mentioned loans and grants of YR 100 million for the Yemeni military, as well as at least E£ 10 
million (YR 30 million at official 1967 exchange rates) for civilian experts, and assorted loans 
to cover Yemeni imports from Egypt, the printing of Yemeni banknotes in Cairo, development 
projects, and other expenses (DWQ, 0078-044113, 11 Sep. 1966; 0078-044112, 1 Nov. 1966; 
0078-044109, no date [Oct. 1967], 9 Jan 1968). Moreover, Cairo provided large capital 
injections in the YAR’s account with the Egyptian central bank, against which new currency 
was issued. The YAR’s foreign currency reserves more than doubled between 1964 and 1965 
from YR 22.4 million to YR 51.1 million thanks to increases in its Egyptian Pound holdings 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 1970, p.13). 
This extensive financial aid in conjunction with the deployment of civilian experts, placed the 
Egyptian command in Yemen in a position to direct government policy making at all levels. 
Egyptian advisors were located in most ministries, often in the office of the minister, and 
wielded great influence. The newly-formed National Security Council that, at least in theory, 
directed the republican war effort, included a number of officers from the United Arab 
Republic, including the commander in chief of the Egyptian forces in Yemen (O’Ballance, 
1971, p.122) and the UAR ambassador to Yemen was treated as a de-facto part of the YAR 
government in German reporting about political developments (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 
26 Aug. 1965). Successive Yemeni governments were highly sensitive to Egyptian threats to 
suspend funding, cut off the supply of paper riyals, which were printed in Egypt, or to freeze 
Yemen’s currency reserves, which had been transferred to Cairo (Alaini, 2004, p.113).145  
In addition to Egyptian aid, the YAR rapidly loaded up on other foreign debt, and the 
generation of YAR government revenue became in important measure about securing foreign 
funds. The German embassy commented that Yemeni politicians "faced with a foreigner now 
know only the topic of musāʿadāt” [aid] (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12337, 9 Apr. 1967). Unlike 
Egyptian support, such aid was earmarked for specific projects and investments and could not 
be used directly to cover running expenses. As a result, they came to define YAR 
infrastructure investments and priorities. Speeches about government achievements became 
catalogues of foreign aid projects (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 26 Sep. 1967) and government 
development plans consisted in the view of the German embassy of little more than the 
development projects of the USSR, China, USAID, and Kuwait (PAAA, B36 244, 7 Jun. 1966).  
                                                          
 
145 The Egyptian government rebuffed repeated requests by the Nuʿmān and later governments to 
release these reserves (O’Ballance, 1971, p.158). 
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External debt had stood at $30 million, or approximately 1.5 times annual government 
income in 1962. By 1970, it reached $170 million, approximately 15 times annual income. 
Most of it had been contracted in the first years of the revolution and during the Egyptian 
presence. By the time of Egyptian withdrawal, debt servicing had “already become a major 
problem for the YAR,” and in 1969 arrears reached $25 million (IBRD, 1970, p.iv). Even 
excluding payments in arrears, the IBRD cautioned that the YAR at the end of the war faced 
debt repayment obligations equivalent to 90% of the country’s total annual foreign exchange 
earnings (IBRD, 1970, p.42).146  
External aid kept pressures to raise additional funds at bay and the development of YAR 
institutions under UAR tutelage, though rapid and extensive in many areas, shows a peculiar 
disregard for the growing imbalance between government income via direct and indirect 
taxation and expenditure. During the 1963-67 period, direct taxes likely continued to slip, 
although no figures are available. Fuelled by demand from Egyptian troops, small initial flows 
of remittances, and increased domestic demand from the large numbers of traders returned 
from Aden, customs duty came to partially make up for declining taxation. Yet expenditure 
far outpaced income from domestic sources. With foreign aid and control of imports and 
exports eclipsing other sources of funding – they account together for more than 70% of the 
1967 budget – the YAR fiscally came to closely resemble a post-colonial ‘gatekeeper state’ 
(Cooper, 2002). 
Egyptian disinterest in ensuring the basic fiscal viability of the state they were creating is, at 
first blush, remarkable, coming as it did in the midst of contemporary Egyptian complaints 
about the cost of operations in Yemen and an ambitious experiment in state building. Yet, as 
suggested in the model, this may be a broader tendency of external funding and has certainly 
been an area of neglect in more recent instances of external state building (Bräutigam, 2008; 
Moore, 2008). Certainly in Yemen, Egyptian state building contributed to the relative neglect 
of the revenue-raising capabilities of the YAR, despite seeking to create a large bureaucracy, a 
                                                          
 
146 The YAR’s largest creditors were the USSR, China, the USA, Egypt, the German Democratic Republic, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Algeria and Yugoslavia, approximately in that order (IBRD, 1970, 
p.42).The flipside of aid was a growing contest between donors for ‘their men’ to win out. In 1968 the 
al-ʾIryānī government faced three attempted coups, for which the German embassy blamed the USSR 
and Egypt (PAAA AV Neues Amt 12337, 14 Mar. 1969). However, according to Orkaby’s (2014, pp.231–
232) research, the Soviet leadership maintained ties with al-ʾIryānī and considered him an asset.  
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large public sector, and more broadly pursuing an avowedly statist vision on the Egyptian 
model.147 This contribution was in part indirect. The availability of foreign funds eliminated 
pressures for Yemeni politicians to raise revenue, while influence over the military, the 
Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Information loomed larger in Egyptian political 
concerns than did the Treasury. Other priorities got in the way, particularly as taxation did 
not feature as a developmental concern either. ‘Modernisation’ efforts of both YAR elites and 
their Egyptian advisors focused on health and education, not revenue extraction.  
Turning taxation over to local authorities and largely eliminating sanctions for non-payment 
was a popular move that rapidly reduced effective tax rates. As long as external financing 
enabled successive cabinets to continue down this path, appetite within the Yemeni 
government to expand taxation was minimal. In the context of souring relations between the 
Egyptian command and tribal leaders, whole tribes refused to pay even the limited taxes that 
were still collected. For instance, German sources refer to a tax revolt in Yarīm that was 
eventually put down by military force in December 1966, while noting that many more areas, 
including ones deeply in nominally republican territory, did not pay taxes while the 
government looked on (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12337, 9 Apr. 1967).  
Moreover, as we saw above, purges of the administration had disproportionally affected the 
māliya, while the small number of graduates who were being recruited into the civil service, 
self-consciously pursuing an agenda of modernisation and state building, were drawn to 
areas closer to their specialisation or that coincided more obviously with the needs of 
development: the most highly qualified new recruits flocked to the ministries of health and 
education, the foreign ministry or the Yemen Bank of Reconstruction and Development. Of 
the approximately 150 university graduates in the civil service at the end of 1969, almost half 
served in the ministries of Health and Education. The Treasury employed two (IBRD, 1970, 
Annex I p.3). 
Beyond providing the external funds that allowed successive YAR governments to ignore the 
growing gap between domestic revenues and expenditure, the Egyptians’ own priorities 
exacerbated this tendency. A listing of 70 experts set to renew their terms on 30 June 1967, 
provides a partial, but revealing snapshot of the priorities of Egyptian intervention: Egyptian 
experts were present in the Council of Ministers, in radio programming and played a key role 
                                                          
 
147 For comparison, Egypt increased its domestic tax revenues almost 40% between 1962/3 and 1964/5 
and also increased non-tax income (World Bank, 1966, p.37). 
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in the Ministry of Interior, where twelve experts were seconded for exceptionally long tours 
to increase capacity in police investigations – and likely domestic intelligence (DWQ, 0078-
044112, no date [late May/early June 1967]). Political influence, control of perceptions 
through propaganda, and control of the security services easily trumped revenue-raising.  
This is not to say that the UAR did not pursue developmentalist aims in Yemen: Egyptian 
experts oversaw the building of some two-dozen ministries and other government agencies, 
which is explored in more detail in Section 5.2. Yet, there were few experts in the tax 
administration. These priorities within Egyptian state building, aside from obvious 
considerations of political control and influence, speak of the Egyptian ambition to bring 
Yemen “out of the middle ages” (DWQ, 0078-044109, 8 Oct. 1962). As Jesse Ferris argues 
with regard to the assumptions pervading Egyptian counterinsurgency manuals for 
operations in Yemen, the Egyptian command viewed Yemenis primarily as “inferior natives in 
need of conversion to the dogmas of revolutionary socialism” (Ferris, 2012, p.183). A specific 
vision of modernity and the institutions appropriate to a modern state animated the direction 
of institutional development. Yemen’s existing religiously-based system of agricultural 
taxation did not fit the model. It was rejected as “at best archaic” and “medieval” not only by 
the Egyptian command, but by the IBRD as well (IBRD, 1970, p.27).  
To the extent that Egypt invested in the YAR’s fiscal and monetary underpinnings, it was in 
‘modern’ areas: Egypt printed Yemen’s new paper currency and an Egyptian was the Director 
General of the Yemeni currency board (lijnat al-naqd), which had primary responsibility over 
monetary policy. Other experts were seconded to the customs administration and played an 
important role in its expansion (DWQ, 0078-044112, n.d.). By the end of the war, indirect 
taxes became the single most important source of income (IBRD, 1970, Annex II p.5). From 
providing 16% of government income under the Imam, they went to supplying 36% of total 
income in the 1967/68 fiscal year and indirect taxes as a share of revenues rises to 60% when 
borrowing and money-creation are stripped out (see Table 5, above). By that time, Egyptian 
experts had taken full control of customs and the flow of goods in and out of Yemen in the 
main port of al-Ḥudayda and at the main overland crossing from South Yemen at al-Rāhida 
(PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 15 Jan 1967). Perhaps because Egyptian experts played an 
outsize role in this expansion, the customs administration was hit hard by Egyptian 
withdrawal. The IBRD documented a "lack of trained staff, both valuers and inspectors,” in 
the customs administration immediately after the war, noting that “smuggling, under-
invoicing and evasion of duties are widespread” (IBRD, 1970, Annex II p.7). 
157 
 
Yet, at several junctures, the neglect of domestic revenue-raising in Egyptian state building in 
Yemen appears to be more than an unintended consequence or a matter of other priorities 
getting in the way. From the Egyptian perspective, reliance on Egyptian funding, though a 
fiscal drain, was a powerful tool of control. Confiscating Yemeni foreign currency reserves 
(PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12337, 9 Apr. 1967, 14 Mar. 1969, no date [Jan. 1970]), stopping East 
German aid shipments (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 8 Mar. 1967), blocking Kuwaiti funding 
(Alaini, 2004, p.113), and freezing its programme of loans to “all Yemeni ministries, 
associations, bodies and companies” in 1967 (DWQ, 0078-044109, 5 Oct 1967), suggests that 
the Egyptian command was more concerned to maintain a monopoly on aid than it was to 
offset the costs of intervention. If it is true that “Nasser envisioned a Yemeni state that would 
be controlled from Cairo and would mirror the United Arab Republic in many aspects, from its 
constitution to the format of its postal stamps” (Orkaby, 2014, p.11), one central plank of that 
strategy of control was financial dependence, even as operations in Yemen became a serious 
drain on Egyptian resources.148  
German analysis, coming as it did during the German Middle-East crisis,149 took on a 
particular anti-Egyptian edge in the mid-60s. Nonetheless, the observation that the 
consolidation of Egyptian influence in Yemen during the second half of 1966 was 
accompanied by intimidation of Yemeni civil servants (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 15 Jan. 
1967), attempts to systematically “paralyze local competencies,” and “cynical, but effective 
terror,” including show trials, arrests, and threats of trials against local officials, highlights the 
very real tensions between political control and the creation of a functioning independent 
administrative apparatus in Egyptian state building (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 8 Mar. 1967). 
The fact that “in some areas of Yemen Egyptian officers acted as virtual governors” 
underscores this point (Vassiliev, 2012, p.291), as does the fact that, during the last year of 
the Egyptian presence in the YAR (and the only one we have data for), two-thirds of Yemeni 
government spending was channelled through Egyptian systems (IBRD, 1970, p.28). 
                                                          
 
148 Conversely, Yemeni attempts to escape the Egyptian bear-hug had a fiscal dimension. The 
government of Ḥasan al-ʿAmrī, for instance, supported the export of qāt to earn foreign exchange and 
sought to curb smuggling and increase customs income (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12337, 9 Apr. 1967). 
149 In early 1965, West Germany’s exchange of ambassadors with Israel led to a crisis in relations 
between the Federal Republic and the members of the League of Arab States. See: Perthes, 2002a, 
pp.129–131; Büttner and Hünseler, 1981. 
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The Egyptian leadership did eventually come to see its expenditure in Yemen as a problem 
and sought to recoup its costs. Yet, it sought to earn money from access to the Yemeni 
market and by control of the exchange rate – both sources of income that did not strengthen 
the YAR’s own revenue-generation. Egypt maintained an artificially low exchange rate 
between Yemeni Riyals and Egyptian Pounds, which allowed the Egyptian government to 
recoup expenses from the republican state through its ability to issue Yemeni Riyals on the 
YAR’s behalf (Ferris, 2012, p.199; PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 8 Mar. 1967). The Egyptians also 
formed a number of Egyptian-Yemeni joint-stock companies (see 4.4.2 above), which were 
closely linked to Egyptian state-owned enterprises and were expected to generate a profit for 
the Egyptian parent company.  
The way in which foreign funding in Yemen deepened the shift away from taxation and 
towards greater spending fits well with the broad outlines of the role of foreign funding 
developed in the model. During this crucial period of state formation in Yemen, the Egyptian 
presence eliminated incentives for domestic revenue mobilisation and changed patterns of 
accountability in ways that made relations to Cairo an important determinant of political 
fortunes. Yet, the discussion also highlights that these broad outlines are underspecified. The 
rapid moves to cut taxation and increase expenditure in 1962, before a significant Egyptian 
presence was established, highlights that foreign funding, at least at first, played 
predominantly an enabling role. The ideas and aspirations of the putschists against the Imam 
mattered, as they took up a central demand of the Free Yemeni opposition about the 
voluntary nature of paying zakat. Similarly, the model does not quite capture the tensions 
and trade-offs in Egyptian policy between political control and fiscal drain. Aggressive 
assertions of fiscal control coincided with periods during which Yemeni politics threatened to 
slip away from the Egyptian leadership, especially between April 1965 and September 1966. 
It was during this time that Egypt blocked other sources of funding, highlighting the 
contingent and context-specific nature of the linkages explored. 
5.1.3 1967-1970: Fiscal crisis and innovation  
Until Egyptian withdrawal, the UAR covered the large imbalance between the YAR’s declining 
income and growing expenditure on military and civil service salaries and tribal subsidies. 
When Egyptian support ended suddenly, the YAR faced a financial crisis and the government 
sought to increase income and reduce expenditure. Both proved elusive. The YAR’s legitimacy 
was too intimately bound up with the absence of taxation and the new and higher incomes it 
was providing to a range of constituencies. Indeed, after an initial dip in the 1967/68 fiscal 
year, when the government came to grips with the loss of Egyptian funding, inflation-
159 
 
adjusted expenditure increased rapidly. However, attempts to increase income generated 
only marginally higher receipts. Spending on tribal subsidies and the military continuously 
ratcheted upwards and the tax administration, left to atrophy for five years, proved difficult 
to resuscitate.  
When Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-ʾIryānī became President in November 1967, he identified the 
bloated government bureaucracy, tribal subsidies, and military expenditure as the principal 
drains on public funds. The YAR at this point had some 13,000 civil servants on the payroll, of 
whom 775 – one out of 17 – held the highest rank and hence received a minister’s salary. The 
YAR was also paying tribal subsidies of YR 40 million a year – roughly equal to all government 
income from direct and indirect taxes (Dresch, 2000, pp.124–125).150 Despite this diagnosis of 
the problem and several attempts to reduce payments and subsidies, government 
expenditure strayed ever higher and attempts to reign in expenditure brought down 
successive governments. For instance, when Prime Minister ʿAbd Allah al-Kurshumī formed a 
government in September 1969, he made the financial crisis a topic of public discussion and a 
government priority. He succeeded in agreeing significant budget cuts, including to the 
military. However, he lacked the clout to enforce cuts to tribal subsidies and resigned in 
February 1970, his budget largely a dead-letter (PAAA, B36 469, 2 Feb. 1970; Burrowes, 1987, 
pp.35–36). In July 1970, the next government faced crisis, when thousands of armed Bakīl 
and Ḥāshid tribesmen met north of Ṣanaʿāʾ to demand a larger share of the government’s 
development aid and the removal of Baʿathist ministers from the cabinet (PAAA, AV Neues 
Amt 12333, no date [9 Jul. 1970]). 
Table 7 provides an overview of estimates for government income and expenditure between 
mid-1966 and mid-1970. “Defence” spending, which included the budget of the Tribal Affairs 
Ministry and hence payments to tribes, increased from 41% to 49% of the total throughout 
the period after Egyptian withdrawal and nearly quadrupled in nominal terms. Controlling for 
inflation, expenditure on defence and tribal subsidies nearly doubled from mid-1967 until 
                                                          
 
150 Official government statistics report a more modest 19 ministers, 116 Deputy Ministers, and 184 
Directors General in 1971 (al-Jihāz al-markazī lil-takhṭīt, 1973, p.109).  
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mid-1970,151 while expenditure on general administration remained constant in real terms 
and declined as a share of the total budget.  
Table 7: Estimated YAR government income and expenditure 1966-1970 (nominal YR 
million) 
 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 
Total Income 55.0 64.4 112.7 160.5 
Direct taxes 7.6 8.2 13.4 15.8 
Indirect taxes 15.5 18.1 27.1 32.9 
Non-tax income 3.1 3.0 5.5 10.8 
Structural Deficit  28.8 35.1 66.7 101 
of which international 
borrowing 
18.0 0 0 44.0 
of which domestic borrowing 10.8 35.1 66.7 57.0 
Total Expenditure 47.4 51.0 109.5 160.4 
General Administration 21.8 25.1 36.6 54.5 
Agriculture 0.3 0.3 1.5 0.9 
Education 2.6 2.8 3.6 6.9 
Defence (incl. tribal affairs) 20.8 21 53.3 78.8 
Transport & Communications 1.9 1.8 6.2 4.3 
Development (central 
investment to local projects) 
0 0 0 15 
Debt retirement 0 0 8.3 0 
All figures in millions of Yemeni Riyals. Source: IBRD, 1970, pp.28, 30-31 and Annex II. 
Conventionally, income should equal expenditure in this form of accounting. The discrepancies 
reflect the poor quality of the data and the use of a mix of estimates and actual figures. 
 
Persistently high and increasing government expenditure was not matched by income. 
Despite a proliferation of new taxes, income from all domestic sources, measured in constant 
1961 Yemeni Riyals, increased only from YR 11.7 million to YR 14.3 million  between 1967/68 
and 1969/70. Most new taxes remained unimplemented and previous moves to decentralise 
and de-institutionalise taxation proved difficult to reverse. In nominal terms, the gap 
between income, including international loans and grants, and expenditure grew from YR 
10.8 million in the last year of the Egyptian presence (1966/67), to YR 35.1 million the next 
                                                          
 
151 From 1971 onward, disaggregated figures for military expenditure and tribal stipends become 
available. In 1971/72, 37% of the total budget was earmarked for the military and 17% for tribal 
subsidies (El-Azzazi, 1978, p.31). 
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year, to more than YR 66 million in 1968/69 (IBRD, 1970, p.30). Despite a large foreign loan in 
the 1969/70 financial year, the deficit still stood at YR 57 million. By this point, government 
revenue from domestic sources covered less than 40% of expenditure (Burrowes, 1987, p.35). 
In addition, foreign exchange was in very short supply: exports by value were only 7% of 
imports. 
These gaps persisted and widened despite government efforts to increase customs income. 
The YAR banned all overland goods transport from Aden and closed all small ports to 
facilitate customs control (IBRD, 1970, p.24).152 Yet without the Egyptian presence, the 
customs service consisted of fewer assessors more prone to influence by local power brokers, 
raising revenue off a smaller total volume of trade.153 The period was also marked by a “rapid 
but unplanned growth of the tax system” (IBRD, 1970, Annex II p.1). It witnessed the first 
attempts to enshrine taxation in secular law in late 1968 (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12337, n.d. 
[Jan 1970]) and also saw the introduction of a large number of ad hoc taxes, most of which 
had very low yields, since they were rarely enforced (IBRD, 1970, p.29).  
No attempts were made to return income from agricultural taxes to higher levels, which 
might have affected tribesmen farmers and landowners more generally. By the time the 
republican government sought to bring back taxation, at the latest, tribal leaders had become 
de-facto veto players. Even during the midst of the financial crisis, German analysis 
highlighted new funds being made available for investment in agriculture through local 
development associations (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 12337, 14 Mar. 1969) 154 and, as we saw 
above, the inability to reduce spending on tribal subsidies toppled successive governments in 
1969.  
What revenue-raising attempts there were targeted traders and state assets. Yet, even taxes 
that should have been easy to administer and more politically palatable to enforce, failed to 
raise the hoped-for revenues. A new monopoly tax, levied on the (partially) state owned 
enterprises established with Egyptian support, proved unsuccessful. A new fuel tax, though 
                                                          
 
152 This may also have been a political move against the South.  
153 Egyptian withdrawal reduced domestic demand as did the slowing of remittance flows, of then 
about $30 million per year (IBRD, 1970, p.40), as Saudi Arabia blocked remittances to Yemen in 1967 
(Dresch, 2000, p.108). 
154 See 5.2 below 
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more successful, generated less revenue than hoped for, despite the fact that the import of 
petroleum products was restricted to the state-owned Yemen Petroleum Company (IBRD, 
1970, Annex II p.4). The government struggled to increase income and was unable to tax 
organisations it theoretically owned, lacking the power to roll back the low taxation for 
traders discussed in Section 4.4, as well as the basic administration to monitor compliance, 
and the authority to enforce it (IBRD, 1970, Annex II p.4). It was not just tribesmen and 
traders that proved difficult to tax: a fragile YAR government needed to manage political 
constituencies on all fronts. When a new property tax in 1968 sparked widespread 
opposition, a presidential decree of the same year exempted owner-occupied houses, making 
the tax far more difficult to administer and ultimately wholly ineffective (IBRD, 1970, Annex II 
p.4).  
During this period of fiscal crisis, the YAR also experimented with compulsory savings 
schemes, introducing laws forcing traders to surrender 50% of all foreign exchange earnings 
to the YBRD at a fixed and undervalued exchange rate. Like the new monopoly tax, this 
measure was often observed in the breach and gave rise to widespread evasion and under-
invoicing: the IBRD estimated that actual exports from the YAR in the late sixties were worth 
$ 8 million per year, as opposed to the $ 2 million officially reported (IBRD, 1970, p.41). While 
only partially effective as a revenue-raising tool, foreign exchange controls did add to the 
patronage opportunities available to the government – or more precisely to those in 
positions to control imports and exports, such as the governor of al-Ḥudayda, Shaykh Sinān 
ʾAbū Luḥūm. Exchange controls meant that the YAR operated a de-facto dual exchange rate. 
Preferred importers with the requisite licenses accessed foreign currency at the official rate, 
which overvalued the Riyal and acted as a subsidy, while the bulk of the YAR’s trade used de-
facto exchange rates (IBRD, 1970, p.42).155 
Absent new foreign patrons willing to cover current expenditure, the YAR leadership turned 
to borrowing from domestic constituencies and outright money printing. As ʾAḥmad ʾAbū 
Saʿīd, a former minister, confided to Robert Burrowes, in the final years of the civil war the 
government reasoned that “about the only thing we could afford was paper, so we had 
money printed just as fast as we could” (Burrowes, 1987, p.35). In the 1968/69 financial year, 
the YAR financed more than 60% of its budget by borrowing against treasury bills and printing 
                                                          
 
155 Import licenses were originally introduced in 1964, but until 1967 they were almost automatically 
issued (IBRD, 1970, p.42). 
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new money. Of the YR 66.7 million raised in this way, nearly YR 59 million came from 
currency issue, producing a strong inflationary effect (IBRD, 1970, p.30).  
Currency in circulation increased from YR 30 million in February 1964, when the new paper 
Riyal was introduced, to ca. YR 94 million in late 1967 – that is an increase of YR 64 million 
over approximately four years. This initial currency was issued against silver riyals that the 
YAR was taking out of circulation and an Egyptian deposit of E£ 29.5 million in the Yemen 
currency board’s accounts with the Egyptian Central Bank. Although this account was never 
formally frozen, it appears to have been inaccessible to the government after Egyptian 
withdrawal. New currency issue of a further YR 91 million in 1968 and 1969 therefore needed 
to be financed by domestic borrowing, not foreign exchange. Treasury bills made up the bulk 
of this, at YR 88 million, although it is not clear that all or most found buyers. The rest was 
loaned outright from the YBRD (IBRD, 1970, pp.33–35). The Egyptian embassy in Ṣanaʿāʾ 
noted in August 1968 that its latest shipment of 16 million Yemeni Riyals fresh from the 
printing presses was being issued without collateral with an immediate inflationary effect 
(DWQ, 0078-044111, 29 Aug. 1968). The US Dollar to Yemeni Riyal exchange rate provides 
one of the few available rough proxies for inflation. The price of the Dollar in Riyal increased 
25% between 1961 and late 1964, or about 8% per year. Between the 1964/65 and 1966/67 
fiscal years, inflation accelerated. The cost of goods priced in dollars increased by about 20% 
annually during this time. Finally, during the fiscal crisis of the final war years, the annual cost 
increase of dollar-denominated goods accelerated further to nearly 40% after Egyptian 
withdrawal, before slowing to 20% in 1969/70.156  
In-line with the model, this period of crisis was one where previous dynamics linked to 
foreign funding stopped operating. The fact that financial difficulties could bring down 
governments at all points to very different relations of bargaining and, as the model suggests, 
the half-hearted attempts at increased taxation that were pursued did relate meaningfully to 
forms of bureaucratic penetration because the fiscal crisis empowered a new generation of 
technocrats within the government. Their skills became central to keeping the crisis at bay: 
they were the financial and administrative wizards that could turn paper into currency, move 
debt around the YBRD’s balance sheet, and issue treasury bills (Burrowes, 2005, p.95). This 
                                                          
 
156 The IBRD, using slightly different figures and different timeframes, notes that the cost of foreign 
exchange in Riyal terms increased by 70% between 1964 and 1968 and by a further 200% between 
1968 and 1970 (IBRD, 1970, p.41). 
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may reflect a more contingent and incidental relationship between fiscal crisis and 
institutional forms than the model suggests. These ‘modernists’ were able to provide access 
to capital while sharing, broadly, a corporate identity in favour of larger, better organised, 
and more centralised government institutions. Yet, this may be as much a result of their 
particular educational trajectories and the economic orthodoxy of the time, as a reflection of 
their structural position within the state. However, all the while, customs duty increased even 
in real terms, even though the volume of imports declined.  
Of course, formal taxation and institutional development were not the only way to raise 
money. The co-option of holders of capital able to offer lines of credit to the YAR government 
or buy its treasury bills, often rested on narrower strategies of patronage. While new taxes 
were unsuccessful as strategies for raising income, they did generate new patronage 
opportunities in the absence of external rents. The selective granting of import licenses, 
controlling access to monopolies, or channelling food aid and loans to selected wholesalers 
who could then sell them on the retail market at a significant mark-up, mostly emerged in the 
few years after Egyptian withdrawal (IBRD, 1970, p.35). Similar strategies existed at the local 
level. Being granted the status of wakīl, representative, of national-level monopolists or 
foreign companies, was an important element of merchants’ business (Messick, 1978, 
pp.281–282, 284, 292). 
5.1.4 After 1970: Saudi funding and the return of the rentier model  
As the civil war drew to a close, Saudi Arabia stepped in to provide external funding, putting 
an end to three years of crisis, fiscal reorientation, and bargaining and entrenching the 
absence of taxation and reliance on foreign rents as the new normal. As a corollary of these 
rents, government spending expanded and became a way to forge connections between new 
institutions at the centre and relatively independent governance mechanisms at the local 
level. Such allocation-led strategies to expand central oversight and influence, pioneered 
during the civil war and particularly the Egyptian intervention, expanded and formed the 
basis of the institutional developments of the 1970s. 
Saudi Arabian financial support put an end to the YAR’s fiscal crisis. A $20 million Saudi 
Arabian grant accompanied reconciliation between royalists and republicans in September 
1970 (Gause, 1990, p.82). Prior to reconciliation, Saudi Arabia had already acted as guarantor 
for a £5 million (ca. $12 million) loan to the YAR in 1969 or 1970, which allowed the YAR to 
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access commercial credit, despite being effectively in default to its international creditors (AV 
Neues Amt 12333, 26 Jul. 1971).157 At approximately the same time, in July 1969, the YAR 
applied to join the IMF and World Bank, despite concern that membership would limit the 
cabinet’s ability to pay for war by printing money. It was a remarkable move at a time when 
the YAR relied heavily on money creation to fund its large deficit, but was a gamble that paid 
off: The YAR was admitted in May 1970 and between the 1970/71 and 1975/76 financial 
years, foreign aid accounted for roughly 80% of YAR capital expenditure and an unknown 
amount of its recurrent expenditure (Nyrop, 1977, p.171; Burrowes, 1987, pp.39–40). Saudi 
Arabia remained the most important donor and covered much of the YAR’s regular expenses 
and military budget, as well as funding individual development projects (Badeeb, 1986; 
Chaudhry, 1997, pp.124–125). Table 8 reflects the same reality, although the details differ: 
Between 1971 and 1974 official foreign grants and loans – there is reason to believe that 
significant fractions of Saudi aid were not officially declared – account for nearly half of 
government income. Foreign funds and customs duty were by far the most important sources 
of funding, together accounting for nearly 80% of government income.  
Despite the outside aid, the YAR struggled to match income and expenditure. As the previous 
section made clear, successive governments tried in vain to contain demands for ever-larger 
stipends from tribes, popular calls for investment in infrastructure and economic 
development, and pressure to increase military expenditure from officers who had become 
part of the dominant coalition. Yet, something more was at work: central government 
                                                          
 
157 Saudi Arabia also covered interest payments for the first two years. Details of the loan differ in: 
Burrowes, 1987, p.36. 
Table 8: YAR government income by source 1966-1970 in nominal YR (millions) 
 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 
direct taxes 7.6 8.2 13.4 15.8 9 13 15 32 
indirect taxes 15.5 18.1 27.1 32.9 63 97 135 184 
other sources 3.1 3.0 5.5 10.8 24 29 49 61 
foreign grants 
and loans 
18.0 0 0 44.0 119 171 117 239 
domestic 
borrowing  
[10.8] [35.1] [66.7] 57.0     
Source: 1966-1970 figures: IBRD, 1970, pp.28, 31 and Annex II; 1970-1974: Chaudhry, 1997, p.193. 
Figures in [parentheses] are actual deficit figures from: IBRD 1970, p.30. Empty cells are missing 
values. 
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spending in the period after 1970 sought to forge connections between new institutions at 
the centre and relatively independent mechanisms of governance at the local level.  
Several authors have noted the emergence of this model in the 1970s. For example, Robert 
Burrowes (1987, p.55) argues that the government of Prime Minister Ḥassan Makkī in 1974 
sought to achieve a greater presence in the periphery by exchanging services for allegiance. 
Others have commented on the large jump in public sector employment after the fiscal 
constraints of the final war years were lifted: from 13,000 civil servants in 1969 to 
somewhere between 18,480 and as many as 31,300 in the mid-1970s (El-Azzazi, 1978, p.129; 
Chaudhry, 1997, p.40; Dresch, 2000, pp.124–125). Yet, as examined so far and expanded on 
in the next Section, 5.2, such an allocation-led approach to expanding central control had 
earlier roots, including in increases in public sector payrolls, increases to tribal stipends, 
support to Local Development Associations (LDAs), and the Egyptians’ ‘hearts and minds’ 
investments of the 1963-1967 period. Never far in abeyance, such investments expanded 
once Saudi Arabian support became available. Growing government expenditure in tandem 
with the end of the war slowly shifted a measure of power back to the centre.  
This suggests that in addition to mechanisms linking fiscal extraction with forms of state 
penetration, state expenditure too has an important effect on institutional development. The 
central government’s growing allocation favoured forms of bureaucratic penetration and 
central control emphasised by a literature on (neo)patrimonialism that has played only a 
marginal role in discussions of the links between civil wars and state formation.158 As we will 
see below, increased expenditure allowed the Republic to gain in substance as vested 
interests in its preservation came to extend to a growing army, civil service, and additional 
beneficiaries of its funds. 
5.2 The wartime evolution of coercive, central, and local institutions 
Besides transforming the fiscal basis of the state, the civil war wrought dramatic changes in 
administrative and security institutions at the central and local levels during the civil war. An 
initial sub-section 5.2.1 revisits the significant changes in the structure and composition of 
the military and its limited growth over the civil war. The model draws attention to how 
                                                          
 
158 The neopatrimonialism literature has been effective in its analysis of how bureaucratic and personal 
ties and logics combine but has tended to overemphasise the negative aspects of neopatrimonial 
politics. See: Khan, 2007. 
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weapons and funds flowing to tribal fighters weakened central control of violence and 
drained resources away from the military. At the same time, the relationship between the 
military and other institutions accords partially to the ‘crowding out’ mechanism of the 
model, whereby increases in the size of the military at important junctures meant lower 
investments in other organisations. Finally, we will see that external intervention helps 
explain why investments in the military as an institution did not significantly bolster central 
control of violence. Continuing an argument from 4.3.2 and one of the potential pathways of 
the model, external security guarantees helped concerns over political loyalty of the armed 
forces trump attempts to centralise control over coercion.  
5.2.2 explores the development of central government institutions, while 5.2.3 explores the 
development of local institutions during the civil war. In keeping with the analysis on the 
state’s fiscal basis, the discussion highlights that, in parallel with ballooning expenditure, 
central institutions expanded dramatically. The compact administration of the Imam became 
a set of sprawling institutions that, together with the military and tribal subsidies, soaked up 
the bulk of government expenditure. Indeed, the civilian bureaucracy overall grew more 
quickly than the military. This highlights the limits of the ‘crowding out’ story and, upon 
investigation, does not accord with the model’s rival pathway of a military demonstration 
effect or ‘crowding in.’ Instead, it reflects the impact of external intervention. Taking their 
cue from Egyptian models, new institutions were highly centralised and found themselves 
largely unconnected to the local level, except as a source of funds. Although weapons and 
money flowing to tribal fighters entrenched the autonomy of local institutions, central 
allocation reconstituted, to a limited degree, central influence.  
5.2.1 The development of the military as an institution 
Section 4.3 traced the growth of the military and the evolving role of officers in the dominant 
coalition. It foregrounded the question whether mobilisation organised new constituencies 
for violence and examined the role of the officer corps within the political settlement. Here, 
we revisit the military from an institutional perspective, foregrounding changes in size, 
hierarchy, structure, and relations to other formal institutions. The sub-section begins with an 
exploration of institutional change through the lens of the model, with its emphasis on trade-
offs between central and local control of violence, between the military and civilian 
institutions, and the importance of external intervention for shaping the YAR military. It then 
returns to the theme of tribal-military alliances and intertwining, which points beyond the 
heuristics of the model.  
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An institution taking shape? 
The Yemeni military grew over the course of the war, though its expansion was not rapid. 
Tracking its growth is made more difficult by the dissolution of parts of the Imam’s military at 
the outbreak of the war and different figures for the size of the military throughout.159 
Conflicting figures reflect both the poor state of record keeping and lack of clarity on what is 
being counted: The military shaded into tribal units and paramilitaries with different degrees 
of formalisation. 
To compensate for defections and spontaneous demobilisation at the beginning of the war, 
the new YAR government called for volunteers to form a National Guard. As Section 4.3 
highlighted, the National Guard was a success in terms of initial mobilisation, though less 
convincing in retaining soldiers and as a fighting force. In 1964, to replace voluntary 
recruitment into the National Guard, the YAR formally introduced general conscription, which 
was observed haphazardly in practice. Around the same time, it integrated most of the 
National Guard into the regular army, creating four new brigades.  
In theory, there was a consensus among republican politicians from 1963 onwards that the 
YAR needed a far larger military. A recurrent demand during the series of tribal and popular 
conferences at Khamr and elsewhere was the formation of a strong national military of at 
least 12,000 soldiers and the consolidation of separate tribal forces into a national militia 
(e.g. PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 28 Apr. 1965). According to Egyptian accounts, this 
consensus extended to the UAR command (ʾAḥmad, 1992, p.301). 
In-line with the model’s suggestion that military spending might crowd-out other 
expenditure, to the extent that the military did expand, growing expenditure came at the 
expense of the civilian central administration. The military received a greater share of the 
government budget and more funds in absolute terms. Expenditure for ‘security’ under the 
Imam in 1961 was YR 7.9 million, or 32% of recurrent government expenditure, of which the 
military received YR 3.8 million (El Attar, 1964, pp.213-214, 217). When government 
expenditure estimates next become available in the 1966/67 fiscal year, ‘defence’ spending, 
including subsidies to tribes, had increased to YR 20.8 million and 41% of the total budget. By 
1968/69 the defence budget increased to YR 53.3 million and 49% of total expenditure. 
Nominal figures, of course, over-state the increase, but in inflation-adjusted terms, 
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expenditure more than doubled and defence spending, including tribal subsidies, captured 
more than the entire real-term increase in the government budget between 1961 and 
1969.160  
Crowding out was evident on an everyday level in that military salaries were prioritised over 
the civil service. During fiscal crises, military officials continued to be paid, while civilian 
bureaucrats sometimes received no or only partial pay (Nājī, 1988, pp.221–222; PAAA, AV 
Neues Amt 1719, clipping of NZZ of 17 Feb. 1966). Similarly, military infrastructure was 
prioritised over other investment (El Attar, 1964, p.283) and the military budget, as discussed 
in Chapter 4, gained an increasingly autonomous status. Moreover, although additional 
military spending probably boosted aggregate demand, since higher salaries circulated in the 
domestic economy, the Keynesian multiplier of YAR military spending beyond salaries was 
likely low. Officers purchased imported consumer goods or built or expanded houses, while 
the military imported weapons, ammunition, and even uniforms and some food items. 
Linkages to the domestic economy were minimal. During the Egyptian presence, Egyptian 
construction companies also captured military infrastructure and real-estate spending. They 
built new military bases and access roads, generally importing cement, other construction 
materials, and even Egyptian workers (e.g. PAAA, B36 45, 9 Oct. 1963).  
Crowding out was not limited to questions of funding and pay. Long-term imbalances in 
resourcing encouraged broader substitution of civilian institutions by military ones. One of 
the few aspects of a 1964 local government reform that was more widely implemented was 
the provision that the military commander of each governorate be a serving officer. Especially 
where tribal organisation was weak or small-scale, these military commanders often were the 
most powerful actor in the governorate as the war ended. Where tribal organisation was 
stronger, the provision contributed to the intertwining of tribal and military power (El-Azzazi, 
1978, 148). After Egyptian withdrawal, Yemeni military commanders were partially able to 
take over the role of Egyptian commanders, who had wielded a great deal of power locally 
and controlled discretionary spending on ‘hearts and minds’ projects, such as wells and 
roads, but also outright gifts of sugar, food, and books (Ferris, 2012, p.185; Somerville-Large, 
1967, p.111). Inserting the military directly into administration at the local level was to have 
significant longer-term effects, since with increased control over local administration, trade 
                                                          
 
160 In addition to the caveats about figures raised elsewhere, this comparison assumes that El Attar’s 
‘security’ category is comparable to the ‘defence’ category of official YAR statistics.  
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routes, and transport infrastructure, military officers, in alliance with local tribal leaders, 
gained access to smuggling and independent sources of income. 
Yet, crowding out is only part of the story. External intervention conditioned the 
development of the military and plans to strengthen the military were implemented 
haphazardly. The central civil service, though it emerged from the war far less powerful than 
the military, actually grew more quickly in terms of its overall size. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
the Egyptian command repeatedly blocked efforts to expand and equip the military when this 
threatened to increase its independence from the UAR chain of command (see 4.3.2 and 
PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 19 May 1965). Other constituencies likewise stood in the way of 
rapid military growth. German reporting highlights that tribal leaders, who had 
enthusiastically endorsed calls for a larger Yemeni army at the Khamr conference, in practice 
obstructed any increase that might leach funding away from their own militias or create a 
central military able to dominate their tribal forces (AV Neues Amt 1719, 10 Jul. 1965).161 As 
the model highlights and as discussed in Chapter 4, there were clearly trade-offs between 
mobilising tribal fighters and building the central military.  
Nonetheless, the republican military reached a size of about 7,000 soldiers by the beginning 
of 1965, although plans for a further three new brigades came to nought (ʾAḥmad, 1992, 
p.299). By the time the Egyptian military withdrew in late 1967, the republican military 
included approximately 10,000 soldiers (Nājī, 1988, pp.237, 241) and consisted of four large 
infantry units referred to variously as brigades (ʾalwiya sing. liwāʾ) or regiments (ʾafwāj sing. 
fawj): the Revolution Brigade stationed in Kawkabān, which was the largest of the units, with 
more than 1,000 soldiers; the Victory Brigade, which was commanded by Brigadier ʿAbd 
Rabbuh al-ʿAwāḍī, the brother of the Minister for Tribal Affairs; the Unity Brigade, which 
primarily guarded the road between Ṣanaʿāʾ and al-Ḥudayda and reached a strength of 1,000 
soldiers at the end of 1964; and the Liberation Brigade, a catch-all term for a number of 
independent units recruited largely from single tribes. At the end of 1964, it consisted of 14 
companies (sariyāt) without any higher-level organisation or an effective chain of command. 
In addition, the YAR military boasted an armoured brigade with companies stationed in 
Ṣanaʿāʾ, Jabal Rāziḥ, Ṣaʿda, Khawlān, Ḥajja, and Māʾrib, a battalion of ṣāʿiqa special forces and 
                                                          
 
161 On the Khamr conference see also 6.2.1. 
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a battalion of paratroopers, who according to some reports included Egyptian soldiers (Nājī, 
1988, pp.257–258; ʾAḥmad, 1992, pp.299–300).162  
They were flanked by a range of further military-like organisations. A rump National Guard or 
“National Army” may have continued to exist, employed in guard duties and border patrols. 
There were also a range of republican ‘tribal armies,’ described as the armies (juyūsh) of  
Ḥāshid, of al-Ḥadāʾ, of Siḥār and Dhū Muḥammad, of Jumāʿa, and of Hādī ʿĪsā, for some time 
the Deputy Chief of Staff (ʾAḥmad, 1992, pp.299–300; Nājī, 1988, pp.257–258).163 However, in 
other accounts, Hādī ʿĪsā, who was executed in October 1966, commanded the National 
Guard (Interview with Qāsim al-Wazīr, 2016; SWB ME/W207/A/3, 11 Apr. 1963) and the list 
may be incomplete and appears idiosyncratic, not least in listing large tribal confederations 
and much smaller individual tribes as like units. As we saw in Section 4.3, the Popular 
Resistance Force militias formed in 1968, about which we also know little, also existed 
alongside, and in ambiguous relation to, the armed forces. 
Tribal military intertwining 
As the absence of a central command hierarchy in the ‘Liberation Brigade’ and the inclusion 
of lists of ‘tribal armies’ in the unit structure of the military highlight, the alliances between 
officers and tribal leaders discussed in Section 4.3 were mirrored on an institutional level in 
an intertwining between the military hierarchy and tribal structures. This points beyond the 
heuristics of the model, its opposition between tribal and military influence and 
straightforward trade-offs between local and central control over violence. Whereas the 
focus in Chapter 4 was on the political settlement and hence the alliances between high 
ranking officers and the most influential tribal leaders, the focus here is on the structure of 
the military as an institution and the way tribal and military forms of organisation combined 
and influenced each other. This mutual influencing extended to the formal administration as 
well and not only tribalised the armed forces and the formal administration, but also 
militarised and ‘formalized’ the tribes, drawing them into much closer relations with the 
                                                          
 
162 The military continued to grow after the end of the civil war to about 40,000 soldiers by the mid-
1970s – thanks to abundant external funds (Chaudhry, 1997, p.131). 
163 al-Ḥadāʾ is a member of the now largely defunct Madhḥaj confederation and one of the few more 
southern tribes, alongside some in al-Bayḍāʾ, to have played a large role in the civil war. 
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central state. In this way, the civil war prefigured and put in place elements of what was later 
described as the tribal-military-commercial complex (Dresch, 1995).  
Within one year of the overthrow of the Imam, the republican military command came to 
include tribal leaders and amended its brief to cover the fighting strength of tribal militias as 
well as the regular military (PAAA, B36 45, 23 Nov. 1963). Distinctions between ‘military’ and 
‘tribe’ blurred and the military was an uncertain solvent of tribal ties. Many recruits in the 
new Yemeni military came from tribes, particularly the minor tribes around Ṣanaʿāʾ, some of 
them nominally royalist (Dresch, 2000, p.149; Sitte, 1973, pp.23–25). Tribesmen in the 
military could respond to calls for mobilisation from their tribe, sometimes abandoning their 
military units to fight in tribal conflicts or opting out of battles that would have pitted them 
against members of their own tribe (Interview with Ḥamūd Baydar, 2016; Nājī, 1988, p.249; 
Dresch, 2000, p.149). Moreover, some officers came from shaykhly families and some headed 
military units composed of members of their tribe stationed in their region of origin. Control 
of such units from Ṣanaʿāʾ was tenuous and in these instances military organisation simply 
formalised and reproduced tribal forms of organisation. 
As the memoirs of ʿAbd Allah al-ʾAḥmar, make clear, operations by officers like Colonel 
Mujāhid ʾAbū Shawārib were commanded from Khamr in Ḥāshid, rather than Ṣanaʿāʾ (al-
ʾAḥmar, 2008, e.g. p.122). Similarly, the forces directly commanded by Ḥusayn al-Difāʿī, the 
Minister of Defence from 1963-1966, consisted largely of members of his Dhū Muḥammad 
tribe, while the tribal militias of al-Ḥadāʾ and Siḥār tribes were commanded by Major 
Muḥammad ʿAbd Allah and Colonel ʿAbd Allah Hussaynī. Both were officers in the regular 
army. Tribal militias could be headed by officers, military units could be commanded by 
shaykhs, and at times the distinction breaks down altogether. Only in the case of the special 
forces, the armoured brigade, paratroopers, and the Revolution Brigade (liwāʾ al-thawra), 
which included most of the artillery of the Yemeni military, was tribal allegiance not a major 
organising factor (Nājī, 1988, pp.256–258).164  
  
                                                          
 
164 However, officers from the ʾAbū Luḥūm family were prominent in the armoured brigade (Interview 
with Qāsim al-Wazīr, 2017). 
173 
 
Many of these features emerge in the general lament of the state of the Yemeni military in 
this report by the Egyptian embassy in Taʿiz (DWQ, 0078-044109, 8 Oct. 1968):  
The soldiers do not have the discipline or military precision to implement attacks and 
the orders of their leaders, and most of them are stationed in their local areas [bilād] 
or tribes. The officers receive the salaries of the soldiers. What is more, they take 
payment from the tribes [… The soldiers] flee from the units and sell ammunition, 
equipment, and weapons for their own gain.  
This interweaving is also well illustrated by Steven Caton’s (2005) study of conflict and 
mediation in North Yemen in the late 1970s. The disappearance of a tribal shaykh’s daughter 
prompts mediation involving more and more powerful men situated higher in formal 
government hierarchies and in higher positions within the tribal system. 
Both of these examples highlight that it was not simply a matter of tribal forms of 
organisation affecting the military, but also military resources and hierarchies inflecting the 
tribal system. We saw in Chapter 4 that it was those tribal leaders who recognised the 
opportunities of new institutional forms, built alliances with officers, and placed relatives into 
new military and civilian institution, who gained the most during the civil war. A similar, but 
distinct, story can be told about tribalism and the military as institutions. As Charles Swagman 
reveals in his comparative study of two rural districts, one of which, ʿAns, had benefited 
handsomely from funding in the period immediately after the war, while the other, Jabal 
Rayma, had not, an important difference between the winners and losers of the post-war 
settlement was the size of potential kin-based action groups. Yet, this by itself was not 
decisive. It was the presence of tribesmen from ʿAns in formal government that added to the 
tribe’s influence as a collective actor. Tribesmen in the military and other Ṣanaʿāʾ-based 
institutions increased its ability to access central funds. At the same time, access to such 
funds increased the influence of these members of the tribe, not all of whom came from 
families with traditional claims to leadership. Skills and training valued in the civil service and 
military empowered those local actors with education and technocratic skills, who came to 
complement the traditional role of shaykhs. In other cases, young shaykhs with technical skill 
might be able to capture such new sources of power and rise to exceptional prominence. 
Shaykhs who sought to keep to their traditional roles saw their standing at the local level 
slowly eclipsed. They maintained respected roles as mediators of disputes, but new 
opportunities for patronage and regulating access to central government funds and 
employment fell to local figures able to build alliances with politicians in Ṣanaʿāʾ or to place 
family members in central administration (Swagman, 1988a, pp.69–81, 109, 126).  
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5.2.2 The development of central institutions 
The YAR civil service grew rapidly during the civil war. New institutions proliferated, yet 
growth was chaotic and salaries were low. As the model suggests, military crowding out, the 
takeover of local-level institutions by tribal leaders, and especially external funding help 
explain what appear at first blush as paradoxes of growth. Together, these factors redrew 
central institutional structures, ultimately creating central institutions defined by Egyptian 
administrative blueprints, performing stateness for external donors, and reliant on alliances 
and control of the purse to influence local governance. Continuing a theme from Section 5.1 
that points beyond the model, the sub-section also highlights the role of the civil service as an 
employer and for allocating and distributing funds – and the ways in which this partially 
reconstituted central influence in new ways. 
The new civil service 
Based on the available evidence, it appears that the YAR civil service grew from some 2,000 
civil servants under the Imam to approximately 4,000 in 1963, 12,500 in 1967 – the first year 
for which official statistics are available – and 13,500 in 1970 at the end of the civil war (IBRD, 
1970, Annex I pp.3-4; Dresch, 2000, pp.124–125). Growth continued after the end of the war 
to almost 18,000 employees in 1974, of whom approximately one-third were working in 
ministries in Ṣanaʿāʾ (El-Azzazi, 1978, p.129).165 Unfortunately, there are no reliable statistics 
about the number of people employed at different levels, the structure of the administration, 
and other basic information. Even overall numbers are suspect and it is often unclear who is 
included in which counts. For instance, the justice ministry only began registering local judges 
during the 1970s, even as income from local religious endowments continued to pay for their 
salaries. Since they had not previously been registered, they could not have been included in 
earlier counts (El-Azzazi, 1978, p.179). Thus, whether and how they and other local officials 
are accounted for in statistics is unclear. Disparities in numbers after official statistics are 
available also cast doubt on earlier figures. For instance, El-Azzazi (1978, p.129) mentions that 
there were 17,906 employees in “ministries and agencies [in Ministerien und Behörden]” in 
1974, but also claims there were 18,480 employees in the public administration [öffentliche 
Verwaltung] that same year without explaining how the tallies differ.  
                                                          
 
165 But see much higher figures for 1975 in: Chaudhry, 1997, p.40; also Dresch, 2000, pp.124-25.  
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In parallel to an increase in the number of people employed in the civil service, new 
institutions proliferated. One of the first announcements of the new revolutionary 
government was “the creation of a full suite of modern ministries” (Peterson, 1982, p.138). 
The new government, with extensive Egyptian support, founded ministries of Foreign Affairs, 
Education, Health, Tribal Affairs, Interior, Justice, Agriculture, Finance, Economy, Labour, and 
Information in the early months of 1963 (al-Abiadh, 1984, p.147; Chaudhry, 1997, p.227). It 
added more administrative bodies later, including an institute for public administration, a 
technical office that compiled the YAR’s first official statistics in 1968, and a currency board 
and development bank that together fulfilled the functions of a central bank between 1964 
and 1971 (Peterson, 1982, pp.139–141). New institutions continued to be created after the 
end of the war, albeit at a slower pace. North Yemen’s Central Bank was established in 1971, 
its Central Budget Bureau in 1972, and its Central Planning Organisation in 1972 (DWQ, 0078-
044113, 11 Sep. 1966; 0078-044111, 29 Aug. 1968; Nyrop, 1977, p.186; El-Azzazi, 1978, 
p.119). Blueprints, hierarchies, and procedures for many of these institutions, particularly 
those created during the Egyptian deployment to Yemen, were imported wholesale from 
Egypt. 
The rapid growth of institutions during this time was chaotic. Two nearly contemporary 
evaluations provide grounded insight into the functioning of new administrative bodies. The 
first is contained in an Egyptian report dated 5 August 1967, on the current functioning of the 
Yemeni Foreign Ministry as a preliminary step towards Egyptian plans to reorganise it. 
According to the report, the ministry in Ṣanaʿāʾ had 45 employees, but significantly fewer 
desks and chairs. The report notes, with some alarm, that officials do not respect the official 
hierarchy and all employees can access the minister directly. It complains that the ministry 
does not keep minutes of meetings, does not receive reports from Yemeni missions abroad, 
and that the number of employees under each director rarely exceeds two or three, 
suggesting a top-heavy organisation (DWQ 0078-044111 5.8.67). El-Azzazi conducted the 
second evaluation. It focuses on the YAR Ministry of Local Administration shortly after the 
end of the civil war. Officially, the Ministry had 82 officials in Ṣanaʿāʾ, 14 of which, even on 
paper, had no job title or portfolio – El-Azzazi surmised that their main function was receiving 
civil service salaries. Moreover, his repeated visits to the Ministry uncovered only 49 officials 
and 8 messengers actually present in the building, sharing two typewriters, and with little 
means or interest in communicating with the local administrations, even though liaison with 
them was theoretically their main task (El-Azzazi, 1978, pp.132–138). Yemeni administration 
at the end of the civil war was “personal and individual rather than institutional” and 
characterised by “duplication of functions, overlapping and conflicts of jurisdiction” between 
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and within institutions (UNDP Yemen Arab Republic Information Paper No 15, 1971, p.35, 
quoted in El-Azzazi, 1978, p.121). Unsurprisingly, in allocating funds and determining the 
location of new infrastructure, civil servants did not necessarily follow central procedures and 
logics. Employees who owed their recruitment to tribe or region were very much 
representatives of these groups – traditional connections and hierarchies often mattered 
more than bureaucratic function (El-Azzazi, 1978, pp.165–166).  
Given this state of affairs within the public administration, new institutions have generally 
been characterised as ‘weak’ and there is a recurrent idea that the 1960s marked a “period of 
stagnation and even retrogression” in terms of state building: “Despite the façade of 
capability and vitality presented by the new administrative structures and economic 
ventures” on paper, they lacked substance in practice (Peterson, 1982, pp.139–140). It was, 
after all, “far easier to recruit a large bureaucracy […] than to endow it with skill” or get it to 
do anything effective (Stookey, 1978, p.261). Students of state formation in northern Yemen 
have diagnosed the institutions created during the 1960s with a long list of problems: serious 
shortages of trained personnel, lack of capacity to collect taxes, imposed Egyptian 
bureaucratic structures, procedures, and personnel, and the continued presence of “old 
groups of people” who brought traditional ideas into new institutions (al-Abiadh, 1984, 
p.148; see also: Burrowes, 2009, “Yemen Arab Republic (YAR)”; Peterson, 1984). 
Accounting for the paradoxes of growth 
There is no doubt that such a list captures important weaknesses of the new administrative 
bodies, which did little effective administering and disappointed on basic metrics of 
effectiveness and responsiveness.166 Military crowding-out of investments in the civilian 
bureaucracy, discussed in 5.2.1 above, and the takeover of local-level institutions by tribal 
leaders due to the resources involved in mobilising local violence specialists, discussed in 
5.2.3 below, help account for obvious weaknesses of the central administration in basic 
facilities, in salaries, and its ability to influence local level governance. In addition, and in 
parallel to its influence on the development of the military, foreign intervention decisively 
shaped new civilian administrative forms and their functioning. On the most immediate level, 
this is about the way in which institutional modernisation consisted of a straightforward 
                                                          
 
166 E.g. a local administrator under the Imam expected telegrams to be answered on the same day. 
After the war even urgent queries took five days (Messick, 1978, pp.106–107). 
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transplantation of Egyptian models to Yemen and the way in which Egyptian strategies of 
political control over new institutions created highly centralised and externally-orientated 
institutions with Egyptians in key positions of influence. Both of these dynamics are worth 
exploring, but a focus on them has generally impeded analysis of the less immediate, but 
similarly far-reaching way in which the large external role in designing, funding, and 
implementing institutional changes shaped the incentives and parameters of new civilian 
institutions, imprinting them with a bias for central and urban administration.  
The Egyptian command and Egyptian experts wielded enormous power over institutional 
design and day to day decisions. Within weeks of the overthrow of the Imam, the new 
republican government invited an Egyptian mission to oversee fundamental administrative 
reform and Egyptian experts defined the structure of new Yemeni ministries (El-Azzazi, 1978, 
p.118-119). This initial burst of institution-building was followed by a formal cooperation 
agreement between the UAR and the YAR in July 1963. Authorising up to 400 seconded 
Egyptian civilian experts, the agreement permitted cooperation in a wide range of areas from 
administration, over agriculture, religious endowments, security, and justice, to education, 
health and infrastructure and meant that Egyptians held key positions in the newly-created 
institutions. The UAR committed E£ 3 million annually for projects, additional salaries and 
expenses for seconded experts until the 1964/65 fiscal year, when the budget was reduced to 
E£ 2 million per year until Egyptian withdrawal (DWQ, 0078-044113, 11 Sep 1966). Egyptian 
experts “prepared and issued republican decrees” on the organisation of new Yemeni 
ministries based on Egyptian models (ʾAḥmad, 1992, p.545).167  
New administrative forms were, according to an early study of institutional development, 
unintelligible to the Yemeni population and the officials working in them (Azzazi, 1978, 
p.121). Many of these officials were recruited at short notice and few had a clear idea of the 
function of their institution, let alone their role within it, as the bureaucracy doubled or 
                                                          
 
167 The health and education systems also depended almost entirely on Egyptian experts. Schools 
adopted the Egyptian curriculum after the revolution (Interview with ʿAlī Muḥsin Ḥamīd, 2015). 
Egyptian headmasters ran the YAR’s three main secondary schools and 180 seconded Egyptian 
teachers made up the entirety of Yemen’s secondary school personnel and the vast majority of 
teachers in ‘modern’ primary schools (DWQ 0078-044112, no date [Outcomes of the study on the 
situation of Arab experts in Yemen in each sector, Annex B]). The Egyptian education ministry also sent 
significant numbers of educational books to Yemen (DWQ, 0078-044111, 21 Nov. 1967; see also the 
figures in DWQ, 0078-044112, 1 Nov. 1966; 0078-044113, 11 Sep. 1966; 12 Jun. 1967). 
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trebled in size within a matter of months (Azzazi, 1978, p.119). The Egyptian leadership, 
foisting its own institutional forms on a very different administrative landscape, ignored the 
lack of fit between new institutions and existing structures and practices168 and blamed the 
Yemenis for failing to operate the new forms effectively. According to President Jamal ʿAbd 
al-Nasir, for instance, “half of the ministers [in Ṣanaʿāʾ] never go to their offices and the other 
half don’t know what to do when they get there” (Nutting, 1970, p.350). He does not 
mention that YAR ministers were being asked to operate Egyptian hierarchies according to 
Egyptian procedures under Egyptian tutelage, without the staff, equipment, experience, or 
other prerequisites to do so. 
Egyptian influence extended beyond the initial blueprints. Egyptian advisors played a decisive 
role in drafting the 1964 constitution, ensuring that, contrary to the wishes of those like 
ʾAḥmad Nuʿmān and ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-ʾIryānī, who sought to enshrine more collegiate forms 
of leadership, the constitution featured a strong presidency under the Egyptians’ preferred 
leader, ʿAbd Allah al-Sallāl (PAAA, B36 115, 2 May 1964). In this instance, the 1970 
Constitution abandoned the strong presidency, but other Egyptian-initiated measures, 
including the creation of state owned enterprises and the outlawing of political parties, 
proved enduring. Similarly, Egyptian influence over day to day decision-making within 
ministries was pervasive. According to German analysis, Egyptian experts were “present and 
influential in all government bodies and public institutions” (PAAA, B36 196, 8 Feb. 1965), 
while the former Yemeni Prime Minster, Muḥsin al-ʿAynī, remembers that his colleagues 
generally deferred to advice provided by Egyptian advisors, the most important of whom sat 
in the office of the ministers themselves (Alaini, 2004; Interview with Muḥsin al-ʿAynī, 
2016).169 Particularly after they forcibly returned President al-Sallāl to power in the summer 
of 1966, Egyptian advisors, military commanders, and intelligence became more and more 
involved in the minutiae of Yemeni politics – down to controlling the appointment of local 
officials and lower-ranking officers (Nājī, 1988, p.230). The German embassy in Taʿiz 
                                                          
 
168 A revealing, if relatively benign, example: to become a Director General in the new civil service, a 
candidate needed a PhD or a university degree and five years of civil service experience. However, 
there were only about 300 university graduates in North Yemen at the time, many of them recent 
graduates without civil service experience (El-Azzazi, 1978, p.141). 
169 Schmidt (1968, p.82) relates the story of a young Yemeni civil servant who resented the Egyptian 
presence in Yemen first and foremost because of his dislike of his boss, an Egyptian advisor in his 
ministry. See also: PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 15 Jan. 1967. 
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perceived a pervasive fear of purges among Yemeni civil servants (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 
13 Nov. 1966) and in the final days of 1966, noted that it seemed as though even President 
al-Sallāl was “no longer allowed even to breathe without Egyptian permission” (PAAA, B36 
245, 10 Dec. 1966). 
On this immediate level, a focus on the role of external actors thus reveals the way Egyptian 
assumptions about ‘modern’ institutions defined the new administrative bodies created in 
Yemen, highlights the extensive control the UAR exercised over domestic political processes, 
and the extent to which it sidelined opponents in formal politics. Political appointments, 
decisions, even constitutional changes were decided in Cairo and influenced through 
relations with the Egyptian command, not Yemeni ministers.170 As such, external intervention 
determined key parameters of Yemeni politics during the civil war and contributed to the 
observed ‘hollowness’ of new institutions. Robert Burrowes is hardly the only observer to 
conclude that “Yemeni state-building was more hindered than helped by the fact that the 
new state was largely built and staffed by Egyptians” (Burrowes, 2009, “Yemen Arab Republic 
(YAR)”).  
Beyond these visible forms of control and the way in which Egyptian models in general 
shaped the structure of new institutions, the Egyptian intervention and its role in designing, 
funding, and implementing institutional changes shaped the incentives and parameters of 
new civilian institutions, imprinting them with a bias for central and urban administration. 
Egyptian political control had the effect of both centralizing decision-making and hollowing-
out Yemeni politics as decision-making came to reside outside the domestic political process. 
This created a growing disconnect between central institutions accountable to the Egyptian 
command and local government that continued to function autonomously, but without being 
able to influence central decision-making and, due to the predominance of external loans and 
aid, without mattering for revenue generation. This tendency was cemented by the specific 
model on offer – advisors created highly centralised ministries on the Egyptian model and the 
war and the urban biases of donors further exacerbated centralisation. The relative ease of 
building institutions in the safety of Ṣanaʿāʾ or Taʿiz, or implementing development projects 
far from the front lines in ʾIbb or al-Mukhā, as opposed to areas with active fighting, helped 
determine where such projects were built. For instance, all the large Egyptian development 
                                                          
 
170 Similarly, the Egyptian command did not allow other Arab countries, including Algeria, Iraq and 
Syria, to send experts or provide support (al-Zayd, 2004, pp. 81-82). 
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projects detailed in the Egyptian archives – hospitals in ʾIbb, Dhamār and Taʿiz, a girls’ primary 
school in Taʿiz, and a birth clinic in al-Mukhā (DWQ, 0078-044109, 15 Sep. 1967) – were in 
lower Yemen in larger towns far from the front lines. Two of the five projects were in Taʿiz, 
the location of the Egyptian headquarters. 
A second more subtle legacy of externally-led state building lies in the development of 
government statistics from about 1965 onwards. Local and central records and accounts had 
of course been kept under the Imam, but these began being aggregated and published in 
official statistics yearbooks. The birth of government statistics dates to the civil war. Statistics 
of course have their origin in attempts to make populations and systems legible to the 
ordering and disciplining power of central administration (e.g. Mitchell, 1988, p.46; Scott, 
1998) and have been analysed as contributing to the production of a state effect (Mitchell, 
2006). Yet, as researchers in Yemen have noted continuously since YAR statistics began being 
published, the statistics available remained deeply unreliable, figures obtained from different 
sources were contradictory or simply counted different things (Messick, 1978, p.17), and 
donors and International Financial Institutions cared about statistics far more than the YAR 
government did: at the end of the war, the statistics department consisted of a single Yemeni 
civil servant and a foreign expert (IBRD, 1970, Annex I p.5). As such, statistics were not 
primarily about making the population legible to domestic administrators, but a way in which 
new institutions performed stateness for international audiences. Reflecting this 
preoccupation, the first statistical yearbooks of 1968 and 1972 are remarkable documents, 
presented for international audiences in Arabic and English. They include precise counts of 
everything that can be counted, perhaps in the knowledge that much that probably ‘should’ 
be being counted was not. We find, for instance, that in 1971 there were 12 handloom 
weaving businesses and 22 brickmaking businesses in the YAR, the latter employing 192 of 
the 6706 workers employed in manufacture overall. Though industry and manufacturing 
were doubtlessly minimal, such staples of the traditional economy as brickmaking and 
weaving almost certainly involved numbers of small businesses and labourers orders of 
magnitudes higher than these estimates (al-Jihāz al-markazī lil-takhṭīt, 1973, p.59). Moreover, 
while we can look up the number of cinema seats in Taʿiz (al-Jihāz al-markazī lil-takhṭīt, 1973, 
p.165), there is no estimate of GDP for before 1969. 
Beyond the model 
The focus on the weaknesses and dysfunctions of the central administration in much of the 
literature on the YAR reflects, as we have seen, important realities that are well captured by 
the model. Yet, it may be useful not only to catalogue the ways in which new institutions did 
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not function, but to explore the ways in which they did. As the rapid increase in the number 
of employees on government payrolls illustrate, the civil service came to play an important 
and growing role as an employer, although, due to high inflation and the state’s perpetual 
fiscal crisis, the salaries on offer were modest (Messick, 1978, pp.204–205; Gerholm, 1977, 
p.72).171 The civil service also came to play a growing role in the allocation and distribution of 
funds from the centre. The new administrative apparatus controlled the allocation of external 
rents through salaries and central budget support and gained influence as a focal point for 
lobbying and influencing. It determined where, at least some, hospitals, schools, or roads 
were built (Schmidt, 1968, pp.286–287). Government-sponsored benefits and other 
payments also increased. In ʾIbb, the state’s role in dispensing ṣadaqa (charity) increased 
rapidly after the revolution. Officials in ʾIbb related to Brinkley Messick that payments of 
ṣadaqa were “constantly on the increase” after 1962 and became, by the early 1970s, an 
expected entitlement (Messick, 1978, pp.229–232). Instead of collecting funds from the 
peripheries, the political centre began to allocate resources, as Section 5.1 highlighted and 
the discussion in the next section, 5.2.3 develops further. Thus, new ministries meant more 
than just the continuation of traditional forms in new guises and modern buildings – 
especially since much of the money available for investment came in the form of foreign 
loans and aid. Navigating forms, drawing up plans, and accessing central funds became 
important parts of the political game and the institutions in control of the purse became 
important fora for bargaining.  
5.2.3 The development of local institutions 
The development of local government institutions during the civil war was ambiguous. On the 
one hand, the civil war left local administration relatively untouched and provided far-
reaching autonomy to established forms of local self-administration. On the other hand, new 
flows of money from the centre reconstituted the relationship between central and local 
government in new ways. Despite some attempts at top-down reforms of local government, 
in practice the war cut ties of monitoring and accountability, the central government lost 
                                                          
 
171 Brinkley Messick’s (1978, pp.204–205) notes on a civil servant’s income in ʾIbb provide a useful 
grounded illustration. A Section Head received 80 MT and about 190 kg of sorghum per month in 1962. 
After the revolution, the salary increased to 100 MT without payment in kind. Subsequent salary 
increases lagged inflation. By 1975 the salary had increased by 380% but prices had increased at least 
1,600%. 
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control of appointments, and tax payments to the centre slowed to a trickle, while local 
institutions continued to function. Locally-raised taxes remained in the local economy and 
circulated as investments in development initiatives, wages to local officials, and loans to 
local merchants. This development accords closely to the model’s emphasis on the ways in 
which civil war can reproduce pre-existing local institutions by fragmenting central control. 
Yet at the same time, increased central government expenditure, albeit on a small scale 
during the 1960s, created ties of patronage from central to local government. Alliances with 
central actors partially reconstituted the more hierarchical relations of appointment and 
accountability under the Imam and in some cases broadened access to power, partially 
counteracting the centralisation within tribes analysed in 4.2.2.  
In theory, Republican Decree 8 of 1964 set forth an amended structure for local government, 
complemented after the war by Decree 55 of 1973, based on Egyptian plans for ‘modern’ 
local administration in Yemen, which envisaged extensive powers of oversight and direct 
control for the central government.172 Yet, these decrees served “at best […] as an ideal 
model” (Cohen and Lewis, 1979, p.10). The provincial councils they envisaged were not 
formed until after the war and even in the late 1970s existed as stipulated only in the main 
cities of Ṣanaʿāʾ, Taʿiz and al-Ḥudayda. Below the governorate level, the reforms remained 
almost entirely a dead letter (El-Azzazi, 1978, p.152). In ʾIbb, their effect was limited to minor 
changes in bookkeeping and organisation (Messick, 1978, pp.184–185). Instead, 
anthropological work of the post-war period tends to highlight both the continuity in local 
government during the war as well as how much local government existed.  
In terms of lines of continuity across the war, Jabal Rāziḥ, in the far north of the YAR, is 
emblematic of many royalist areas in that the Imam’s officials stayed in post and continued to 
collect zakat and administer the ʾawqāf throughout the war. After declaring for the royalists, 
Rāziḥ cut connections to Ṣanaʿāʾ, but relations with the Ḥamīd al-Dīn princes and royalist 
                                                          
 
172 Local administration in the YAR was organised on the basis of governorates (muḥāfiẓāt) 
restructured from the Imamate system of provinces (ʾalwiya, sing. liwāʾ). Every muḥāfiẓa was divided 
into several ʾaqḍiya (sing. qaḍāʾ), which, especially in the central highlands, were often coterminous 
with tribal territories. Each qaḍāʾ was subdivided into nawāḥī (sing. nāḥiya) and ʿuzal (sing. ʿuzla). For 
example, the qaḍāʾ of ʿAns was one of twelve districts in the muḥāfiẓa of Dhamār. Qaḍāʾ ʿAns was 
coterminous with the ʿAns tribe and was composed of 3 nawāḥī. Swagman describes ʿAns as belonging 
to Bakīl, elsewhere it is identified as belonging to Madhḥaj (Swagman, 1988a, pp.97-98, 100; see also: 
IBRD, 1970, Annex I, pp.3–4). 
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officials too were weak. Administration became largely autonomous (Weir, 2007, p.281). At 
the other end of the YAR, in the town of ʾIbb, more representative of republican controlled 
areas, the structure of local administration and its personnel was likewise marked by 
continuity, though some of the top positions changed hands and the administrators 
themselves complained that “the republican government is no government at all – ‘everyone 
governs himself’ now.” Imamic government had been smaller, tighter, and stronger (Messick, 
1978, p.106).  
Attempts to conduct more general, but still grounded, research on the YAR’s local 
government confirm this picture: at the lower levels of administration, communities chose 
representatives according to local conventions. At higher levels, Imamate-era institutions 
continued to function, and the theoretically centrally-appointed ʿāmil (the head of nāḥiya-
level administration) and the ḥākim (director) and mudīr al-māl (director of finances) that 
headed qaḍāʾ-level administration tended also to be locally-chosen and largely autonomous 
from Ṣanaʿāʾ well into the 1970s (El-Azzazi, 1978, pp.155–156; Swagman, 1988a, pp.98–
100).173 Local government during much of the civil war enjoyed “local sovereignty” (PAAA, AV 
Neues Amt 1719, 7 Sep. 1966) and locally-administered religious endowments (ʾawqāf) and 
local forms of taxation, particularly market taxes, provided a real and enduring base for local 
administration, particularly in larger towns, independent of the central government (Messick, 
1978, pp.204–205). 
However, though the basic structure and size of local institutions did not change significantly 
during the war – in contrast to far-reaching changes in central government – those changes in 
central government and the war itself fundamentally affected the power relations within 
local institutions and their way of functioning. National-level campaigns against the sāda 
meant the downfall of many powerful Hashemite families and their replacement by local 
rivals, while reliance on tribal mobilisation reproduced and strengthened tribal forms of 
organisation. These changes are familiar from the discussion above. In addition, changes to 
taxation had their most immediate and tangible effect at the local level and central ideas 
                                                          
 
173 Gerholm’s work on Manākha defies this general trend. Yet, it is not always clear that assertions like 
“government servants […are…] an appendix to the central government in Ṣanaʿāʾ, a means of building a 
nation out of many independent-minded regions” are statements of fact, rather than aspiration 
(Gerholm, 1977, p.66). 
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about modernist, hierarchical, and technocratic governance leaked down to the local level 
through the central allocation of funds.   
By turning taxation over to local officials and sharply reducing the tax burden, central fiscal 
reforms redrew the relationship between local administration and the centre. Giving up 
control over taxation quickly brought in its wake an erosion of central control over 
appointments and other local government decisions. Local proceedings and decisions about 
taxation and investment stopped impinging on central administration, just as the structures 
of central government were being fundamentally re-drawn. As a result, central 
administration became uncoupled from local government. In Jabal Rāziḥ, for instance, Weir 
notes that the first republican governors after reconciliation held little sway and largely did 
token work amassing fees and bribes. If they threatened local interests, local shaykhs could 
complain and get them replaced (Weir, 2007, p.288). This primacy of local power brokers was 
echoed elsewhere and reflected the changing balance of power created by the flow of 
resources to tribal leaders, discussed in Section 4.2 above.  
Tribal leaders’ growing claims on central stipends paradoxically also increased the leverage of 
central institutions in ways not well captured in the model. Once the war came to an end and 
tribal mobilisation became less important for regime survival, the fact that local taxation was 
no longer an important source of government revenues strengthened the bargaining power 
of central institutions: their reliance on local support and cooperation decreased and their 
growing importance as a source of funds allowed officials to gain leverage, build patronage 
networks, and gain influence at the local level.174 Of course, such officials were themselves 
members of tribes, village networks, or influential families and it is therefore easy to 
overstate the extent to which such central control was autonomous from local concerns. The 
power the YAR government exercised through control of the purse towards the end of the 
civil war was restricted, particularly as the resources at its disposal remained limited.  
The Local Development Associations (LDAs) provide a revealing case study of this dynamic 
and its ambiguities. Though LDAs really came into their own only in the 1970s, they first 
emerged during the civil war and the complex local power struggles over their control and 
government moves to influence LDAs through the provision of central funds, in the late 
1960s, reveal the role of allocation in attempts to rebuild central influence. 
                                                          
 
174 Gerholm (1977, pp.112–114) makes a similar point. 
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Yemenis returning to the areas in and around Taʿiz from Aden in 1962 and early 1963 
founded the first LDAs, which thus emerged at the beginning of the civil war as grassroots 
initiatives for local development, drawing on older traditions of village-level cooperation for 
building and maintaining public infrastructure (Swagman, 1988a, p.63; Cohen et al., 1981). 
New laws, patterned on Egyptian models, legalized cooperatives and associations in 1963, 
formalising these bodies (Carapico, 1998, p.114). Although their number and importance 
would increase significantly in the mid and late 1970s, by 1972, shortly after the end of the 
war, there were already 25 recognised LDAs in Taʿiz governorate, 15 in Ṣanaʿāʾ, two in ʾIbb, 
one in al-Ḥudayda, one in Ḥajja, and two in Radāʿ/al-Bayḍāʾ (al-Jihāz al-markazī lil-takhṭīt, 
1973, p.165). LDA projects included such development staples as drilling wells and building 
access roads, schools, and clinics (El-Azzazi 1978, pp.161-164, Swagman 1988, p 67).  
Most LDAs were organised at the lowest administrative levels as the result of local initiatives 
at the hamlet, village, or ʿuzla-level (El-Azzazi 1978, 160-161). Some widened the arena of 
local politics, providing opportunities for young people and low status traders and craftsmen 
with the requisite skills or capital to gain a voice in local administration and rise in social 
status (Gerholm, 1977, p.114; Swagman, 1988a, pp.115–116). Indeed, some LDAs included 
deliberate provisions to keep shaykhly control at bay (Weir, 2007, p.291). Yet, LDAs could also 
be power multipliers for local notables (Carapico, 1998, pp.111–112). LDAs might be 
headquartered in a local shaykh’s house and come under his decision-making (Gerholm, 
1977, pp.28–29, 41). For instance, the cooperative mentioned in the 1972 statistics in Ḥajja, 
was likely the large cooperative, active across 6 districts in Ḥāshid territory,175 set-up, run, 
and financed by Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-ʾAḥmar to consolidate influence within Ḥāshid 
(Carapico, 1998, p.111). Depending on the balance of power in LDAs, investments could be 
concentrated in out-of-the-way villages and local taxes or subscriptions repurposed for LDA 
investment sometimes found their way into the pockets of leading local officials (El-Azzazi, 
1978, pp.164, 170; Gerholm, 1977, p.99; Carapico, 1998, pp.112–113; Swagman, 1988a, 
p.155).  
LDAs were also a tool of central patronage. From 1973 onwards, the central government 
attempted to exert greater central control, when al-Ḥamdī, who was President of the 
Confederation of Yemeni Development Associations before he became President of the YAR, 
sought more top-down influence (Swagman, 1988a, p.63). Later still, manipulating funding to 
                                                          
 
175 ʿAmrān was not a separate governorate at the time. 
186 
 
the LDAs allowed President Ṣāliḥ to “establish a local presence at low cost” (Chaudhry, 1997, 
p.36). Yet even before the end of the civil war, funding for LDAs gave a measure of 
information and control to central institutions that were otherwise on the retreat.  
Carapico identifies 1968 as a key date in this initial phase. The al-ʾIryānī government 
established a Department of Youth, Labour, and Social Affairs within the Ministry of Local 
Administration in 1968 as a concession to the Baʿathist and Qawmiyyin left. It was tasked 
with promoting LDAs and from early 1969 the YAR government also began providing central 
funding to the Local Development Associations (AV Neues Amt 12337, 14 Mar. 1969). What 
little staff the Department had rarely visited, let alone managed, local projects, but governors 
released funds and set priorities for development in Ḥajja (Shaykh al-ʾAḥmar) and al-Ḥudayda 
(Shaykh ʾAbū Luḥūm) (Carapico, 1998, pp.107, 114, 127, 132).176 Though far less organised 
than during the 1970s and less closely controlled by the centre than during the 1980s, 
attempts by the central government to use funding to LDAs for influence at the local level 
began during the civil war as an alternative to direct relations of accountability almost as 
soon as LDAs themselves were created. 
5.3 Conclusion to Chapter 5 
During the civil war, thousands of Yemenis found new employment in the civil service, and 
government investment in infrastructure, virtually unheard of until 1959, grew significantly. 
At the same time, the new republican treasury lost much of its ability to tax the population, 
losing revenue not only from the areas under royalist control, but also forfeiting much of the 
tax income from nominally republican areas. Along with the ability to tax, the political centre 
lost other prerogatives: central appointments and oversight of local governing arrangements 
declined and changed shape: whereas the Imams relied on the hostage system and 
associated stipends, religious legitimacy, and punitive expeditions to regulate local affairs and 
control appointments, the republican state came to rely to a far greater extent on patronage 
and inducements. New institutions fulfilled different functions, operated with different logics 
and incentives, and with different lines of accountability than either the ideal-typical 
institutions they were modelled on, or the Imamate institutions that they articulated with 
and partially replaced.  
                                                          
 
176 It is possible that the YAR’s ‘agriculture’ budget line was reserved for LDA support, in which case 
central funds were YR 1.5 million in 1968/69 and YR 0.9 million in 1969/70.  
187 
 
These are largely new insights for the literature on the Yemen Arab Republic. In particular, 
the fiscal basis of the state has rarely received much attention. In the rare cases where it has 
(e.g. Chaudhry, 1997), the profound wartime transformations of this fiscal basis and the way 
this connected to broader institutional developments and the trajectory of state formation 
have largely remained unexamined. The YAR’s institutional orientation towards external 
rents, perhaps because it is a recurrent, almost prototypical feature of postcolonial states 
(Cooper, 2002), has largely been taken for granted. Yet the investigation reveals it to be, in 
important measure, an outcome of the civil war that operated in ways that closely 
approximate those suggested by the model.  
Beyond drawing attention to this important and long-lasting transformation, the model 
suggests ways to understand the how and why of rapid institutional change in North Yemen 
during this time. It reveals how decentralising control over taxation went hand in hand with 
ceding central control over coercion to local violence specialists, which in turn implied far-
reaching de-facto decentralisation of appointments, oversight, and decision-making. 
However, unlike the story of wartime changes in taxation and the fiscal basis of the YAR, this 
is a more familiar story from the extant literature, as is the role of external interveners and 
particularly Egypt for shaping the development of state institutions. Here, the contribution is 
about nuancing and adding to this established story, revealing wartime origins of enduring 
features of centre-periphery relations in the YAR. The model highlights the way in which the 
war and intervention created pressures for dismantling formal institutions at the local level, 
at the same time as international donors were busy creating large central institutions on the 
Egyptian model in Taʿiz, Ṣanaʿāʾ, and al-Ḥudayda. These central institutions connected loosely 
to de facto local authorities through alliances and the allocation of central funds, re-
constituting, in significantly modified form, a measure of central oversight and influence.  
As in the previous chapter, the investigation of the civil war in Yemen from this perspective 
also highlights the limitations of and suggests modifications to the model. The chapter 
returns several times to the ways in which government spending can at least partially 
substitute for direct control in terms of institutions’ centralising and aggregating functions in 
ways that the model does not capture well – and highlights that it was external intervention 
that made allocation-led strategies of control viable. This is an insight familiar from literatures 
on neo-patrimonial regimes and rentier states that has started to be applied to the nexus of 
war making and state making in the Middle East (Schwarz, 2012). However, it has not 
sufficiently been taken into account in an otherwise highly productive literature about 
institutions in conflict and war-centred state-formation narratives (e.g. Arjona et al., 2015; 
Mampilly, 2011).  
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A second additional theme across the two sections relates to the way in which the messy 
realities of the war partially collapse the analytical distinctions of the model – echoing the 
need to ‘bring politics back in’ identified in Chapter 4: the changing political settlement 
analysed in the previous chapter, as well as the Imamate-era institutions explored in Section 
3.2, decisively influenced changes in institutions. While some actors were seeking to 
transform and re-make government institutions, others were seeking to guard and maintain 
institutional legacies of the Imamate, while still others sought to carve out new spaces of 
autonomy and keep central institutions at bay. Who pursued which strategies had much to 
do with contingent and historically specific alliances, group beliefs, and educational and 
political trajectories, and less with structural positions in the state apparatus. Their relative 
and evolving bargaining position inside and outside government helped determine the 
institutional changes wrought by the war.  
Finally, the investigation highlights the importance not only of path dependency, but of the 
way some paths are largely one-way. In the civil war, dismantling and redeploying institutions 
proved far easier than building or re-building them. 
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6 THE CIVIL WAR AND IDEAS OF THE STATE 
Yemenis life stories as well as the historiographical narrative are divided into a period “before 
the revolution” and “after the revolution.”177 The civil war in North Yemen marks a decisive 
symbolic break associated with substantial ideational changes. The war even served as a 
generational marker, as young adults without first-hand memories of life under the Imam 
became known as ʾawlād al-thawra, children of the revolution, in the 1970s and 80s 
(Swagman, 1988a, p.134). Arguably, the very language within which Imamic claims to 
legitimacy were traditionally couched stopped making sense by the end of the war (Dresch, 
1993b, pp.274–275 note 27).  
This chapter explores the way the war itself shaped these changes and investigates whether 
they can be attributed to the causal mechanisms proposed in the model. It takes as its point 
of departure the ideas of the state current in the last years of Imamic rule (3.3), and the 
mechanisms linking civil war to ideas of the state (2.4). Through the lens of rhetorical 
commonplaces, it explores changes to the way royalists and different republican factions 
mobilised support and discredited political enemies. To do so, it draws on little-researched 
royalist and republican publications, archival material, interviews, and the secondary 
literature, presenting new royalist propaganda material and existing material in a new light. 
The evolution of ideas or imaginings of the state has not been widely examined in the 
literature on Yemen. Approaching changes in ideas of the state during the war through the 
lens of the model reveals little-remarked developments; and shows that the war occasioned 
deeper ideational changes than western scholars have generally given the ‘revolution’ credit 
for. The civil war led to a partial convergence of elite discourses around new state-centric 
rhetorical commonplaces. Their plausibility and importance in people’s lives, in turn, rested 
on the centre’s ability grant resources, that is, to spend. The chapter also traces how tribal 
forms came to define not only the formal structure of state institutions but ideas of national 
belonging, suggesting that the war played an important role in the emerging imagination of 
the YAR as ‘a nation of tribes.’ Contrary to the dynamics suggested by the model and the 
                                                          
 
177 On life histories in ʾIbb see: Messick, 1978, p.73. For sāda families see: vom Bruck, 2005. For 
examples of the official historiography see: al-Maqāliḥ, 1987; and Markaz al-Dirāsāt wa al-buḥūth al-
yamanī, 1987. 
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literature on which it is based, this privileging of local identities was not antithetical to ‘the 
state’ so much as providing a particular vision of state authority. 
Section 6.1 introduces the rhetorical commonplaces around which royalists and ‘moderate’ 
and ‘radical’ republicans rallied178 and explores the processes associated with the emergence 
of rivals to the dominant coalition presented in 2.4. In line with the model, the war 
exacerbated political polarisation and it was divisions within the ruling elite and between 
incumbents and challengers that activated boundaries and defined cleavages. Changing elite 
framings enabled local action against traditional authorities and particularly the sāda. Yet, the 
exploration also cautions against taking political polarisation as fixed and neatly aligned with 
an attack on or a defence of the established order. Instead, elite discourses co-evolved: What 
was being fought for and what was worth preserving changed through contests over the 
meaning of central rhetorical commonplaces. Similarly, while changing macro cleavages can 
enable local action against traditional authorities, in Yemen, these authorities themselves at 
times successfully leveraged such cleavages to re-produce their power. 
Section 6.2 traces processes of ideational change linked to different mobilisation strategies. 
As the model suggests, relying on tribal levies strengthened the tribes and re-enforced their 
functioning according to logics different from those of the bureaucratic state. However, 
whereas the model suggests that this should generate political fragmentation and undermine 
ideas of coherent domination, a close examination of the case suggests something more 
ambivalent: the increased salience of tribal identities had centripetal as well as centrifugal 
effects, providing a framework for bridging divides and for (re-)imagining ‘Yemeni-ness’. In 
addition, the war coincided with a surge of nationalism and a militarisation of ideas of the 
state, as the model suggests civil war tends to. However, it appears that the processes of the 
model were not active. Foreign intervention prompted these effects vicariously. 
The chapter closes by tracing wartime dynamics linking control of capital to ideas of the state 
(6.3). In contrast to the predictions of the model, reduced central taxation increased the 
legitimacy of the central state, as it was coupled with increases in central allocation. The 
decentralisation of rights over taxation coincided with increasing demands being addressed 
to the state. The section also explores to what extent the war normalised political violence 
and assassinations in particular. 
                                                          
 
178 Despite being politically loaded and contested terms, these contemporary labels are used without 
single quotation marks in the following. 
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6.1 From elite divisions to popular polarisation 
The civil war rapidly widened political divisions between royalists and republicans as each 
side sought to mobilise support and invest rhetorical commonplaces with divergent 
meanings. The divisions of the civil war sometimes ran through the middle of tribes and 
families and estranged friends and neighbours, placing individuals of similar backgrounds on 
opposite sides. The royalist-republican divide was deep, violently inscribed, and underpinned 
by broader politicisation, at least in the urban centres of a largely rural country. While 
reconciliation at the end of the war brought some royalists to positions of influence in the 
YAR state, the vilification of the Ḥamīd al-Dīn remains a foundational myth of Yemeni 
nationalism and the dominant figures of Yemeni politics into the 2000s were figures who rose 
to initial prominence on the republican side during the civil war. 
Despite internal tensions and varying motivations, royalist supporters were broadly aligned 
behind the declared goals to reinstate the Imamate and eliminate the Egyptian presence in 
Yemen, appealing to loyalty, religious legitimacy, and opposition to foreign rule.  
Republicans agreed that the Ḥamīd al-Dīn Imamate had to end and advocated some form of 
republican government in its stead. There were also deep intra-republican divisions, 
expressed as disagreements over the role of the Egyptians, who took sides in the intra-
republican divisions; over the concentration of coercive power in military units with differing 
loyalties and between tribe and military; and over land reform, nationalisation, and the role 
of existing elites. 
Within the terminology of republican politics, the radical republicans comprised President al-
Sallāl and his supporters, who generally described themselves as Nasserist and pursued 
policies that accorded with Egypt’s experiments with Arab Socialism. Radical republicans also 
included some Yemeni Baʿathists and al-qawmiyyin al-ʿarab (the Movement of Arab 
Nationalists – MAN), with their links to the southern National Liberation Front (NLF) and a 
rising generation of radical officers. Divisions among these groups complicate the picture, as 
family ties and divisions as well as regional political developments structured internal 
republican disagreements. Baʿathist Iraq’s and Nasserist Egypt’s rival claims to regional 
leadership, the split between the Syrian and Iraqi Baʿath in 1966, and divisions within the 
southern independence movement between the NLF and the Egyptian-supported Front for 
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the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) all found an echo in domestic politics.179 On 
the other side of this internal republican divide stood the ‘moderate’ republicans. They 
emerged in organised form at the ʿAmrān Conference in 1963, styling themselves the 
‘national opposition’ (al-muʿāraḍa al-waṭanīyya). Splits between them and President al-Sallāl 
deepened in the course of 1964 and came to a head after al-Zubayrī’s assassination in April 
1965 and particularly in the wave of purges al-Sallāl launched against suspected enemies in 
autumn 1966 (al-Masʿudī, 2006, p.329).180 Despite the purge, Egyptian withdrawal set the 
scene for moderates’ increasing dominance. While key figures like ʾAḥmad Nuʿmān, ʿAbd al-
Raḥman al-ʾIryānī, and Muḥammad al-ʾAkwaʿ had hardly been at the pinnacle of the Imamic 
state, they were culturally and educationally products of the Imamate (Haykel, 2003, p.221). 
Like them, most moderates hailed from well-known tribal or learned families, and drew their 
support largely from similar circles, their patronage networks, and their positions of 
prominence in tribes, towns, or villages. They opposed the Imamate, believed in 
modernisation, and adopted a nationalist register, but largely rejected the language and ideas 
of Arab socialism. Invested in the status quo, they sought to keep more far-reaching social 
change at bay, seeking modernisation and improved standards of living within the framework 
of the traditional social order. As a result, they also couched their criticism of both the Imam 
and President al-Sallāl in the traditional register of Islamic – and often Zaydī – jurisprudence, 
rather than ideas of socialism and revolution, and in rhetoric and practice sought to appeal to 
consultation and respect for tribal norms.  
The following sub-sections assesses to what extent the model can account for how the 
divisions mapped above translated into broader polarisation and politicisation.  
6.1.1 Elite divisions and political polarisation 
The model outlined in Chapter 2 suggests that elite divisions take on broader social meaning 
as divided elites activate and police boundaries, generating powerful macro-cleavages that 
politicise the population. Getting people to buy into and identify with central cleavages, in 
turn, can challenge accepted notions and undermine state legitimacy or, conversely, produce 
                                                          
 
179 For instance, the Yemeni Baʿath split between a group around Muḥsin al-ʿAynī aligned with the Iraqi 
Baʿath and the ṭalīʿa radicals around ʿAbd Allah Bādhīb aligned with the Syrian Baʿath. 
180 On republican divisions see also: Johnsen, 2017, p.124; al-Yāzilī, 2002, esp. pp.251-252. 
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a rally to the established order, not least by making the state more visible and its categories 
matter more immediately to everyday life worlds.  
Polarisation and top-down mobilisation 
Indeed, divisions within the ruling elite and between incumbents and challengers drove 
political polarisation. Elites re-cast public discourse and sought to mobilise followers through 
propaganda and the use of instruments of mass politics that were entirely novel in the North 
Yemeni context. This contributed to an erosion of established bonds and alliances. In 
combination with a re-imagination of traditional forms of popular participation in new terms, 
this lent the wartime divisions weight and plausibility as the civil war contributed to public 
polarisation, politicisation, and forms of mass politics. 
North Yemen had only witnessed its first demonstrations in the summer of 1962. In August, 
little more than a month before the overthrow of the Imam, high school students in Ṣanaʿāʾ 
marched through the streets, chanted slogans demanding reforms, and held up pictures of 
ʿAbd al-Nasir. When the regime responded with mass arrests, students in Taʿiz protested in 
solidarity and were locked inside their school without food, water, or electricity. For many 
young students, this was an important moment of political awakening (Interview with ʿAlī 
Muḥsin Ḥamīd, 2015). Aside from this one incident, experimenting with a novel repertoire of 
contention, demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of mass direct action were virtually 
unknown in North Yemen when the Free Officers overthrew the Imam; yet by the mid-1960s, 
demonstrations with thousands of participants backing different republican factions became 
a regular feature of urban life, largely due to top-down efforts at mobilisation.181 
Al-Sallāl’s declaration of the new Yemen Arab Republic prompted several days of consecutive 
demonstrations in favour of the new regime in Ṣanaʿāʾ and Taʿiz. The fact that the young men 
with signs and flags who thronged the streets were accompanied by trucks with mounted 
loudspeakers and megaphones, suggests official sanction and support, even organisation of 
these demonstrations (PAAA, B12 1059, 5 Oct. 1962). In November 1962, nearly two months 
after the overthrow of the Imam, the German embassy noted that the central and local 
government in Taʿiz still “regularly organised” youth demonstrations (PAAA, B52 1059, 23 
                                                          
 
181 Strikes and demonstrations were common in Aden throughout the 1950s and were an important 
reference point for both republican leaders and large numbers of migrant workers. See 3.3 above and 
Carapico, 1998, pp.87–99. 
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Nov. 1962). During the same period, al-Sallāl was engaged in a cross-country tour to 
popularise the idea of the republic and denounce the Imam. The German embassy reported 
on his “huge popularity.” Thousands thronged the roads by which he approached Taʿiz, 
Dhamār, ʾIbb, and the nearby towns of Jibla, Dhī al-Sufāl, and Yarīm, so that his open jeep was 
slowed to a crawl (PAAA, B12 1059, 5 Dec. 1962). Republican leaders travelled around Yemen 
giving speeches and were met with poems and plays denouncing the Imam, praising the 
republic, and explaining the ideas and forms of republican government (Swagman, 1988a, 
p.78). Egyptian news teams pursued a similar politicising mission: Egyptian radio reporting 
teams organised demonstrations, taught villagers slogans, and handed out banners in the 
towns and villages they reported from (Deffarge and Troeller 1969, pp.25-26).182 In this way, 
the new leadership sought to generate and mobilise mass support and to signal its popularity 
to Yemeni and foreign observers.  
When divisions within the republican camp came into the open from 1964 onwards, 
mobilisation in North Yemen’s few urban centres reached new heights. Rival factions staged 
competing protests and conferences to uphold their claims to speak for the Yemeni people. 
As ʾAḥmad Nuʿmān travelled to Cairo to meet with ʿAbd al-Nasir, seeking to reduce the 
Egyptian role, ‘spontaneous’ demonstrations in Ṣanaʿāʾ against al-Sallāl and the Egyptian 
presence strengthened his hand (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 24 Jun. 1965). After the 
Egyptians decided to force al-Sallāl’s return to Yemen, Taʿiz police rounded up passers-by to 
participate in pro-Sallāl demonstrations (PAAA, B36 195, 10 Jul. 1965). Similarly, after 
cracking down on dissent in autumn 1966, al-Sallāl launched a charm offensive. Touring the 
country, he mixed old and new registers of patronage to gain popular support. According to 
the German embassy, a typical visit consisted of a government delegation arriving with sheep 
and cattle that would be slaughtered and handed out, then al-Sallāl would arrive and promise 
cars, schools, and hospitals (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 16 Dec. 1966). These instances of 
mobilisation are all notable for seeking to gain and display public popular support, as well as 
for their heavy-handed orchestration from above, which helped feed Western fears over the 
                                                          
 
182 Egypt was also heavily involved in radio programming and broadcasting. At the time of Egyptian 
withdrawal, there were approximately 30 Egyptian experts employed in connection to “special 
broadcast devices including radio broadcast equipment and jamming stations” (DWQ 0078-044109, no 
date [Sep. 1967]; see also: 0078-044112 no date [late May/early June 1967]; 0078-044113, 30 Jun. 
1965; 197 31 Jan. 1963; SWB/ME/W197/C/2; ME/W198/C/1). 
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role of Egyptian, Chinese, and Soviet agitators (E.g. PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 6 Nov. 1965; 
FRUS 1964-8, Vol. 11, Doc. 441). 
By the end of the war, Yemeni politicians routinely used loudspeaker trucks and paid slogan-
chanters, attracted participants with hand-outs, and used Ṣanaʿāʾ radio, student groups, and 
the labour union to recruit protestors, or called on the police to force passers-by into 
marches (PAAA, B36 46, 1 Sep. 1963; AV Neues Amt 1719, 13 Feb. 1967). In October 1967, 
when the Egyptian command was seeking to impose its plans for withdrawal on a Yemeni 
leadership reluctant to assist in its own overthrow, the beleaguered president and his 
supporters organised demonstrations, ultimately mobilising thousands with loudspeaker 
trucks after Egyptian troops opened fire on a smaller earlier demonstration (DWQ, 0078-
044109, 3 Oct. 1967; 4 Oct. 1967). Likewise, after the siege of Ṣanaʿāʾ, al-ʿAmrī skilfully played 
the new register of mass politics, announcing his resignation in August 1968 – in the context 
of the ‘August events’ discussed earlier – only to retract it after being ‘forced’ to remain by 
large popular protests urging him to stay, just as ʿAbd al-Nasir had in mid-1967. Off the back 
of this public show of force, he moved against his rivals in the army, arresting ʿAlī Muthannā 
al-Jibrān, removing him as the head of the artillery, and replacing him with one of his allies 
(ʾAbū Luḥūm, 2002, p.327).  
Nuancing the process: limits to top down control and the coevolution of elite discourses 
These forms of politicisation and polarisation along royalist versus republican and radical 
versus moderate republican lines followed elite divisions and attempts to mobilise public 
opinion around them. Yet there was also an opposite tendency. While conflict polarisation 
revolves around, generally elite-led, processes of othering, elite framings are in competition 
for popular support. In Yemen, this competition led to a partial convergence of elite 
discourses around a new set of rhetorical commonplaces. This was due to a tendency for 
mobilisation to escape top-down control, the fact that the ideas in circulation and globally on 
offer all envisaged a central role for the state, as well as genuine competition between 
royalists and republicans and within republican circles for support for some of the same 
constituencies.  
During the later years of the civil war, orchestrated and carefully choreographed 
demonstrations at times escaped control. Ideas of revolution and armed resistance from the 
independence struggle in the south spread in ways its Egyptian supporters would have liked 
to avoid, coming to be employed against Egyptians troops. Grenade explosions, shootings, 
and political assassinations became a recurrent feature of urban politics in Ṣanaʿāʾ, Taʿiz, and 
other cities from October 1966 onwards (O’Ballance, 1971, p.165; see also 6.3.2 below). 
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Organisations initially sponsored by the Egyptians in both North and South also turned 
increasingly against the Egyptian presence in Yemen (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 28 Nov. 
1965). The NLF turned against its erstwhile sponsor and carried out attacks in Taʿiz and, in 
January 1967, a carefully vetted assembly of delegates in Ṣanaʿāʾ abandoned their designated 
role to cheer for the government, and instead harangued it for its chronic failures (PAAA, AV 
Neues Amt 1719, 13 Feb. 1967). As top-down attempts to mobilise mass support escaped 
top-down control, there was a multiplying of political ideas and of lines of division.  
Yet, at the same time, and in part because of popular politicisation and the need to appeal to 
groups becoming conscious of their importance in the wartime context, the rival ideas elites 
appealed to converged. Evolving alliances and rival groups’ need to maintain mobilisation, 
meant that both sides sought to capture opponents’ ideas that gained traction and to blunt 
the charges against them, ultimately contributing to a co-evolution of political discourse that 
forged new shared elements of common sense as much as providing a framework for 
polarisation and division. Thus, within two years of the war’s beginning, royalists had 
wholeheartedly adopted the rhetorical commonplaces of the people and modernity, 
emphasising as their main point of difference with republicans their battle against the 
Egyptians as external invaders. Moderate republicans adopted in tempered form much of this 
anti-Egyptian sentiment. Meanwhile radical republicans, after an initial period in which they 
pursued modernisation as a revolutionary project, came to advance a vision of modernity as 
development little different from that embraced in royalist propaganda. 
To dispute the republican charge that the Imamate was backward, royalist radio and other 
propaganda stressed Imam al-Badr’s reformist credentials. Republicans, they argued, had 
needlessly plunged Yemen into chaos by overthrowing a reformist Imam, who shared their 
most reasonable and popular aspirations (Interview with ʿAbd Allah al-Kibsī, 2016). They also 
tended to avoid describing their goal in terms of reinstating the Imam, instead framing the 
war as a fight between ‘the Yemeni people’ and an Egyptian invader. These themes are taken 
up extensively in a special issue of the royalist Al-Yaman magazine from 16 March 1967 
(private collection of Yūsuf Ḥamīd al-Dīn). In an article entitled “Who benefits from the war in 
Yemen,” the magazine draws a sharp distinction between a positive past under the Imam and 
the destruction, horrors, and foreign occupation of war. The description of the Imamic golden 
age is remarkable: rather than discussing the Imam’s justice, the application of God’s law, or 
the appropriate ordering of society, the article describes the Imamate’s achievements in 
terms of modernisation. The Imam had set Yemen on a “natural course” towards the “path of 
development and building.” Thanks to the Imams, Yemen before the revolution had boasted 
growing numbers of schools and hospitals, a modern port, new roads, and “an automatic 
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telephone service in all of Ṣanaʿāʾ, Taʿiz, and al-Ḥudayda” (Al-Yaman, 16 Mar. 1967, p.8). 
Concrete reforms accompanied this rhetoric. A little more than two years in to the civil war, 
after a string of battlefield victories, religious scholars and royalist princes drafted a royalist 
constitution that guaranteed equal rights for Zaydī and Shāfiʿī citizens, placed limits on royal 
discretion, included an elected legislature with real powers, and specified a mechanism for 
electing the Imam. The reforms adopted many of the demands of the 1948 constitution, 
appealing to ‘third way’ republicans, while seeking to placate Shāfiʿīs. It was sufficiently 
popular to prompt ʿAbd al-Nasir to visit Yemen in late April and to sign-off on a cabinet 
reshuffle that brought the prominent moderate politicians al-ʾIryānī, Nuʿmān, and al-Zubayrī 
into government, despite their opposition to the Egyptian presence (O’Ballance, 1971, p.124; 
Stookey, 1978, p.241). Instead of contesting republican claims to deliver modernity and 
represent the people, the royalists sought instead to invest the same rhetorical 
commonplaces with their own meanings. 
In addition, royalist propaganda centred on the idea that the Imam was leading Yemeni 
resistance against foreign aggression, developing a rhetorical commonplace that was 
eventually picked up by republicans demanding Egyptian withdrawal. In the words of ʿAbd 
Allah al-Kibsī, the former director of the royalist radio station: 
Every day we were broadcasting, attacking the Egyptians because they were invaders and 
praising our Imam, who was the victim of a conspiracy by the Egyptians. […] Our main purpose 
was to show that we are not fighting because we do not like the Egyptians or that we accept 
Yemenis getting killed but that we are defending ourselves. We were not the aggressor 
(Interview with ʿAbd Allah al-Kibsī, 2016). 
This narrative drew heavily on Egyptian violations of Yemeni norms of warfare: in 
conversation with journalists, like Deffarge and Troeller, rank and file royalist fighters and 
sympathisers consistently stressed that they supported the Imam to get foreigners out of 
Yemen. The main reason, in turn, why this was essential, was the foreigners’ contempt for 
the hijra, or sanctuary, status of protected towns and people, the destruction of fields and 
livestock, and their general disregard for the rules that contained conflict in the tribal 
highlands (Deffarge and Troeller, 1969, p.155; Johnsen, 2017, p.135). Al-Yaman magazine 
provides revealing examples of this framing, including an interview in which Imam al-Badr 
declares that “the fight will not stop until the last Egyptian soldier leaves” and describes the 
Egyptians as imperialists (mustaʿamirīn) and their presence as an occupation (ʾiḥtilāl) (Al-
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Yaman, 16 Mar. 1967, p.2).183 The magazine makes no mention of the republicans – the 
conflict is cast as one solely between ‘the Yemeni people’ and ‘the Egyptians.’  
Moderate republican leaders like Nuʿmān, al-Zubayrī, and ʿAbd Allah al-ʾAḥmar shared many 
of these critiques of the Egyptians, though they were far more reserved in the way they 
articulated them, since they were not sure that the Republic could survive without Egyptian 
support.184 This did not stop the republican-sponsored ʿAmrān and Khamr conferences from 
demanding Egyptian withdrawal and an end to foreign intervention in tribal affairs (Dresch, 
1993b, p.249). Anti-Egyptian propaganda circulating in Taʿiz, hardly a royalist stronghold, 
lampooned President al-Sallāl as the Egyptian’s High Commissar in Yemen, branded the 
Egyptians colonialists, and reminded readers that Yemen had driven out the Ottomans while 
Egypt was still a colony (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 25 Sep. 1966, 19 May 1965). In this way, 
the royalist critique of the Egyptian presence became increasingly part of the republican 
mainstream. 
At the same time as royalists and moderate republicans converged in their critique of the 
Egyptian presence, radical republicans reframed their initial revolutionary aims. The new YAR 
government initially confiscated all lands belonging to the Ḥamīd al-Dīn family and other 
leading families of the Imamate, imagined as nationalisation and land reform. Sāda were 
identified as feudal lords and the overthrow of the Imam was ostensibly directed against 
imperialism and reaction (El Attar, 1964, pp.265–266). This project initially received 
significant Egyptian support, with lessons-learned documents from the war showing that the 
Egyptian command sought to use radio broadcasts, newsletters, and pamphlets to instil 
“revolutionary consciousness” in “backwards” Yemen (Ferris, 2012, p.183). Yet, by 1964 at 
the latest, Yemeni government speeches, commemorations, and parades imagined 
modernisation in different terms, not far removed from the way royalist propaganda invested 
the rhetorical commonplace of ‘modernity.’ Republican leaders like al-ʾIryānī explicitly sought 
to frame changes in terms of development, arguing that the language of socialism was 
counterproductive and played into the hands of royalist propaganda (al-ʾIryānī, 2013, p.105). 
                                                          
 
183 Royalist propaganda refers consistently to the Egyptian invasion (al-ghazwa al-maṣrī) and the 
“colonising [Egyptian] forces” (al-quwāt al-ʾistiʿmāriyya). 
184 Republican anti-Egyptian sentiment (like royalist-Saudi tensions) remains largely invisible and clad in 
euphemism in more official memorialisation. 
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The predominant referents became not land reform, class struggle and ‘consciousness,’ but 
roads, pumps, hospitals, and schools. 
Government claims about the ‘success of the revolution’ became centred on opening new 
schools and hospitals, even if they were only half-built, or else on launching new building 
projects (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 1 Oct. 1965, 8 Oct. 1966, 26 Sep. 1967). In his revolution 
day speeches, al-Sallāl declared that the revolution continued the tradition of 1948, 1955, 
and 1961 – uprisings against the Imam with decidedly non-socialist aims – and sought to 
achieve the commonplace goals of social justice, public participation in government, and 
economic development (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 1 Oct. 1965). A focus on development 
rather than revolution is also increasingly apparent in Egyptian technical assistance and 
commanders’ practice. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry’s internal correspondence came to 
describe Egyptian experts’ mission as being concerned with “raising the level of 
administration in Yemen” (DWQ 0078-044113, 19 Aug 1966) and military ‘hearts and mind’ 
operations sought to deliver not land reform or revolutionary tracts, but medical services, 
tractors, water pumps, and seeds (Schmidt, 1968, pp.83–85).  
In this way, competition between royalists and republicans and within republican circles for 
public support, led to a partial convergence of elite discourses around the rhetorical 
commonplace of ‘modernity.’ It became a shared positive signifier, albeit with contested 
meanings, central to both republican and royalist claims to legitimacy. By extension, the fact 
that ‘modernity’ and its twin ‘development’ were, in the 1970s, the central yardsticks “from 
which the legitimacy of particular governments largely derives” (Dresch, 1993b, p.266; see 
also: Messick, 1978), might usefully be read as an outcome of the civil war that reflects 
convergence rather than polarisation. Next to ‘modernity,’ the rhetorical commonplaces of 
‘the people’ and the idea that the state is the primary addressee of their claims, as well as an 
ideal of independence from foreign control, came to define elite propaganda. While not 
adding up to a coherent ideology of rule, these rhetorical commonplaces map out a 
reconfigured and shared political field, albeit one that was more fragmentary, multiple, and 
potentially contradictory than under the Imamate.  
6.1.2 Changes in macro cleavages and the re-configuration of power at the local level 
The model also suggests that rapid changes in macro cleavages, often tied to material 
support from either incumbents or challengers, can provide a legitimating framework for 
those seeking to alter existing forms of local authority and control, re-casting local allegiances 
and challenging traditional authorities. Indeed, the model, drawing on a literature on the 
micro-dynamics of civil wars, suggests that it is primarily the re-configuration of power at the 
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local level that undermines the established political order. This captures important dynamics 
of the civil war. The fall of the sāda, discussed in terms of changes to the political settlement 
in Chapter 4 above, can be analysed as an instance of local actors leveraging central cleavages 
to bring down traditional local authorities. However, the civil war in Yemen also highlights an 
opposite tendency, not reflected in the model: traditional elites used central cleavages and 
the material support that went with them to reinforce their power. Indeed, the case suggests 
that this tendency may often predominate, an idea that is further explored in 6.2 below. 
Central cleavages, the fall of the sāda, and attacks on tribal leaders 
The specific context of the Yemeni Free Officers’ coup in 1962 meant that its organisers 
imagined their challenge to the ruling dynasty not, as the organisers of the 1948 coup had, in 
terms of Zaydī traditions of resistance to an unjust Imam, but in terms of the military-led 
revolutions in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, which provided an established script for military officers 
to seize power from kings in the name of the people (Orkaby, 2014, pp.66–67). As one near-
contemporary observer remarked, rather too easily: “the Yemeni coup was […] followed by 
the standard […] political and social changes that had become a common pattern in the Arab 
revolutionary movements: the establishment of a republic, the removal of the old ruling 
class, the end of big landlordism, the creation of a public sector, and the transition towards a 
socialist economy” (Haddad, 1973, p.253). While, as Chapter 4 highlighted, large landholdings 
in Yemen were limited, the revolution did little to change them, and calling North Yemen a 
socialist economy is probably inaccurate, destroying the power of a landed upper class was 
the accepted script for military-led revolution in the Arab world and vilification of the sāda 
thus fit an established frame and associated repertoire of contention.  
In this context, attacks on the sāda formed a central plank of revolutionary rhetoric and were 
particularly marked in the speeches of Vice President ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-Bayḍānī and the first 
post-revolution Minister of Education Qāsim Ghālib ʾAḥmad, who “took the lead in the 
ideological fight against the royalists” (Haykel, 2003, p.218). While al-Bayḍānī drew on many 
of the critiques of the Imamate the Free Yemenis had developed – that the Imam was a 
tyrant, that he ruled Yemen as his own property, and sought to keep the population ignorant 
and undeveloped to maintain his rule – much of his criticism followed a different script, 
pioneered in Nasirist attacks on King Hussein of Jordan. It focused on the status of the ruling 
family as Hashemites – descendants of the prophet Muhammad – and in al-Bayḍānī’s hands 
became an assault on the ‘sayyid class’ for ruling Yemen in its own interest (al-Shāmī, 1984, 
pp.17-37; Douglas, 1987, p.236). One of the core claims was that the sāda as a whole – and 
by extension the Ḥamīd al-Dīn ruling family – were alien foreigners. They were ʿadnānī 
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northern Arabs, the historical oppressors of the ‘true’ Yemenis, qaḥṭānī southern Arabs, and 
had divided and exploited them for the past millennium. According to al-Bayḍānī, ʿadnānī 
Hashemites divided a naturally united Yemen and exploited Shāfiʿī populations and regions 
(Haykel, 2003, p.220). The speeches and plays of the revolutionary period that heaped scorn 
on the sāda ensured that “in the eyes of ordinary people the revolution was directed against 
the sāda collectively.” Indeed, some believed that the “purpose” of the revolution was to 
“finish the sāda” (vom Bruck, 2005, p.61; see also: Messick, 1978, pp.47–48, 73).  
Republican and Egyptian violence against the sāda accompanied this rhetorical onslaught. 
Steven Caton, for instance, describes local memories that sāda were “hunted” and “killed” by 
Egyptian troops (Caton, 2005, p.105). Bottom-up attempts to act on the revolution’s 
professed ideals complemented such top-down violence and constituted an example of the 
‘co-production’ of local action, wherein local actors used and adapted the rhetoric of central 
elites to advance their agendas to the extent that they could be made to fit the overarching 
narrative (Kalyvas, 2003). In Lower Yemen, where the particular framing of the sāda as 
ʿadnānī foreigners resonated with recent experiences, local notables widely took up the 
license given to violence against the sāda. The Imam had imposed northern outsiders, often 
sāda, as governors and senior administrators on lowland towns and cities. The revolution’s 
anti-sāda protests allowed families who had been prominent under the Ottomans, but side-
lined by the Ḥamīd al-Dīn, to reclaim positions of local prominence. Participation in anti-sāda 
actions was not limited, however, to rival elites. In ʾIbb after 1962 “street people” pulled sāda 
from their houses (Messick, 1978, p.73). Across lower Yemen, sāda were ridiculed in slogans 
and chants and abused in public. The effectiveness of the re-branding of ‘sayyid’ from an 
honorific to an insult is driven home by a story, related to Gabriele vom Bruck, of a shaykh’s 
son scolding a servant as a “reactionary,” a “dog” and a “sayyid” (vom Bruck, 2005, p.61, see 
also: 2004).  
A revealing, if comparatively benign, personal story highlights the way local actors made use 
of the anti-sayyid discourse from the centre. One of my interviewees described his memories 
of a visit to a mosque near the city of ʾIbb, where the preacher delivered a strongly anti-
Hashemite sermon. Then, he remembered: “That same afternoon at a qāt chew, a man 
refused to shake hands with my father [because he was a sayyid], but he did shake hands 
with me, saying, ‘I’ll shake hands with your son because I know he loves Nasir’” (Interview 
with ʿAlī Muḥsin Ḥamīd, 2015). Although his father supported the revolution, he was 
ostracised and lost his position in the local administration when a subordinate, who wanted 
his job, denounced him (Interview with ʿAlī Muḥsin Ḥamīd, 2015).  
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Co-produced anti-sayyid action went beyond removal from formal positions of power. In 
some areas, preachers and other local notables encouraged sharecroppers to refuse to pay 
the sāda for use of the land – often as part of their own efforts to buy or confiscate this land 
from the sāda. Though there was no wholesale land reform in Yemen,185 many individual 
cases of purchase under threat and confiscation of sayyid land took place, largely at the 
instigation and for the benefit of competitors for local leadership (vom Bruck, 2005, p.60). In 
Taʿiz, one of the main centres of opposition to the Imam, sāda or at least their distinctive 
headgear “completely disappeared” from the city in the first weeks of the revolution, since 
stones were thrown at people wearing the ʾimāma, the traditional headgear of sāda (PAAA, 
B52 1059, 23 Nov. 1962; vom Bruck, 2005, p.61). 
Such co-production is also clearly evident in the way the experience of sāda contrasted with 
that of other Imamate officials. While the new YAR government encouraged violence against 
sāda and engaged in it itself, it disproportionally targeted sāda in executions and reprisals 
against former government officials (see 4.1.) and did not tolerate violence against other 
local elites. For instance, in al-Nādira, a village near ʾIbb, villagers made a citizen’s arrest of 
the Ḥākim of the area shortly after the revolution alongside sayyid officials, considering him 
to be the local face of the royalist administration. He was accused of growing rich on the 
village’s tax proceeds, his palace allegedly named al-Nādira after the village that had paid for 
its construction. Yet this Ḥākim, a qāḍī rather than a sayyid and related to ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-
ʾIryānī, then Justice Minister and later President of the YAR, was released after intervention 
from Ṣanaʿāʾ. He kept his formal position, wealth, and status (Interview with ʿAlī Muḥsin 
Ḥamīd, 2015).  
Beyond the model: the resonance of ideas and reinforcing local authority 
Despite its undoubted importance in re-shaping local and central politics, this co-produced 
violence was geographically circumscribed and limited to lower Yemen. In Upper Yemen, it 
appears that violence against the sāda was rare. Instead, the war prompted a “flurry of pact 
making” between tribes and “their” sāda. Indeed, the anti-sayyid bent of the early 
proclamations of the revolution and the speeches of al-Bayḍānī and others were important 
factors in alienating the northern tribes and pushing them to support the royalists (Weir, 
2007, p.281; Dresch, 1993b, p.248). This suggests that the absence of violence against sāda in 
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Upper Yemen was not only and probably not primarily a consequence of being within the 
royalist sphere of influence,186 but rather the opposite: positive attitudes towards sāda 
predicted opposition to anti-sayyid rhetoric and support for the royalists.187 The model and 
the literature on which it is based hence take insufficient account of the elementary, but 
perhaps too easily neglected, point that central discourses are circumscribed by how they 
resonate, or fail to resonate, with specific local governing arrangements and associated 
beliefs. In areas where sāda were not powerful quasi-feudal landlords, but rather respected 
mediators, teachers, and preachers, dependent, at least in local understandings, on tribal 
protection, there was little scope for local actors to pick-up and act upon central cleavages.  
Similarly, although attacks on tribal leaders in initial revolutionary proclamations did not 
come near the vilification of the sāda in prominence or intensity, republican elites inherited 
from the Imamate a language of state authority opposed to tribal forms, the idea, familiar 
from the discussion in 3.3.1, that tribes were enemies of central order. This handily combined 
with ideas, imported from education abroad and the Egyptian interveners, that tribes were 
backwards and archaic. Given this framing, the Egyptians initially deployed with the intention 
to side-line the tribes. Although their evolving counterinsurgency practice increasingly made 
a mockery of this aim, ultimately reinforcing tribal power (see 4.2), rhetorically and in the 
plans of civilian experts and teachers, this hostility lingered (al-Ẓāhirī, 1996, pp.136–137; 
Huwaydī, 1982, p.104).  
Punitive expeditions, designed to cow tribes into submission, Egyptian officers’ humiliation of 
tribal leaders, and instances of land confiscations from tribal shaykhs in the name of social 
equality in the last months of 1962 formed part of an initial Egyptian attempt to shore-up the 
revolution (El Attar, 1964, pp.282–283; Sirrs, 2010, p.77). Later, Egyptian policies vacillated 
between pragmatic bargains with tribal leaders, driven by short-term military objectives, and 
attempts to weaken tribes in line with their project of political transformation. At several 
points, including when they felt as though they were losing tribal support in the mid-1960s, 
the Egyptian command froze payments to local tribal committees and pushed tribal 
representatives out of formal and informal decision-making (al-Ẓāhirī, 1996, p.141). Indeed, 
                                                          
 
186 Compare Kalyvas, 2006 on collaboration and the logics of territorial control. 
187 Though of course conflicts could and did occur between tribes and ‘their’ sāda. Steven Caton 
describes a later instance of such conflict in 1979/80 during which a tribesman declared: the sāda 
“were dogs…before the revolution kicked them out of power” (Caton, 2005, p.106). 
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Egyptian writing on the war into the 1990s insisted that the Egyptian mission in Yemen was, 
in part, about freeing Yemenis from the “prison of tribal custom” (ʾAḥmad, 1992, p.525).  
Such propaganda may have contributed to a fear among tribal leaders that the revolution 
represented a Shāfiʿī power grab against their privileges (El Attar, 1964, p.281), yet it had 
little success in rousing local opposition, indeed may have increased support for them (al-
ʾIryānī, 2013, p.193). In contrast to the anti-sayyid master cleavage, which was readily taken 
up by rival local elites, few local rivals emerged to take up the anti-tribal strains of 
revolutionary propaganda. As traced in the previous chapters, tribal forms rather emerged 
strengthened from the war, which provided material support for the reproduction of tribal 
forms and a context in which tribes’ ability to control coercion and thus provide protection 
played an important role in the everyday experiences of tribesmen and those nominally 
under their protection.  
6.2 Mobilisation for violence and ideas of the state 
Previous chapters probed the effects of wartime mobilisation on the political settlement and 
formal institutions. Wartime mobilisation also had a large impact on ideas of the state. In line 
with the model, because mobilisation of local violence specialists strengthened social 
organisations – the tribes – operating according to logics that differed from those of the 
bureaucratic state, the war shaped ideas about the nature of state authority, so that tribal 
forms came to define the formal structure of state institutions and it became possible to 
imagine Yemen as ‘a nation of tribes.’ However, while the literatures the model drew on 
suggests that such developments must undermine state forms, we will see that these logics 
need not be, in fact were not, antithetical to ‘the state’ so much as providing a particular 
vision of state authority.  
Sub-section 6.2.2 goes on to probe the idea that recruitment for the republican military 
increased the salience of the central state, while simultaneously militarising ideas of the 
state. It highlights that while the central state did become more important as an addressee of 
claims and its functions became imagined in military terms, it is unclear whether wartime 
mobilisation can convincingly account for these developments. Instead, central allocation of 
resources and the extensive and heavily militarised Egyptian intervention best account for 
these changes. 
6.2.1 Local violence specialists 
Previous chapters examined how royalists and republicans and the Egyptian and Saudi 
Arabian governments, relied on tribal support to wage war. This reliance on tribal 
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mobilisation contributed to the central state’s minimal ability to collect taxes, meant it 
struggled to attain predominance in the use force, and had to abdicate much responsibility 
for public order. Mobilisation of the tribes created and cemented a political settlement and 
institutional structures in which central actors unable to form alliances with tribal leaders had 
limited reach and influence. In analogous ways, the war reinforced tribes’ ability to not only 
reproduce tribal logics internally, but to structure other institutions in tribal terms, as the 
model suggests it would. Some of these ways have been highlighted in previous chapters: 
tribesmen in the military abandoned their units to respond to calls for mobilisation from their 
tribe, lines of command in the military and of authority in civilian ministries at times followed 
tribal hierarchies rather than organigrammes, and control of much local government from 
Ṣanaʿāʾ was tenuous. 
In addition, the republican state itself became imagined in tribal terms through the series of 
republican conferences at the centre of the Yemeni historiography of the war: the ʿAmrān 
conference of September 1963, the Khamr conference of May 1965, and the Ḥaraḍ 
conference of November 1965. The decisions of the ʿAmrān conference include, for example, 
demands to arm the tribes, to establish a committee of shaykhs to resolve inter-tribal 
disputes, to form a national consultative body composed of tribal leaders, and to create a 
committee of shaykhs to ensure, by military measures if necessary, an end to foreign 
intervention in tribal affairs (Dresch, 1993b, p.249; ʾAḥmad, 1992, p.363). The Khamr and 
Ḥaraḍ conferences reiterated most of these demands. These conference decisions did not 
demand a greater role of tribes in existing institutions – by increasing the number of tribal 
recruits to the military, increasing the number of ministerial posts for tribal leaders, or 
demanding more far-reaching authority for a ministry of tribal affairs. Instead, they 
demanded a reconfiguration of the republican state in tribal terms: a new tribal army, a 
parliament conceived as a tribal gathering, and new institutions of self-government.  
Though largely a dead letter until Egyptian withdrawal, these conference decisions did 
provoke Egyptian and radical republican adaptations and shaped institutional blueprints 
during the al-ʾIryānī presidency. President al-Sallāl defined a “Charter of National Action” 
broadly in line with the demands of the Khamr conference, while insisting on an Egyptian 
presence in Yemen (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 19 Jul. 1965). In Egyptian thinking, tribal 
conferences, like support to tribal leaders, became an alternative to the arduous business of 
building new institutions. A lessons-learned document from the operations in Yemen, 
composed by the Egyptian military in 1964, counsels using tribal conferences and working 
with republican shaykhs to encourage tribes to support the republic (Ferris, 2012, p.183). 
Wherever possible, radical republicans also organised tribal conferences and ‘people’s 
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congresses,’ during the 1966 stand-off with moderate republicans, which likewise adopted 
the form and vernacular of traditional tribal gatherings for the new politics. The Ṭāʾif 
conference in August 1965 between royalists and dissident republicans, sponsored by Saudi 
Arabia and associated with the ‘third way’ politics of Ibrahim al-Wazīr, may have had a similar 
effect of privileging tribal forms on the royalist side.188 By some accounts, the Ṭāʾif conference 
cemented a shift in King Faysal’s approach. Thereafter, he reduced funding to the Ḥamīd al-
Dīn and reached out to tribes directly (Schmidt, 1968, pp.278–279; ʾAḥmad, 1992, p.372).189  
The model suggests that this should reinforce divisions, generate political fragmentation, and 
undermine the idea of the state. By contrast, a close examination of the case highlights the 
centripetal as well as centrifugal tendencies of this ‘tribalisation’ of republicanism. In a 
situation where Imamate-era ideas were in crisis (3.3.3) and the republican ideas formulated 
and imposed in important measure by external intervention failed to resonate with 
significant portions of the population and were rejected by large parts of the Northern 
Yemeni elite (6.1.2), tribal forms provided a framework to contain fragmentation. In addition 
to its well-documented and undoubted effects tending to aggravate fragmentation and de-
centralisation, the increasing and increasingly powerful presence of tribal leaders at the heart 
of YAR government was, by the end of the war, one of the few things meaningfully 
connecting local and central governance, shaped imaginings of how they should fit together, 
and what being Yemeni meant after the fall of the Imam.   
The tribal conferences provided one of the few frameworks to bridge divides between 
royalists and republicans and within the republican camp. Participation at the ʿAmrān, Khamr, 
and Ḥaraḍ conferences did not include the Ḥamīd al-Dīn or other official royalist 
representatives, but it did include a large number of tribal leaders affiliated with the royalists. 
Tribal ties and rules of hospitality also allowed republicans opposed to the Egyptians and in 
open conflict with President al-Sallāl, to sit with the royalist delegation at the Ḥaraḍ 
conference. These included Sinān ʾAbū Luḥūm, ʾAḥmad ʿAlī al-Maṭarī, and Mujāhid ʾAbū 
Shawārib, who had all been consistently anti-royalist and had actively led troops against 
royalist forces (see e.g. al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, pp.101-103, 107-109, 112–118). Similarly, tribal 
agreements crossed republican-royalist divides at a more local level, muting wartime 
                                                          
 
188 For a detailed documentation of the Ṭāʾif conference, see: al-Wazīr, n.d.a. 
189 Gause (1990, p.71) dates the same development later.  
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polarisation and likely encouraging the coevolution of elite discourses traced in 6.1.1.190 For 
instance, in ʿAmrān, when disagreements about how to divide royalist payments between 
different sections and families in Murhiba tribe threatened to unseat the shaykh, tribal 
leaders from nearby Banū Ṣuraym, who supported the republicans in the war, were amongst 
those mediating a solution (Dresch, 1993b, p.258). More broadly, truces between tribes 
structured dynamics along the front-lines of battle and tribes divided in terms of their 
allegiance to royalists or republicans could and did come together in other contexts (Dresch, 
1993b, pp.258–259). Many of these agreements did not outlaw fighting per se, but regulated 
it and distinguished between ‘tribal’ and ‘political’ logics. For instance, an important truce 
between Ḥāshid and Bakīl, also negotiated in Murhiba, which put a stop to a confrontation 
that threatened to turn into an all-out war between these two large tribal confederations, 
specified that any member of Ḥāshid or Bakīl who wants to “fight for his country (dawla)” can 
"fight in Ṣanaʿāʾ” (al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, pp.138–139). Tribal mediation also sought to resolve and 
contain entirely non-tribal disputes, as when tribal forms were mobilised to mediate between 
President al-Sallāl and the Egyptians as their relationship soured with Egyptian withdrawal in 
autumn 1967 (al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, pp.142–143). 
Tribal forms also played a central role in the everyday functioning of the republican state and 
came to colour the imagination of how the central state should relate to the local level. Just 
as Imamate institutions had sometimes operated through and sometimes alongside tribal 
institutions, so did the republican state after the war. Personalised alliances with tribal 
leaders were one of the few ways central government decisions might influence local level 
governance in Upper Yemen. Of course, this is a form of administrative penetration identified 
precisely with the absence of state forms in tribal systems – leaders of local patrimonial 
networks accept central patrimonialism, but reject bureaucratic forms, declaring loyalty to a 
ruler, but not to a system of government, its logics, or levels of authority (Charrad, 2011, 
p.59). Yet, this too readily takes an ideal-typical Weberian vision of what the outcome of 
central-local bargaining should look like for an account of its starting points and the process 
of bargaining itself. As Sheila Carapico (1998, esp. pp.112-120; see also 5.2.3) has shown in 
her study of civic participation in the YAR, it was the LDAs that, in the 1970s and 80s 
ultimately were one of the main instruments for the central state to influence local politics 
                                                          
 
190 Even though such deals and agreements may have appeared as “nothing more than codified 
treachery” to royalists, republicans, and particularly the Egyptians (Dresch, 1993b, p.258) 
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and formed the basis for its fragile hegemony. Yet these LDAs began life as non-state spaces, 
sometimes providing a forum for bottom-up resistance and the formation of new local 
centres of influence, sometimes captured by established local elites, but not, during the 
1960s, functioning according to a central system, its logics, or levels of authority. This 
observation on the LDAs holds more broadly: the post-war parliament may have come close 
to being the ʿAmrān conference’s envisaged council of shaykhs, but it formed the main 
institutionalised mechanism connecting local demands with central decisions and spending.  
Finally, tribal imaginings formed an important element in the evolving articulation of national 
identity in Northern Yemen. The identification of tribe and nation had a significant pedigree 
in Yemeni nationalist writing from the 1950s onwards, highlighted in particular by Paul 
Dresch, who insists that, from the outset, “the rhetoric of national politics and tribalism were 
entangled” (1993, p.245, also pp.240-4). This initial ‘entanglement’ was discussed in 3.1.2, 
which highlighted the way early nationalists like al-ʿAynī and al-Zubayrī had imagined the 
‘Yemeni people’ as being composed, in important measure, of tribes.191 During the civil war, 
both al-ʿAynī and al-Zubayrī rose to positions of political influence, as did others sharing a 
similar vision of Yemeni nationalism. Al-Zubayrī’s assassination ensured he became enshrined 
as a republican martyr and his writing continued to define nationalist imaginings.  
Royalist propaganda stressed many of the same themes. Whereas in power, the Imams had 
vacillated between celebrating the tribes as the ‘wings of the Imamate’ and casting them as a 
barbarian threat to the Imam’s domain of order, during the war royalist propaganda came to 
celebrate tribal poetry, and in rhetoric and pictorial representation tribesmen stood in for 
‘the Yemeni people’ as a whole (e.g. al-Yaman, 16 Mar. 1967, pp.12-13). This further point of 
republican-royalist convergence coloured what Paul Dresch (1993b, p.263) has called the 
“new double relation of identity and contrariety” of tribes to the state, whereby tribes 
imagined themselves to be part of a Yemeni people and hence associated with a state that 
claimed to represent it; while at the same time guarding against state encroachment onto 
tribal autonomy. 
In these ways, the war laid the foundation for a growing acceptance of tribal forms as 
institutional blueprints, and their celebration as authentic and particularly Yemeni. They 
became embedded not only in the political settlement and the institutions of the YAR, but in 
                                                          
 
191 By contrast, nationalist politicians from lower Yemen tended to stress Yemen’s ancient greatness 
and Qurʾānic references without a tribal dimension. See e.g.: Zayd, 2004, p.80. 
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the very idea of the state, precisely because they offered a framework to potentially contain 
the growing fragmentation of ideas of the state. There was no fundamental incompatibility 
between tribal and ‘national’ identity. As Yemen became imagined as a nation of tribes, those 
with tribal identities sometimes laid claim to being more ‘authentically’ Yemeni by virtue of 
their tribal particularism and what radical potential there was in appeals to ‘the people’ as 
(equal) citizens became contained by the mediated vision of the people as also being a 
collection of tribes (Mundy, 1995, p.7). War made a North Yemeni state in which tribal 
organisation structured formal institutions and defined national imaginings more strongly 
than otherwise likely, with far-reaching effects.  
6.2.2 Organising new violence specialists  
The model links new organisations dealing in violence with the spread of state-centric 
identities and a militarisation of ideas of the state. Chapter 4 traced the way in which military 
mobilisation partially extended central patronage networks and meant that officers became a 
far more important part of the dominant coalition. Yet, it also stressed the partial and 
abortive nature of military mobilisation during the civil war, highlighting how rival power 
centres sought to limit and reverse increases in the size and importance of the military and 
how this contributed to an intertwining of the two mobilisation pathways of the model: the 
tribes were militarised and the military tribalised. Due to this limited nature of mobilisation; 
and due to the way in which traditional forms structured new organisations, there is limited 
evidence of military mobilisation fostering state-centric identities beyond narrow circles in 
the officer corps. A straightforward modernist narrative, whereby conscription turned 
peasants and tribesmen-farmers into ‘Yemenis’ is not convincing. The military remained small 
and military service, though increasingly attractive as a path of advancement, was not a 
nationalist rite of passage. Yet, despite this, it does appear that ideas of the state became 
extensively militarised in North Yemen during the civil war, in that the military came to be 
imagined as the guardian of national values and the avatar of modernisation. Military officers 
came to dominate the formal state, the pageantry of the republic revolved around military 
displays, and its ideology celebrated ‘unity’ as embodied by the military. In light of the limited 
nature of military mobilisation, it is most convincing to ascribe this, beyond the framework of 
the model, to the heavily militarised Egyptian intervention. 
After Radio Ṣanaʿāʾ declared the overthrow of the Imam, the new YAR government sent out 
messages to foreign capitals. Under a letterhead on which ‘Mutawakkilite Kingdom’ and the 
crown atop the coat of arms had been carefully crossed out, the message declared (PAAA, 
B12 1059, 2 Oct. 1962): 
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[sic] The revolution of the Arab people of Yemen – undertaken on their behalf by its armed 
forces against anturies of oppression, feudalism and exploitation caracterized by utter 
contempt to the elementary principles of the right of men, have culminated on 27th of Rabii 
Thani 1383 (September 26th 1962) in the proclamation of the Arab Republic of Yemen, 
unanimously acclaimed throughout Yemen.  
The idea that the military carried out the revolution on behalf of the people, was, of course, 
not a Yemeni invention, but is indicative of the prominence the military assumed in 
republican discourse and the way the military and imported technologies of violence became 
identified with ideas of the modern. This was particularly evident in the way the YAR 
celebrated its revolution. The Imams from Yaḥiyā forward had taken to reviewing their 
troops, parading long lines of men outside the city gates of Ṣanaʿāʾ and then Taʿiz and al-
Ḥudayda to showcase their power. The republican government and its military leaders 
significantly expanded and redefined these spectacles. While the Imam might have reviewed 
hundreds of soldiers marching past with rifles, the YAR’s revolution-day parades featured 
thousands of soldiers in identical Egyptian-style uniforms, marching in step, accompanied by 
tanks and armoured vehicles. Although the pageantry of revolution also included plays and 
nervous schoolchildren reciting patriotic poetry (Gerholm, 1977, p.24), it was the military 
parade that was broadcast on Radio Ṣanaʿāʾ and to which foreign dignitaries were invited 
(e.g. PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 1 Oct. 1965; 8 Oct. 1966). Every year, these parades grew in 
size and sophistication and foreign observers noted that troops appeared “consistently better 
trained and better dressed” from 1964 through 1966 (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 8 Oct. 
1966; 1 Oct. 1965). Moreover, President al-Sallāl, unlike ʿAbd al-Nasir, never exchanged his 
uniform for a suit – or a thawb – and much daily news reporting during the civil war revolved 
around al-Sallāl’s visits to the military academy, to frontline positions, and to the Egyptian 
command (e.g. PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 24 Jun. 1965), highlighting how official 
government media equated war-fighting and ruling during the civil war.  
This re-centring of popular imaginings of political order onto the military is likewise evident in 
Messick’s description of the ‘new men’ of the 1970s. Describing changing ideals of authority 
in ʾIbb, in lower Yemen, he highlights that ‘great men’ in the traditional mould were those 
who had mastered religious learning and attained high office in the Imamic administration, 
whereas the ‘new men’ who conformed to the ideals of the 1970s, were men from learned 
families who became military officers (Messick, 1978, p.109). This shift was not limited to one 
of the YAR’s geographic regions. In his ethnographic work focused on tribes in Upper Yemen, 
Dresch diagnosed a change in emphasis away from religious learning for high office, towards 
a conception of political order in military terms. Since the revolution, “unity is the catchword 
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of governments” in Yemen and “the idea of the military answers to this most directly” 
(Dresch, 1993b, pp.265–266). 
Yemeni domestic military mobilisation does not account well for militarisation. Instead, 
Egyptian intervention was decisive. This is encapsulated nicely in the cancellation of the YAR’s 
1967 revolution-day parade, after Egyptian defeat in June and amidst Egyptian withdrawal. 
The German embassy speculated whether the YAR would have been able to put on a parade 
at all, given the rushed repatriation of heavy weapons to Egypt “without regard for 
ownership” (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 29 Sep. 1967) and the dominance of Egyptian 
planners, organisers and even troops and musicians in the parades of the previous years (see 
also: PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 8 Oct. 1966).  
Moreover, Egyptian troops were, throughout most of the civil war, the most visible and 
sometimes the only expression of the new YAR state present at a local level and Egyptian 
officers made extensive decisions about local government. In some areas they acted as de-
facto governors and everywhere decided about the projects of Egyptian combat engineers, 
offering well-building and pumps in exchange for collaboration (Vassiliev, 2012, p.291; Ferris, 
2012, p.185). Visiting the Egyptian garrison in Ṣaʿda, Dana Adams Schmidt, a correspondent 
for the New York Times, noted that the Egyptians had built a school, distributed tractors to 
farmers, and installed water pumps. The Egyptian field hospital catered to Yemeni civilians. 
More broadly, the Egyptian Army in Yemen had a section entirely devoted to civilian 
development activities (Schmidt, 1968, pp.84, 208). Describing the role of the Egyptian 
commander, Schmidt noted:  
I felt he was enjoying his role as dispenser of largesse in a primitive community. Dealing with 
the supplicants at his gate with a mixture of condescension and affection, he may have 
imagined himself in the role the British played for so many years in his own home in Egypt. 
After the commander had given away three pumps and six tractors, “he found himself 
settling disputes about the distribution of water, the use of the tractors, and a thousand 
other things” (Schmidt, 1968, pp.84–85, 208). He began, in other words, to rule and 
administer as the de facto representative of the new order.  
The specific military model the Egyptians sought to export to Yemen structured this 
militarisation. It was not just external intervention, but intervention that sought to create a 
vanguardist, economically favoured, and politically active officer corps, that underwrote a 
militarisation of ideas of the state as military officers came to see themselves as the natural 
leaders of the YAR. In the lead-up to the revolution, Egyptian intelligence and ʾAnwar al-
Sadat, who held the Yemen portfolio within the Egyptian leadership, had shifted their support 
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away from the civilian Yemeni Union to the Free Officers, who consciously modelled 
themselves on the Egyptian conspirators of 1952 (Douglas, 1984, p.228). The relative side-
lining of civilian revolutionaries and reformists in the overthrow of the Imam translated 
directly into a series of officer-dominated cabinets. It also played an important role in the 
unwavering Egyptian support for President al-Sallāl, a military officer, long after he had lost 
domestic support. This combined with the Egyptian decision to remake the Yemeni military in 
the Egyptian image, discussed in 5.2.3. Many Yemeni officers hence sought to formally take 
control of state institutions in ways in which tribal leaders did not and civilians, lacking 
military support, could not. Despite limited mobilisation, the Yemeni military was 
indispensable for any government by the end of the civil war – and so were its most popular 
and influential officers (AV Neues Amt 12333, 26 Jul. 1971).  
The civil war thus militarised ideas of the state through a sort of vicarious mobilisation. This 
also reinforced state-centric identities, but primarily among the officer corps, the most 
privileged group of newly recruited violence specialists. The Egyptian military presence and 
model, while, as we saw in Chapter 4, playing an ambivalent and often limiting role in the 
development of the YAR military, did much to politicise its officers and to identify the 
Republic with military-led modernisation and military rule. Of course, as previous chapters 
and Section 6.2.1 above highlight, this dynamic was unfolding at the same time as tribal 
forms experienced an unprecedented boost, intertwining the organisational forms and ideas 
associated with both the tribes and the military. 
6.3 War financing: taxation, allocation, and the idea of the state 
The saying that nothing is certain but death and taxes, attributed to Benjamin Franklin, 
suggests how state revenue production can contribute to the idea of state permanence, 
coherence, and inevitability. Taxation, allocation, and ideas of the state intertwine closely. In 
the model, dominant coalitions can choose to either outsource taxation to the local level or 
expand centrally-administered taxation. In terms of ideas of the state it suggests that 
outsourcing taxation may either retroactively justify central control, or highlight the power- 
and meaninglessness of the centre for lived realities at the local level. Expanding centrally 
administered taxation, on the other hand, can make the state more present, powerful and 
meaningful in popular imagining but may also serve to escalate grievances against it.  
There is a problem of evidence in seeking to evaluate these claims. While triangulating from 
post-war ethnographies, contemporary foreign service and journalistic reporting, individual 
interviews, and memoirs has allowed the, often impressionistic, reconstruction of important 
local level dynamics in other chapters; local imaginings of the state and changes in them 
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appear particularly difficult to reconstruct. This is all the more true since the Egyptians and, 
to a lesser extent, the royalists dominated cultural production during the civil war. From 
them, we have newspapers and transcripts of radio broadcasts. For a sense of how Yemenis 
made sense of changing patterns of taxation at the local level, we have, at best, a handful of 
ethnographies and the memoirs of powerful shaykhs writing to establish their legacies long 
after the events in question.  
Yet, this problem of evidence may be less acute than it appears. We know from Chapter 5 
that central taxation was on a downwards trend throughout most of the civil war, except 
during a limited period after Egyptian withdrawal. At the same time, local taxation, which the 
model identifies with elite predation, also does not appear to have increased, since local 
leaders had a surfeit of resources accruing to them directly. More broadly, it is not clear that 
the relationship between tribesmen and tribal leaders would have allowed extensive 
predation so that the relatively equal balance of power within tribes contributed to the fact 
that outsourcing taxation led to limited taxes in accordance with locally accepted forms of 
authority.192 On its own, this might have reduced the importance and presence of central 
institutions and could ultimately have eroded the idea of the central state and its relevance 
for everyday life. However, Chapter 5 also highlighted that the decline of taxation occurred in 
conjunction with large increases in allocation, a central missing story in the historiography of 
the civil war to date. As a result, while central control over local taxation, appointments, and 
dispute settlement decreased, the legitimacy of central government increased.  
Actors in the civil war pursued neither of the two options the model identifies. Instead, 
allocation-led state building made the central state a more important addressee of claims as 
it came to demand less and offer more. Increased central allocation and the concentration of 
externally provided resources in Ṣanaʿāʾ-based institutions that interfaced with international 
donors, made the capital the arena for bargaining and disputes over distribution. As a result, 
the central government became more important. The idea that there was a North Yemeni 
state, that it determined important features of people’s lives, and defined in some measure a 
                                                          
 
192 This is puzzling from the perspective of a literature on elite predation and state capture (see: Di 
John, 2010b for a summary and review), and unremarkable from a political economy perspective that 
takes the local political settlement and the checks and balances on the power of tribal leaders 
seriously. 
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reference point for political belonging, became more plausible in direct relation not to the 
centre’s ability to tax, but its ability to spend.193 
An instructive, if perhaps crude, remark from Hugh Leach, a British foreign service official 
visiting the YAR immediately after the war, drives home the increased expectations many in 
the YAR came to have of the government and a tendency towards increased claim-making 
vis-à-vis the central state. In the early 1970s he noted that Yemenis were “constantly” 
complaining “about the inadequacies of the central government” and measured its 
shortcomings in comparison “to America or Europe.”194 After the civil war there was an 
expectation that the government should be providing services and opportunities, suggesting 
an ideal not of (tribal) autonomy, of being left alone, but of expectations and demands for 
state intervention. These expectations are also evident in the memoirs of Shaykh ʿAbd Allah 
al-ʾAḥmar, who stresses the occasions during the civil war when Ḥāshid fought without 
salaries, was cut off from stipends, or did not receive the expected investment, such as after 
Egyptian defeat in the Six-Day War. On these occasions, he highlights that Ḥāshid continued 
fighting while receiving "not a single riyal" from al-Sallāl or the Egyptian command (al-ʾAḥmar, 
2008, p.138, see also 126). The (new) expected normal was clearly that tribes receive central 
stipends – and by extension tribes were justified in pressuring the central government to 
resume such payments when they ceased. If the Imamate ideal was direct access and a 
personal relationship with the Imam (compare 3.3), this was increasingly replaced by an ideal 
of direct access to state funds (e.g. Carapico and Myntti, 1991). According to the same logic, 
in nominally royalist Rāziḥ, the “small minority” of officials who were openly republican 
sought to sway local public opinion by appealing to the infrastructure the republic would 
deliver to Rāziḥ (Weir, 2007, p.281). It helped that allocation in the form of road-building 
reduced obstacles to mobility, facilitating the circulation of people, goods, and ideas. 
Tribesmen who had never been outside their valleys, or villagers in lower Yemen who had 
never travelled beyond the nearest market town, were increasingly able to hitch a ride to 
                                                          
 
193 This is not to endorse a simple modernisation story. Academic and journalistic writing on the YAR 
during the 1960s and 1970s was suffused with arguments that placed much emphasis on the nature of 
newly-available goods and (too) little on who controlled new resources. On the imagined 
transformative power of Hollywood movies and Coca Cola see e.g.: Boals, 1970, p.258. 
194 John Shipman Papers: Hugh Leach, “The Lost Tribes of Israel: a survey of the remaining Jews living in 
the Yemen,” 20 Jun. 1971. 
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Ṣanaʿāʾ or Taʿiz and access shops, cafes, movies, as well as central government (Schmidt, 
1968, p.287; Gerholm, 1977, p.36). A second major area of local investment was in school 
building. Even after Egyptian withdrawal, these schools were manned by Egyptian teachers, 
pushing a statist and Nasirist narrative (Gerholm, 1977, p.24; see also: Tsourapas, 2016).195  
6.4 The inscription of violence in ideas of the state  
Egyptian destruction of towns and villages, the mutilation of Egyptian soldiers’ corpses,196 
local famines, political assassinations, violent protests, and gruesome executions all marked 
the lived reality of the civil war. Such events, the triggers of the collective and individual 
trauma of war, also affect conceptions of the state and everyday politics in the sense that 
violence may become normalised as part of the regular practice of government. During the 
civil war, political assassinations proliferated, arrests, executions, and other coercive 
instruments of governance grew in scale, and ‘popular violence’ in the form of bombing and 
sabotage entered the repertoire of contentious politics in the YAR. There was a shift in the 
coercive basis of the state and the forms of political violence rulers and state officials 
engaged in. The model suggested that this could underwrite a rally to ‘normalcy’ and 
legitimate (any) order by comparison to the traumatic violence of war, or undermine 
legitimacy by reducing faith in the state’s ability to afford even the most basic protection to 
its citizens. Yet, rather than directly legitimating or undermining the status quo, the spread of 
these forms of violence served rather to change popular expectations of how politics was 
conducted. Although, as studies of the 1970s and later highlight, on an everyday level, 
formidable mechanisms for conflict mediation and management could contain conflict, mass 
arrests and assassinations became a much more ‘normal’ part of how YAR politics operated 
during and after the civil war. 
                                                          
 
195 Later, the experience of working in Saudi Arabia and contact with the expanding welfare provisions 
there likely coloured these views. Both Saudi welfare provision and Yemeni migration to Saudi Arabia 
was in its earliest stages into the late 1960s and did not take off until after 1970 (Al-Rasheed, 2002, 
pp.116–124). 
196 Dresch (1993b, p.274 note 24) argues that such mutilations were not an ‘ancient tribal custom,’ but 
a disgrace. However, at various points Saudi Arabia offered money for trophies and the Egyptian 
soldiers’ presence “outside the moral universe” of the tribes meant these incentives were repeatedly 
taken up. 
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According to German embassy reporting, bombings and assassinations became a regular 
occurrence during the civil war, particularly from 1965 onwards.197 A report of 19 August 
1965 mentions three bomb attacks in Taʿiz on the evenings of 10 and 11 August targeting the 
Egyptian headquarters, which were attributed locally to “imperialist subversion” (PAAA, AV 
Neues Amt 1719, 19 Aug. 1965). A report from 1 October 1965 reports the ambassador’s 
worries about sitting near President al-Sallāl during the revolution parade due to the 
“notorious Yemeni predilection for explosives” and mentions that a young man had died 
when a bomb he was carrying detonated prematurely earlier the same day in Taʿiz (PAAA, AV 
Neues Amt 1719, 1 Oct. 1965). In February 1966, a particularly large explosion, which the 
Germans blamed on conflicts over control of the southern independence struggle, killed 10 
people (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 8 Feb. 1966). A report from later that year refers to 
Egyptian efforts to outlaw the carrying of weapons in cities to combat “almost daily” 
ambushes and attacks on Egyptian troops – and notes the Egyptians used the death penalty 
to enforce the prohibition (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 21 Oct. 1966). On 15 November of the 
same year, reporting mentions an attack with explosives on a Taʿiz power plant (PAAA, AV 
Neues Amt 1719, 15 Nov. 1967). The list could be continued: a report from August 1966 calls 
attacks with explosives “a real plague in this country,” mentions a host of recent executions, 
and reports on the summary justice meted out to suspected bombers (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 
1719, 1 Aug. 1966).  
In addition to events reported as sabotage and terrorism, a host of reports also refer to 
assassination attempts of high-profile political figures: In addition to the well-known and still 
unsolved assassination of Muḥammad al-Zubayrī, killed in March/April 1965, other prominent 
politicians were likewise found dead far from the front lines: ʿAbd al-Qawī Ḥāmīm, a pro-
Egyptian former Foreign Minister, who had organised a Taʿiz ‘people’s congress’ in the run up 
to the Ḥaraḍ conference, was ambushed and killed shortly thereafter (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 
1719, 26 Aug. 1965; Muṭahar, 1984, pp.216-18). In April 1966, ʿAbd Allah al-ʾIryānī, the 
prominent brother of ʿAbd al-Raḥman al-ʾIryānī was murdered (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 19 
Apr. 1966). Muḥammad Nuʿmān, a close relative of ʾAḥmad Nuʿmān, experienced the same 
fate in July (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 20 Jul. 1966). Al-ʿAmrī escaped multiple assassination 
                                                          
 
197 In contrast to the increase of such events in German reporting, my interviewees largely denied that 
bombings and assassinations became a more regular occurrence during the civil war.  
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attempts (see e.g. PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, n.d.; 21 Jun 1966),198 while the royalists 
claimed “officers in Ṣanaʿāʾ” were trying to assassinate shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-ʾAḥmar, after a 
mine destroyed a car traveling in his convoy, killing the passengers (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 
1719, News from Yemen No. 4, 15 Oct. 1967).199 In February 1967, three bombs exploded at a 
school building shortly before its planned inauguration by President al-Sallāl and the Soviet 
Minister Muhiedinov (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 13 Feb. 1967). 
In addition, the period witnessed new levels of state-led violence: executions, arrests, and 
reprisals proliferated. Opponents of Imam ʾAḥmad had used the Imam’s killing of 32 of the 
plotters of the 1948 coup to great effect. Particularly the execution of his family members 
was central to anti Imamic propaganda, underlining that these executions could be leveraged 
as something shocking and out of the ordinary in terms of popular expectations of just rule. 
Similarly, when the new republican government executed leading Imamic officials and 
members of the Ḥamīd al-Dīn family in September and October 1962 (see 4.1.1), this pushed 
at least some who were vacillating between royalists and republicans towards supporting the 
Imam (al-Ẓāhirī, 1996, p.136; al-ʾAḥmar, 2008, p.86). These executions long remained a very 
important reference point for royalist supporters (Interview with ʿAbd Allah al-Kibsī, 2016).  
As such killings became more common in the course of the war, their importance in memori-
alisation wanes. There is much less interest in the historiography on the process whereby the 
revolution came to eat its children, notably the executions of Hādī ʿĪsā, Muḥammad al-
Ruʿaynī, and four others in October 1966. Al-Ruʿaynī was dragged through the streets and the 
dead were eventually thrown to the dogs (AV Neues Amt 1719, 27 Oct. 1966). Besides these 
executions, the German embassy identified show trials, arrests, and threats as constituting, 
from mid-1966 onwards, a system of “cynical, but effective, terror” (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 
1719, 8 Mar. 1967), which also included assassinations, executions, and mass arrests of as 
many as 2,000 tribal leaders, government functionaries, officers, and others. Public buildings 
were converted into makeshift prisons (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 2 Nov. 1966). When 
al-Sallāl was deposed in November 1967, one of his allies alleges that the new government 
                                                          
 
198 Several of these reports point fingers at Egyptian intelligence. However, most are silent or 
nonplussed about the potential culprits and their motivation. The crisis of Egyptian-German relations 
and the German Middle-East crisis (see 5.1) may have coloured reporting.  
199 News from Yemen was an English-language royalist magazine.  
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gunned down protestors in Taʿiz, killing five, injuring 15, and arresting more than 300 
(Muṭahar, 1984, p.183). 
Collective punishment and reprisals accompanied these forms of political violence. In 
addition to punitive bombing raids and the destruction of houses and whole villages,200 the 
Egyptian air force’s extensive use of poison gas is increasingly well documented. It formed an 
element of its efforts to depopulate the countryside through a “scorched-earth policy 
designed to eliminate support for the royalist guerillas” (McGregor, 2006, p.263). Egyptian 
warplanes used chemical weapons in 13 separate attacks in May 1967 alone and, according 
to CIA reports, the UAR had been using chemical agents against royalist forces since as early 
as May 1963. The US repeatedly confirmed the presence of chemical agents, including nerve 
gas, in villages attacked by Egyptian planes (Orkaby, 2014, pp.247–248).  
While reports of executions might have roused popular anger at the outset of the war, 
according to the German embassy, popular reactions to escalating levels of political violence 
and massacres in 1966 and 1967 increasingly dismissed individual occurrences. The embassy 
describes the coping mechanism of the “man on the street” in terms of normalising violence. 
Asked about Egyptian gas attacks, the typical response was to freely acknowledge that such 
attacks occurred (something Egyptian propaganda always denied), yet to shrug them off as 
something that “always happens.” In much the same way, the embassy thought most 
Yemenis accepted the “limitless rule of the secret police” during the mass arrest of thousands 
of suspected dissidents in late 1966 and early 1967 as something both mundane and 
inevitable (PAAA, AV Neues Amt 1719, 13 Feb. 1967), even though leading politicians 
criticised the intelligence services’ excesses and their framing of opponents to Egyptian rule 
for plots they did not commit (al-ʾIryānī, 2013, p.277). Post-war politics continued wartime 
violence by the same means. The secret police, likely launched by Egyptian intelligence, was 
significantly expanded under ʾIbrāhīm al-Ḥamdī. Similarly, the political assassinations that 
proliferated during the civil war and the southern independence struggle would return as an 
instrument of political competition in the 1970s, as an instrument of repression against the 
NDF in the 1980s, and as a tool to monopolise power in the 1990s.201  
                                                          
 
200 For instance, the Neue Züricher Zeitung reports that villages along the Ṣanaʿāʾ-al-Ḥudaydah road 
were destroyed in retaliation for the killing of Egyptian teachers (PAAA AV Neues Amt 1719, NZZ 
clipping from 22 Feb. 1966).  
201 Thanks to Martin Jerrett for this observation. See also: Jerrett and al-Haddar, 2017. 
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6.5 Conclusion to Chapter 6 
The evolution of ideas of the Yemeni state have not been widely examined and the evidence, 
approached in terms of the model’s focus on ideas of the state, shows that the war 
occasioned deeper ideational changes than western scholars have generally given the 
‘revolution’ credit for.  
The chapter traced the way elite contests politicised and mobilised the population, creating a 
new register of mass politics in Yemen’s larger cities and contributing to the co-production of 
‘popular’ violence against the sāda, which directly challenged sayyid privileges and the 
ideology of sayyid rule itself. However, the investigation also highlighted that action against 
the sāda was geographically localised and stressed that central cleavages did not prompt 
local action against either sāda or tribal leaders north of Ṣanaʿāʾ. Conflict not only drives 
change, but also supplies the means for existing centres of power to reproduce themselves. 
Violence against sāda and top-down politicisation fundamentally challenged Imamate ideas 
of just rule, yet proved unable to replace them with a coherent vision of republican 
government. Instead, elite discourses converged around a set of rhetorical commonplaces – 
modernity, the people, and development. These commonplaces were sites of significant 
contestation and the political field they delineated remained fragmentary, with much scope 
for disagreement and contradiction. Yet, they also all privileged the central state as an actor 
and as an addressee of claims and hence contributed to the production of a state effect — 
the idea that a dominant and coherent central organisation exists; or at least that it should. 
The specific state effect produced in Yemen was mediated through tribal forms and 
expectations and the idea that Yemen was a nation of tribes. Tribal mechanisms for conflict 
resolution, military mobilisation, and self-government became embedded in the formal state. 
Of course, tribal self-government and jurisprudence had also been accommodated by the 
Imam. Although Imamic texts tend to vilify tribal custom as un-Islamic, arbitrary, and 
particularistic, in contrast to the Imam’s application of shariʿa coded as Islamic, ordered, and 
universalist, tribal custom was routinely accommodated and formed a central part of the 
practice of Imamic government. Yet, tribal forms were under significant pressure as the 
Ḥamīd al-Dīn consolidated power. The civil war not only gave them a new lease on life, but 
provided the conditions under which they were institutionalised and formalised in the 
growing state apparatus and into the ideas of Yemeni nationalism that this apparatus began 
actively to reproduce through public displays and celebrations, investment decisions, and 
schooling.  
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Such tribal logics were not antithetical to ‘the state’ so much as providing a particular vision 
of political authority. This point, partially familiar from a literature on hybrid political orders 
and (neo)patrimonialism, needs to be taken far more seriously in thinking about state 
formation. There “are many paths to state formation, with each characterized by a distinctive 
relationship between the central state and local communities” (Charrad, 2011, p.51). The 
organisation of power at the centre is always shaped by pre-existing logics, rules, and 
practices, which help define specific institutional structures and by extension their operation 
and effects. 
Continuing one of the main arguments of Chapter 5, the investigation also revealed how 
increased spending made the central state a more important addressee of claims as it came 
to demand less and offer more. The idea that there was a North Yemeni state, that it 
determined important features of people’s lives, and defined in some measure a reference 
point for political belonging became more plausible in direct relation not to the centre’s 
ability to tax, but its ability to spend, reflecting a reality and expectation of public 
infrastructure and state services. The absence of allocation-led state building from the model 
reflects a broader neglect of the fiscal underpinnings of state formation in the literature and 
the need to move on from the important insights of political settlement perspectives on the 
role of rents in stabilising dominant coalitions, to how the different use of such rents to 
stabilise rule impacts dynamics of state formation in differential ways. The conclusion returns 
to this idea.  
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7 CONCLUSION 
Yemen has a long and unhappy history of civil war and conflict. These conflicts were not 
bracketed periods of crisis, but were productive and transformative in the sense that they 
determined, for better and often for worse, key features of the post-war political order. War 
and conflict drove state formation in particular directions and in, North Yemen, wartime 
violence and the practices associated with its mobilisation, administration, and financing 
shifted the political settlement, transformed formal institutions, and altered the very idea of 
political order between 1962 and 1970.  
7.1 What the model helped us discover about Yemen 
Approaching these wartime transformations from the perspective of a model that specifies 
mechanisms connecting civil war and state formation, reveals dynamics and processes that 
have been hitherto neglected in the study of the royalist-republican civil war and its 
aftermath. 
Although the growing power of tribes during the civil war is well established, the sheer scale 
of the flow of resources to tribal leaders, the fundamental transformative effects of the war 
on the political settlement, and the long-term impacts arising from this have rarely been fully 
acknowledged. Much of the more recent literature, in particular, has tended to take tribes as 
given features of the Yemeni political landscape, has treated their prominence during the 
1980s and 1990s as unremarkable, and has naturalised the limited reach of central 
institutions and their reliance on tribal allies. Yet these are all outcomes of the war; and, as 
the evidence collected along the model’s multiple and contradictory pathways serve to 
highlight, they are outcomes of this specific war and its particular constellations.  
The model, by drawing attention to wartime mobilisation and the recruitment of local 
violence specialists, accounts well for how tribal influence increased within the new state. It 
revealed that the civil war made tribal leaders’ ability to mobilise armed tribesmen 
indispensable, while external intervention provided the resources that cemented tribal 
leaders’ power and ensured they could extend wartime gains into the post-war period. 
Egyptian and Saudi Arabian intervention and their shared hostility to the political and 
disciplinary challenges of mass mobilisation, were revealed to have played a decisive role in 
producing and reproducing the armed power of the tribes.  
The discussion, building on the framework of the model and the specific dynamics it helped 
reveal, also moved beyond its immediate categories to explore not only how the tribes 
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shaped and benefited from the war, but how the war shaped the tribes, driving a process of 
centralisation by expanding tribal leaders’ opportunities for patronage while disrupting the 
livelihoods of ordinary tribesmen. This effect of the war on the tribes, subsequently 
institutionalised in the everyday functioning of the YAR, was recently also analysed by 
Marieke Brandt (2017, p.73), who concluded that over time, this “helped to distort a 
functioning tribal order” as growing gaps of income and status between the members of 
tribes and their leaders, compounded by the growing importance of tribal leaders as the 
interface between tribe and state, bred considerable resentment. Similarly, beyond the 
general rise of tribal leaders well-captured by the model, the exploration drew attention to 
the thick politics of personal connections and alliance formation to explain why specific 
shaykhs rose to particular prominence: these tribal leaders exploited the specific 
opportunities of war and were particularly well-placed to build an alliance with traditional 
notables and military officers opposed to both the Imam as well as more far-reaching social 
change.  
The emphasis in the model on different mobilising pathways and their potential impact on 
the political settlement also revealed how the ‘tribal-military-commercial’ complex of the YAR 
took shape during the civil war. Thinking about military mobilisation alongside mobilisation 
organised along traditional lines of kinship and tribal subscription, in particular, helped 
explain the observed tribalisation of the military and the militarisation of the tribes, which 
long defined the power dynamics in the north of the country – and arguably does so to this 
day. Examining these dynamics in tandem with external intervention, as the model suggests, 
also highlighted how Egyptian intervention privileged military officers in the dominant 
coalition, even as intervention, in line with the model, accounts for the slow and repeatedly 
aborted growth of the Yemeni military. Egyptian intervention fostered the politicisation of 
the YAR officer corps through training, purges, and growing roles in administration and 
decision-making, while ensuring they sat atop a weak and divided military. Because of the 
weakness of the regular military, alliances with tribal leaders became essential for some 
officers and, especially after Egyptian withdrawal, became the main way for officers to 
remain functionally operational and politically relevant. In addition, the Egyptian intervention 
provided opportunities for rapid capital accumulation for trading families, while underwriting 
their exclusion from the political settlement and their inability to access or control coercion, 
thus structuring the role of merchants on the margins of the settlement.  
A comparison of attempts to seize political power drives home the shifting political 
settlement between 1962 and 1967. In 1948, a handful of sayyid and qāḍī conspirators 
sought to topple the Imam more or less on their own. In 1962, a small contingent of military 
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officers alongside a loose network of oppositional ʿulamaʾ did so successfully. Thereafter, 
changes in leadership required both military and tribal support. In 1967, President al-ʾIryānī 
did not depose President al-Sallāl until he had secured the support of tribal leaders and the 
officers in charge of the most powerful military units. When President al-Ḥamdī in turn 
overthrew President al-ʾIryānī, it was at the head of an alliance of military officers and such 
tribal leaders as Sinān ʾAbū Luḥūm and ʿAbd Allah al-ʾAḥmar, although he later sought to limit 
their power. By 1967, military officers and tribal leaders were the central players in the 
dominant coalition.  
Similarly, using the emphasis in the model on different strategies of war financing as a lens 
for approaching the civil war, revealed dramatic and largely untold fiscal transformations of 
the YAR state. The YAR’s institutional orientation towards external rents, perhaps because it 
is a recurrent, almost prototypical feature of postcolonial states, has largely been taken for 
granted. Yet, the investigation reveals it to be, in important measure, an outcome of the civil 
war. Attempts to break decisively with Imamate era taxation provided the initial rationale for 
abandoning taxation. Egyptian aid, priorities, and the antinomies of external state building 
then provided the context in which taxation could be left to languish, while external rents and 
blueprints drove institutional change. During the war, the state in North Yemen went from 
being organised around taxation and especially the extraction of agricultural surplus from 
lower Yemen and the Tihāma, to a state built around the central allocation of international 
rents. The readiness of Saudi Arabia under King Faysal to give direct budget support to the 
YAR government in exchange for political influence and assurances of hostility to the PDRY 
after the end of the war, allowed this model to become entrenched in the 1970s.  
Such a far-reaching transformation of the political settlement and the fiscal basis of the state 
could not but have a defining impact on state institutions. The model highlighted tendencies 
of fragmentation and the challenges to developing effective central institutions likely to arise 
from abandoning taxation, relying on local violence specialists, and prioritising investment in 
the military. These tendencies helped frame a discussion of how the war, by ending taxation 
and heaping arms and funds upon tribal leaders, transformed centre-periphery relations. YAR 
administration, well into the 1980s at least, was far more decentralised and fragmented than 
it had been under the Imam. The rival pathways of the model also helped make sense of 
other developments that appear superficially to contradict this story of decentralisation and 
framed the discussion of how external rents and the specific models Egyptian experts sought 
to impose led to a rapid expansion of central institutions. By 1971, top-heavy central 
ministries employed at least 10,000 civil servants and provided one in ten jobs in Ṣanaʿāʾ. Yet, 
their growth was haphazard and chaotic. Despite producing statistics, publishing 
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administrative decrees, and otherwise acting ‘as if’ they constituted an effective state 
administration for the benefit of expert advisers and international audiences, these bodies 
were largely disconnected from the actual practice of governing and were reliant on alliances 
with local power brokers for local access and to implement their plans and projects – to the 
extent these were seriously pursued at all. Central allocation fed by international rents 
underwrote these alliances, though the funds involved during the 1960s were small and the 
model was new and untested. Yet this wartime development proved an important switch for 
the subsequent development of the state, with long-term impacts. As analysis of the practical 
functioning of the YAR and Republic of Yemen has frequently concluded, without necessarily 
probing its wartime origins, central patronage became the dominant mode of political 
integration. However, it produced little development and restricted political participation 
(e.g. Brandt, 2017, p.72). 
The war also occasioned deeper ideational changes than western scholars have generally 
given the ‘revolution’ credit for. The model helped to structure an exploration of these 
changes, which have rarely been given appropriate attention.202 It revealed that the acute 
competition between royalists and republicans and within republican circles for public 
support and for mobilising followers under conditions of conflict, prompted a convergence of 
elite discourses around the rhetorical commonplaces of modernity, development, and the 
people, defining a changed set of ideas and expectations of what the state should do and 
how it should be organised. Although not adding up to a coherent ideology of rule in the way 
that the Zaydī doctrine of the Imamate had, these rhetorical commonplaces constituted a 
fragmentary, potentially contradictory, and multiple basis for the conflicting claims of 
Republican politics that all privileged the central state as an actor and addressee of claims. 
Modernity and development in the 1960s were statist concepts, even if they were articulated 
in a context in which central institutions were weak and flanked by an imagination of the 
people heavily inflected by tribal forms. Across the political settlement, institutions, and ideas 
of the state, the model helped to reveal how specific features of the YAR, ones often viewed 
as characteristic of Yemen, were decisively influenced by and took shape during the civil war. 
                                                          
 
202 Exceptions are: Wenner, 1967; Dresch, 1993b; and for a later period: Wedeen, 2008. 
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7.2 The war then and the war now 
Of course, state formation did not cease with royalist-republican reconciliation in 1970, nor 
did the war sweep aside all features of the Imamate. Changes that took place because of the 
civil war did not determine future developments, nor is it useful to draw direct lines of 
continuity between, say, the Ḥūthī movement and the royalists, or to suggest that the current 
conflict is a replay of the civil war of the 1960s. Yet the exploration has value beyond the 
confines of understanding Yemen during the 1960s and both the exploration of the 1960s as 
well as the model that structured it, promise to be of relevance for understanding Yemen 
today, some 56 years after the beginning of the civil war. 
On-going conflict in Yemen is, in important ways, about the state formation legacies of earlier 
wars. That is not to say that the political settlement, the relationship between formal central 
institutions and local power brokers, or the parameters of legitimacy were set for the 
foreseeable future during the civil war of the 1960s. They needed to be reproduced to endure 
and continued to evolve through a series of external and internal shocks, not least the 
expulsion of Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia, Yemeni unification and the war between 
North and South in 1994 (Phillips, 2016, p.58; see also: Schmitz, 2016). Yet, central features 
set during the civil war defined the politics of the YAR and affect even the current war, 
ongoing at the time of writing; even as it further upends a status quo already called into 
question by declining oil rents in the 2000s and the uprisings of 2011.  
The breakdown of the long-standing alliance between tribal and military power – whose 
formation during the civil war formed one important theme of the discussion – was one of 
the factors precipitating the war. Saudi Arabia’s decision to come to the aid of ʿAbd Rabbuh 
Manṣūr Hādī decisively influenced and exacerbated the current conflict – and, as we saw, 
Saudi Arabian influence on and direct involvement in Yemeni politics largely dates from the 
civil war. Some elements of the sayyid elite who lost influence in the 1960 civil war – not 
limited to the al-Ḥūthī family – are at the forefront of the Ḥūthī movement. This has led the 
Hādī government, the ʾIṣlāḥ Party, and other anti- Ḥūthī forces to charge the Ḥūthī’s with 
seeking to re-fight the 1960s civil war and to re-instate the Imamate. The current war also 
involves renewed battles over centralisation and control from Ṣanaʿāʾ, in ways that re-enact 
civil war-era conflicts. History, of course, does not repeat itself, but there is much we might 
better understand about contemporary developments in Yemen, if we take its history of state 
formation and particularly the civil war of the 1960s more seriously. 
More importantly, having demonstrated its utility for analysing the implications of the 1960s 
civil war for state formation in the following decades, the model promises to be a useful 
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starting point for thinking about the likely impacts of the current war, underscoring the need 
to explore dynamics of mobilisation, war financing, the complex role of external interveners, 
the unintended consequences of devastating aerial bombardment, and likely shifts in ideas 
and expectations of political order.  
Since oil rents slowed in the 2000s, throughout the Ḥūthī wars, the emergence of the 
Southern Movement, the 2011 protests, and especially since the beginning of the devastating 
current war, the longer term political trajectory of Yemen has more frequently been analysed 
in terms of ‘state unmaking,’ than state formation (Lackner, 2017; Salisbury, 2016; see e.g. 
Hill, 2017). Such a view effectively captures dynamics of fragmentation, the devastating 
impact of the war on livelihoods, and the acute disappointment of many Yemenis in the state. 
Yet, it may be fruitful to take the ambivalent effects of conflict more seriously and to analyse 
current dynamics through the lens of a model that provides a way for thinking about such 
dynamics in conjunction with changing elite bargains, countervailing centralising pressures, 
and the formation of new local and central institutions. 
Understanding the transformations of the war will be central to effective post-war 
reconstruction, a topic beginning to attract increasing attention (e.g. Brehony and Al-Sarhan, 
2015). Reconstruction will not occur on a blank slate, nor will it be able to take as its point of 
departure the status quo ante bellum. Rather, reconstruction will be conditioned by a 
political order defined in important measure by the transformations of the war, but need not 
reify these changes or simply provide the resources for the winners of the war to consolidate 
their power. The 1960s civil war entrenched interests, ideas, and habits of rule that resisted 
further change and limited possibilities after the war to achieve the developmental outcomes 
most Yemenis wanted. Yet, as the intra-republican battles of 1968 and 1969 and the 
continuous negotiation and contestation of power during the 1970s highlight, the state 
formation outcomes of the war were hardly set in stone and were called into question by the 
transition to peace.  
An appreciation of state formation dynamics during the civil war in the 1960s also highlights 
that important features of the YAR – features that were subsequently developed, adapted or 
superseded – were outcomes of the civil war. They are not inherent features of Yemeni 
society or the political order. We saw how specific conjunctions of structural pressures, 
interests, ideas, and personalities activated certain combinations of causal pathways that 
shaped subsequent possibilities. The origins of the current order were deeply contingent. 
Though the current conflict will condition post-war possibilities, it does not determine the 
future, or condemn Yemenis to relive the past (see also: Heinze, 2018).  
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7.3 What Yemen tells us about the model 
Taking a step back from Yemen and its history of state formation, what does the discussion 
suggest about the initial puzzle? What was the relationship between war making and state 
making during the 1960s and do similar dynamics continue to hold? Where does the 
exploration of the case leave the model? 
The reconceptualization of the key terms in Chapters 1 and 2 and their subsequent 
investigation in Chapters 4 to 6 made clear that the type of relationship that might exist 
between war making and state making is not a “whenever x then y” regularity, nor a function 
of the type y=y(x), or indeed a statement of the kind x ⇒ y. War making is not always state 
making, stateness is not a function of war, and ‘putting in’ more war does not mean ‘getting 
out’ consistently more (or less) state, nor is war likely to be, strictly speaking, necessary for 
state formation. At the same time, the evidence that the two are connected is compelling and 
more detailed explorations of the nexus between war making and state making have 
consistently been fruitful. 
The investigation thus started off by suggesting linkages between war making and state 
making that captured as much as necessary the underlying diversity of the phenomena in 
question, the radically different contexts in which they may play out, and the often 
contradictory pressures they create. This produced the ‘model’ of Chapter 2. The model 
structured and gave coherence to an exploration of the state formation effects of civil war in 
Yemen that accepts that both the state and civil war are complex concepts with fuzzy 
borders: it was an investigation of how something that looks like and gets called civil war but 
is not necessarily like all other civil wars, beyond sharing a range of general common features, 
affects processes related to the formation and development of a particular state – one that 
may be quite different from other trajectories of state formation in other places at other 
times. It is an investigation and a conceptualisation that insists on process but also on 
contingency and one that subscribes to the view that the main motor of history is 
endogeneity (Prezeworski, 2004, p.168). 
Nonetheless, the model survived the encounter with Yemen remarkably intact. The 
investigation confirmed the importance of the phenomena to which the model drew 
attention and confirmed several of the postulated causal pathways. The model helped to 
highlight the way the war caused rapid shifts in the dominant coalition, a renegotiation of the 
political settlement, created an opening for shifts in the parameters of legitimacy, and served 
to inscribe violence into ‘politics as usual,’ thereby drawing attention to changes in ideas of 
the state wrought by the war. Specifically, the model highlighted the way wartime 
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mobilisation strategies focused on payments to tribal fighters were linked to increases in the 
independence of local violence specialists, their growing strength within the dominant 
coalition, and weakening central control of violence. Many of the pathways linked to external 
intervention also held in this case: the external provision of coercive and financial capabilities 
created domestically unviable dominant coalitions, weakened the domestic holders of 
capital, and ultimately reduced the legitimacy of the dominant coalition. Moreover, external 
security guarantees allowed the neglect or purposive fragmentation of central institutions in 
control of violence; and external funding meant that donors defined institutional forms and 
priorities. The model thus  provided a solid foundation for tracing how the transfer of 
resources and the crisis of the political settlement affected the domestic balance of power 
and how this in turn drove specific patterns of state formation and caused institutions to 
form and to operate as they did. Following work on the fiscal basis of states and the 
importance of fiscal extraction, the model also placed great emphasis on taxation – an insight 
studies of state building especially must do more to systematically accommodate.203 This 
revealed the systematic transformation of the fiscal basis of the YAR during the 1960s.  
Yet, the model was hardly a perfect fit. Keeping the caveats about the type of underlying 
relationship that likely exists between the variables of interest in mind, a consideration of the 
specific shortcomings of the model’s pathways can usefully illuminate – and complicate – the 
assumptions and generalisations of the broader thematic literature from which the model 
was constructed.  
The examination provides empirical grounds to call into question some widespread 
assumptions about the relationship between civil war and state formation. In particular, it 
suggests four points that merit further inquiry and thus four additional sets of questions or 
relationships that an updated model must accommodate. First, the model was largely blind to 
the politics of the crisis of the political settlement, the formation, consolidation, and 
breakdown of alliances, and thus the ways in which conflict may partially redraw the very 
units of political settlement analysis. Second, although the model suggested an important 
role for external intervention, intervention was both more important than the model 
suggests and less successful at achieving its goals, suggesting a need to re-think how such 
intervention is analysed. Third, though the emphasis on taxation proved fruitful, there was a 
lack of corresponding attention to government spending in dynamics of state formation, yet 
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public spending seems to have played a central role in reconstituting connections between 
different levels of administration and for rebuilding the influence of the central government. 
Finally, the contradiction that the model posited between state-centric and local identities 
proved to be far less straightforward than much of the literature assumes, suggesting that 
the very links made and connections brokered between local particularisms and central 
‘state’ identities help define trajectories of state formation. The discussion below considers 
each of these points further. 
7.3.1 The politics of a settlement in crisis 
We saw that for understanding the state formation outcomes of the war, the specific political 
projects and interests of the protagonists were important and could not be readily abstracted 
from. The specific alliance between a network of religiously-educated notables, certain tribal 
leaders, and high-ranking officers sympathetic to their politics, played an important role in 
the development of the forms of elite (neo)patrimonial politics built on international rents 
that came to define the YAR.  
During the civil war, central elites sought out tribal allies, but not all central elites did so. 
Tribal leaders were a political constituency and ‘fragmentation strategies’ centred on their 
empowerment were pursued primarily by central elites with personal ties to, and similar 
backgrounds as, specific tribal leaders. In an extended confrontation, this alliance between 
tribal and military leaders and local notables faced off against other elements of the officer 
corps, party militias, the southern independence movement, and a small number of tribal 
leaders in open conflict with the leading republican shaykhs. Ultimately, the ‘moderate’ 
tribal-military alliance won out, and it was this specific alliance and their associated values 
and world-views that entrenched the intertwining of tribal and military power in the last 
years of the civil war. This specific alliance, which defined the political settlement, also 
decisively influenced changes in institutions: While some educational emigrants and political 
radicals sought to build ‘modern’ technocratic bureaucracies and the royalists and local 
officials sought to guard and maintain institutional legacies of the Imamate, the most 
powerful actors that emerged during the war sought both a measure of central institutional 
development and to carve out new spaces of autonomy and keep central institutions at bay. 
Their relative and evolving bargaining position inside and outside government helped 
determine the institutional changes wrought by the war. Who pursued which strategies had 
less to do with their structural position in the state apparatus than with contingent and 
historically specific alliances, group beliefs, and educational and political trajectories. The 
model’s competing mobilisation pathways turned out to be intimately linked and intertwined 
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and one of the central distinctions of the model, between mobilising local violence specialists 
and creating new security forces, could not readily be upheld in practice. 
This suggests that there is much value in recent attempts to bring politics back in to thinking 
about conflict and its effects (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2008). This has sometimes been framed in 
terms of taking ‘ideology’ more seriously (Staniland, 2015). The exploration of the case 
certainly underscores the importance of bringing ideas seriously back into the mix of 
explanatory factors we draw on to make sense of the relationship between war making and 
state making, just as they have been successfully (re)introduced in attempts to understand 
violent conflict more broadly (Oppenheim et al., 2015; Gutiérrez Sanín and Wood, 2014).  
However, it is not clear that the term ‘ideology,’ with its implications of dogma, coherence, 
and homogeneity, is the most useful way to do this and party labels in Yemen often proved 
transient and obscured more than they revealed. Instead, the investigation drew on ideas of 
rhetorical commonplaces as the sites where contests over the meaning of shared signifiers 
and attempts to define and dominate ideas take place. This was combined with an interest in 
co-production (Wood, 2008; Kalyvas, 2003) to highlight the ways in which central cleavages 
and tropes anchored to such rhetorical commonplaces are utilised in everyday practice. 
Together, these ideas provide a messier, but more revealing picture of the way armed conflict 
shaped ideas of the state and vice versa. The case highlights the very inseparability of ideas 
from interests and from specific experiences and life trajectories in the formation of domestic 
alliances. That is, for many leading republicans, education abroad and personal experiences 
of being thrown in jail or seeing family members killed by the Imam or his officials made the 
nationalist and republican ideas that they adopted and professed to be fighting for plausible 
and attractive. Ties of family, tribe, or friendship often determined what faction they joined 
and which ideology they came to defend. The sort of politics that needs bringing-back in to 
the study of violent conflict, then, is the thick process of alliance formation, not the thinner, 
but often most visible, labels of ideology.  
The idea of political organisation provides an additional avenue to bring politics back in to the 
discussion – and the case serves to highlight why its relative neglect in the writing used to 
derive the model is problematic. “Political organisations are groups whose purposeful action 
is principally directed to achieving positions within the state and shaping its rules or 
institutions, and basic policy direction” (Putzel and DiJohn, 2012, p.20). The terminology of 
political organisation serves to draw attention to the fact that the way contending groups 
organise to take control of the state matters. Loose coalitions function differently from highly 
institutionalised parties, organisations with mass membership operate differently from elite 
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cabals, and so on. The case suggests that causality runs both ways: While political 
organisation shapes the form of the political settlement, the political settlement and the 
perceived interests and strengths of the dominant coalition conditions the potential forms of 
political organisation. In north Yemen, the growing strength of regional, rurally-based power 
brokers through the war, and their growing control of military resources, meant that the 
dominant coalition would not support the centralisation implicit in building a national 
political party or to create a strong executive “with the power and resources to discipline 
defectors and reward those who play by state rules” (Putzel and Di John, 2012, p.20). Both of 
these developments – and their mixed legacies – would not play a significant role in north 
Yemen until the central state gained access to oil revenue in the second half of the 1980s. As 
a result, the stabilising functions some authors have attributed to these features could not 
come into play and the ad-hoc nature of political organisation in the YAR – in sharp contrast 
to political organisation in the PDRY – served to reproduce the fragmentation built into the 
political settlement and institutionalise the personalised, kin- and patronage-based power of 
the tribal leaders, officers, and notables who formed the key actors within the dominant 
coalition.  
7.3.2 Rethinking external intervention 
In addition, the importance of external intervention, even in excess of the substantial role 
imputed by the model, was a recurrent theme of the investigation. Chapter 4 argued that it 
was external interveners that drove reliance on local violence specialists and who were 
responsible for the very large amount of weapons and resources transferred to tribal leaders. 
At the same time, Chapters 5 and 6 highlighted the limitations of external influence and the 
inability of external interveners and especially the UAR to achieve its intended objectives. For 
instance, the state formation outcomes they produced were a far cry from the Egyptian 
blueprints and the Egyptian command repeatedly had to accept ministerial appointments of 
people it judged hostile and whole governments it distrusted. Yet, these chapters also 
underscored just how significant the legacies of foreign spending of multiples of the domestic 
government budget, extensive institutional engineering, and the stationing of tens of 
thousands of troops for five years were. 
This suggests there is a paradox in the literature: an enduring tendency to overestimate the 
possibilities of intentional social engineering through external intervention; combined with a 
tendency to underestimate the unintended consequences of interveners pursuing their own 
objectives and the extent to which external intervention shapes the parameters within which 
domestic actors pursue their strategies. Although thinking about externally-led state building 
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has largely moved away from the naïve optimism of the 1990s and early 2000s, there is an 
enduring tendency to see it as being primarily about the policy choices of the interveners – 
the dilemmas they confront, the parameters they must optimise, the mistakes they should 
avoid – with far less attention to the way that the ‘context’ defines their options and how the 
‘tail’ wags the ‘dog’ (e.g. Caplan, 2008, 2012; Paris and Sisk, 2009). There is, of course, an 
established critique of this literature, much of it stressing the importance of domestic 
dynamics and the political settlement (Cramer, 2006; Di John, 2010b; Putzel and Di John, 
2012; Goodhand and Mansfield, 2013) and the investigation here amply bears out this 
criticism.  
In this context, it is remarkable that South-South state building by occupation in Yemen 
during the 1960s – the heyday of statist economic and political ideas – had effects remarkably 
similar to late 20th and early 21st century North-South state building framed in terms of liberal 
peace building (e.g. Boyce and O’Donnell, 2007b). State building then created large formal 
institutions, while eroding the relationships that connected central and local administration, 
undermined the fiscal basis of the state, and did little to consolidate central control of 
violence, due to a reliance on foreign troops and local tribal leaders. It may be that these 
similarities reflect broader structural factors of foreign intervention or a similar configuration 
of local violence specialists. Both possibilities would merit further investigation.  
Yet, acknowledging similarities across time and the central importance of the domestic 
political settlement should not lead us to underestimate how decisively external intervention 
can reshape the settlement and the parameters for domestic actors to pursue their agendas, 
even though much of this impact is indirect, unintended, and chaotic in the sense that small 
decisions can have outsize effects. There have been some attempts at grappling with such 
unintended consequences of external state building. These have generally taken their cue 
from broader debates about the potential for well-meaning (and less well-meaning) 
international intervention to do harm (Anderson, 1999; Birdsall, 2007) and have concluded 
that unintentional effects are pervasive, under-explored, and may be the predominant way in 
which external state building and security assistance influence their intended targets 
(Schroeder, 2010).204 Since unintended consequences often predominate even in domestic 
interventions, where planners and experts have a great deal of information and contextual 
knowledge (Scott, 1998; Mitchell, 2002), such unintended consequences are likely to loom 
                                                          
 
204 However, Schneckener (2010) suggests such effects might be managed and minimised. 
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very large indeed. The experience of North Yemen during the 1960s certainly suggests that 
Egyptian state building was both deeply influential and almost wholly ineffective in achieving 
its objectives, suggesting a need for further research into the unintended consequences of 
external intervention that takes as its point of departure the domestic political settlement. 
7.3.3 Taking taxation and spending seriously 
The discussion also highlighted an ongoing neglect of fiscal institutions, taxation, and 
allocation in writing about contemporary conflict. The examination found little support for 
the pathways connected to taxation, possibly because there was little taxation that occurred 
during this period in north Yemen. Fiscal trajectories also appeared to depend more on 
changes in the balance of coercive power than the model’s emphasis on separate pathways 
might suggest: Local fiscal autonomy largely came as a result of tribes’ growing military 
power. More importantly, however, the examination drew attention to the way that 
government spending, not just taxation, was of central importance.  
There has been a tendency, criticized at the outset in Chapter 1, to focus on state functions in 
attempting to assess the influence of conflict on the state. As a result, state institutions and 
the impact of conflict on them are often evaluated from the perspective of good governance, 
economic growth, or occasionally in terms of “regime type,” and much more rarely from the 
perspective of their impact on taxation and allocation. There is limited writing that takes 
taxation really seriously in state formation and reproduction (Gennaioli and Voth, 2015; 
Thies, 2009, 2005; Lu and Thies, 2013), and less still that seriously grapples with incorporating 
power, politics, and coercion alongside taxation (but see: Boyce and O’Donnell, 2007a; Di 
John, 2010a; Levi, 1988). New databases with richer data and more careful approaches to 
analysing them may offer new insights (van den Boogaard et al., 2018). However, even within 
this literature, there is a tendency to neglect spending while using fiscal extraction as a 
straightforward proxy for ‘state strength.’  
Yet the examination of Yemen during the 1960s, which gave up taxation while expanding 
central spending, highlights the importance of taking allocation-led state building more 
seriously across the board. The tendency to neglect government spending in state formation 
is perhaps least pronounced in the Middle East, a region that gave rise to thinking about 
rentier states. Yet, since Yemen at the time had no meaningful natural resources or other 
exports to speak of, in relation to this literature too, the case highlights the importance of 
continuing work to complicate ideas about rentier state formation and particularly the 
assumption that rents contribute in straightforward ways to ‘weak’ states. The process 
tracing of state formation during the civil war in Yemen revealed how government spending 
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can at least partially substitute for direct control in terms of institutions’ centralising and 
aggregating functions. Allocation-led state building made the YAR central state a more 
important addressee of claims as it came to demand less and offer more. The idea that there 
was a North Yemeni state, that it determined important features of people’s lives, and 
defined in some measure a reference point for political belonging became more plausible in 
relation not to the centre’s ability to tax, but to its ability to spend.  
In northern Yemen, well after the civil war, patronage politics shifted as the flow of central 
rents expanded further and the dominant coalition narrowed during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Increasingly, students of Yemen described the regime as being almost exclusively based on 
patronage (Philips, 2008, p.5) or adopted the language of kleptocracy to describe the capture 
of government rents (Lackner, 2017), suggesting a qualitatively different regime of stabilising 
rule through allocation. This suggests a need to move beyond an inquiry into the role of rents 
in stabilising dominant coalitions, to how different bargains underpinning the distribution of 
rents can have very different effects (Snyder, 2006) and how the use of such rents to stabilise 
rule in different ways and under different conditions impacts dynamics of state formation 
through grounded, process-focused research into the ways in which fiscal policies shape state 
formation. The allocation of rents has long been central to the reproduction of political order 
(North et al., 2009), but we know too little about the very different trajectories of state 
formation this may be associated with.  
7.3.4 State building and the ‘local’ 
Finally, the examination highlighted a tendency to neglect the way in which local 
particularisms can be harnessed to state building projects – or rather, the way such central 
projects must always and everywhere build on and work with ‘local’ identities. In terms of the 
model’s pathways associated with ideas of the state, the examination revealed that 
empowering local violence specialists did not in a straightforward way reinforce non-state 
local logics and reduce the legitimacy of the political order. Not only was the relationship 
between local and central violence specialists more complex than the model initially posited, 
but local identities articulated with and ultimately contributed to the formation of a larger 
imagined community and a YAR national identity. Thus,  tribal logics need not be, in fact were 
not, antithetical to ‘the state’ in Yemen. Instead, they provided a particular vision of state 
authority during the civil war. Although the transfer of rights to tribal leaders implied 
significant decentralisation and weakened central control, tribal institutions were also 
essential to the (re)construction of central institutions and to ideas of national belonging and 
state coherence both during and after the war. In a political landscape fragmented by 
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reliance on tribal fighters and rent by political divisions, tribal forms paradoxically were one 
of the few effective mechanisms that could bridge wartime divides and connect central 
institutions with access to foreign funding to local projects and investments. Institutions 
imagined in terms of tribal logics and established practices came partially to define the formal 
structure of state institutions and the idea that Yemen was a ‘nation of tribes’ provided a way 
to integrate tribal and national identity to the extent that being a member of a tribe became 
a way to claim more ‘authentic’ Yemeni-ness.  
Paul Dresch (1993b, p.263) has developed a similar idea in terms of the “dual relationship of 
identity and contrariety” between tribes and the Yemeni state, and much the same point was 
recently made by John Peterson in terms of two antithetical, yet complementary, prisms to 
approach the relationship between tribes and the state in Yemen. In his scheme, the first is 
the role of tribes in the state, i.e. how they contribute to the state’s authority and provide 
support or legitimacy to the regime. The other is the tribes versus the state, which draws 
attention to the fact that tribalism in Yemen continues to be, in part, about resisting state 
encroachment and regulation (Peterson, 2016, p.112). Similar relationships have been 
suggested for other countries in the Middle East (Mohammed, 2007) and the complex 
relationships between state building projects, nationalism, and existing ideas of identity and 
community became a focus for (an admittedly limited) literature on the relationship between 
tribes and states in the Middle Eastern context in the 1990s and 2000s (Abdul Jabar and 
Dawod, 2001; Khoury and Kostiner, 1990; Rabi, 2016).  
These insights, however, have not made it into thinking about conflict, state building, and 
state-formation, with the partial exception of a literature on hybrid political orders that has 
helped to re-cast a discussion about fragility and state failure in more productive ways (Boege 
et al., 2008, 2009). Yet, these dynamics may benefit from being considered outside the 
framing of hybridity, since hybridity suggests the (not necessarily viable or stable) 
combination of non-hybrid things. The many different varieties of tribalism within Yemen, let 
alone across the Middle East, or in other contexts where the term has been more or less 
successfully applied as an analytical lens, suggest tribes themselves may be ‘hybrid.’ As we 
saw in Chapter 1, the state certainly is not a ‘pure’ form. A literature on European nationalism 
that underscores how national and state-centric identities were constructed out of and 
articulate with existing ideas of community and belonging (e.g. Applegate, 1990, 1999) 
underscores that this is not a feature peculiar to Yemen, nor of late development. But if all 
political orders are hybrid, then diagnosing hybridity must take a back seat to a detailed 
analysis of the historically specific ways new ideas and practices interact with existing social 
structures and the ideas that legitimate them.  
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These considerations might be summarised in an updated or revised model as suggested 
below. Such an updated model should provide a useful starting point for further explorations 
of the impact of civil war on state formation, provided such explorations acknowledge that 
thinking seriously about the relationship between war and state formation requires an 
openness to the multiple and non-determinist ways in which violence is channelled by and 
shapes existing social forms during processes of state formation than can readily be captured 
in such summary form. 
 
Table 9: Effect of civil war on the political settlement (revised) 
Starting point        → Intervening process               → Effects on the political settlement 
Civil war reveals the 
existence of 
alternatives to the 
incumbent 
Reflects and provokes crisis in the 
dominant coalition 
Rapid shifts in the dominant coalition 
and renegotiation of the political 
settlement. Contending groups are 
unstable and new political organisations 
can emerge 
Civil war increases the 
salience of violence for 
rule maintenance 
Contenders 
pursue a mix 
of 
mobilisation 
strategies, 
combining 
elements 
and 
outcomes of: 
Mobilising local 
violence 
specialists 
Increases the independence of local 
violence specialists and strengthens 
them within the dominant coalition 
Organising new 
violence 
specialists& more 
sophisticated 
security 
institutions 
Strengthens the leaders of security 
forces within the dominant coalition 
Gaining outside 
coercive 
capabilities 
Enables the formation of domestically 
unviable dominant coalitions; may 
weaken domestic capital within the 
dominant coalition 
Civil War redraws 
zones of control, 
decreasing income 
derived from 
territorial control and 
increasing costs of rule 
maintenance 
Contenders gain external 
financing 
Enables the formation of a domestically 
unviable dominant coalition; may 
weaken domestic capital within the 
dominant coalition and strengthen local 
and/or central actors in control of 
coercion 
Provides fiscal resources to broaden the 
dominant coalition and buy support 
Contenders expand taxation or 
borrow money domestically 
Strengthens domestic capital in the 
dominant coalition 
 
Table 10: Effect of civil war on institutions (revised) 
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Civil war reveals the 
existence of 
alternatives to the 
incumbent 
Reflects and provokes a crisis in 
the dominant coalition 
Multiplies competing local institutions 
and weakens central control of violence 
Civil war increases the 
salience of violence for 
rule maintenance 
Contenders 
pursue a mix 
of 
mobilisation 
strategies, 
combining 
elements 
and 
outcomes of: 
Contenders 
empower local 
violence specialists 
Multiplies competing local institutions 
and weakens central control of violence 
Contenders 
organise new 
violence 
specialists, 
creating more 
sophisticated 
security 
institutions 
Strengthens central control of violence 
Weakens non-coercive formal 
institutions by crowding-out investment 
and capacity 
Strengthens non-coercive formal 
institutions through linkages and 
demonstration effects 
Contenders gain 
outside coercive 
capabilities 
Security guarantees allow neglect or 
purposive fragmentation of central 
institutions in control of violence 
Outside training and equipment 
strengthen the security forces and 
central control of violence 
Civil War redraws 
zones of control, 
decreasing income and 
increasing costs of rule 
maintenance 
Contenders gain external financing 
Donors define institutional forms and 
priorities; accountability flows to donor 
Contenders decentralise taxation 
and/or spending 
Weakens non-coercive formal 
institutions through crowding-out 
Contenders expand central 
taxation and/or spending 
Strengthens non-coercive formal 
institutions through demonstration and 
emulation 
 
Starting point         → Intervening process                → Effects on institutions 
Table 11: Effect of civil war on ideas of the state (revised) 
Starting point         → Intervening process             → Effects on ideas of the state 
Civil war reveals the 
existence of alternatives 
to the incumbent 
Reflects and provokes a crisis in 
the dominant coalition, leading 
to political polarisation 
Creates an opening for shifts in the 
parameters of legitimacy 
Produces and reinforces state-centric 
identities 
Inscribes violence into ‘politics as usual’ 
Civil war increases the 
salience of violence for 
rule maintenance 
Contenders empower local 
violence specialists 
Reinforces local logics. Impact on ideas 
of state and legitimacy of the political 
order depends on relationship of local 
and national identities 
Contenders organise new 
violence specialists 
New, direct relations between central 
and local actors reinforce state-centric 
identities 
Larger coercive institutions militarise 
ideas of the state 
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Contenders gain outside 
coercive capabilities, making 
them vulnerable to charges of 
foreign occupation and control 
Reduces legitimacy of the dominant 
coalition 
Civil War redraws zones 
of control, decreasing 
income derived from 
territorial control and 
increasing costs of rule 
maintenance 
Contenders print money, 
potentially triggering inflation 
and economic crisis 
Reduces legitimacy of the dominant 
coalition 
Incumbents decentralise 
taxation. Local power dynamics 
determine variable effects 
across different areas: 
Increased predation reinforces state-
centric identities 
Reinforces local logics. Impact on ideas 
of state and legitimacy of the political 
order depends on relationship of local 
and national identities 
Contenders expand central 
taxation and/or spending 
Increased taxes and/or investment 
make the state present and visible, 
reinforcing state-centric identities 
Increased taxes are a grievance, 
reducing the legitimacy of the political 
order 
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ANNEX 1 
Path Questions Data/ indicators Sources205 
Shared 
starting 
points 
and 
path-
ways  
 Was there a crisis in the 
dominant coalition? How 
did powerful actors 
respond? 
 Alliances and 
divisions between 
actors influential 
under the Imamate 
 Interviews with royalist 
and republican officials, 
tribal leaders, army 
officers, descendants 
 Existing secondary 
literature especially 
anthropological studies on 
social change and the 
impact of the war in 
Yemen (published 
sources) 
 Contemporary memoirs  
 Diplomatic cables (PAAA, 
if necessary UK and US 
archives)  
 Egyptian public 
statements about war 
effort (EDK) 
 Egyptian records of 
deployment, 
administration and 
situation reports (EDW) 
 Egyptian diplomatic cables 
(EDW) 
 Revenue and expenditure 
information of Yemeni 
state (YNA if possible) 
 Yemen Army and Ministry 
of Defence documents 
related to war (YMM if 
possible) 
 Who fought? What 
constituencies were 
mobilised for war? How? 
 Did royalists and 
republicans rely on 
existing militias or locally-
based organisations 
dealing in violence?  
 Did they create new 
military organisations and 
organise new 
constituencies?  
 How did the organisation 
of the security forces 
change between 1962-
1970? Did Yemen develop 
more sophisticated 
security organisations? 
 Military recruitment 
and training 
procedures including 
information about 
sources of 
recruitment of the 
Yemeni military 
 Existence, 
effectiveness and 
relative importance 
of tribal militias and 
new military and 
paramilitary groups 
 To what extent did 
royalists and republicans 
rely on external support 
for organising and 
deploying coercion? What 
was Egyptian policy and 
practice with regard to 
waging war in Yemen? 
 Details of Egyptian 
military deployment, 
policy, practice and 
lessons learned from 
Yemen 
 Relationship 
between Egyptian 
and Yemeni troops 
and civilians 
 How did the royalists and 
republicans finance the 
war effort? What was the 
relative weight of 
taxation, looting and local 
predation, borrowing, 
printing money, and 
external financing?  
 Is there evidence of 
changing taxation 
practices locally?  
 Information on 
government revenue 
sources and targets 
of expenditure 
 Presence and 
functioning of state 
and informal 
institutions in 
different parts of 
country 
Political 
Settle-
ment 
 How did power shift 
within the dominant 
coalition? Who gained/ 
 Changes in 
importance of 
various power 
 Records of government 
composition and social 
background of ministers 
                                                          
 
205 EDK: Dār al-Kutub, Egypt; EDW: Dār al-Wathāʾiq, Egypt; PAAA: German Foreign Ministry Archive; 
YNA: Yemen National Archive, YMM: Yemen Military Museum, Ṣanʾāʿ. 
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lost influence? 
 Were organisations 
dealing in violence or in 
control of capital 
strengthened relative to 
others?  
 Who benefited from war 
(smuggling, supplying 
troops, other economic 
opportunities) and related 
changes to security 
organisations and to fiscal 
policy and practice? Who 
lost out materially? 
brokers over time 
including through 
analysis of 
composition of 
government 
 Relative power and 
changes in the 
relationship of 
security forces, tribal 
leaders, business 
interests (including 
as expressed in 
formal and informal 
payments) 
 (Economic) benefits 
accruing to different 
groups based on 
policies (subsidies, 
import controls, 
authorisations, 
monopolies, taxes) 
and power-brokers 
(published sources) 
 Reports of UN observation 
mission (online) 
 Interviews with royalist 
and republican officials, 
tribal leaders, army 
officers, descendants 
 Diplomatic cables (PAAA, 
if necessary UK and US 
archives)  
 Contemporary memoirs 
(EDK) 
 Analysis of republican 
pact of 1970s (published 
sources) 
 Records of Yemeni 
Ministry of Defence, 
Interior and Presidency on 
war effort (YNA) 
 Records of Yemen 
Ministry of Tribal Affairs 
(YNA) 
 Egyptian diplomatic cables 
(EDW) 
 What was the relationship 
between security forces 
and fiscal authority? 
 Assessment of who 
made spending 
decisions and 
relative size of 
budgets 
 How did the central 
government and local 
military commanders 
interact with tribal 
leaders? 
 Relative power of 
tribal leaders and 
changing roles of 
local power brokers 
and officials (sada, 
shaykhs, qadis) 
 What was the role of 
external interveners 
(Egypt, Saudi Arabia) in 
determining government 
composition and winners 
and losers? 
 Degree of Egyptian 
and Saudi influence 
and the incentives 
created by their 
support 
Institu-
tions 
 How did formal state 
institutions change during 
the civil war? 
 What effect did changes 
in the organisation of 
coercion and capital have 
on formal state 
structures?  
 How did the presence of 
the formal state change 
‘on the ground’ in 
different areas? 
 Composition/ 
sources of 
government income 
 Size and targets of 
government 
expenditure 
 Changes in the size, 
composition and 
functioning of 
ministries, 
departments, local 
government 
(number of people, 
budgets, function, 
location) 
 Records from the Yemeni 
Ministry of Finance: 
budget, tax receipts, aid, 
etc. (YNA) 
 Papers of new 
government ministries 
(YNA) 
 Information on 
government budget and 
statistics (World Bank) 
 Records, official 
documents and reports of 
UAR technical advisers 
(EDW) 
 Contemporary 
anthropological studies 
and journalistic accounts 
(published) 
 Interviews with royalist 
 Did new military 
organisations and/or 
Egyptian troops crowd-
out civilian control or 
create linkages and 
 Assessment of 
potential linkages 
 Life histories and 
trajectories of 
military officers 
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provide new 
organisational tools? 
and republican officials, 
tribal leaders, army 
officers, descendants 
 Contemporary memoirs 
(EDK) 
 Diplomatic cables (PAAA, 
if necessary UK and US 
archives)  
 Analysis of Yemeni state 
institutions by 
development agencies, 
scholars (published 
sources) 
 What elements of control 
over violence were 
centralised or 
decentralised?  
 Assessments of who 
effectively 
commanded military 
units and tribal 
militias 
 What elements of control 
over capital were 
centralised or 
decentralised?  
 Changes in fiscal 
policy and taxation 
(oversight, degree of 
centralisation, who 
(else) taxes)  
 Spending priorities 
and assessment of 
who made spending 
decisions 
 Did Egyptian state 
building interventions 
shape formal institutions 
and their practices? In 
what ways? 
 Egyptian state 
building aims and 
blueprints and 
evaluation to what 
extent they were 
achieved 
 Degree of reliance of 
ministries, military 
and other formal 
institutions on 
Egyptian advisers 
Idea of 
state 
 How did notions of 
legitimate authority and 
ideas about the state 
change? 
 Was there increased 
politicisation and 
polarisation? Who did 
new ideas appeal to? 
What cleavages were 
accentuated? 
 Did local control/ 
governance mechanisms 
change? How? How were 
changes articulated/ 
justified? 
 Did politics become more 
violent? What forms of 
violence were 
normalised? 
 Is there evidence of a 
militarisation of the state 
in official rhetoric and 
representation? 
 Ideas republicans 
and royalists 
appealed to in 
propaganda and 
public 
pronouncements 
and implicit and 
explicit in reforms 
and policies  
 Changes in role and 
importance of mass 
membership 
organisations 
(parties, unions, local 
development 
associations, Islamic 
organisations) 
 Shifts in roles of 
traditional power 
brokers in local 
government (e.g. 
role of sada, qadis, 
tribal leaders) 
 Interpretation by 
citizens in different 
locations of 
interventions by 
different ‘state’ 
authorities 
 Forms of state-
sanctioned and/or 
 newspaper and magazine 
editorials and official 
radio broadcasts (EDK, 
published sources) 
 Official speeches and 
statements by royalists 
and republicans (BBC 
Summary of World 
Broadcasts) 
 Interviews with royalist 
and republican officials, 
descendants  
 Existing secondary 
literature  
 Existing anthropological 
studies on traditional 
elites and communal and 
local government  
 Contemporary memoirs 
(EDK) 
 Records of Yemeni trade 
unions and parties (YNA) 
 Official stamps, 
banknotes, building plans 
(YNA) 
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publicly justified 
violence 
 Rhetoric and practice 
around military and 
its role in the state 
 Life histories and 
trajectories of 
military officers 
 
